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The S c o t t is h  Economy and the Post-W ar
B r i t i s h  Governments, 1943-1951 i
A b stract |
The S c o tt is h  economy fo llo w in g  the Second World War was faced  /
w ith  a m u lt ip l ic i t y  o f  problems ; shortages o f  housing, s k i l l e d  labour
Iand raw m a ter ia ls , a d ec lin in g  share o f the w orld  market in  t h e ir  -q
heavy in d u s tr ie s  and a h igher unemployment l e v e l  than Great B r ita in  |  
as a whole. The 1945-1951 y ea rs  were a time o f  tr a n s it io n , not on ly  
from war to  peace-tim e but a ls o  an adjustment to  th e co n tin u a tio n  o f  
war-time c o n tr o ls  in to  p eace-tim e. The 1945 Government r e ta in e d  a |
much g rea ter  amount o f c e n tr a lis e d  power than had been the case  fo llo w -  §  
in g  the F ir s t  World War in  1918. "1
The new Labour Government e le c te d  in  J u ly  o f  1945 had pledged % 
i t s e l f  to  various sweeping s o c ia l  and economic reform s, such as |
n a t io n a lisa t io n  o f  many ’b a s ic ’ in d u s tr ie s . A t t le e ’ s Government was 
e le c te d  in  1945 on the c r e s t  o f enthusiasm , a w idespread fe e l in g  among T 
Labour v o ters  th a t a new age o f Government r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  was about to  5 
dawn. The B everidge Report w ith  i t s  promise o f ’freedom from w ant’ and--; 
the Keynesian g o a ls  o f  ' f u l l  employment' and comprehensive s o c ia l  4
s e c u r ity  were to  be ca rr ied  out la r g e ly  w ith  the a id  o f  f i s c a l  and 
monetary p o lic y .
The S c o t t is h  economy was m ainly concentrated  on very  heavy - f
industry  -  th e s o -c a lle d  d ec lin in g  in d u s tr ie s  o f  co a l, ir o n  and s t e e l  I 
and sh ip b u ild in g , w ith  some very  l ig h t  in d u stry  such as t e x t i l e s ,  |
e s p e c ia l ly  ju te . Through R egional P lanning an attem pt was made to
b rin g  new and l ig h t  in d u stry  in to  S cotlan d , T his was to  be done by  
variou s means such as New Towns, O v e r sp ill, Development A reas, 
In d u s tr ia l E s ta te s , and I n d u s tr ia l Development C e r t i f ic a te s .  T h is  
th e s is  w i l l  thus attempt to  analyse the 1945-1951 S c o t t is h  economy 
w ith  sp e c ia l a t te n t io n  to  employment, housing and in d u stry . The 
relev a n t post-w ar Government economic p o l i c i e s  w i l l  then be examined 
in  t h is  co n tex t.
I ,  C ecelia  M ille r , hereby c e r t i f y  th a t th is  t h e s i s  has been  
w r itte n  by me, th a t i t  i s  the record  o f work ca rr ied  out by me, 
and th a t i t  has not been subm itted in  any prev ious a p p lic a tio n  fo r  
a h igher degree.
S ignature
>3
Date
I  was adm itted as a resea rch  student under Ordinance No, 12 
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In tro d u ctio n
T h is t h e s is  w i l l  attem pt to  analyse employment, housing and 
in d u stry  in  th e S c o tt is h  economy between 1945 and 1951, in  th e  con­
t e x t  o f  B r it is h  Labour Government p o lic y , fo r  example, n a t io n a lisa t io n  
and r e g io n a l p o lic y . Most o f  the s o c ia l  innovations o f  th ese  years, 
such as N ation a l H ealth , w i l l  on ly  be mentioned in  p a ss in g . The fo cu s  
i s  th e  economy, w ith  a stron g  con cen tra tion  on industry; post-w ar  
p o l i c i e s  regarding such is s u e s  as New Towns and fa c to r y  b u ild in g  w i l l  
then b e  examined in  t h i s  l i g h t .
Thé immediate post-w ar y ea rs  were ones o f  c r i s i s  and change fo r  
the B r i t is h  economy as a w hole. In  J u ly  1945 & .Labour Government le d  
by Clement R ichard A tt le e  rep la ced  Winston C h u r c h ill’ s C o a lit io n  
Government o f  the war y ea rs . I t  was under t h e . C o a lit io n  Government 
th a t many o f  th e  major economic and reg io n a l p o l ic ie s  fo r  th e  post-w ar  
p eriod  were formed, having th e  b e n e f it  o f input from menbers o f  a l l  the  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s .  Therefore th e  subsequent achievem ents and problems 
o f  th e economy cannot be a ttr ib u te d  to  or blamed s o le ly  on th e Labour 
Government in  power : eq u a lly , i t  would be wrong to  imagine th a t the  
course o f  ev en ts , 1945-1951 was preordained by d e c is io n s  taken in  war­
tim e. T his i s  as tru e o f S co tlan d  as i t  i s  o f  Great B r ita in  a s  a whole, 
though th e  added fa c to r  here i s  th a t under the C o a lit io n  Government 
Scotland  had an en erg e tic  Labour Secretary  o f  S ta te , Tom Johnston, who 
gained support from a l l  p a r t ie s  and from a l l  s e c t io n s  o f  in d u stry  fo r  
a more em p h atica lly  S c o tt is h  approach to  th e  problems o f the S c o t t is h  
econony. T his p ersp ec tiv e  was not n e c e s s a r ily  th e  dominant one under 
th e Labour Governments, but once having been gained  i t  was not a l t o ­
g eth er  l o s t .
Scotland  a f t e r  1945 was f i r s t  faced  w ith  th e  ch a llen ge  o f  con­
v e r t in g  a war economy to  a p eace-tim e one. T his was a p a r t ic u la r ly  
d i f f i c u l t  problem here ( compared to  England) because she was very  
h e a v ily  dependent on ’b asic*  in d u s tr ie s , notab ly  c o a l, iron  and s t e e l  
and sh ip b u ild in g . These in d u str ie s  had come in to  t h e ir  own once more 
during the war and were almost f u l l y  employed on war production  
although  th e ir  c a p a c ity  had been con sid erab ly  reduced as  a r e s u lt  o f  
th e  r a t io n a l is a t io n  schemes o f  the in ter-w ar p er io d . ^
The end o f  war brought red u ction s in  orders in  both  heavy and
l i g h t  in d u stry , th e  m assive d em ob ilisa tio n  o f  the armed fo r c e s , and
oth er  s im ila r  changes th a t s ig n a lle d  th e  tr a n s it io n  from a war-time to
a p eace-tim e economy. For some in d u str ie s  not in vo lved  in  m unitions
p r o d u c tio n ,' t h is  caused l i t t l e  change as th e  nature o f t h e ir  output was
not a f fe c te d . But numerous fa c to r ie s  had been rem odelled fo r  s p e c if ic
w ar-tim e u ses  or had had th e ir  p lan t d ism antled , • which made recon stru c-
2t io n  a te d io u s  and p a in sta k in g  ta sk . There a lso  arose  a t t h is  tim e a 
p r e ss in g  demand fo r  consumer goods th a t had been im p o ssib le  to  ob ta in  
during th e  war. But shortages o f  food, p e tr o l ,  b u ild in g  m ater ia ls , 
e t c . ,  meant th a t r a t io n in g  -  both  in d u s tr ia l and consumer -  continued  
in to  th e  immediate post-w ar y ea rs . A ll  o f  the main in d u s tr ie s  were 
hanpered by major sh ortages in  f u e l ,  raw m a ter ia ls  ^ d  s k i l l e d  labour, 
which were b a s ic a l ly  o b s tr u c tiv e  to  growth and redevelopm ent in  the  
S c o t t is h  economy, and were ty p ic a l o f the problens that the Government 
was fo r c e d  to  confront. But b efo re  we can d isc u ss  th ese  and s im ila r
1* S .E .C .S ,, 1946, p p .3—4 .
2 . I b id . ,  p .4 .
m atters i t  i s  n ecessary  to  a s se ss  th e  gen era l backgroind o f  the  
economic p o l ic ie s  pursued by the Labour Governments between 1945 
and 1951 .
Chapter One
The B r i t i s h  Governments' Economic P o lic y , 1945-1951
I3II
1. Problems Facing; th e Labour Government A fte r  1945 J
( i )  R econ stru ction
1 . A llan  G, Gruchy, Comparative Economic System s, (Boston, Houghton 
M iff l in  Company, I 966) ,  p .477.
2 , J ,  D. P . W iles, 'Pre-War and War-Time C o n tr o ls ', in  Worswick and 
Ady, p .149.
Not on ly  d id  B r ita in  have to  recover in  1945 from the a c tu a l 
p h y s ic a l damage in f l i c t e d  by bombing, but i t  had to  b eg in  to  compensate 
in d u s tr ia l ly  fo r  th e  l o s s  o f  in crea sed  production which would have been  
generated  had B r ita in  been a t peace from 1959-1545. Thus, recon stru c­
t io n  was a major p r io r ity  fo r  the B r i t is h  economy. Much o f the Labour 
Government’ s post-w ar economic programme was con stru cted  w ith  th e aim 
o f  improving th e  e f f ic ie n c y  and output o f  the B r i t is h  manufacturing 
in d u s tr ie s .  ^
Many f a c to r ie s  had been ’ concentrated ' during the war. These 
firm s had been asked, or f a i l in g  th a t com pelled, to  manufacture in  p la ce
o f , or in  a d d itio n  to , t h e ir  own product some item  which contributed  to
2 4the war e f f o r t .  Mich c i v i l i a n  production  was sim ply forb idden , e s p e c i-
a l l y  b u ild in g . Most f a c t o r ie s  had been converted  fo r  some type o f war­
tim e u se  and in  1945 w ith  th e  conclusion  o f  the war needed to  be recon­
v erted  fo r  normal production .
During the Second World War i t s e l f  o f f i c i a l  thought was b e in g  
g iv en  to  how B r ita in  could d ea l e f f e c t iv e ly  w ith  post-w ar rec o n stru ctio n .
A Deceirber 1944 ’B u lle t in  o f  th e  I n s t i tu te  o f  O f f i c ia l  S t a t i s t i c s ’ by  J|
M. K alecki p red ic ted  on th e  b a s is  o f  ' assum ptions about post-w ar le v e l s  
o f p r ic e s  and ta x a tio n ' an estim a te  o f  a ' t r a n s it io n '  p er iod  o f  two or
I
th ree  years fo llo w in g  the end o f  th e  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  according to  o f f i -
I n f la t io n  remained th e  g r e a te s t  economic fe a r  as B r ita in  sw itched  
from a war to  peace-tim e economy in  1945. The v e iy  r e a l  fe a r  o f m assive
unemployment, which had b een  experienced  follovdm g World War I  and
/
through th e  in ter-w ar y ea rs , was a m otivatin g  fo rce  behind th e  passage  
o f th e  Employment P o l ic y  White Paper (1944). B r ita in  was now committed 
to  a F u ll Employment P o lic y . Jobs would have to  b e created  f o r  th e  
in f lu x  o f servicem en retu rn in g  home fo llo w in g  th e  con clu sion  o f  the war, 
as w e ll as 'm aintained fo r  th e  v/orkers in  B r ita in .
The economic p o lic y  making o f  th e  1945-1951 Labour Government was 
th u s a f fe c te d  by a g rea t d ea l o f  suppressed in f la t io n .  P o lla rd  des­
c r ib e s  the economic c lim ate  o f  th e  tim e as ’an e x c e ss  o f  purchasing
power over goods a v a ila b le  at cu rrent p r ic e s , prevented  from r e s u lt in g
2
1. I b id . ,  p .23.
2. S idney P o lla rd , The Development o f the B r it is h  Economy 1914-1950, 
(London, Edward Arnold P u b lish ers  L td ., I 962) ,  p . 364.
Ic i a l  f ig u r e s , but when K alecki c a lc u la te d  p r iv a te ly  he reckoned i t
would be up to  s i x  y ea rs . The l a t t e r  f ig u re  proved to  b e f a i r l y  |
accu rate , fo r  the e le c t io n  o f a C onservative Government in  1951 i s  
u s u a lly  taken as th e end o f  the iim iediate post-w ar era in  B r ita in .
' tin  open in f la t io n  o n ly  by p r ic e  co n tro l and p h y s ic a l r e s t r i c t io n s ’ .
War bonuses and oth er monies not spent during the war, because o f  th e  ?|
V 'absence o f  luxury item s during th e  war, in je c te d  hew money in to  th e  
economy in  1945. But th ese  on ly  provided an a r t i f i c i a l  ’mini-boom' 
e f f e c t  and the Labour Government sought a more permanent s o lu t io n  àIthrough n a tio n a l economic p lann ing and c o n tr o ls . <I
R econ stru ction  v/^ as a f fe c te d  by B r i t a in 's  adverse b a lan ce o f  pay- |
ment8 s itu a t io n  fo llo v /in g  th e co n clu sion  o f  the Second World War, A
8d e f in i t e  need e x is te d  fo r  the Lahour Government to  "balance i t s  
in te r n a l d u tie s  m th  i t s  p o lic y  o b lig a t io n s . C o-operation  w ith  the  
r u le s  o f  in te r n a tio n a l b o d ie s , e s p e c ia l ly  th ose  g iv in g  a id  to  B r ita in  
a t t h is  tim e, th reatened  B r it is h  ba lance o f  payments, and made the 
f u l l  employment scheme d i f f i c u l t  to  carry ou t. B efore th e  war the 
U nited  Kingdom's e x ter n a l balance on current account depended to  a 
la rg e  ex ten t on the r e c e ip t  o f payments fo r  what are known as ' in v i s ib le '  
item s, n otab ly  in te r e s t  and d ividends on overseas in vestm en ts. Thus th e  
balance o f  payments c r i s i s  i t s e l f  was aggravated by B r i t a in ’s o b lig a ­
t io n s  to  in te r n a tio n a l b o d ie s , and the money owed to  o th er  ccu n tr ie s , 
such as the D o lla r  Loan Package o f 1946, as w e ll as the l o s s  o f  
' in v i s ib le '  item s. Consequently p u ttin g  the balance o f payments on the  
current account r ig h t  became one of the major aims o f post-v/ar recon­
s tr u c t io n  and the o v e r -a l l  economic p o lic y  fo r  the y ears  1945 t o  1951.
The r e la t io n  between im ports and exp orts had g rea tly  changed by  
1945. The need fo r  im ports was h igh in  B r it ia n  and exports ( i . e .  coa l) 
were lim ite d  to  meet h igh dom estic demand. B r i t is h  earnings on in v e s t ­
ment abroad were g r e a tly  reduced because o f  war-time red u ction s in  th ese  
investm ents. B r ita in  began to  meet keen com p etition  in  s e l l in g  fr e ig h t  
and other s e r v ic e s  in  th e post-w ar period . F ollow ing World War I I  
commodity im ports were u s u a lly  pa id  fo r  w ith  commodity ex p orts , in  1938 
exports p a id  fo r  64 per cen t o f  commodity im ports, by 1950 i t  was 94 
per cen t. ^ Thus t h is  a lte r e d  im port-export r e la t io n sh ip  p la ced  a new 
need fo r  B r i t i s h  in d u stry  to  keep abreast o f  tech n o lo g ica l advances.
A fter  1945 th e  B r i t is h  econony had to  develop  a new trade p a tte r n . 
Coal mining, t e x t i l e  and c lo th in g  in d u str ie s  d e c lin e d  in  importance as
1. Gruchy, p .477.
export in d u str ie s , w h ile  the m anufacturing o f m etal and engineering  
p roducts accounted fo r  an in crea sin g  proportion  o f  commodity exp o rts . 
A ccording to .A lla n  G. Gruchy in  h is  hook Comparative Sconomic System s, 
'Between 1913 and 1950, coa l d ec lin e d  from 10.2  to  2 ,8  per cen t and 
t e x t i l e s  and c lo th in g  from 37 .8  to  19.1  per cent o f  th e  t o t a l  va lu e o f  
B r i t i s h  commodity exp o rts . In  th e  same period, manufactured m etal and 
en g in eerin g  products in creased  from 4 0 .5  to  67 .1  per cent o f  th e  t o t a l  
v a lu e  o f  commodity e x p o r ts '.  ^ W ith in  the category o f m etal and engin ­
eer in g  products, fo r e ig n  demand s h if t e d  from r a ilr o a d  r o l l in g  sto ck  and 
lon g  e s ta b lish e d  ty p es  o f machinery, to  motor v e h ic le s ,  a ir c r a f t  and 
e l e c t r i c a l  equipment.
T able 1 -  The Changing Composition o f U nited  Kingdom Commodity E xp orts, 
1915-1950
Percentages o f  t o t a l  value o f
Commodity exp orts
Coal
T e x t i le s  and c lo th in g  
M etal and en g in eerin g  products 
Other manufactured goods 
Other goods
T ota l
Source; P. D. Henderson, 'B r ita in 's  In te r n a tio n a l P o s i t io n ' , The 
B r it is h  Economy, 1945-1950, 1952, in  A llan  G. Gruchy, 
Comparative Economic System s. (Boston, Houghton M iff l in  
Company, I 966 ) ,  p .478.
commodity exports
1915 1929 1938 1950
10 .2 7 .2 8 .6 2 .8
57 .8 33 .5 2 1 .5 19.1
26.7 29.2 58.0 50.3
13.8 15.5 17.4 1 6 .8
11 .5 14.8 14.5 1 1 .0
100.0 1 0 0 .0 1 00 .0 100 .0
1. I b id . ,  p .477 .
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1, Roger E atw eli, The 1945-1951 Labour Governments, (London, B i l l in g  
and Sons, 1979), p . 157.
2 . P au l Sajm elson, Economics, (Chicago, McGraw H i l l  C o., I 967) ,  p .706.
O verall, the stru ctu re  o f  B r i t i s h  industry  remained in  many ways s im i- y
la r  to  th e pre-war world, although  there was some s tru c tu ra l change, 
and investm ent and p r o d u c tiv ity  in  general r o se . Even so, t h i s  provided ^
B r ita in  w ith  a f r a g i l e  economic base in  view  o f  th e  a s s e t s  w hich she 5
1had so ld  o f f ,  and debts she had incurred during the war.
I t  was obvious to  v i s i t o r s  to  the Continent during the 1945-1951
y ea rs  th at the European co u n tr ies  were recovering  f a s t e r  from the war .-g
than B r ita in , The standard o f  l i v in g  in  th ese  co u n tr ie s  f i r s t  met,
then  surpassed i t s  pre-war l e v e l s .  Part o f  t h is  may be a ttr ib u te d  to  |
the poor economic co n d itio n  o f  B r ita in  during th e in ter-w ar y e a r s . 3
A lso , M arshall A id and oth er a id  programmes had a favourable e f f e c t  on
the l e s s -th a n -a ff lu e n t  co u n tr ies  o f  the time -  Germany, Holland, Prance
and I t a ly .  ’ P r im a rily  on th e ir  own, however, by a p ro cess  no one had
p red ic ted , th ese  n a tio n s began a m iraculous sp r in t o f p ro d u ctiv ity
2beginn ing in  th e  e a r ly  19 5 0 's .
B r i t is h  economic p o lic y  in  1945 had th ree major aims. The f i r s t  
was to  put r ig h t the balance-of-paym ents on current account. Second, 
i t  was necessary  to  make good the d e stru c tio n  and lo s s  o f wartime, and 
then to  b eg in  to  reduce the 'n o t io n a l' lo s s e s ,  both  a t  home and abroad ; 
a f te r  rep a ir in g  or re p la c in g  war-damaged housing fo r  example, a s ta r t  yg
was to  be made on th e  backlog o f  houses whose co n stru ctio n  had been  
h a lted  or prevented b y  th e  war. S im ila r ly , w ith  the c e s s a t io n  o f hos­
t i l i t i e s  th e  Government had to  fa ce  the prospect o f  repaying i t s  accu­
mulated d eb ts. F in a lly ,  th e  p o lic y  aimed at r a is in g  the standard o f
11
s'
:
1 ,-tl i v in g  to  a  l e v e l  app roach ing  t h a t  o f  th e  p re-w ar y e a r s .  I
ach iev e  a  b a la n c e  i n  th e  c o u n try 's  e x te r n a l  econony. The f i r s t  o f
B r i t a i n 's  p o s t-w a r  ta s k s  was to  f in d  ways o f  in c re a s in g  p ro d u c tio n  a s
r a p id ly  a s  p o s s ib le  i n  o rd e r  to  in c re a s e  commodity e x p o r ts  and to  work
2tow ard  a  b a la n c e  betw een  im ports  and e x p o r ts  o f  goods and  s e rv ic e s ,
( i i )  A void ing  Slump and  High Unemployment
1 , G, D. N, W orswick, In tro d u c t io n :  'The B r i t i s h  Economy, 1945-1951
i n  Worswick and Ady, p . 21.
2 . G ruchy, p .479.
5. Ib id ., p.480.
The problem s o f  t r a n s i t i o n  and re c o v e ry  th a t  fa c e d  th e  p o s t-w ar 
L abour Government w ere th e  same prob lem s w hich any governm ent in  power §
w ould have had  to  c o n f ro n t.  -T h ese  prob lem s in c lu d e d  th e  need to  expand 7
“p ro d u c tio n , improve p r o d u c t iv i ty ,  m a in ta in  f in a n c ia l  s t a b i l i t y ,  and J%
The f e a r  o f  unemployment and  a  r e p e t i t i o n  o f  th e  severe  d e p re s s io n  
fo llo w in g  W orld War I  was th e  m o tiv a tin g  f a c to r  b e h in d  th e  Emplo.yment '
IP o l ic y  W hite P a p e r  (1944 ). A voidance o f h ig h  unemployment was a  m ajo r |
i.Labour commitment. The c o iip le te  i n f r a s tm c tu r e  o f  p o s t-w ar r e g io n a l  ^
p o l ic y  was b a se d  on unemployment a s  th e  on ly  c r i t e r i a  upon w hich d e c i­
s io n s  w ere made, i . e .  which r e g io n s  were to  b e  dem arcated  a s  D epressed  
A reas.
A ccord ing  to  G ruchy, th e  Labour P a r ty  made two p r in c i p a l  c r i t i c i s m s  
o f  th e  fu n c tio n in g  o f  th e  p re -w ar B r i t i s h  economy. T hese were t h a t  ' t h e  
economy f a i l e d  to  m a in ta in  a  b a la n c e  betw een t o t a l  n a t io n a l  o u tp u t and  
t o t a l  demand a t  a  f u l l  employment l e v e l  and th a t  th e  t o t a l  demand d id  
n o t r e f l e c t  p r i o r i t i e s  in  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  goods and s e rv ic e s  th a t  w ould 
m axim ize economic w e l f a r e ' . ^
1. I b id . ,  p .480.
2 . Ib id .
■J
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During World War I I  th e r e  was l e s s  debate in  B r it is h  p o l i t i c a l
c ir c le s  about post-w ar economic and s o c ia l  g o a ls  than th ere  was about
th e means by which th ese  g o a ls  were to  be ach ieved . Gruchy w rote
th a t 'th e  means proposed by th e C onservative and L ib era l P a r t ie s  were
along n o n - s o c ia l is t ,  Keynesian l in e s  which would draw the government
deeply in to  th e n a tio n 's  economic a f f a ir s ,  but not as d eep ly  as would
the s o c ia l i s t  proposa ls o f  th e  Labour P a r t y ' T h e  K eynesian-Beveridge
procedures fo r  securing f u l l  employment and comprehensive s o c ia l
se c u r ity  can b e s t  be d escrib ed  as 'government in terv e n tio n  ra th er  than
2n a tio n a l p la n n in g ' .  The in terven tion ism  o f Lord Keynes and S ir  W illiam
Beveridge was to  b e ca rr ied  out la r g e ly  w ith  the a id  o f  f i s c a l  and %
'monetary p o l i c i e s  th at were to  f la t t e n  out the booms and slumps in  a J
secure s o c ie ty .  The means by which the Labour P a r ty 's  post-v/ar g o a ls  
were to  be reached went fa r  beyond the in terven tion ism  o f  th e  Conserva­
t iv e  and L ib era l P a r t ie s .
But i t  was p lann ing and c o n tr o ls , which were agreed on by both  
th e  Labour and C onservative P a r t ie s ,  w ith  varying degrees o f  enthusiasm , 
th a t  were con sid ered  th e  proper means to  ca ib at in f la t io n ,  which was 
expected  to  fo llo w  a post-w ar boom. F isc a l and monetary p o l i c i e s  were 
used to  avo id  an economic d e c lin e . This r a is e s  th e  is s u e  o f w hether  
Labour's economic p o l i c i e s  were meant to  be long-term  so lu tio n s  or  
whether even th e  Labour le a d e rs  considered  them to  b e s in p ly  temporary 
stop-gap  measures fo r  th e post-w ar yea rs . This q u estion  w i l l  be d e a lt  
w ith  la t e r .
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The American economy recovered  much more q u ick ly  from World 
War I I  than d id  th e  B r it is h .  According to  o f f i c i a l  f ig u r e s , the  
U nited  S t a t e s ’ N ation a l Income a t ' constant p r ic e s ’ , i . e .  a f t e r  ad ju s­
t in g  fo r  the r i s e  in  d o lla r  p r ic e s  due to  in f la t io n ,  was 67.8  per cent 
above th e l e v e l  o f  1938, w h ile  i t s  consumption was up 53 .5  per cen t in  
1948.^  In  B r ita in  in  the same year , t o t a l  n a t io n a l output was on ly  3 
per cen t h igher than in  1938. As the population  had increased  by 5 per
cen t, t h i s  meant a cut back o f more than 1 per cen t in  th e  standard o f
2l iv in g  fo r  each person . The d iffe r e n c e  can be tra ced  to  the g rea te r  
unemployment and underemployment o f  resources in  th e  U nited S ta te s  than  
in  th e  U nited  Kingdom in  the y ea rs  im m ediately preceed ing 1939.
Unemployment in  Great B r ita in  in  th e  1940’s never approached i t s
pre-war l e v e l s .  In  1931 unemployment as a percentage o f  insured  workers
in  Great B r ita in  peaked a t 21 .1  per cen t; fo llo w in g  Yforld War I I
unemployment never rose  above 3*0 per cen t -  th e 1947 f ig u r e  -  during
3the immediate post-w ar y ea rs . N ev erth e less , fe a r  o f a recurrence o f  
the h igh  unemployment which had occurred a f te r  World War I  was a key 
fa c to r  in  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  e le c to r a te  to  vote Labour in  1945, w ith  
i t s  campaign platform  o f p lanning and co n tro ls .
( i i i )  How to  Implement S o c ia l i s t  I d e a ls
The post-w ar years were, from th e Labour vantage p o in t, a p rop i­
t io u s  tim e fo r  s o c ia l i s t  r eco n stru ctio n . The Second World War had
1. Roy Harrod, The B r i t is h  Economy. (New York, McGraw H i l l  C o., I 963),
p . 16 .
2 . Ib id .
3 . E rik  Lundberg, e d . , The B u sin ess  Cycle in  th e  Post-War World. 
(London, M acmillan and Co. L td ., 1955), p .37.
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en larged  the scope o f government in terv e n tio n  in  economic a f f a ir s  to  
an ex ten t never experienced  b e fo re  1939* There was a general mood in  
favour o f  su b s ta n tia l economic and so c ia l reform . No one wanted to  
r e v e r t  to  the pre-war economic system  w ith  i t s  h igh  unemployment, 
recu rrin g  slumps and inadequate s o c ia l  se c u r ity .^
The two main ta sk s  o f  the new Labour Government in  1945 were
recon vertin g  the economy from war to peace, and reb u ild in g  B r ita in
along s o c ia l i s t  l i n e s .  The recurrin g  theme in  s o c i a l i s t  w r it in g s  was
th a t o f  a more eq u ita b le  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  w ealth and opportunity .
S o c ia lism  was d efin ed  by E atw ell as *a commitment to  a s o c ie ty  based
on cooperation  ra th er  than com petition; a s o c ie ty  in  which a high
degree o f economic and s o c ia l  eq u ity  i s  a major g o a l; a so c ie ty  in
2w hich c o l le c t iv e  needs are e lev a ted  above p r iv a te  en d s'. But by t h is  
d e f in i t io n  E atw ell concludes th a t the 1945-1951 Labour Governments'
• 3c la im s th at they  were s o c ia l i s t s  were debatable.
The ta n g ib le  economic measures th a t th e  Labour Government im ple­
mented during i t s  ad m in istra tio n  -  such as N ational H ealth , N ational 
Insurance and n a t io n a lisa t io n  o f  sev era l o f  th e  b a s ic  in d u s tr ie s  -  were 
responses to  a very r e a l need fo r  some p o s it iv e  economic change : 
th ey  were a ls o  considered  to  be products o f s o c ia l i s t  d o c tr in e , 'The 
post-w ar Labour government was prepared to  a l t e r  the fu n ctio n in g  as w e ll  
as th e stru ctu re  o f the B r i t is h  economy along l in e s  th a t th e government 
f e l t  to  be necessary  i f  a s o c ia l i s t  s o c ie ty  was to  be e s ta b lish e d .
1. Gruchy, p. 480.
2. E a tw ell, p .10.
3. Ib id .
4 . Gruchy, p. 480.
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The means o f  implementing s o c ia l i s t  id e a ls  were found in  the Labour 
Government’s economic p o lic y . These were monetary and f i s c a l  p o lic y ,  f
economic n a tio n a l p lanning and c o n tr o ls , n a t io n a lis a t io n  o f  in d u stry  
and r eg io n a l p o l ic y .  Each o f  th ese  w i l l  be tr e a te d  in  greater  depth  
in  th e  next s e c t io n  o f  t h is  chapter.
There were some moves during 1945-1946 towards lon g-term  macro-
economic planning, a tren d  which probably would not have occurred under
a C onservative Government. The O f f ic ia l  S teer in g  Committee on Economic
P o l ic y  a s  ea r ly  as September o f 1945 decided  to  draw up a n a tio n a l
p la n .^  According to  A lan Budd in  P o l i t i c s  o f Economic P lanning, the
Labour P a rty  was committed to  planning and con fid en t th a t i t  would
r e c e iv e  support when i t  launched th e f i r s t  major p lanning experim ent.
I t s  h is to r y  can be g leaned  from th e su c c e ss iv e  e d it io n s  o f  the Economic
Survey, s ta r t in g  in  1947» They show how economic p lanning -  th a t i s ,
the attem pt to  ach ieve ta r g e ts  fo r  the p a ttern  and s c a le  o f in d u s tr ia l
development -  was rep la ced  by demand management. By 1951 planning had
more or l e s s  been abandoned. W elfare ca p ita lism  rep laced  so c ia lism  as
2the Labour P a rty ’ s p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e .
The movement away from n a tio n a l planning and the gradual loosen in g  
o f  c o n tr o ls , u n t i l  th e  outbreak o f  the Korean War, showed th e  n a t io n ’ s 
d is illu s io n m e n t w ith  s o c ia l i s t  id eo logy . The development o f  s o c ia l i s t  
thought ran headlong in to  the year 1947, which proved calam itous fo r  the  
U nited  Kingdom. The hard w in ter  o f  1946-1947 was accompanied by a s e r i ­
ous shortage o f  co a l and e l e c t r i c i t y .  The c o n v e r t ib i l i ty  c r i s i s  o f  1947
g
S
%
I
1 , D. N. C hester, ’Machinery o f  Government and P lann ing’ , in  Worswick 
and Ady, p . 341.
2 . Alan Budd, The P o l i t i c s  o f Economic P lann ing. (M anchester, Manchester 
U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 1978), p p .58-59.
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and the d eva lu a tion  o f s t e r l in g  in  1949 proved to  he f a t a l  b low s to  
p u b lic  op in ion  regarding Labour p o l ic ie s .  But th ese  c r is e s  can not 
b e a ttr ib u te d  w holly  to  Labour economic mismanagement, fo r  in  s p ite  
o f  th ese  e x ig e n c ie s  the B r i t is h  economy d id  make considerab le p rogress  
under Labour r u le .
Although th e  Labour Government n a tio n a lise d  se v e r a l o f the b a s ic  
in d u s tr ie s  and ca rr ied  on con sid erab le  s ta te  trad in g  in  the economy’ s 
in p o r t sec to r , one o f i t s  major problems was to  p lan  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
an economic system in  which p r iv a te  en terp rise  was a nnch la r g er  fa c ­
to r  in  terms o f output and onployment than was p u b lic  en terp r ise . 
A ccording to  Gruchy: ’The B r i t is h  economy o f th e year 1945-1951 was
a mixed economy which combined so c ia lism  in  th e p u b lic  en terp r ise  se c ­
to r  w ith  ca p ita lism  in  th e  p r iv a te  en terp r ise  s e c to r ’ .^ Gruchy compares 
th e p u b lic -p r iv a te  en terp r ise  economy o f th ese  y e a r s  w ith  the p a r t ia l  or
lim ite d  so c ia lism  th a t i s  advocated by the Scahdi* navian and oth er West
2European s o c ia l i s t  p a r t ie s .
Most of the post-w ar changes in  th e economic stru ctu re  had been  
agreed on by the war-time C o a lit io n  Government, Thus t h is  le a d s  to  the  
q u estio n  o f  whether a C onservative Government would have implemented any 
d if f e r e n t  programmes. Did any s o c ia l  r e v o lu tio n  occur during th ese  s i x  
years? F u ll  employment was the most ta n g ib le  change to  most peop le in  
p o st-1 9 4 5  B r ita in . However, according to  Roy Harrod in  The B r it is h  
Economy, t h is  arose from th e  fundamental post-w ar economic co n d ition s  
and had nothing to  do w ith  the s p e c i f i c a l ly  s o c ia l is in g  measures o f  the 
government. Many o f  the Labour ’ s o c i a l i s t  programmes' were being
1. Gruchy, p . 578.
2. Ib id .
5. Harrod, p. 65 .
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implemented in  the U nited  S ta te s  a t  t h is  tim e as ’recovery  or w elfare  |
%programs’ . But so c ia lism  was s ig n if ic a n t  as the means which brought
i
in to  e x is te n c e  sev era l s o c ia l  and economic programmes th a t r a ise d  the ÿ
standard o f l iv in g  in  post-w ar B r ita in . The fa c t  the C onservatives  
re ta in e d  most o f the Labour changes in  1951 does not d e tr a c t from th e  
Labour Governments’ record, indeed i t  v in d ic a te s  many o f i t s  d e c is io n s  
as b ein g  the co rrect c h o ic e s . N everth eless , t h is  does show th at th ese  
p o l ic ie s  can not be viewed w holly  as Labour c r e a tio n s , and y e t  cre d it  
was due them fo r  th e ir  d e d ic a tio n  in  implementing th è se  p o l i c i e s .
2. T ools A v a ila b le  to  Them ; and the Problems o f  Using Them
( i )  K eynesian In flu en ces  ; and Old T ra d itio n s
(a ) C la s s ic a l Econom ists
The pre-1939 B r it is h  economic system had been  in flu en ced  by  
a number o f o ld er  tr a d it io n s  o f  economic thought. C la s s ic a l economic 
d o c tr in e  i s  u su a lly  dated  from Adam Sm ith’s An Enquiry in to  th e  W ealth  
o f  N ations (1776). The economic system  he founded i s  b e s t  known by the  
term ’la i s s e z  f a i r e ’ . T his phrase comes from the P h ysiocra t slogan , 
’L a is s e z  fa ir e  e t  l a i s s e z  p asser , l e  monde va de lui-m em e’ .^ Thomas 
Robert Malthus (1776-1834), who belonged  to  the next gen eration , sought 
a r a t io n a l exp lanation  fo r  the p ro g ress iv e  s o c ia l  problems o f  mankind,
H is th eory  o f  the ’ s tr u g g le  fo r  e x is te n c e ' s ta te d  th a t th e  con tin u a l 
p ressu re  o f  p opulation  on su b sisten ce  has h is t o r ic a l ly  on ly  been r e l ie v e d
----------------------
1 . George Soule, Id ea s o f  the Great E conom ists, (New York, V iking |
P r e ss , 1952) ,  p .36 . IÎ
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b y war, p e s t i le n c e ,  and fam ine. T h is le d  to  h is  b e l i e f  in  the 'ir o n
law  o f  wages' which sa id  th a t r e a l  wages could  not r i s e  m ch  above
th e l e v e l  o f  su b s is ten ce  because an in crease  in  w e ll-b e in g  would le a d
to  a la r g e r  supply o f  workers. M althusian d octr in e  had no room fo r
p u b lic  support or c h a r ity  except fo r  the 'd eserv in g  p o o r ', th ose  who,
although  b ein g  re sp o n s ib le  or in d u str io u s , had su ffe r e d  undeserved
ca lam ity .^  Ricardo (1772-1823) was th e  f i r s t  to  in trod u ce th e concept
o f  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  w ealth , which was to  la y  th e  fou ndation  fo r  Karl
2Marx' 8 theory o f  th e  e x p lo ita t io n  o f  labour.
Of th e  e a r ly  s o c i a l i s t s  -  a ich  as th e French U top ians, Saint-Sim on, 
F ou rier , B lanc and Proudhon, Jereraey Bentham (U tilita r ia n ism ) and. Robert 
Owen -  K arl Marx was c le a r ly  the 'grea t prophet o f  modern so c ia lism '.  
Marx o u tlin e d  a framework o f  what he b e lie v e d  to  be the fu tu re  course 
o f ev en ts , on which he b ased  p r e sc r ip t io n s  fo r  a s tr a te g y  to  be ap p lied  
by th o se  who w ished to  change th e nature o f  s o c ie ty . The economic 
th e o r ie s  he, along w ith  F r ied r ich  E n gels, developed in  The Comminist 
M anifesto ( l8 4 8 )  and Das K ap ita l ( I 867) were almost w holly  c la s s ic a l  in  
o r ig in . I t  i s  commonly argued th a t Marx was a c l a s s i c a l  econom ist, the  
o n ly  d iffe r e n c e  b e in g  th a t in  h is  case  the reasoning became a weapon to  
a tta c k  c a p ita lism  ra th er  than a weapon to  defend i t . ^  &!arx agreed w ith  
R ica rd o 's  view  th a t th e economic v a lu e  o f  commodities i s  the labour  
expended on them, and then Marx c a rr ied  t h is  fh rth er , so th at in  order  
to  produce value labour must be s o c ia l ly  v a lu ab le . S o c ia l i s t  id eo lo g y
1. I b id . ,  pp .4 7 -4 8 . See Thomas Robert Malthus, An E ssay  on the  
P r in c ip le  o f  P o p u la tio n  as i t  A f fe c ts  the Future Improvement o f  
S o c ie ty  (1798 ).
2. I b id . ,  p . 52. See David R icardo, The P r in c ip le s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
Economy and T axation  ( I 817) .
3 . I b id . ,  p p .61 and 63.
.'II
1, Alan Palmer, D iction ary  o f  Twentieth Century H istory  1900-1978. 
(M iddlesex, England, Penguin, 1979), p. 139*
2. Ib id .
can be traced  d ir e c t ly  to  Marx’s p h ilosophy o f  h is to r y , h is  theory
' 4
o f  the ’c la s s  stru ggle*  and 'd ia l e c t i c a l  m ater ia lism ', which s ta te d
th a t th ere i s  a t h e s i s  or i n i t i a l  s itu a t io n , an a n t i t h e s is  o f r e a c t io n , |
and then  a sy n th e s is  or compromise, in  every h is t o r ic a l  s itu a t io n .
Many peop le hold  th a t i t  i s  more appropriate to  v iew  Marx's most in f lu ­
e n t ia l  con tr ib u tio n s as belonging  to  th e  theory o f  s o c ia l  or p o l i t i c a l  
development, ra th er than to  econom ics.
The 1917 R ussian R evo lu tion  a s  a w hole, and the B o lsh ev ik s and 
S o c ia l R ev o lu tio n a r ies , who w ished to  transform  R u ss ia 's  economy and 
s o c ie ty  a s  the f i r s t  step  to  world p r o le ta r ia n  r e v o lu tio n  in  p a r tic u la r , 
were a tremendous encouragement to  th e development o f B r i t is h  so c ia lism  
in  th e  e a r ly  part o f  t h is  century. At t h i s  tim e th e  Fabian S o c ie ty  was 
th e c e n tr a l group working to  apply s o c i a l i s t  p r in c ip le s  in  the B r it is h  
system . The lea d ers  o f t h i s  group were Sidney and B e a tr ic e  Webb, who 
saw so c ia lism  as 'a  triumph a s  a sequel o f  u n iv ersa l su ffra g e  although  
only  as a clim ax o f  a lon g  p eriod  o f  p o l i t i c a l  ev o lu tio n  not through 
rev o lu tio n a ry  p lan n in g' .   ^ The Fabian S o c ie ty  was one o f the c o n s t itu ­
ent elem ents which s e t  up th e  Labour R epresen tation  Committee, la t e r  
the Labour P arty , in  I 9OO. Subsequently th e  S o c ie ty  tended to  act as  
a s p e c ia l is e d  research  agency fo r  th e Labour P arty , although i t  c o n s is ­
te n t ly  advocated what S idney Webb c a l le d  'th e  in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  gradual-
2ness* in  a Labour P arty  conference speech, 26 June 1923.
H iring World War I  L loyd George had a sm all war-time Cabinet r e s ­
p o n sib le  fo r  the n a t io n 's  p lanning and c o n tr o ls , but th is  i n i t i a l
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B r it is h  experiment in  s ta te  in te r v e n tio n  was disbanded immediately  
a f te r  the A rm istice in  I 9I 8 . The y ears fo llov /in g  the Great V/ar were 
marked by economic d ep ression , and on th e  Continent were accompanied 
by the r i s e  o f to ta li ta r ia n is m  in  Germany and fa sc ism  in  I t a ly  fo llo w ed  
in  1939 by the advent o f  y e t  another World War, In  1945 the c o n tr o ls  
introduced  in  war-time were not l i f t e d  in  B r ita in , and Labour was e le c ­
te d  la r g e ly  on i t s  prom ise o f n a tio n a l p lanning. T h is was due in  p art  
to  th e  fe a r  people f e l t  a t  the sp ectre  o f a return  to  th e unemployment 
and economic slump o f  the la t e  1920 's  and 1930's .
The T o r ies  were the o n ly  r e a l  th rea t to  Labour in  1945. The 
L ib era l P arty  had been weakened by d isp u tes  between A squith and Lloyd  
George during the F ir s t  World War and the Labour P arty had in h e r ite d  
i t s  r a d ic a l t r a d it io n s . L ib era l rep re se n ta tio n  a t W estm inster f e l l  con­
tin u o u sly  during th e in ter-w a r  period  and the slump continued  a f t e r  1945. 
Only s ix  L ib e r a ls  were returned  in  th e  gen era l e le c t io n s  o f 1950 and 
1951. The Tory P arty  advocated fewer n a tio n a l co n tro ls  than Labour, but 
in  e f f e c t  had approved many o f  the new programmes w h ile  the government 
was s t i l l  fu n ction in g  as a C o a lit io n  u n it  during the war. A p r in c ip a l  
Tory in te r e s t ,  p r iv a te  or fr e e  en terp r ise , remained a major fa c to r  in  
the now 'mixed' B r it is h  economy, th at i s ,  so c ia lism  and ca p ita lism , o f  
the la t e  1940’s .
The development o f s o c i a l i s t  thought was moulded by the c l a s s i c a l  
econom ists, M arxist d octr in e , th e  R ussian R evo lu tion  and the subsequent 
estab lishm ent o f  a ' s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e ’, the two World Wars, in  ter-w ar  
depression , and th e  emergence o f  B r it is h  Fabianism  in  Labour P arty  
socio-econom ic p o l i c i e s .  The new stream o f economic theory rep la c in g  
la i s s e z - f a i r e  in  the m id -tw en tieth  century had as  i t s  spokesman John 
Maynard Keynes, th e  eminent Cambridge econom ist.
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(b) Keynes and Keynesianism
Today many o f the fundam entals o f K eynesian theory are  
accepted  by econom ists o f  a l l  sch o o ls  o f  thought, although a g rea t  
many do not share Keynes* p a r t ic u la r  p o lic y  view s and d if f e r  on tech ­
n ic a l  d e t a i l s  o f  a n a ly s is .^  Even though most current econom ists regard  
them selves as ’K eynesian', 'an ti-K ey n esia n ', or ' neo-K eynesian', th ey  
have tended to  work towards a sy n th e s is  o f  whatever has remained va lu ­
a b le  in  o ld er  economics and o f  modern th e o r ie s  o f  income determ ination . 
The r e s u lt  i s  now known as 'n e o -c la s s ic is m '. But in  1945-1951 Keynesian  
economics were w id ely  accepted  w ithout the broad sch o o ls  o f c r i t ic i s m  
th a t have sin ce  evolved . T his does not mean, however, that a l l  th e  
post-w ar B r i t is h  Governments' economic p o l ic ie s  were in flu en ced  or even  
accep tab le  to  exponents o f  Keynesianism . Rather, i t  i s  suggested  th a t  
during th ese  y ea rs  th ere  had not y e t  developed th e  organised framework 
o f  anti-K eynesianism  th a t has s in c e  evolved, even though th ere was no
1 . Samuelson, p . 205.
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shortage o f contemporary c r i t i c s .^
1 , T his su b -sec tio n  i s  ob v iou sly  fa r  too b r ie f  to  b eg in  to  do ju s ­
t i c e  to  e ith e r  Keynes or K eynesianism  (a s  was a ls o  the case w ith  
th e  se c t io n  on th e  c la s s ic a l  econom ists) but m ention must b e made 
o f  Keynes* work and i t s  in f lu e n c e  on the post-w ar B r it is h  Govern­
ments, There i s  such a mountain o f  l i t e r a tu r e  on both  Keynes and 
Keynesianism th a t one i s  fo rced  to  mark immediate boundaries.
Thus, the fo llo w in g  l i s t  o f fu r th er  reading i s  l im ite d  to  c r i t i c a l  
s tu d ie s  p u b lish ed  during th e post-w ar years or im m ediately th e r e ­
a f te r .  The books l i s t e d  are b a s ic  s tu d ie s  r e la t in g  d ir e c t ly  o r  
in d ir e c t ly  to  Keynesianism . S ir  W. B everidge, F u ll  Employment in  
a Free S o c ie ty , (London, George A llen  and Unwin, 1944)1 D. D illa r d ,  
The Economics o f  John Maynard Keynes. (New York, P r e n tic e -H a ll,
1948) ; K ing's C o llege Memoir, John Maynard Keynes, 1883-1946,
F ellow  and Bursar, (Cambridge, 1949); and M. P o lan y i, F u ll  Employ­
ment and Free Trade, (Cambridge, Cambridge U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 1945). 
The fo llo w in g  works are more advanced: A. H. Hansen, A Guide to
Keynes. (New York, McGraw H i l l ,  1955) ; S, E. H arris, e d ., The New 
Economics ; K eynes's In flu en ce  on Theory and P u b lic  P o lic y , (New 
York, 1947) ; L. R. K lein . The Keynesian R evo lu tion . (New York. 
Macmillan, 1947); A. P. Lerner, Economics o f  Employment, (New 
York, McGraw H i l l ) ;  A, C. P igou, Keynes* General Theory ; A 
R etrosp ect. (New York, Macmillan, 1951); Joan Robinson, The Rate 
o f  I n te r e s t  and Other E ssays. (London, Macmillan, 1952); and 
M. F. T im lin, K eynesian Economics. (Toronto, U n iv e r s ity  o f Toronto 
P r e ss , 1944) .  The th ree  fo llo w in g  books are chosen from the v a st  
anti-K eynesian  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  the post-w ar years: A, F. Burns,
Economic Research and the Keynesian Thinking o f Our Times. (New 
York, N ational Bureau o f  Economic R esearch, 1946); L, van M ises, 
Planning fo r  Freedom and Other E ssays and A ddresses. (South Holland, 
I l l i n o i s ,  L ib er ta r ia n  P ress , 1952); and G. W, Terborgh, The Bogey 
o f  Economic M aturity . (Chicago, Machinery and A ll ie d  Products 
I n s t i tu t e ,  1945).
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The in f lu e n c e  o f Keynes on B r it is h  and in te r n a tio n a l economics
1went fa r  beyond h is  involvem ent w ith  the B r i t is h  Treasury. Even so 
during the Second World War Keynes' achievem ents a t  the Treasury in c lu ­
ded such noteworthy accom plishm ents as : th e  n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  the  
U nited  S ta te s  on Lend-Lease, h is  lead ersh ip  a t  th e B retton  Woods Con­
feren ce  o f 1944 -  which e s ta b lis h e d  the In te r n a tio n a l Monetary Fund 
(designed  to  s t a b i l i s e  fo r e ig n  exchange) and the In te rn a tio n a l Bank 
fo r  R econstruction  and Development (formed fo r  the purpose o f  encour­
aging in te r n a t io n a l in vestm en t), as w e ll  as h is  major r o le  in  n egotia ­
t in g  the U n ited  S ta te s  Loan Agreement to  B r ita in  in  1945.
N ev erth e less , Keynes' g r e a te s t  impact was through h is  w r it in g s .  
Among h is  b e s t  known books were The Economic Consequences o f  th e  Peace 
( 1919) ,  A T r e a tise  on Money (1 9 3 0 ), and h is  major work -  .The G eneral 
Theory o f  Employment I n te r e s t  and Money (1936). During the Second World 
War he wrote How to  Pay fo r  the War? A R adical P la n  fo r  the C hancellor
1. The o f f i c i a l  b iography o f  Keynes i s  R. F. Harrod, e d ., The L ife  o f  
John Maynard Keynes ; A P erson a l Biography. (London, Ivlacmillan, 
1951) .  One o f th e  few in c id e n ts  in  which Keynes' character i s  
allow ed  to  sh ine through Harrod' s eu lo g is in g  i s  th e  fo llow in g:
On h o lid ay  to  A lg er ia  and T u n isia  in  the E a ster  v a ca tio n  o f 1921, 
Keynes and a fr ie n d  were stoned by s tr e e t  u rch in s because they had 
apparently g iv en  one o f them an in s u f f ic ie n t  t ip  fo r  clean ing  
t h e ir  shoes, Keynes was c e r ta in  the t ip  he had g iv en  was co rrec t  
and when h is  companion suggested  r a is in g  i t  to  escape the wrath o f  
the boys Keynes d ec lin ed  f ir m ly  saying, 'I  w i l l  not be p arty  to  
debasing th e cu rren cy ', Harrod, p ,304.
There i s  an extrem ely in te r e s t in g  c o l le c t io n  o f b io g ra p h ica l 
sk etch es o f Keynes in  M ilo Keynes, e d ., E ssays on John Maynard 
Keynes. (Cambridge, Cambridge U n iv e r s ity  P re ss , 1975), Part I ,  
pp. 1- 72, See a ls o ,  D, E, Moggridge, Keynes. (London, Macmillan,
1976).
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o f  the Exchequer (1 9 4 0 ).^  The Keynesian concept o f macro-economics 
coloured  not on ly  th e  Anglo-American post-w ar rec o n stru c tio n  t r e a t i e s
but a ls o  the B r i t i s h  (and to  some ex ten t in te r n a tio n a l)  a tt itu d e
2 3towards economic development. For ’we are a l l  K eynesians now’ .
By t h i s  p o in t the major economic to p ic s  o f  concern were the  
Keynesian movement from c la s s ic a l  economics to  preoccupation  w ith pro­
p en s ity  to  consume, m arginal e f f ic ie n c y  and the r a te  o f  in t e r e s t .  D ie  
to  Keynes ’ in flu en ce  th e balanced  budget was no lon ger regarded as  
n e c e s s a r ily  the co rrec t accounting p r a c t ic e  fo r  the Government, Yet 
Keynes d id  consider the budget to  be a key fea tu re  fo r  Government s tr a ­
tegy , and in  th is  sen se looked  upon the Government as the great compen­
sa tin g  fa c to r  fo r  p r iv a te  ca p ita lism . Keynes sought a sy n th e s is  b e t­
ween so c ia lism  and c a p ita lism  by in s i s t in g  th a t f u l l  employment could  
be a tta in e d  by means o f production  o f c a p ita l  goods, the adoption o f  a 
’cheap-money’ p o lic y  and a programme o f p u b lic  in vestm en t.^
The orthodox economic theory in  which Keynes was tra in ed  h eld  th a t  
the Sm ithian ’ in v is ib le  hand' produced a u to m a tica lly  a s ta te  o f f u l l  
employment, u n le s s  th e  workers in s is t e d  on an o v er ly  high l e v e l  o f  
wages. T h is c la s s ic a l  theory cou ld  not b eg in  to  exp la in  th e  m assive  
unemployment o f  the in ter-w ar y ea rs , which seldom f e l l  below  10 per cent
1, John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences o f the P ea ce ,
(London, Macmillan, I 919) i John Maynard Keynes. T rea tise  on Money. 
(London, Macmillan, I 930); John Maynard Keynes, General Theory o f  
Employment. In te r e s t  and Money. (London, Macmillan, I 936); and 
John Maynard Keynes, How to  Pay for  the War? A R adical P lan  fo r  -i-l
th e  C hancellor o f  th e  Exchequer. (London, Macmillan, 1940).
2, Harrod, p p .595-596.
3 . A. J .  Youngson, The B r it is h  Economy 1920-1957. (Cambridge,
M assachus., Harvard U n iv ers ity  P r e ss , I 96O), p .261.
4 . Palmer, p .213.
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and a t i t s  w orst reached 20 per cent o f th e  t o t a l  labour fo r c e .
C la s s ic a l econom ists blamed th e  fa i lu r e  o f  the economy to  expand on 
the i n f l e x i b i l i t y  o f wages, arguing th at the trade un ions should  
accept wage c u ts . On the o th er hand, Keynes argued th a t although th is  
p o lic y  might make sense fo r  a p a r tic u la r  in d u stry  (such as  co a l mining) 
a gen era l cut would lower consumption, income and aggregate demand, and 
th is  would o f f s e t  th e  encouragement to  employment by low ering  o f  the  
’price* o f  labour r e la t iv e  to  th e p r ic e  o f  c a p ita l ,  e .g .  p la n t and 
machinery.^ Keynes produced an a lte r n a t iv e  theory which showed that  
the l e v e ls  o f production  and demand depended on th e  l e v e l  o f aggregate  
demand ( th e  sum o f aggregate consumption) and aggregate investm ent^  
(which was in flu en ced  by b u s in e ss  ex p ecta tio n s  and the r a te  o f  in t e r e s t ) ,  
w ith  investm ent determ ining the aggregate demand by means o f i t s  ’m u lti­
p l ie r  e f f e c t  ’ on consumption.  ^ The Keynesian m u lt ip lie r  was d e fin ed  by  
Sarauelson a s  ’th e  numerical c o e f f ic ie n t  showing how great an in c r e a se  
in  income r e s u l t s  from each in cr ea se  in  such investm ent spending ’ . ^  
According to  Keynes the l e v e l  o f  aggregate demand was ab le  to  produce
1. Graham Bannock, R. E. B axter and Ray R ees, D iction ary  o f  Economics. 
(M iddlesex, England, Penguin, 1972), p p .264-265.
2 . In  th e c l a s s ic a l  system th e  n a tion a l product was determ ined by th e  
le v e l  o f  investm ent, and th e  n a tio n a l income by the l e v e l  o f  r e a l  
wages. I t  was then th e  q u an tity  o f money th a t determined the  
p r ic e s . Investm ent and sav in gs were brought in to  balance by means 
o f th e  r a te  o f in t e r e s t .  In  th e  Keynesian system  the e q u a lity  o f  
savings and investm ent was achieved  by adjustm ents in  th e l e v e l
o f  n a tio n a l income or output working through the m u lt ip lie r . Thus, 
in  the Keynesian model, i f  one increased  th e  p rop en sity  to  in v e s t  
or consume, one d id  not sim ply r a is e  the r a te  o f  in t e r e s t ,  one 
r a ise d  input and employment. Samuelson, p . 232.
3. Harry G. Johnson, ’Keynes and B r it is h  Econom ics’, in  M ilo Keynes, 
p p .108-109.
4 . Samuelson, p .265.
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f u l l  employment and money wage r e s t r ic t io n s  cou ld  in flu en ce  employ­
ment on ly  in d ir e c t ly  through t h e ir  u n certa in  e f f e c t s  on investm ent,^  
th e  quantity  o f  money in  r e a l term s, the equ ilibrium  r a te  o f  in t e r e s t  
and through b u s in e ss  ex p ec ta tio n s . According to  Keynes, unbrid led  
ca p ita lism  cou ld  e a s i ly  lea d  to  chron ic unemployment, thus, p o l ic y  
d e c is io n s  on th e n a tio n a l l e v e l  were required to  m aintain  s a t is fa c to r y  
employment, which came to  be known as  ’f u l l  employment’ . Keynes f e l t  
sure th a t monetary p o lic y  a lone cou ld  achieve ’f u l l  employment ’ bu t th e  
f a i lu r e  o f ’easy  money’ in  th e  1930 ’ s encouraged th e  d es ire  among
K eynesians fo r  co n tro l o f  aggregate demand by budgetary p o lic y , s e t t in g
2th e  l e v e ls  o f ta x es  and government expenditure -  f i s c a l  p o lic y .
A r e a c tio n  a g a in st l a i s s e z - f a i r e  economics which th e 'Keynesian  
R ev o lu tio n ’ (among o th ers) c e r ta in ly  was, was in e v ita b le .. Y et, on th e  
other hand, an exp lan ation  as to  why i t  was necessary  i s  requ ired .
’A l l '  th a t Keynes d id  was to  apply th e  c la s s ic a l  economics th a t the  
econom ists a lready had. But i t  was a n ecessary  step , g iv en  the  
in a b i l i t y  and/or r e fu s a l o f  most o f Keynes' contem poraries in  economics
1 . Keynes challenged  th e  c la s s ic a l  Sm ithian quantity  th eory  o f money 
by contending th a t sav in gs and investm ent were independently  
determ ined. As in  th e  case o f  wages, he minimised the r o le  o f  
p r ic e s  in  a f fe c t in g  supply and demand. Keynes d id  not deny 
c l a s s i c a l  theory. He agreed th at a red u ction  o f  wages could, in  
theory , be b e n e f ic ia l ,  but i t  would operate on ly  through th e  
l iq u id i t y  p referen ce schedule. L iq u id ity  p referen ce  being  the  
d e s ir e  to  hold  money ra th er than o th er forms o f w ealth , such as  
s to ck s  and bonds. L iq u id ity  p referen ce was in flu en ce d  by th e  
l e v e l  o f income, r a te s  o f in t e r e s t ,  bond p r ic e s , ex p ecta tio n s  
and th e in s t i t u t io n a l  fea tu res  o f th e economy which determined
th e v e lo c it y  o f  income c ir c u la t io n . T his type o f monetary p o lic y  -  
or monetarism -  was an in t r in s ic  p art o f  K eynesian economic p o lic y ,  
which regu la ted  th e  le v e l  o f money (o r  l iq u id i t y )  in  th e economy 
in  order to  ach ieve some d es ired  p o lic y  o b je c t iv e , such as  the con­
t r o l  o f  in f la .t io n . See Graham Bannock, R. E, B axter and Ray Rees, 
D ictio n a ry  o f  Economics, (Miiddlesex, England, Penguin, 1972), 
p p .265-266 and 279 .
2. Johnson, p. 109. See a lso , Joan Robinson, 'What has become o f the  
K eynesian R ev o lu tio n ? ’, in  Milo Keynes, pp. 123-131.
27
to  apply th e to o ls  o f th e ir  trade to  th e ir  s o c ie ty 's  most p ressin g  
economic problem -  unemployment. ^
Disagreement over fu tu re  economic p o lic y  in  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c l e s
during th e Second Vforld War d id  not o fte n  concern post-w ar s o c ia l  and
economic g o a ls . Rather, th e  argument cen tred  arcund the means by which f-
th ese  g o a ls  were to  be ach ieved . The measures propounded by the
C onservative and L ib era l P a r t ie s  were along n o n -s o c ia l is t ,  K eynesian
l in e s  which would draw the Government to a much g rea ter  ex ten t in to  the
economic a f f a ir s  o f  th e  n a tio n , y e t  not as d eep ly  as would the s o c ia l i s t
proposals o f  th e  Labour P arty . The Keynes ian-B everidge procedures fo r
securing both  f u l l  employment and comprehensive s o c ia l  s e c u r ity  were to
be accom plished by Government in terven tion ism  ra th er  than n a tio n a l
p lanning. 'The in terven tion ism  o f  Lord Keynes and S ir  W illiam  Beveridge
was to  be a tta in e d  w ith  th e  a id  o f  f i s c a l  and monetary p o l i c i e s  designed
to  even out th e  booms and slumps along th e 'road to  f u l l  employment ' .
The Labour P a r ty 's  p rop osa ls, however, went fa r  beyond the K eynesian
in terven tion ism  o f the C onservative and L ib era l P a r t ie s .  According to
the Labour P arty  post-w ar rec o n stru c tio n  cou ld  on ly  b e ach ieved  by  
2n a tio n a l p lann ing.
Hence, when th e  Labour Government came Jto power in  1945 i t  repudi­
a ted  much o f  th e  K eynesian approach to  the e lim in a tio n  o f economic 
slumps. This approach had c a l le d  fo r  p u b lic  a c t io n  in  the form o f chan­
g es  in  ta x  or in t e r e s t  r a te s  and in  p u b lic  spending to  o f f s e t  both  
in f la t io n a r y  and d e fla tio n a r y  tren d s in  th e p r iv a te  sec to r . The Labour
1. Ib id .
2. Gruchy, p . 480.
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Government rep la ced  Keynes * c o n tr a -c y c lic a l approach w ith  a n a tio n a l 
economic p lann ing programme. The Government b e lie v e d  n a tio n a l p lan­
ning was th e  on ly  method capable o f  m aintain ing the n a tio n a l output at 
f u l l  employment.^
Keynesian economics was w id e ly  cred ited  fo r  the fa c t  th at th e
post-W orld War I I  era was ch a ra c te r ised  by th e  disappearance o f th e
chron ic unemployment that had p lagued  B r ita in  betw een the wars.
C r it ic s  o f  K eynesian economics im p l ic i t ly  concur by blaming post-w ar
in f la t io n  on th e  adoption  o f K eynesian p o l ic ie s .  The v a l id i t y  o f  both
arguments i s  now doubted. Other co u n tr ies  managed to  recover from the
war extrem ely s u c c e s s fu l ly  w ithout Keynesianism, such as Japan w ith
i t s  very  orthodox economic p o l i c i e s .  The le g a cy  o f  ' f u l l  employment'
was no doubt one o f  the most la s t in g  con tr ib u tio n s o f  Keynes and
Keynesianism  to  economic policy-m aking in  B r ita in . But d e sp ite  i t s
r a d ic a l new departure, i t  n e v e r th e le s s  embodied many o f  the l im ita t io n s
o f  th e  c la s s ic a l  sch o o l o f  econom ics. By way o f  example, according to
E liz a b e th  Johnson in  th e  Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, the K eynesian
th eory  o f  f u l l  employment ' i s  very  in tim a te ly  r e la te d  to  K eynes's
e s s e n t ia l ly  a r i s t o c r a t ic  view  o f th e  economic requirem ents o f  a happy 
2s o c ie t y ' .  But in  1945 Keynes* th e o r ie s  were extrem ely in f lu e n t ia l  -  
in  f a c t ,  in escap ab le  -  a s  shown by th e  passage o f the Employment P o l ic y  
W hite Paper (1944) which c a l le d  fo r  f u l l  employment based on K eynesian  
m odels, and was la r g e ly  endorsed and then p a r t ia l ly  implemented b y  th e  
Labour Government.
1 . Ib id .
2 , Johnson, p p .119-120.
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( i i )  Monetary and F is c a l  P o l i c i e s
The B r i t is h  Government's economic p lanning in  th e y ea rs  1945-1951  
was d ir e c te d  by f iv e  main themes ; the problem o f the ex ter n a l balance  
o f  payments, th e con tro l o f  the tendency towards in f la t io n ,  th e  growth 
o f  th e Gross N ational Product (GNP), th e  maintenance o f  h igh and stead y  
le v e ls  o f employment, and th e d e s ir e  to  l e v e l  the b u s in e ss  c y c le . I t  
was w ith  th e  weapons o f monetary and f i s c a l  p o lic y  th a t th e Labour 
Government attem pted to  ta c k le  th ese  is s u e s .  As th e  war-time co n tro ls  
were gra d u a lly  removed so th e burden o f  'r eg u la tin g ' th e economy f e l l  
in c r e a s in g ly  upon f i s c a l  p o lic y .  In  some cases the removal o f  a co n tro l 
was rep la ced  by a gen tlem en 's agreement between an in d u stry  and the  
Government to  go on d evotin g  a g iven  prop ortion  o f i t s  output to  th e  
export tr a d e . In  other ca ses  th e removal o f  a co n tro l meant r e s to r in g  
a com p letely  fr e e  market,^
The Labour Government was confronted  w ith  a tremendous b a lan ce of
payments d iseq u ilib r iu m , a w orld d o lla r  shortage and a s t e r l in g  c r i s i s
in  1947. The f i r s t  evidence o f  monetary p o lic y  used  to  combat economic
c r i s i s  was ÎÆr. D a lto n 's  'cheap money' p o lic y . T h is d e lib e r a te  monetary
p o lic y  was implemented to  s tim u la te  th e economy and to  reduce th e  co st
o f  Government borrowir^. The methods by which th e aim o f  cheaper money
can be ach ieved  are e s s e n t ia l ly  sim ple. In  e f f e c t ,  th e  C hancellor
wanted to  d ic ta t e  th e terms on which th e Government could borrow and,
in  order to  do th a t , he had e i th e r  to  persuade th e  p u b lic  to len d  on
th ose  terms, or  to  ob ta in  th e  money from banks, a s u f f ic ie n t  amount o f
2c r e d it  having been created  to  make th is  p o s s ib le .  From the b eg inn ing
1. Worswick, p . 23.
2. I b id . ,  p .195 .
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o f  the war u n t i l  the f a l l  o f  th e  Labour Government in  1951, such  
cre a tio n  o f  c r e d it  took p la c e  au tom atica lly  in  response to  the needs 
o f  th e  money market, and not on the i n i t i a t i v e  o f  the Bank o f  England. 
D alton  wanted to  keep long-term  in te r e s t  bank r a te s  down to  2 -3  per  
cen t fo r  th ree reasons : i t  would mean cheap n a t io n a lisa t io n , fo r  i t  
lowered th e c o s t  o f  Government borrowing, i t  would help  lo c a l  au th ori­
t i e s  borrow fo r  housing programmes, and i t  was considered  to  be an . 
encouragement to  general investm ent.
According to  Youngson, during th e 1945-1951 phenomenon o f  ’ cheap 
money', what a c tu a lly  happened was th a t th e ex ce ss  o f  purchasing power 
crea ted  by t h is  q u ite  novel p o l ic y  o f  fo rc in g  down in te r e s t  r a te s  cou ld  
n ot, due to  p r ic e  c o n tr o ls , be used  by consumers to  b id  up th e  p r ic e s  
o f  and so a t tr a c t  resou rces in to  th e  production o f  the commodities th ey  
r e a l ly  wanted to  buy. In stead , i t  was used to  encourage production  in  
l i n e s  o f  secondary a ttr a c t iv e n e ss  where p r ic e s  were not co n tro lled , and 
to  r a is e  the g en era l l e v e l  o f c o s ts  and, hence, th e  p r ic e s  o f B r i t is h  
ex p o rts .^
Two major even ts showed th e  very  shaky foundation  o f  B r it is h  
f in a n c e s  during th ese  y ea rs . The f i r s t  was the s t e r l in g  c r i s i s  o f  1947, 
which was p r e c ip ita te d  by th e  in s is t e n c e  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  th at s t e r ­
l in g  b e made co n v ertib le  as soon as p o s s ib le  fo llo w in g  the con clu sion  o f  
World War I I .  Thus on 15 J u ly  1947 B r i t is h  s t e r l in g  was made conver­
t i b l e .  But the rush on B r i t is h  go ld  r e ser v es  was such th at by 20 August 
o f  th e  same year th e c o n v e r t ib i l i ty  o f  s t e r l in g  had to  be ended. The 
second f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  was the d eva lu ation  o f s t e r l in g .  Major cu ts in
1. Youngson, p .l6 0 .
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the budget, e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e ever mounting c o sts  o f  the s o c ia l  ser ­
v ic e s ,  came in  October 1949 fo llo w in g  th e d eva lu ation  o f  the pound in  
September from 4 .0 5  to  2 ,8 0  d o lla r s  to  th e pound. According to  
E atw ell t h i s  50 per cen t d eva lu a tion  was to  help in  f u e l l in g  in f la t io n ,  
w ith  se r io u s  e f f e c t s  on th e Government’s p o p u la r ity  in  1950-1951.^
One of the w orst se t-b a ck s fo r  the U nited  Kingdom r e s u lt in g  from
the war was in  th e  balance o f  payments. Balance o f  payments in  t h i s
sen se  was d e fin ed  as: the d if fe r e n c e  between th e t o t a l  sum o f money
accruing to  the Government or to  persons w ith in  B r ita in  in  payments from
oth er co u n tr ies  or persons r e s id e n t  in  them, and a ls o  the t o t a l  sums
which B r ita in  or her r e s id e n ts  p a id  to  r e c ip ie n ts  abroad during a g iven  
2p eriod . Very la r g e  ex tern a l lo s s e s  had occurred and to  red re ss  th e  
s itu a t io n  major s tr u c tu r a l readjustm ents had to  b e  made in  the economy. 
Economic p o lic y  makers had recu rren t a n x ie t ie s  about the ba lance o f  
payments throughout the post-w ar period , and th e se  caused them to  take  
measures c a lc u la te d  to  r e s tr a in  a c t iv i t y  in  th e  dom estic economy, o fte n  
a t tim es when th ese  were not s t r i c t l y  appropriate from th e  p o in t o f
3v iew  o f  th e b u s in e ss  c y c le . T h is may be seen  to  be the major cause o f  
th e ra th er weak growth r a te  m an ifested  by th e  U nited  Kingdom in  t h i s  
p eriod .
From 1947 to  1952 the economy o f  the U nited  Kingdom was c o n tr o lle d  
in  i t s  broad o u t lin e s  by three main instruTments : co n tro l over im ports; 
c o n tr o l over investm ent; and c o n tro l over consumption. By e x e r c is e  o f
1. E atw ell, p . 104 .
2. G, D. H, C ole, The Post-War C ondition  o f  B r ita in , (London, 
R outledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p .192.
3 . Harrod, p p .27-28 . .
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th e se  co n tro ls  i t  was hoped to  ach ieve a balance o f  both ex tern a l 
payments and r e c e ip t s .^
The need fo r  demand management, d ir e c t  f i s c a l  p o lic y , was c o n s i­
dered an obvious n e c e s s ity  by th e post-w ar B r it is h  Government. In  
t h i s  sen se f i s c a l  p o l ic y  i s  d efin ed  as 'th e  part o f  Government p o lic y
which i s  concerned w ith  r a is in g  revenue through ta x a t io n  and other
2means and decid ing  on th e  le v e l  and p a ttern  o f ex p en d itu re '. I t  i s  
through th e  l e v e l  and p a ttern  o f  budgetary su rp lu ses and th e ir  means 
o f fin a n c in g  th a t th e Government can co n tro l th e  l e v e l  o f demand in  
th e  economy.
Government expenditure in  1945-1951 c o n s titu te d  a h igh er  propor­
t io n  o f  n a tio n a l income than ever b efore  in  peace-tim e. C onsequently  
ta x a tio n  a ls o  reached new h e ig h ts . A gap betw een gross inccxnes n et o f  
d ir e c t  ta x a t io n  began to  open q u ite  low on th e income s c a le ,  and widened 
as incomes in creased , u n t i l  f o r  the h ig h est  incomes on ly  éd. was 
re ta in e d  o f  every £1 re c e iv e d .  ^ T his crea ted  new problems o f  ta x -  
evasion  and a ls o  o f  in c e n t iv e s .
T his le a d s  to  th e  to p ic  o f r e d is tr ib u t io n  and employment. The 
th eory  o f the harmful e f f e c t  o f  ta x a tio n  on th e  supply o f labour i s  
th a t  i t  c re a te s  a gap, or in c r e a se s  an a lready e x is t in g  gap, between  
th e  va lu e o f a man's marginal product and h is  n et m arginal earn ings.
1 . Lundberg, p .41 .
2 . Bannock, p . 185. A very s la n te d  p ersp ectiv e  o f  Labour f i s c a l  p o lic y  
was g iven  by Carl P. Brand in  The B r it is h  Labour Party, (London, 
Oxford U n iv ers ity  P ress , 1965), pp. 240-241 in  a chapter e n t i t l e d  
'Labour's Great M in istry* , in  which D alton, th e C hancellor o f  th e  
Exchequer, ju st  escap es can on isa tion .
5. G. D. N. Worswick, 'P ersonal Income P o l ic y ' ,  in  Worswick and Ady,
p . 319.
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A taxed  worker, th erefo re , i s  in crea sin g  the va lu e  o f the n a tio n a l
income at a g rea te r  ra te  than he i s  in crea sin g  h is  own income. Gonse- |
quently  i t  i s ,  in  p r in c ip le , im possib le  to  compensate him ad eq u ately  #
1fo r  in creased  e f fo r t ,  or tim e, and s t i l l  le a v e  something over.
The d eva lu a tion  o f s t e r l in g  came a s  a ser io u s  blow  to th e  economic 
and f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s  o f  the Government. New measures were in troduced  
q u ick ly  by the C onservative Government e le c te d  in  th e  Autumn 1951 
General E le c t io n . There was an immediate move to  monetary p o lic y .
These new measures included  a su b s ta n t ia l import cu t and r a is in g  o f  
th e  Bank R ate.
P ost-1951  economic thought changed towards demand management,
f i s c a l  p o lic y  and the f u l l  employment th eory . No lon g er  was f u l l
employment deemed o b ta in ab le  i f  on ly  the proper fo r e c a s ts  were made
and the correct economic p o l ic ie s  implemented. , Further enç)hasis was
put on demand and the wages theory, which were considered  more important
in  economic d e c is io n  making. The r e a l weaknesses in  B r i t i s h  f i s c a l
d e c is io n s  in  1945-1951 la y  in  two fundamental assum ptions. F ir s t ,  i t
was assumed th a t the l e v e l  o f  unemployment could be m aintained at any
chosen ta r g e t  w ith in  a wide range and th a t the on ly  in h erent o b s ta c le s
were th e  te c h n ic a l d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  fo r e c a s t in g . I t  was fu rth er  assumed
th a t, w ith in  a very wide range the p ressu re  o f demand and the l e v e l  o f
unemployment made p r a c t ic a l ly  no d if fe r e n c e  to  th e movement o f  money
2wages and, th erefo re , to  th e dom estic causes o f in f la t io n .
1. I b id . ,  p .182.
2. Samuel B r i t t  an, Second Thoughts on F u ll  Employment P o l ic y , (London, 
Barry Rose (P u b lish ers) LtdT fo r  Centre fo r  P o lic y  S tu d ies , 1978, 
th ir d  e d it io n ) ,  p p .25 and 28. -;|A
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( i i i )  P lanning and C ontro ls
1. E a tw ell, p . 69.
( P lanning 3
The concept o f  p lanning economic and s p e c i f i c a l ly  in d u s tr ia l
reco n stru ctio n  was presen t b e fo r e  the Second World War. I t  has been  
viewed as a r e a c t io n  ag a in st th e  unemployment o f th e  in ter-w ar y ea rs , 
and during World War I I  i t s e l f  p lanning came to  b e considered  th e  
proper means o f  preven tin g  the recurrence o f  a post-w ar r e c e s s io n  and 
a p o s s ib le  economic d ep ression . O verall p lanning by no means n eces­
s a r i ly  accompanies s ta te  in te r v e n tio n . I t s  a p p lic a t io n  in  B r ita in  
b efo re  1945 was alm ost s o le ly  due to  war. B efore I 9I 6 i t  d id  not e x i s t  ; 
th e modern economic S ta te  had not been invented, a l l  measures were taken  
piecem eal and Government departments competed w ith  each other, even  in  
purchasing su p p lie s . But by August 1939, w ith  th e  p u b lic a tio n  o f th e  
Barlow Report th ere  was expressed  a d es ire  fo r  a new m in istry  to  
coord inate on a n a tio n a l l e v e l  r e g io n a l development o f in d u stry . Accor­
ding to  E a tw ell, a f t e r  1945 th ere  was mounting in te r e s t  in  th e  u se  o f -â
budgetary p o lic y  to  secure economic g o a ls , n o tab ly  f u l l  ' employment, 3
which had been accepted  as an economic aim in  th e 1944 White Paper on 
Employment P o l ic y .^ The post-w ar era saw a s h i f t  in  economic p o l ic y  
from planning to  demand management ( f i s c a l  p o l ic y ) ,  and f in a l l y  b y  th e  
la t e  1940’ s to  a r e tr e a t  from planning as an economic co n tro l.
According to  Budd i t  was Keynes' new id eas on th e  causes o f  unem­
ployment which strengthened  the Labour P a r ty ’s case  fo r  p lanning. 
Unemployment was caused by a mismatching o f  d e c is io n s  on savings and 
investm ent; the problem could be so lv ed  by c o n tr o ll in g  investm ent II
A lthough as a technique i t  was p o l i t i c a l l y  n eu tra l, i t  was the  
case in  p r a c t ic e  that in  B r ita in  planning r e c e iv e d  more support from 
the l e f t  than from the r ig h t .  What i s  more, economic p lanning tended  
to  b e  p a r t ic u la r ly  a s so c ia te d  w ith  the Labour P arty . Thus, much o f  
th e  p o l i t i c s  o f economic p lanning was party  p o l i t i c s ,  and one should  
view  i t  m ainly in  terms o f  th e  id eas and a c t io n s  o f the two major par­
t i e s .  The Labour Party was a sso c ia te d  w ith  p lanning fo r  two major 
reason s. The f i r s t  was th e b e l i e f  held  by Labour supporters th a t the  
in t e r e s t s  o f  th ose  whom th e p arty  rep resen t were b e s t  met by p lanning. 
The second was th a t s in ce  th e  war the Labour P arty  had wanted planning  
to  b e  i t s  d is t in c t iv e  approach to  economic p o lic y . I t  needed such a 
d is t in c t iv e  approach both  as a sa le s  d ev ice  and fo r  in te r n a l party  
cohesion . The post-w ar h is to r y  o f  economic p lanning in  th e  Labour Party  
can b e seen  as i t s  attem pt to  f in d  a creed to  rep lace  i t s  pre-war 
commitment to  p u b lic  ownership. (Although the theory o f p u b lic  owner­
sh ip  was one s t i l l  f a i r l y  prominent between 1945 and 1951 .)
The problem o f  how to  d ea l e f f e c t iv e ly  w ith  th e  c o n f l ic t  betvreen 
s o c ia l  c o s ts  and b e n e f it s  had lo n g  been recogn ised  by economic th eo r­
i s t s .  Government planning and c o n tr o ls  were th e  Labour P a r ty ’s and thus  
th e  post-w ar Government’s way o f  d ea lin g  w ith  th ese  problems. I t  was
1. Budd, p p .55-56.
2. I b id . ,  p .16.
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d ir e c t ly .  But Keynes h im se lf was to  sabotage th e  argument. He 
argued th a t  o v e r a ll demand management, w ith in  the com p etitive  c a p ita -  %Il i s t  system , was th e  s o lu t io n , and th e  post-w ar years have o ften  been  3
1 .p resen ted  as an example o f  t h is .
3é
th e  f in a l  break w ith  Sm ithian la i s s e z - f a i r e . A t t le e  spoke o f th e  
Labour P a r ty ’ s in te n t io n  ’to  s u b s t itu te  fo r  the anarchy o f  co m p etitive  
in d u str ia lism  a planned and organ ized  system ’ The id ea  of p lanning  
in  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t  was co n tra sted  w ith  C onservative p o l i c i e s  which 
were seen  a s  p lann ing in  the in t e r e s t  o f  c a p i t a l i s t s .  Indeed, i t  i s  a 
b i t  su rp r is in g  th a t in  i t s  1945 e le c t io n  m an ifesto , Let Us Face The 
Future, th e  Labour P arty  made fev/ referen ces  to  the machinery o f  econ­
omic p lanning.
S in ce n a tio n a l economic p lanning was a new ven tu re, the f i r s t
Survey devoted some space to  d e fin in g  th e o b ject o f  planning: ’to  u se
the n a tio n a l reso u rces  in  the b e s t  in t e r e s t s  o f  the n a tio n  as a whole
2and to  provide i t  w ith  a p h ilo sop h y’ . D is i l lu s io n  w ith  n a tio n a l p lan ­
n ing can be traced  through the su c c e s s iv e  v ers io n s  o f  the Economic 
Surveys. Demand management soon rep laced  d e f in it iv e  economic p lann ing. 
By 1951 p lanning had been more or l e s s  abandoned. W elfare c a p ita lism  
rep la ced  so c ia lism  as th e Labour P a r ty ’s p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e . I t  com­
b in ed  Keynesian methods o f  demand management -  u s in g  gen era l ra th er  than  
s p e c i f i c  measures to  in flu en ce  th e  economy -  w ith  th e  ex ten sion  o f  th e  
W elfare S ta te . The Labour Party cou ld  no longer r e ly  on e le c to r a l  
support f o r  p lanning, and the C onservatives, p a r t ly  in  response to  
popular sentim ent, b r i e f l y  moved towards L iberal-C onservatism . The 
C onservatives came t o  power in  1951 cla im ing to  ’ s e t  th e  people f r e e ’ ; 
but in  p r a c tic e  th ey  adopted p o l i c i e s  which were b a r e ly  d is t in g u ish a b le  
from th o se  o f the d e fea ted  Labour Government.^
1 . C. R. A ttlee , The Labour P arty  in  P er sp ec tiv e , (G ollancz, 1937), 
p . 284.
2. Budd, pp. 98-  59.
3 . I b id . ,  p . 59.
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P o lla r d  sunraarlzes th e  economic p lanning o f  1943-1951: 'In
p r a c t ic e , th e  Government’s p o lic y  o f ’dem ocratic p la n n in g ’ was to  be
somewhat betw een e c l e c t i c ,  varied , and changing ra p id ly  in  i t s  b r ie f  
1y ears o f  o f f i c e ’ . A ccording to  E atw ell: ’The most obvious economic
change between pre-v/ar and post-w ar B r ita in  was f u l l  employment, a 
change which had a major e f f e c t  in  reducing poverty and r a is in g  l iv in g  
standards. But i t  i s  d ou btfu l whether the governments’ p o l ic ie s  had 
much t o  do w ith  t h i s ,  A m assive post-w ar c y c l ic a l  boom was alm ost cer­
t a in ly  more important than th e governm ents’ e f fo r t s  a t p lanning and
K eynesian demand management. Indeed, by th e  la t e  1940s p h y s ic a l p lan -
2ning was tak ing a l e s s  and l e s s  important r o le  in  economic p o lic y  ’ . 
Another o f  the major c r i t ic is m s  o f th e  national p r o je c t io n s  s e t  fo r  
s p e c i f i c  in d u str ie s  was th a t ta r g e ts  were not r e a l i s t i c  in  terms o f  
production  cap acity . But n a tio n a l p lanning served as a v i t a l  b rid ge  
betw een c o n tr o lle d  wartime economy and a peace-tim e economy run along  
m odified  s o c ia l i s t  l i n e s .  As the economy r ea sser ted  i t s e l f  fo llo w in g  
the war the need fo r  p lann ing le ssen ed , but t h is  does not d im inish  i t s  
importance during the f i r s t  post-v/ar y ea rs .
(b) C ontrols
There e x is te d  in  B r ita in  a t the c lo s e  o f the Second World War 
a need fo r  the con tin u ation  o f  c o n tr o ls . B r ita in  was fa ced  w ith  a v a st  
balance o f  payments problem, an enormous p ressu re o f  dom estic demand, 
and r a p id ly  r i s in g  in f la t io n .  The post-w ar Labour Government took over 
th e  whole panoply o f wartime co n tro ls  and, w ith  few ex cep tio n s , kept 
them in  b e in g . Given th e economic s itu a t io n  o f  B r ita in  a t th e  tim e.
1 . P o lla r d , p p .272-273.
2. E a tw e ll, p .157.
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hov/ever, i t  may be assumed th e C onservative Party  would have done the  
same, a t  le a s t  fo r  a number o f y ea rs . A whole range o f co n tro ls  were 
u sed  during t t i is  p er iod . D irec t c o n tr o ls  included  b u ild in g  r e s t r ic ­
t io n , production  g u id e lin e s , p r ic e  c o n tr o l, r a tio n in g , both  consumer 
and in d u s tr ia l ,  and s ta tu to r y  co n tro l.
When th e  F ir s t  World War began th e  whole o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  economy 
o f modern war had y e t  to  be thought out. Apart from sheer ignorance  
and in ex p er ien ce  th ere were many in to le r a b le  d e la y s  in  im posing c o n tro ls , 
and much r e s is ta n c e  on d o c tr in a l grounds o f  l a i s s e z - f a i r e . But by I 9I 8 
v ery  g rea t changes had been  wrought, immensely in crea sin g  the scope o f  
th e S ta te .  Every form o f c o n tro l introduced in  th e F ir s t  World War was 
repeated  in  the Second, bu t th e fo llo w in g  were not used in  1914-1918 : 
’cheap money] fo rced  loan s from th e p u b lic , exchange co n tro l, p o in ts  
r a tio n in g , th e  con cen tration  o f  c iv i l ia n  in d u s tr ie s  and d ir e c t io n  o f  
labour.^  The a c tu a l c o n tro ls  taken over from the Caretaker Government 
in  1545 a t  the end o f the war and continued by the Supp lies and S erv ice s  
(T r a n s it io n a l Powers) Act o f  1945 contained f i s c a l ,  f in a n c ia l  and 
p h y sic a l p lann ing powers. The U nited  S ta te s  la r g e ly  got r id  o f  con­
t r o l s  by 1946, bu t had c o n tr o ls  been kept by th e  Americans a l i t t l e  
lon ger  the g r e a t  upsurge o f  d o lla r  p r ic e s , which had a w orld-w ide e f f e c t ,
might have b een  avoided. But th ere was no doubt th a t a fu r th e r  p eriod
2o f co n tro l was e s s e n t ia l  fo r  th e  U nited Kingdom.
The actu a l course fo llow ed  betw een 1945 and 1950 was 
a gradual d ism an tlin g  o f  war-tim e c o n tr o ls . The pro­
c e ss  was not uniform: attem pts were made from tim e
to  tim e, e .g .  a f t e r  th e c o n v e r t ib i l i ty  c r i s i s  o f  1947,
1 . W ile s , p .127.
2 . Harrod, p .46 .
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to  t ig h te n  up or to  réim posé p a r tic u la r  c o n tr o ls .  
But, by  1950, f in a l  consumers were ra tion ed  on ly  
in  resp ec t o f the p r in c ip a l item s o f  food, and, 
in  an inform al way, o f  co a l. R ationing had been  
removed from c lo th in g  and fu r n itu r e  and o th er  
item s such as soap and p e tr o l .  Raw m a ter ia l a l l o ­
ca tio n s  to  in d u stry , in c lu d in g  s t e e l ,  had b een  
e n t ir e ly  removed by 1950, but ea r ly  in  1951 world  
shortages o f raw m a ter ia ls , and rearmament, le d  to  
a r e s to r a t io n  o f  c e r ta in  c o n tr o ls . The c o n tr o l of 
labour had gone: the e x te n s iv e  p r ic e  co n tr o l o f
non-food goods o f  the war y ea rs  had been la r g e ly  
removed, or had become so vague as to  be in e f f e c ­
t iv e .  B u ild in g  lic e n s in g , however, s t i l l  remained 
and was alm ost as ' r e s t r ic t iv e '  in  i t s  impact on 
in d iv id u a ls  and firm s in  1950 as a t  any tim e during 
the post-w ar p e r io d .1
Government co n tro l o f  in d iv id u a l commodities provided c le a r  
examples o f  d ir e c t  involvem ent, fo r  the Government continued to  be the  
c h ie f  su p p lie r  of raw m a te r ia ls  fo llo w in g  the con clusion  o f  the Second 
World Vfar. C ontrols p e r s is t e d  in  the c a p ita l  investm ent f i e l d .  B u ild ­
ing l ic e n c e s  were t ig h t ly  c o n tr o lle d  and norm ally required  a sponsoring  
Government department, and attem pts were made to  put in to  p r a c t ic e  th e
wartime b lu e p r in ts  fo r  the planned u se  o f land; th e v a st p r o f i t s
r e a liz e d  by ‘d evelopers' s in c e , exp la in  in  part the b i t t e r  o p p o sitio n  
to  th ese  c o n tr o ls . Other powers survived a f t e r  1951, in c lu d in g  the Town 
and Country P lanning Act which gave C ounties and County Boroughs a v e to  
over th e s i t in g  o f in d u s tr ie s  c o n f lic t in g  w ith  th e ir  long-term  p la n s.
The s ix  'Development A rea s', ex ten sion s o f  the former 'S p e c ia l A reas', 
were a id ed  under the D is tr ib u t io n  o f Industry A cts o f  1945 and 1950 by  
Government funds fo r  the co n stru c tio n  o f  f a c t o r ie s  to  be l e t  to  l i g h t  
in d u stry  a t  pre-war ren ts , and by o th er inducements, in clud ing  s e r v ic e s ,
f a c i l i t i e s ,  and lo a n s . I t  was the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  ob ta in in g  labour.
1 , Worswick, p . 23.
:v:r  v  r-ryrr;
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l ic e n c e s  and f a c i l i t i e s  e lsew here th a t made the e f f o r t s  to  d ea l w ith
By e x e r c ise  o f  th ese  c o n tro ls  th e  Government sou gh t-to  ach ieve
b oth  eq u ilib riu m  betw een th e  supply and demand fo r  resou rces, and a
b a lan ce  o f  ex tern a l payments. But in  February 1947 th ere  appeared th e
Economic Survey, fo r  1947, which d eclared  th a t, even w ith  the help  o f
c o n tr o ls , 'th e  ta sk  o f  d ir e c t in g  by dem ocratic methods an economic
system  as la rg e  and complex as ours i s  fa r  beyond th e  power o f  any
Governmental machine ' ; but which f a i l e d  to  produce any new id ea s f o r
d ea lin g  w ith  an economic c r i s i s  which The Economist d eclared  in  August
2was ' reaching d esp erate  p ro p o r tio n s '. P h y sica l c o n tr o ls  were coming 
under in crea sin g  a tta ck  from C onservatives and b u s in e ss  by 1948, though 
some businessm en d id  w e ll  out o f  co n tro ls;  fo r  example, p r ice  c o n tr o ls  
were f ix e d  through c o n su lta tio n  w ith  an industry , o f te n  a t  r e la t iv e ly  
h igh  levels,"^  'D ir ec t co n tro ls  were b ein g  abandoned la t e  in  1948; 
th e r e tr e a t  from 'dem ocratic p la n n in g ' had b eg in . A fter  a ra th er  
d isa s tr o u s  in te r v a l ,  monetary co n tro l was 'd iscovered ' by the Tory 
Government in  1951.
The f a c t  i s  th a t no one knows how fa r  a Labour Government, i f  
returned  to  power in  th e  autumn o f  1951, would have gone towards 
l ib e r a l i s a t io n  w ith in  th e p r iv a te  e n terp r ise  sec to r  o f th e  econoiry. 
Harrod w r ite s  th a t s in ce  i t  i s  u n lik e ly  th a t a C onservative Government 
would have taken a d if f e r e n t  a t t itu d e  towards th e  regime o f  co n tro ls  in
1. P o lla r d , p p .371-372.
2 . Youngson, p .l6 7 .
3. E a tw e ll, p . 99.
4 . Youngson, p . 265.
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the d eep -se t  problems o f  th ese  d i s t r i c t s  tem p orarily  su c c e s s fu l.^
4 1 I
1, Harrod, p .4-8.
2 . Brand, pp. 241-242.
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th e  1940’ s , and, indeed, on i t s  assum ption o f  power in  1951 i t  actu ­
a l l y  in t e n s i f ie d  c e r ta in  r e s t r ic t io n s ,  t h i s  asp ect o f so c ia lism , i f  IÎ
i t  i s  r ig h t  to  so regard i t ,  cannot be sa id  to  have made any la s t in g  
im print on th e B r i t is h  economy,^
( iv )  N a tio n a lisa t io n
The n a t io n a lis a t io n  o f in d u stry  was probably th e  most id e n t i f ia b le  
fe a tu r e  o f  the 1945-1951 Labour Government, and had been one of the Imajor g o a ls  o f  the Labour P arty as i t  came in to  power in  1945- Backed 
by a strong m ajority  in  the Commons, the Labour Government proceeded  
to  enact the programme o u tlin ed  in  Let Us Face The Future (1945). 4
N a tio n a lisa t io n  was something upon which the p a r t ie s  were in  im tual d is ­
agreement. To Labour i t  was d e s ir a b le , not as an end in  i t s e l f ,  but as  
a u s e fu l t o o l  both  fo r  p lanning and fo r  high p ro d u c tiv ity , and f o r  a 
b e t te r  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  w ealth  and grea ter  s o c ia l  eq u a lity . The 
C onservatives and L ib era ls  were opposed on p r in c ip le ,  although they  
were w il l in g  to  accept and u se  i t  when the o cca s io n  demanded. The p o st­
war Labour Government n a t io n a lis e d  th e  Bank o f England, the co a l mining
industry , c i v i l  a v ia tio n , telecom m unications, e l e c t r i c i t y  and gas
2supply, in lan d  tra n sp o rta tio n , and iron  and s t e e l .
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Table 2 -  N a t io n a lisa t io n  D ates fo r  B r i t is h  In d u s tr ie s , 1947-1951
V estin g  date
The N ation al Coal Board (N, C.B. ) 1 January 1947
The B r i t is h  Transport Commission 1 January 1948
The B r it is h  E le c t r ic i t y  A uthority
(B.E.A. ) and Area E le c t r ic i t y  Boards 1 A pril 1948
The Area Gas Boards and the B r i t is h
Gas C ouncil 1 May 1949
The Iron and S t e e l  C orporation o f
Great B r ita in  15 February 1951
Source; C legg in  Worswick and Ady, p .425.
N a tio n a lisa t io n  needs to  be understood as n ot prim arily  about 
Government ownership, but as Government co n tro l. Stockholders were 
is su e d  new Treasury stock  to  rep la ce  th at o f th e  company which had been  
n a tio n a lise d . The Treasury thus became the company, ner s^. rep la c in g  
th e  body o f owners.
N a tio n a lisa t io n  came to  be view ed as  appropriate fo r  s p e c if ic  
in d u s tr ie s  ( i . e .  to  be operated  on a nation-w ide s c a le )  but by no means 
was to  in vo lv e  a l l  th e country’ s in d u stry . The Labour Government adopted  
the m od ified  s o c ia l i s t  theory  o f  a ’mixed economy’, which m aintained th a t  
n a t io n a lisa t io n  was n ecessa ry  fo r  ’b a s i c ’ in d u str ie s  and th a t l e s s  
d ir e c t  means o f co n tro l su ff ic e d , a t l e a s t  in  th e short terra, fo r  o th er  
in d u s tr ie s .^
1. H. A. Clegg, ’N a tio n a liz ed  In d u stry ’, in  Worswick and Ady, p p .424, 
426 and 427.
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In  each o f the in d u s tr ie s  th a t were n a tio n a lise d , p r ic e s  b efo re  
n a t io n a lis a t io n  had by no means been determ ined by com p etition . War­
tim e p r ic e  co n tro ls  and f la t - r a t e  in c r e a se s  had fu rth er  ’warped’ the  
p r ic e  system . Apart from mining, the n a tio n a lise d  in d u s tr ie s  belonged  
to  the group o f  in ter-w a r  ’s h e lte r e d ’ in d u str ie s  whose workers su ffered  
a d e c lin e  in  wages and earnings during the war period . But by 1952 
n a t io n a lis e d  in d u str ie s  were ex cep tio n a l among B r it is h  in d u stry  fo r  th e  
high  p rop ortion  o f  wages in  r e la t io n  to  th e ir  t o t a l  c o s t s .  The duty o f  
the N ation a l Boards was to  r a t io n a l is e  system s o f  p r ic e  adjustment which
were g e t t in g  out o f  hand, not t o  rep la ce  a fr e e  market by  a system o f  
1plann ing.
The argument made most freq u en tly  fo r  n a t io n a lisa t io n  was th a t
2such measures were e s s e n t ia l  in  th e in te r e s t s  o f e f f ic ie n c y .  But th e  
a d m in istra tiv e  problems o f a la rg e  programme o f  n a t io n a lis a t io n  could  
not have been  c le a r ly  fo r e se e n . One very r e a l  problem was th a t ’th e  
savings ob ta in ed  by transform ing eq u ity  c a p ita l  in to  g i l t - e d g e  savings  
and by c e n tr a liz e d  commercial arrangements are r e a l, but sm all compared 
to  the t o t a l s  in vo lved  and may e a s i ly  be swallowed up in  r i s in g  c o s ts  
due to  a r i s in g  p r ic e - le v e l ,  wage in cr ea se s , or f a l l in g  demand',^ I t  
was soon seen  th a t th e d if fe r e n c e  between making money and a c t in g  in  
the p u b lic  in t e r e s t  was sm aller  than most p eo p le  had imagined, and th a t  
n a t io n a lisa t io n  had some d i f f i c u l t  problems o f  i t s  own. A ccording to  
Youngson i t  a ls o  became in c r e a s in g ly  c lea r  th a t B r i ta in ’s  fu tu re  was not 
to  be secured so much by reo rg a n isin g  b a s ic  in d u str ie s , as by develop ing
1. I b id . ,  p p .442, 443 and 438.
2. Worswick, p . 27.
3. C legg, p . 448.
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1. Youngson, p p .187-188,
2. Harrod, p p .61-62.
3. Gavin McCrone, R egion al P o l ic y  in  B r ita in . (London, George A llen  
and Unwin L td ., I 969) ,  p . 19*
new and e x is t in g  in d u s tr ie s  which could  s e l l  th e ir  vvares in  com peti- |
t iv e  m arkets overseas and produce fo r  home consumption th e  goods 
which a p eop le  growing ra p id ly  r ich er  wanted to  huy.^ H arrod's c r i ­
tiq u e  o f th e se  years was th a t ' I f  we take the whole p ic tu r e , i t  
appears th a t th e Labour government from 1943 to  1951 d id  not take the  
country much fu rth er  towards th e  n a tio n a l ownership and co n tro l o f  
industry  than might have been  thought exped ient by m id d le-o f-th e-ro a d
2people, who were not d eep ly  wedded to  th e d octr in e  o f  l a i s  se z - fa ir e  '.
(v ) R egional P o lic y
Although d isc u sse d  b efo re  the Second World War, reg io n a l p o lic y  
was not implemented u n t i l  the post-w ar era . There are sev era l reason s $ 
fo r  t h i s  : the 1945 Labour Government was more sym pathetic to  a p o l ic y  
o f r e g io n a l con tro l than any prev ious ad m in istration ; in  1945 a l l  the  
machinery o f  war-time co n tro l was s t i l l  a v a ila b le  fo r  u se  as a programme 
o f  r e g io n a l p o lic y  was begun; and reg io n a l p o lic y  v/as necessary  i f  a 
f u l l  employment p o lic y  was to  be a c tu a liz e d .
I t  was th e  Barlow Report th a t f i r s t  l a i d  emphasis on 'th e  lin k s
between r e g io n a l p o lic y , urban redevelopm ent p o lic y  and transport  
3p la n n in g '. The purpose o f  the Report was to  in q u ire  in to  the fo r c e s  
which had in flu en ced  th e  geograph ical d is tr ib u t io n  o f th e  in d u s tr ia l  
p op u la tion  o f  Great B r ita in  and to  su ggest th e  probable d ir e c t io n  o f  
any fu tu r e  change in  th a t d is tr ib u t io n  w h ile  a lso  exp lor in g  th e  s o c ia l .
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economic and s tr a te g ic  d isadvantages a r is in g  from th e  con cen tra tion  
o f  in d u s tr ie s  and an in d u s tr ia l  p op u lation  in  la rg e  towns or p a rticu ­
la r  areas o f  the country. ^
The gen era l con d itio n s o f  th e  ea r ly  post-w ar p eriod  were q u ite
favourable to  a r e d is tr ib u t io n  o f  industry . The e x iste n c e  o f  some
/A13 m ill io n  squstre f e e t  o f  su rp lu s ord nance f a c t o r ie s  in  the a s s i s t e d
areas, the r e la t iv e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  labour, a pent-up demand fo r
c a p ita l investm ent, and, most im portantly, th e  ex ten t to  which
A t t le e ' s  Government was w i l l in g  to  enforce i t s  c o n tr o ls  a l l  favoured
r e d is tr ib u t io n . As a r e s u lt  o f  t h is ,  the Development Areas gained
th e ir  g r e a te s t  ever share o f  new in d u s tr ia l development : over 50 per
cen t o f  t o t a l  n a tio n a l development by area in  th e  p eriod  1945- 1947•
T his s itu a t io n  changed d ram atica lly  fo llo w in g  th e  October 1947 b a lan ce
o f  payments c r i s i s ,  which fo rce d  th e  Government in to  p ib l i c  expenditure
c u ts , s h if te d  emphasis to  export production and focu sed  a t te n t io n  on
n a tio n a l ra th er  than reg io n a l problems. T his 'de-em phasis' o f  r eg io n a l
a s s is ta n c e , acceded to  u n w illin g ly  by the Labour Government, was embraced
2openly by th e C onservative Government e le c te d  in  1951.
In  1945-1951 r e g io n a l p o lic y  was considered  to  have a p rim arily  
economic focu s ( i . e .  th e  red u ction  o f  unemployment) and i t  was not u n t i l  
th e  l a t e  1 950 's th a t  th ere  appeared a p o l i t i c a l  a sp ec t to  i t .  The econ­
omic a sp ec ts  o f  th e  ca se  both  fo r  and a g a in st r e g io n a l p o lic y  were f i r s t  
s e t  out in  d e t a i l  as th ey  ap p lied  to  B r ita in  by th e  Barlow Report in
1 . Royal Commission on the D is tr ib u t io n  o f the I n d u s tr ia l P op u la tion  
Report. (London, H.M.S. 0. Cmd, 6153, January 1940), pp. 17 and 51. 
Commonly r e fe rred  to  as the Barlow Report.
2. J .  D, McCallum, 'The Development o f  B r it is h  R eg ion a l P o l ic y ’, in  
Duncan Madennan and John B. Parr, R egional P o lic y . (Oxford, 
M artin Robinson, 1979), pp. 8- 9 .
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1 9 4 0 .  ^ The case  r e s te d  on th ree  main p o in ts;
(1 ) th a t f r e e  market fo r c e s  cannot be r e l ie d  on to  operate  
s a t i s f a c t o r i ly  in  lo c a t io n  d e c is io n s ;
( 2) th a t economic growth req u ires  a p o lic y  to  ensure that 
th e economy's spare resou rces are as fa r  as p o s s ib le  
u t i l iz e d ;
( 3) th a t the avoidance o f  in f la t io n  and achievement o f  stead y
growth are on ly  com patible i f  wide d if fe r e n c e s  in
2reg io n a l unemployment r a te s  are avoided .
According to  Fogarty i t  was th e duty o f  the proposed n a tio n a l a u th o r ity  
to  estim ate th e  development o f  each in d u stry  and th at i t  should be a 
means o f  coord in a tion  not c o n tr o l.^  The th ree  main concerns o f  reg io n a l 
p o lic y  were : th e  d ec lin e  o f  se v e r a l lead in g  in d u str ie s , i . e .  co a l, 
sh ip b u ild in g , iro n  and s t e e l ,  l in e n  and ju te ;  the d ec lin e  in  employment 
in  a g r icu ltu re ; and the growth o f  b ig  towns w ith  th e ir  in h erent s o c ia l  
disad vantages,^  Depressed areas, urban or r u r a l, were u s u a lly  areas o f  
s p e c ia liz e d  in d u s tr ie s . A ccording to  Fogarty 'new fa c to r ie s  are impor­
ta n t to  break down the b e l i e f  th a t S p ec ia l A reas are f i t  on ly  fo r  th e ir
5tr a d it io n a l in d u s tr ie s ' .
1. McCrone, p . 26.
2. I b id .,  p p .30- 31.
3. M. P. Fogarty, P rosp ects  o f  the In d u s tr ia l Areas o f  Great B r ita in . 
(London, Methuen and Co. L td ., 1945), p .453. The term 'S p e c ia l  
Area' was changed to  'Development Area' in  1945.
4 . M. P . F ogarty, 'The L ocation  o f In d u stry ', in  Y/orswick and Ady,
p p .254- 255.
5 . I b id .,  p . 264.
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Gavin McCrone remarks in  R egional P o lic y  in  B r ita in , tlm t in  
view  o f  th e  lon g -sta n d in g  nature o f  the problem i t  may seem su rp ris in g  
th a t reg io n a l p o lic y  d.id not come in to  ex is ten ce  u n t i l  a f te r  1945.
But i t  must be remembered th at i t  was not u n t i l  World War I I  th at the  
Government began to  accep t the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  and powers n ecessary  to  
co n tro l the le v e l  o f  n a tio n a l economic a c t iv i t y .  A cceptance o f  f u l l  
employment as an o b je c t iv e , along w ith  the g o a ls  o f  th e  w elfare s ta te ,  
n e c e s s ita te d  r e g io n a l p o lic y .^
1, McCrone, p .13.
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Chapter Two
Framework fo r  Post-War S cotland
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1. Impact o f  the War
The f i r s t  Sunday o f  September 1939, the a ir -r a id  warning was SI
1 '^:^jf i r s t  heard in  S cotlan d  and throughout B r ita in .
The B r i t i s h  a ir  d efen ces reached the c r u c ia l  suraaer o f  1940 w ith
a f ig h te r  fo r c e  which i t s  Commander-in-Chief and the A ir S ta f f  agreed
was uncom fortably sm all. The early-w arning and rep ortin g  system  was
near com pletion  in  the south and ea st but i t  was notably d e f ic ie n t  in
2the w est and p a r ts  o f  Scotland , Thus i t  i s  not su rp r is in g  th a t ’ the  
h ea v ie st c a s u a lt ie s  su ffe red  during th e f i r s t  h a lf  o f  J u ly  1940 
occurred in  Aberdeen, where more than 50 peop le være k i l l e d  or s e r i ­
ou sly  in ju red  on th e n igh t o f  th e  tw e lfth  in  an a ttack  d e liv e r e d  when
3th e s ir e n s  had not sounded.
L iving  through th e B l i t z ,  which attem pted to  show the e f f e c t s  o f  
th e  German b l i t z  on th e  morale o f  the various reg io n s  o f  Great B r ita in ,  
s t a t e s  th at;
In  Scotland, on ly  Glasgow (p op u la tion  c . 1 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 )  
w ith  the a s so c ia te d  C lydeside shipyard and indus­
t r i a l  towns, r e c e iv e d  f u l l  b l i t z in g ,  a s  the north­
w estern  ex ten sio n  o f  the L u ftw a ffe 's  main e f f o r t .
I t  was l e f t  unm olested a l l  autumn and w in ter (1940), 
to  r e c e iv e  a l l  i t s  f i v e  b ig  r a id s  between mid-March
1. B a s i l  C o ll ie r ,  The D efence o f the U nited  Kingdom, (London,
H.M.S.O., 1957), p . l .
2 . I b id .,  p . 154.
3. I b id . ,  p . 163 . Aberdeen was h i t  again  in  1943 when th ir t y  bombers
were sen t from a forward base in  Norway, an unusual t a c t i c ,  fo r
the purpose o f  a dusk a tta c k  on the port c i t y .  The a tta ck in g
p lan es escaped w ith  no in te r fe r e n c e  and tw o-th ird s o f  th e  load  h it  
Aberdeen i t s e l f  (C o ll ie r ,  p. 316). But Aberdeen was not trou b led  
as much as Glasgow by a ir -r a id s  because i t  was not con sid ered  as  
prime an in d u s tr ia l ta r g e t .
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and mid-May ( l9 4 l ) ,  w ith  some I 3OO tons o f  HE 
(h igh  e x p lo s iv e s ) .  The Clyde towns thus had a 
la r g e  margin o f  time to  prepare, a f te r  th e  
b l i t z  had begun fa r th er  south .^
But Glasgow vfas, by th e end o f the war, to  b e mentioned on a l i s t  o f
'c la im an ts (tow ns) to  the m elancholy honour o f  having su ffe r e d  most
2in  the n ig h t o f f e n s iv e ' .  The most ser io u s  and sp ectacu lar  a ir -r a id  
damage was n ot, in  f a c t ,  in f l i c t e d  on Glasgow i t s e l f ,  but on neigh­
bouring Clydebank, where John Brown's and S in g e r 's  were s itu a te d .
Much o f  th e  town was destroyed  by eneny a c t io n .
The Glasgow area  was, during the ea r ly  p art o f the war, by no
means free  o f  th e  in d u s tr ia l  u n rest which had b een  p resen t on th e
C lydeside s in c e  b e fo r e  th e  F ir s t  World War. Some lead in g  c i t i z e n s  even
3argued that 'what Glasgow needed as a few good bombs'. But Tom 
Johnston was r ig h t ly  proud o f  th e  d iffe r e n c e  betw een th e F ir s t  and 
Second World War in  th is  r e s p e c t . In  fa c t  in  World War I I  the o n ly  
d isru p tiv e  an ti-w ar elem ent was provided by the Communist P arty  (which  
was strong in  th e  Unions and th e  Glasgow Trades C ouncil) who opposed  
th e war w ith  H it le r  u n t i l  Germany attacked  R u ssia , and then th ey  threw  
t h e ir  w eight w ho le-h earted ly  beh ind  i t .  W illiam  G allacher, th e  le a d in g  
member o f th e  S c o t t is h  Commnist P arty , r e issu e d  h is  book. R ev o lt on 
th e Clyde, to  in s p ir e  workers to  throw th e ir  w eight behind the war. He 
w rote in  h is  In tro d u ctio n  to  the August 1941 e d it io n ;
1. Tom H arris son. L iv ing Through the B l i t z . (London, C o llin s , 1976), 
p .252. See a ls o , C o llie r , p p .503-505, Appendix XXX, 'N otable N ight 
A ttacks on U nited  Kingdom C it ie s ,  14th November, 1940 -  l6 th  May,
1941*.
2 . C o llie r , p . 281. . .
3 . H arrisson, p , 253.
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I t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  note th a t  when the a ir -r a id s  began th a t th e r e  was 
l i t t l e  in d u s tr ia l  d is lo c a t io n  in  the Glasgow area . For example, 'many 
Olydebankers worked in  th e  John Browns sh ipyards. Of th ese  a "good 
proportion" turned up as u su a l [ fo r  work, th e  day a f te r  an a ir - r a id ] .
The "vast m ajority"  o f  a b sen tees  went back a f t e r  an average 11-14  
d ay '.^
O vera ll S co tlan d  was not as b ad ly  a ffe c te d  by a c tu a l bonbings a s  
London or even n o r th -e a s t  England, No major in d u s tr ia l  works were des­
troyed  in  S cotlan d  during German bombings. A cogent argument can be 
made th a t th e  reason fo r  fa s t e r  German post-w ar reco n stru ctio n , in  
comparison to  B r i t i s h  recovery, i s  due to  the very  f a c t  th a t German
3fa c t o r ie s ,  i . e .  th e  Krupp M unitions Works in  th e Ruhr V a lley , had been  
com p lete ly  destroyed  or d ism antled  during the war. Thus fo llo w in g  World 
War I I  when r eb u ild in g  was done in  Germany i t  was, n a tu ra lly , done on 
th e  most modern l i n e s .  But in  most o f  the A llie d  c o u n tr ie s , e s p e c ia l ly
R evo lt on th e  Clyde shows how the workers fought 
in  th e circum stances o f the la s t  war, I  hope i t  
may b e the means o f  in sp ir in g  men and women in  
th e  fa c to r ie s ,  to  f ig h t  now, in  new circum stances, 
a s  th ey  never fought b e fo re , fo r  th e weapons th at  
are n ecessary  to  honour our a ll ia n c e  w ith  the  
S o v ie t  Union -  th a t so our people and the people  
o f  th e  S o v ie t Union, s tr ik in g  from the E ast and 
from the West, may smash fo r  ever the power o f  
H it le r  Germany and fr e e  th e peop le o f  Europe 
from th e menace o f  F a s c is t  S lavery. ^
1. W illiam  G allacher, R evolt on th e Clyde, (London, Lawrence and 
W ishart, 1936), p p .4 -5  o f  In trod u ction .
2 . I b id . , p .256. See a ls o , Terence H. O'Brien, C iv i l  Defence.
(London, H.M.S. 0. , 1955), and Richard M. T itm uss, Problems o f  ï
S o c ia l P o l ic y . (London, H.M .8.0 . ,  I 950) .  3
3 . See, W illiam  M anchester, The Arms o f  Krupp 1587-1968, (Boston,
L i t t l e ,  Brown and Company, I 964) .
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S co tlan d  w ith  i t s  minimal bombing damage, t h is  type o f  f u l l - s c a l e  
m odernisation  o f  in d u stry  was not even attempted or considered  
d e s ir a b le . S cotlan d  wanted sim ply to  return  i t s  in d u s tr ia l  production  
to  i t s  peace-tim e ca p a c ity . U nfortunately , w ith l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  and 
o ld e r  methods, S co tla n d  was handicapped as i t  began to  compete in  a 
new post-w ar in te r n a tio n a l market. Germany did  not recover in d u s tr i­
a l l y  a s  fa s t  as B r ita in  in  th e la t e  1940's  because most o f i t s  f a c to ­
r i e s  were not y e t  workable, but by th e  1950's  German p ro d u ctiv ity  had 
surpassed  th a t o f B r ita in , fo r  by then Germany had implemented more 
so p h is t ic a te d  m achineiy and tech n iq u es.^
Another problem su ffe red  by S c o tt is h  industry  a f te r  the war was
th a t during th e war much o f  th e  a v a ila b le  S c o tt ish  fa c to r y  space was
used  sim ply fo r  Government sto ra g e . The d elay  caused by the n e c e s s ity
o f  c le a r in g  prem ises o f  Government su p p lie s  con tributed  to  the problems
o f  p ost-w ar rec o n stru ctio n , along w ith  the much more acu te  problems o f
2ob ta in in g  m a ter ia ls , new machinery and labour. Thus i t  was o fte n  not  
damaged as  m ch  as unused f a c to r ie s  th a t S c o tt is h  in d u s t r ia l i s t s  had to  
deal w ith  in  1945. And many in d u s tr ia l works had to  be converted from  
war to  p eace-tim e p roduction .
D em o b ilisa tio n  posed i t s  own problems, as retu rn in g  servicem en and 
women needed p eace-tim e jo b s. This added to  the fea r  th a t th e p o s t-  
World War I I  y ea rs  would be a repeat of the m assive unemployment and 
economic slump o f  th e 1 9 2 0 's  and 1 9 3 0 's . War bonuses and o th er  monies
1. See, Samuel son, p. 706, on th e  e f f e c t  o f  M arshall Aid on th e l e s s -  
th a n -a ff lu e n t  cou n tr ies  post-W orld War I I ,  i . e .  Germany and th e ir  
'm iraculous sp r in t o f  p r o d u c tiv ity  growth in  th e 1 9 5 0 's ' .
2 . Fogarty, P ro sp ects  o f th e  In d u s tr ia l A reas o f  Great B r ita in , p .80.
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not ^ e n t  during the war, because only 'u t i l i t y *  goods were a v a i l ­
a b le , gave on ly  a small post-w ar boom to  the economy. R ation ing con­
tin u ed  u n t i l  th e  la t e  1940's ,  in  both  the in d u s tr ia l  and p r iv a te  
s e c to r s . The bread shortage o f  1946 was marked by r a tio n in g  beginn ing  
on 21 J u ly  o f  th a t year, a lthough  bread had never been r a tio n ed  during  
th e war i t s e l f .  In d u s tr ia l r a tio n in g  and th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f  raw 
m a ter ia ls  continued .
The s o c ia l  and p h y sica l d is lo c a t io n s  o f the war made the ta sk  o f  
rec o n stru c tio n  d i f f i c u l t ,  y e t  in  the confusion , i t  crea ted  an atmos­
phere in  c e r ta in  r e sp e c ts  conducive to  change. A w ar-tim e country used
to  r a tio n in g , c o n tr o ls  and Government planning, B r ita in  in  1945 was 
more prepared to  accep t Government in terv e n tio n , even the n a t io n a lis a ­
t io n  o f  s p e c if ic  in d u s tr ie s . B r ita in  (under the in f lu e n c e  o f the  
B everidge p lan  and Lord Keynes) not on ly  allow ed but expected the  
Government to  provide fo r  i t s  c i t i z e n s  fo llo w in g  World War I I  to  ensure 
th a t  th e  d ep ression  o f  th e in ter-w a r  years was not repeated . The new 
s p i r i t  o f  co -o p era tio n  between Government and b oth  s id e s  o f in d u stry  
was ex em p lified  b y  the work o f Thomas Johnston, th e  S c o tt is h  S ecre ta ry  
o f  S ta te  during th e  war, and by th e  kind o f  h eigh ten ed  awareness o f  
th e  need fo r  s o c ia l  reform s which i s  illu m in a ted  in  Our S c o tt is h  Tov/ns.^
T his book d escr ib ed  the evacuation  o f  c i t y  ch ild r en  in to  the cou n trysid e  
a f t e r  the outbreak o f  war, and, more e s p e c ia l ly ,  th e  shock o f m iddle- 
c la s s  housewives a t d isco v er in g  th e  p h y sica l and s o c ia l  con d itio n  o f  so 
many o f  the slum -dw elling  fa m il ie s  that came to  l i v e  w ith  them, Johnston  -,|
w rote a foreword in  which he drew the moral th a t in  the brave new w orld {
1 , S c o t t is h  Women's Group on P u b lic  W elfare, Our S c o t t is h  Towns ; 
E vacuation  and th e  S o c ia l Future, (Edinburgh, 1944).
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a f te r  th e war a l l  c la s s e s  would work to g eth er  to  see th a t  th ese  condi­
t io n s  were not perpetuated .
In  th e  economic sphere, planners lik e  Fogarty saw th a t i t  might be  
p o s s ib le  fo r  in d u stry  to  a ccep t a degree o f  d ir e c t io n  in  r e sp e c t  to  
lo c a tio n  fo llo w in g  the war.
Firms which are anxious to  r e - s t a r t  normal pro­
duction  at a tim e o f  keen demand are sc a r c e ly  
l i k e ly  to  be d eterred  by n eg a tiv e  con tro l o f  the  
lo c a tio n  o f  t h e ir  new p la n ts  or o f  other a sp e c ts  
o f  th e ir  p o lic y ,  provided th a t a reasonably wide 
f i e l d  o f a c t io n  i s  l e f t  open to  them . . .  Many o f  
them would in  a d d itio n  be ready to  accept a con­
s id era b le  degree o f  p o s it iv e  co n tro l o f t h e ir  
p o l ic ie s  in  retu rn  fo r  s p e c ia l c o n c e ss io n s .1
Fogarty was not ex p ressin g  th e a t t itu d e  th a t B r i t is h  c i t i z e n s  expected  
and welcomed t h is  ; ra th er  he recommended t h is  t a c t ic  a s  part o f  
r eg io n a l p o lic y .
The e le c t io n  o f  A t t le e ' s  Government in  1945 was to  provide ( in  
theory a t  l e a s t )  an opportunity  to  t e s t  new means o f  d ea lin g  w ith  
S co tla n d 's  t r a d it io n a l problems o f  housing, unemployment, and s tru c tu ra l  
disadvantage. I t  was th ese  problems th a t b oth  the Government and b u s i­
n ess  were a ttem pting  to  so lv e  through post-w ar economic r ec o n stru c tio n .
1 , Fogarty, p ,8 0 .
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2. In d u s tr ia l Production
The in d ex  o f B r i t is h  in d u s tr ia l production  by 1950 was 4-0 per |
1 4cent g r e a te r  than in  1946. T his in crea se  was in d ic a t iv e  o f  major 
changes in  employment, in d u stry , personal expenditure (a t  1948 p r ic e s )  
and volume o f  both  exp orts and im ports. Thus production  ro se  8 per  
cen t per annum during each o f  these f iv e  y ea rs .
Table 1 -  Major Economic Changes in  Great B r ita in  1946-1950
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
In d u s tr ia l
production 100 108 121 129 140
P ersonal
expenditure 100 108 103 105 108
a t  1948 p r ic e s
Volume o f  
Exports
Volume o f  
Imports
100 103 139 153 177
100 114 119 129 130
1. Worswick, p .2. T his f ig u r e  i s  an average o f  percentage f ig u r e s  
f o r  many in d u s tr ie s .
I
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F igure 1 -  Ma.jor Econanic Changes in  Great B r ita in  1946-1950
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Source: Monthly D ig est o f  S t a t i s t i c s ,  (H, ÎÆ. S. 0. Cmd, 8203) and R ostas,
Economic Journal (March 1952), in  Worswick, p .3.
In  1948, 1949 and 1950 the a c tu a l performance o f in d u s tr ia l pro­
d u ction  exceeded the o f f i c i a l  ex p ec ta tio n s  a t th e b eg in n in g  o f each year, 
as announced in  the Economic Surveys. The years were not eq u a lly  smooth 
( f o r  example, production  in  ea r ly  1947 was somewhat h e ld  back b y  th e  
c r i s i s  in  coa l su p p lie s )  but in  la t e  1947 and in  1948 i t  was a c c e le r a te d  
a s  the economy overcame t h is  d is lo c a t io n .  There i s  c e r ta in ly  no ev idence  
th a t the economy was, a s i t s  c r i t i c s  sometimes averred, ’ shackled by  
c o n tr o ls  and slov/ly  grin d in g  to  a ' h a l t P r o d u c t i o n  continued to  r i s e
in  th e  la t e  1 9 4 0 's and e a r ly  1 950 's , although th ere was much in f la t io n
2as a r e s u lt  o f  the e x c e s s iv e  d eva lu a tio n  o f  s t e r l in g  in  1949* T h is
1 . I b id . ,  p .6.
2 . Harrod, The B r i t i s h  Economy, p . 22.
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1950-1951j w ith  the rearmament d rive  fo r  the Korean War, was substa n t i -
2a l l y  g r e a te r  than during the in ter-w ar y ears.
1 . Worswick and Ady, p .7 .
2. Ib id .
3. I b id . ,  p p .7 -8 . In  t h i s  sen se p r o d u c tiv ity  i s  b ein g  d iscu sse d  as  
a fa c to r  d ir e c t ly  a f f e c t in g  production.
-
r i s e  in  production  was due to  many cau ses : d em ob ilisa tion , the
1b u ild in g  up o f working c a p ita l and th e  expansion o f  s c a r c e  m a ter ia ls .
There was a r i s e  in  th e  amount o f  m a ter ia ls  a llo c a te d  b y  th e Government
to  in d u stry  fo r  commercial purposes in  the post-w ar y e a r s . But th ere  |
$were e x is t in g  at th e  same time tremendous shortages o f  raw m a ter ia ls ,
i . e . ,  f o r  housing and sh ip b u ild in g , in  r e la t io n  to  demand. O vera ll, th e  
annual r i s e  o f  B r i t i s h  in d u s tr ia l production  from 1947-1950 and then
S ev era l d iv erse  fa c to r s  con trib u ted  to  the r e la t iv e ly  good record  
in  B r ita in  during th e post-w ar years in  comparison to  th e pre-war era .
The p a tte r n  o f  post-w ar output was p a r tly  determ ined by changes that  
had taken p la ce  in  th e  war, so th a t th e  share o f en gin eerin g , i t s e l f  a ,|
h igh  p r o d u c tiv ity  in d u stry , ro se  sharply. Although p r o d u c tiv ity  
in cr ea se s  w ith in  en g in eerin g  d id  not add much a f te r  the war to  general 
higher p r o d u c tiv ity , th e  permanently h igher output of machinery c o n tr i­
buted a g r e a t deal to  th e  in crea se  in  output o f the in d u s tr ie s  in s t a l ­
l in g  th ese  m achines. The n et investm ent in  machinery, tech n o logy  and 
p lan t o f  th e  k ind which had a d ir e c t  e f f e c t  on output (a s  d is t in c t  from  
b e t te r  b u ild in g s , fo r  example, whose p r o d u c tiv ity  e f f e c t s  were l e s s  
d ir e c t ) ,  was higher fo llo w in g  th e war.^ Other co n tr ib u tin g  fa c to r s  to  
the post-w ar production g a in s  were th e  r i s e  in  the p r e s t ig e  and q u a lity  
o f  management and the r i s e  o f  personnel management. C red it should be
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a ttr ib u te d  to  both  management and the trade unions tlia t t h is  was one 
o f  the few p er io d s in  modern B r it is h  h is to r y  o f  such continued indus­
t r i a l  p eace,^
B r it is h  production  rose  u n in terru p ted ly  u n t i l  th e  w in ter o f  1951- 
1952. Hence th e 194-8 r e c e s s io n  which occurred in  the U nited S ta te s  was 
m issed by the U n ited  Kingdom. T h is may be taken as the n atu ra l conse­
quence o f  the low  le v e ls  p r e v a ilin g  in  B r ita in  in  1948 as compared w ith  
the U nited  S ta te s .  American in d u s tr ia l  production , even as e a r ly  as  
194-7, was more than tw ice  th a t  o f  i t s  1938 l e v e l ,  w h ile  in  Europe i t  
was one-quarter. But w hile  European production  clim bed s te a d ily  from
very  low 194-6 l e v e l s ,  the tren d  in  the U nited  S ta te s  was r a p id ly  upwards,
2and was in terr u p ted  in  194-8-194-9 by  an a ctu a l f a l l .  Lack o f synchro­
n is a t io n  o f  the American b u s in e ss  c y c le  and o th er  in d u s tr ia l c o u n tr ie s  
was a very  im portant fea tu re  o f  the economic h is to r y  o f  the e a r ly  
1950’ s . T h is was a h e lp fu l f a c to r  as i t  prevented  any cum ulative ex ter ­
n a l e f f e c t s  o f  th e  American r e c e s s io n  as a w hole. ^
A s im ila r  r i s e  in  in d u s tr ia l production  was apparent in  Scotland  
to  th a t p resen t in  B r ita in  as a whole but the S c o t t is h  s itu a t io n
1 . I b id . ,  pp .7 -8  and 9<
2. Harrod, p .19.
3 . L eser, p .91.
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d if fe r e d  in  se v e r a l s ig n if ic a n t  r e sp e c ts .^  S cotlan d  d if fe r e d  from  
Great B r ita in  in  1939 in  term s o f  in d u str ia l s tru c tu re , e tc .  Indus­
t r i a l  production  b e fo re  th e war was r is in g  more slow ly  in  S cotlan d  than  
in  th e r e s t  o f  th e  country la r g e ly  because o f the absence o f  the newer 
in d u str ie s  in  S cotlan d  and th e ir  rap id  expansion south o f th e  border  
throughout the 1 9 3 0 's .  T his was r e f le c te d  in  the slower r is e  in  the
n a tio n a l income, in  the low er r a te  o f earn ings, and in  h igher unemploy-
2ment percentages in  Scotland . The war i t s e l f  had ce r ta in  e f f e c t s  in  
confirm ing S cotlan d  as a base fo r  p a r tic u la r  in d u s tr ie s .  One reason  
fo r  th e la g  o f  in d u s tr ia l production  in  the post-w ar years was th a t  
during the war production  had r i s e n  fa s te r  in  S cotlan d  than in  the r e s t  
o f  th e country. According to  f ig u r e s  from the 1935 and 1948 Census o f  
P op u lation  th e  n et output o f  th e  trad es in creased  by 225 per cen t fo r  
B r ita in  as a w hole.^  Although most o f t h is  in cr ea se  was in  p r ic e  ra th er  
than output, and i f  i t  were p o s s ib le  to  value what was produced a t con­
s ta n t p r ic e s  so as to  i s o la t e  th e r e a l  in crease  in  in d u s tr ia l production .
1 . See N e il K. Buxton, 'Economic Growth in  S co tlan d  between th e Wars : 
the R ole o f P roduction  S tru ctu re  and R a t io n a liz a t io n ', Economic 
H istory  Review. 33 (1980), pp. 538-555. The standard argument i s  
th a t the o v e r a ll  poor performance o f  the S c o t t is h  economy, in  com­
parison  to  the B r it is h  economy as a whole during the in ter-w ar  
y ears, was not due to  s tr u c tu r a l weaknesses per se . rath er S co tla n d ’ s 
r e la t iv e ly  weaker performance was to  b e a ttr ib u te d  to  the fa i lu r e ,  
in d u stry  by in d u stry , to  match the ra te  o f  growth achieved  in  the  
n a tio n a l economy. Buxton d isa g r e e s  w ith  th is 'p o p u la r  view  th a t  
th ere  was no g rea t d iffe r e n c e  between the in d u s tr ia l  p a ttern  o f  
Scotland  and Great B r ita in ' ( p .538). According to  Buxton the  
in a b i l i t y  o f S c o t t is h  in d u s tr ie s  to  ach ieve r a te s  o f  growth on a
par w ith  the r e s t  o f  the country was not the major exp lan ation  o f  
th e r e la t iv e ly  slow  ra te  o f  growth o f  the S c o t t is h  economy betw een  
wars; ra th er i t  was th e f a c t  th a t s ig n if ic a n t  s tr u c tu r a l d if fe r e n ­
c e s  d id  e x i s t  betw een Scotland  and the r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in  th a t  
was the key to  ex p la in in g  th e  slow  ra te  o f growth o f the in ter-vfar  
S c o t t is h  economy. „
2 . I b id . ,  p .72.
3# Roy Campbell, R ise  and F a l l  o f  S c o tt is h  Industry , pp. 98-99*
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th e degree o f  d e f la t io n  would n o t n e c e s sa r ily  have been th e same in  
S cotlan d  as  in  Great B r ita in ,
Dramatic changes in  th e  en gin eerin g  and ir o n  and s t e e l  in d u s tr ie s  
in  th e 1930's  a f fe c te d  in  th e  lon g  run the p r o sp e r ity  o f th e  e n t ir e  
S c o t t is h  economy. In  1930 th ese  two sec to rs  in  Scotland  le d  over  
England and W ales : in  terms o f  n et p r o f it  ach ieved  per worker, iro n  
and s t e e l  found r i e s  by a sm all margin (£187 to  £186) and sh ip b u ild in g  
by a  su b s ta n tia l margin (£235 to  £ 1 9 4 ). The le a d  in  sh ip b u ild in g  was 
l o s t  in  1935 (£193 to  £ 1 94 ). T h ereafter  the tren d  was a g a in st Scotland, 
although i t  was much more marked in  the newer e l e c t r ic a l  engineering  
concerns than in  th e  t r a d it io n a l m echanical en g in eerin g . Campbell 
a ttr ib u te d  much o f  the blame f o r  lower production in  Scotland to  th e  
la c k  o f  lea d e rsh ip  in  th e v i t a l l y  important iro n  and s t e e l  and sh ip ­
b u ild in g  in d u s tr ie s  in  th e  1 9 3 0 's , e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e areas o f major 
employment (Glasgow) or in  th e  newly developing in d u str ie s , which took  
t h e ir  le a d  from the e s ta b lish e d  in d u str ie s . The continued su c c e ss  in  
coal-m in ing and in  non-ferrous m eta ls  was not a b le  to  o f f s e t  th e  poor 
S c o t t is h  performance in  e l e c t r i c a l  en gin eerin g .  ^ Bur v iir tu a lly  every­
one now s t r e s s e s  the o b je c t iv e  market fa c to r s  when examining in d u s tr ia l  
production  o f  th e  1 9 3 0 's . A ccording to  Buxton, 'th ere  was l i t t l e  th a t  
in d iv id u a l entrepreneurs cou ld  have done to  am eliorate  the e f f e c t s  o f  
th e depressed  in ter-w a r environm ent. They were overwhelmed by market 
fo r c e s  beyond th e ir  cap a c ity  to  c o n tr o l' .  Buxton argued th a t what was 
needed was a 'much g rea ter  commitment to  in d u stry  on the part o f  the
1 . Campbell, p p .98-99*
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sta te*  ra th er  than th e  'patching* and lim ite d  number o f c lo su res  th a t  
were ca rr ied  ou t.^
P roduction  rose f a s t e r  in  Scotland  during th e war because o f  the  
rev ived  demand fo r  tr a d it io n a l  in d u str ie s  and a lso  because Scotland  
su ffered  l e s s  damage from bombing. But t h i s  r i s e  was a r t i f i c i a l l y  
induced and may have been d etrim enta l in  th e  long run as S c o t t is h  
post-w ar in d u s tr ia l production  lagged  behind th at o f th e  r e s t  o f  
B r ita in .
1 . Buxton, pp. 554-555. See a ls o ,  Anthony Slaven, The Development o f
the West o f  Scotland 1750-1960. (London, R outledge and Kegan P au l, |
1975), p p .183-209 on in d u s tr ia l  production  during th e in ter-w ar 4
y ea rs .
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Table 3 -  In d u s tr ia l P roduction  in  S cotlan d  and in  the U nited  Kingdom, 
1948 and 1951 (1948 = lOO)
Industry group S cotlan d
U nited
1951 Kingdom1951
Mining and quarrying 100 108
Chemicals and a l l i e d  tra d es 114 134.
M etal manufacture 109 115
E ngineering, sh ip b u ild in g  and e l e c t r ic a l  
goods 128 127
V eh ic les 112 124
M etal goods not included  elsew here 127 113
T e x t i le s 123 119
C loth ing 107 111
Food, drink and tobacco 103 105
B uild ing, and con tractin g 104 101
Gas, e l e c t r i c i t y  and w ater supply 111 124
T o ta l : m anufacturing in d u str ie s 116 121
T ota l : a l l  in d u str ie s 112 117
Source: Monthly D ig est o f  S t a t i s t i c s  and D ig e st  o f S c o tt ish
S t a t i s t i c s ,  in  L eser, p .72.
The r i s e  in  production  was n o ta b ly  grea ter  in  th e  U nited Kingdom. The 
excep tion s to  t h i s  trend  were b u ild in g  and b u ild in g  m a ter ia ls , t e x t i l e s ,  
and m isce lla n eo u s  m etal goods which were g rea te r  in  Scotland . The 
in crea se  was apparently  about th e  same in  S co tlan d  in  en g in eerin g  and 
sh ip b u ild in g  a s  in  the r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in .
In  terms o f  broad in d u s tr ia l  groups there was s u p e r f ic ia l ly  no great  
d iffe r e n c e  betw een the in d u s tr ia l p a ttern  in  S co tlan d  and Great B r ita in  
as a whole, though Scotland  had more emphasis on primary production .
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There m s ,  however, a predominance o f  heavy en gin eerin g  in  S co tlan d  
to  a much g rea te r  ex ten t than in  England and W ales, and o ften  t h i s  made 
S cotlan d  more vu ln erab le  to  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  employment. The newer 
en gin eerin g  in d u s tr ie s , which were poorly  rep resen ted  in  Scotland , had 
developed la r g e  export markets so th a t S co tla n d 's  share o f en g in eer in g  
exports was d im inished .^
i t  had, q u ite  reasonab ly , been  expected  th at S c o t t is h  in d u s tr ia l  
production  fo llo w in g  the war would have kept b e t te r  pace w ith produc­
t io n  in  th e  r e s t  o f th e  country; unemployment became as n e g lig ib le  in  
S cotlan d  as elsew here, a lso  many new in d u str ie s  had been sta r ted , as  
w e ll as various e s ta b lis h e d  in d u s tr ie s  r e lo c a tin g  and expanding. In stea d  
th ere  was a much slow er r i s e  in  Scotland , the c la s s ic  example b ein g  th e
coal-m in ing in d u stry  in  which the d ivergence o f  the trend  between
2S cotlan d  and the r e s t  o f Great B r ita in  was ^  ^ s t a r t l in g .  A lthough  
unemployment was lov/ and demand g r e a te r  than supply in  Scotland  fo llo w ­
ing  th e  Second World Yfar, production  remained s lu g g ish . Hence, a lthough  
the in cr ea se  o f  in d u s tr ia l  production  was one o f  S c o tla n d 's  major 
economic g o a ls  throughout the immediate post-w ar y ea rs , i t  was not 
ach ieved  as ra p id ly  or a s  e x te n s iv e ly  as had been hoped.
1 . L eser, pp .71-72 .
2 . See p p .193-195 on production  in  th e  S c o tt is h  and B r i t is h  co a l­
mining in d u s tr ie s .
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?3. The S c o t t is h  O ffic e  I
( i )  The S c o tt ish  O ffic e  3iThe S c o t t is h  O ffice  was th e  body which was most r e sp o n sib le  fo r  
implementing th e Labour Government's w ishes in  Scotland  during the  
immediate post-w ar years as w e ll  a s rep resen tin g  the S c o t t is h  view­
p o in t in  London. The a c tu a l s ta tu to r y  powers o f  the S c o t t is h  O ffice  
were in  f a c t  lim ite d  during th ese  years. In  th e  area o f  s o c ia l  4
se c u r ity , unemployment b e n e f i t s  had been moved from lo c a l  government 
to  a n a tio n a l a u th o r ity  -  th e  Unemployment A ss is ta n ce  Board -  in  1934, 
and in  1945 h ea lth  and p en sion s insurance was tra n sferred  from lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s  to  th e  !Ministry o f  N ational Insurance. L ater in  1948 the  
remainder o f  p u b lic  a s s is ta n c e  was tra n sferred  from lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
to  th e N a tio n a l A ss is ta n ce  Board, t h is  was an enlarged v e r s io n  o f  the  
Unemployment A ss is ta n ce  Board. When the N ation a l H ealth Serv ice
was g iven  to  th e  S c o tt ish  O ff ic e , th is  o f  course im m ediately r a ise d  
the p r e s t ig e  and power o f  th e  Department o f  H ealth  fo r  S cotlan d  in  
the S c o t t is h  O ffice ; more im portantly, though, i t  meant that the
ad m in istra tion  o f  the 'w e lfa re  s ta te '  was com pletely  s p l i t  between
1S c o tt ish  and B r it is h  Departments.
The S c o t t is h  O ff ic e  was headed by the S ecre ta ry  o f S ta te  fo r  
Scotland  and had i t s  headquarters a t  S t. Andrews House in  Edinburgh.
There was a ls o  a sm all o f f ic e  in  W hitehall a t  Dover House, which served  
a s  a cen tre  fo r  l i a i s o n  w ith  th e  W hitehall departm ents as w e ll  a s  a base
1 . K e lla s , The S c o tt is h  P o l i t i c a l  System, p . 35.
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la r  r o le  : i f  he * speaks fo r  Scotland* in  London, he a ls o  ' speaks fo r
2London* in  S co tlan d . Thus a study o f the s ix  S c o t t is h  S e c r e ta r ie s  
o f  S ta te  who h e ld  o f f ic e  during th e 1945-1951 y ea rs  i s  appropriate -  
and in  fa c t  v i t a l .
( i i )  The S ecretary  o f  S ta te  fo r  S cotland  
(a ) Tom Johnston (1941-1945)
During the World War I I  y ea rs  Scotland  experienced  th e  most 
dynamic lead ersh ip  i t  has ever f e l t  from the S c o tt is h  O ffic e , Much o f
1. I b id . ,  p .25.
2 . Ib id .
3. James G. K e lla s , Modern Scotland. (London, George A lle n  and Unwin,
1968) ,  p . 100.
4 . George P o ttin g e r , The S e c r e ta r ie s  o f  S ta te  fo r  S cotlan d  1926-1976. 
(Edinburgh, S c o t t is h  Academic P r e ss , 1979), p p .89 -90 .
:t.
1fo r  the conduct o f  parliam entary b u s in e ss . The m in is te r ia l  ‘ team* Ja t  th e  S c o tt is h  O ffic e  during th e  1945-1951 y ea rs  included  th e  
S ecretary  o f  S ta te  and two U nder-Secretaries o f S ta te .  The S ecre ta ry  #
o f  S ta te  p e r s o n if ie d  'S c o tt ish  Government'. I t  was p a r tly  a proconsu- I
'.I
th e  c r e d it  fo r  t h is  i s  due to  the p e r so n a lity  and v igou r o f  th e  '4t
S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  Scotland  from 1941 to  1945, Thomas Johnston. %
■IJohnston  was a s o c i a l i s t  and e x -e d ito r  o f Forward, th e  Glasgow Inde- 
pendent Labour P arty  (ILP) newspaper.  ^ He la t e r  stood  as the Labour 
M.P. f o r  West S t ir l in g s h ir e .  From I 929- I 93I  he was Parliam entary  
U nder-Secretary o f S ta te  under W illiam  Adamson, th e  f i r s t  Labour 
S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te . Johnston  was a ls o  Lord P rivy  S ea l, bu t f%€)onal,d' s 
Government d id  not l a s t  long enough fo r  him to  make any s ig n if ic a n t  
p rog ress  in  t h i s  p o s it io n .  In  1939 he was made R egional Commissioner 
fo r  C iv i l  D efence in  S co tlan d .^
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Robert Munro, Lord A lness, th e  one surviv ing  S c o t t is h  S ecretary , a ls o  
2jo in ed  t h is  group. The C ouncil met p e r io d ic a lly  from 1941-1945 to  
examine th e  problems o f post-v/ar reco n stru ctio n . I t  was w ith  th e ir  
approval th a t Johnston s e t  up in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  th e is s u e s  o f  hydro- 
e l e c t r ic i t y ,  th e  herring in d u stry , h i l l  sheep farming and land  s e t t l e ­
m ent.^ Johnston  was able to  count on C h u rc h ill’ s backing whenever the  
C ouncil o f  S ta te  were in  agreement on a S c o tt is h  is su e .
Joh n sto n 's  lo y a l t i e s  were w ithout doubt to  Scotland , but he never  
developed  any sympathy towards th e  S c o tt is h  N a t io n a lis t  Movement. ^
1 . I b id . ,  p p .97 and 201.
2. The M in ister  fo r  S c o tt is h  a f f a ir s  was c a lle d  S ecretary  o f  S ta te  
fo r  Scotland  on ly  a f t e r  1926, b e fo re  th is  tim e th ey  were r e fe r r e d  
to  a s  S c o tt is h  S e c r e ta r ie s . S ir  David M in e , The S c o tt is h  O ff ic e .  
(London, George A llen  and Unwin L td ., 1957), p p .8- 9 .
3. P o tt in g e r , p . 91.
4 . See Tom Johnston, Memories, (London, C o llin s , 1952), p p .231-232, 
fo r  a d isc u ss io n  o f  Robert Muirhead. the f i r s t  chairman o f  th e  
N ation a l P arty  in  Scotland  ( in  1927) and an advocate o f  a Home 
R ule Parliam ent fo r  Scotland ,
%The exp lan ation  o f  th e  r i s e  o f  power o f  the S c o tt is h  O ff ic e  
in  th ese  y ea rs  l i e s  m ainly w ith  the e x ig e n c ie s  o f war. I t  was because  
o f  war-tim e co n d itio n s  th a t Johnston was a llow ed  v ir tu a l  fr e e  r e in  in  |
the S c o t t is h  O ffic e . T h is type o f s itu a t io n  was p o s s ib le  because o f  
th e good working r e la t io n sh ip  between C hu rch ill and Johnston :
C hurchill having agreed to  Johnston’ s s t ip u la t io n  in  1941 th a t i f  he 
accepted  th e p o s it io n  he should  b e  allow ed to  se t  up a C ouncil o f  
S ta te , comprised o f  a l l  l i v in g  e x -S e c r e ta r ie s  o f  S ta te  fo r  S cotlan d  
ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  party . The Council was e v en tu a lly  to  in c lu d e  fcu r  
e x -S e c r e ta r ie s  o f  S ta te , v iz .  A rchibald S in c la ir ,  (L ib era l, 1931-1932); 
W alter E l l i o t ,  (C onservative, 1936-1938); D. J .  C o lv i l le ,  (Conserva­
t iv e ,  1938- 1940); and E rnest Brown, (C onservative, 1 9 4 0 -1 9 4 1 ).^
I
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Johnston  in stea d  sought a so lu t io n  to  S cotlan d ’ s economic d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  b y  ’ga in in g  r e c o g n it io n  o f  S c o t t is h  requirem ents w ith in  the  
e x is t in g  framework’ .  ^ What he d e s ir e d  as a f i r s t  s tep  was a S c o t t is h  
C ouncil o f  Industry  and Development. Thus in  February 1942 th e  
S c o t t is h  Council on Industry  was formed.
A ccording to  K e lla s , t h i s  body served  an important fu n c tio n  
sim ply b y  improving the S c o t t is h  O ffic e  ’ s  in d u str ia l co n ta c ts . I t  was 
an independent body composed o f  r e p r e se n ta tiv e s  of S c o t t is h  economic 
in t e r e s t  groups (whose funds supported i t )  and o f r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  o f  
th ree S c o t t is h  Government departments. Whether or not the Council was 
p rim arily  r e sp o n sib le , i t s  form ation co in c id ed  w ith  the rap id  improve­
ment o f  S c o t t is h  production  -  between 1942 and 1945 700 new in d u s tr ia l  
en te r p r ise s  were crea ted  in v o lv in g  90 ,000  job s. A lso  th e  M in istry  o f
Supply was persuaded to  commit £12 m il l io n  on fa c to r ie s  and p lan t  
2m a te r ia ls . I t  needs to  be s ta ted , however, th a t even b e fo re  1939 
much work had been a lread y  done by the S c o tt is h  O ffice  to  co -o rd in a te  
in d u s tr ia l  development in  Scotland.
An e a r l ie r  advisory  body, e s ta b lish e d  by the S c o tt ish  O ff ic e  in  
1930, the S c o t t is h  Development C ouncil, had been s ig n if ic a n t  e s p e c ia l ly  
fo r  i t s  p u b lic a tio n s  in  th e  la t e  1930’s . The S c o tt is h  Economic Commit­
t e e ,  a s e le c t  group o f the S c o t t is h  Development C ouncil, p u b lish ed  a 
rep ort on th e  Highlands and Is la n d s  (1938) and a book e n t i t l e d  L ight 
Industry  in  Scotland  (1 9 3 8 ) ,^  and in  January 1939 i t s  General Report
1 . P o tt in g e r , p .93.
2. K e lla s , Modem S cotlan d , p. 101 and Johnston, p .1 5 1 .
3 . See, L ight In d u str ie s  in  Scotland. A Case fo r  Development. (Great 
B r ita in , S c o tt ish  Economic Committee P u b lica tio n , 1938), pp .7 -9 .
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e n t i t l e d  ’S co tla n d 's  I n d u s tr ia l Future -  The Case fo r  Planned  
Developm ent’ , Thus, b e fo r e  th e advent o f  the Second World War, there  
was a lread y  much in t e r e s t  in  the S c o t t is h  O ffic e  in  economic p lanning, 
e s p e c ia l ly  d ir e c te d  tcw ards overcoming S co tla n d 's  s tr u c tu r a l disadvan­
tage  and to  r e l ie v e  th e h igh  unemployment in  th e  reg io n  then  known as  
one o f  the S p ec ia l or D epressed Areas, la t e r  to  b e renamed Development 
Area
These two b o d ies , th e  S c o t t is h  Council of, «Industry and th e
S c o tt is h  Development C ouncil, were merged a t  a m eeting in  S t. Andrews
House, Edinburgh in  June 194-6 and renamed as th e S c o tt is h  C ouncil
2(Development and In d u stry ). The o r ig in  o f  t h i s  important i n i t i a t i v e  
must be m ainly a ttr ib u te d  to  S ir  Steven B ils la n d , Chairman o f the  
S c o tt ish  In d u s tr ia l E s ta te s  L td ., but the id ea  had long been a favour­
i t e  o f  Tom Johnston ,  ^ B ils la n d  was appointed by Westwood, the S ecretary  
o f  S ta te  in  1946, as P re sid en t o f  the newly formed S c o tt is h  C ouncil 
(Development and Industry)
The d u tie s  o f  the S c o t t is h  C ouncil (Development and Industry) 
covered th e  advancement o f  a l l  areas o f  the S c o tt ish  economy, w ith  
regards to  both  t r a d it io n a l  and new in d u stry . In  r e sp e c t  to  in d u s tr ia l  
rec o n stru c tio n  th e C ouncil was re sp o n sib le  fo r  the su p erv is io n  o f
1 , See a ls o , R, H. Campbell, 'The S c o t t is h  O ffice  and the S p ec ia l 
Areas in  the 1 9 3 0 's ' .  The H is to r ic a l Journal. 22 (1 9 7 6 ), 167-177.
2 , The S c o tt is h  C ouncil (Development and In d u stry ), Annual Report 
1946-1947. (Edinburgh, 1948), p . l .
3. P erson a l in terv iew  w ith  J . H. McGuinness, C .B ., form er A ss is ta n t  
Under S ecretary  o f  S ta te  a t  the S c o t t is h  O ffice  and former 
Chairman o f  the S c o t t is h  Economic P lanning Board, on 20 A pril 1982 in  Edinburgh.
4 . Annual Report 1946-1947. p .2 . C
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e x is t in g  in d u str ie s  in  Scotland; the exam ination o f  th e  r e la t io n sh ip  
o f  S c o t t is h  in d u stry  to  th e  trade o rg a n isa tio n s; communication w ith  
firm s in te r e s te d  in  lo c a t in g  in  Scotland; the promotion o f  tra in in g  
fo r  management; and th e  promotion o f  th e fo llo w in g  item s : l ig h t  
en g in eerin g , p la s t ic s ,  b u ild in g  m a te r ia ls , w hite f i s h  and s h e l l  f i s h ,  
the c r o f t e r  w oollen  in d u stry , food  p reserv a tio n , t o u r is t  industry , 
Forth-C lyde Ship Canal, tran sport, th e chem ical in d u stry , e tc .^  The 
fu tu re  ou tlook  fo r  S cotlan d  depended not on ly  on th e  so lu t io n s  of 
problems a r is in g  from th e  war but a lso  from the pre-war d e f ic ie n c ie s  
o f  th e S c o t t is h  in d u s tr ia l  s tru ctu re . Thus, W hitehall and the S c o tt is h  
O ffic e  were eager not o n ly  to  b r in g  production  back to  pre-vrar stand­
ards and then beyond, b u t a lso  to  in troduce new and r e lo c a te d  in d u stry  
in to  S co tlan d  -  e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e S c o t t is h  Development Area.
M ilne, in  h is  book on th e  S c o tt is h  O f f ic e , d escr ib es  the sp e c ia l
r e la t io n s h ip  between the S c o t t is h  O ffice  and th e S c o tt ish  C ouncil
(Development and Industry) as 'one o f  th e  most in te r e s t in g  examples o f
th a t p artn ersh ip  o f  o f f i c i a l  and voluntary e f fo r t  which i s  common in
2modern ad m in istra tio n * . O r ig in a lly  th e S c o t t is h  Council o f  Industry  
was s e t  up by Tom Johnston as  an independent quango, a quasi-non­
governmental o rg a n isa tio n , ( th e  m eetings o f  the Council and i t s  
committees were u su a lly  h e ld  in  S t. Andrews H ouse).^  In  a c tu a l fa c t  
b oth  i t  and, t o  a g rea ter  degree, th e  S c o t t is h  Council (Development and 
Industry) fu n ctio n ed  as sem i-governm ental b o d ie s . The f in a n c ia l  sup­
port o f  the S c o t t is h  C ouncil (Development and Industry) came from th e
1 . Ib id .
2. M ilne, p. 174.
3. Ib id .
I
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Government, u n lik e  th e monies fo r  the S c o tt is h  C ouncil o f  In du stry  
which had come from S c o tt is h  economic in te r e s t  groups. Appointments 
o f  th e se n io r  members o f  b oth  groups had always been made b y  th e  
S c o tt is h  S ecre tary  o f  S ta te . Thus the S c o t t is h  Council (Development 
and In d u stiy ) was, in  M iln e 's  words, 'an independent body m aintain ing  
i t s e l f  on p u b lic  su b scr ip tio n  and rep resen tin g  a l l  the in t e r e s t s  con­
cerned in  S c o t t is h  economic a f f a ir s  -  the chamber o f Congress, th e  
S c o t t is h  T .U .C ., the banks, th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  and many in f lu e n t ia l  
in d iv id u a ls ' .^  The Council was very a c t iv e  in  stim u la tin g  develop­
ments to  a id  the S c o tt ish  economy, e s p e c ia l ly  in  promoting a b e t t e r  
balance o f  development in  th e S c o tt is h  in d u s tr ia l  s tru ctu re , fo r  u n t i l  
the post-w ar y ea rs  Scotland  had lagged  behind England in  terms o f  
l i g h t  in d u s tr ia l  development. A lso  the C ouncil was su c cess fu l in  
a ttr a c t in g  new in d u stiy . T h is  was seen most d ram atica lly  in  terms o f  
the North American firm s moving to  Great B r ita in , o f  which 80 per cen t
moved to  S cotlan d . Joh n ston 's  la b e l  o f  th e  S c o t t is h  Council a s  an
2' in d u s tr ia l  parliam ent' s t i l l  seems an apt d e sc r ip tio n .
Throughout th e  w ar-years Johnston  would never p a r t ic ip a te  in  any 
d ir e c t  way towards 'th e  war e f f o r t ' (through r a l l i e s ,  e t c . )  : t h i s  i s  
perhaps a ttr ib u ta b le  to  h is  Glasgow IBP background. H is en erg ies  were 
e n t ir e ly  d ir e c te d  towards p lanning post-w ar rec o n stru c tio n  in  S cotlan d . 
McGuinness b e l ie v e s  th a t Johnston was o ffered  th e  p o s it io n  o f M in ister  
o f R econ stru ction , la t e r  h e ld  by Lord Woolton, but d ec lin ed ,  ^ presumably  
b ecau se he saw h im se lf  as a S c o t t is h  statesm an ra th er  than a U nited
1. I b id .
2 . P o ttin g e r , p . 94.
3. McGuinness In terv iew .
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1. Hamish MacKinven (A ss is ta n t  Inform ation O ffic e r  o f  th e  North o f  
S co tla n d  H ydro-E lectric  Board), Highland H y d ro -E lec tr ic ity . 
(Glasgow, An Comunn Gaidhealach, Highland Inform ation S e r ie s  
N o.28 , 1972), p . 3.
2 . I b id . ,  p . 3.
% 
"I
4-;
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■1Kingdom one. C erta in ly , on the narrower stage, he was a very e f f e c -
It iv e  one. |
IOne o f  the m yster ies  o f  h is  career i s  why, a f t e r  such a d i s t in -  4
gu ished  p eriod  in  the S c o tt ish  O ff ic e , and one in  which he had d ir e c ­
te d  i t s  a tte n t io n  to  th e  importance o f  pleinning post-w ar reco n stru ctio n , 
he d id  not continue as S ecretary  o f S ta te  in  1945. In  fa c t ,  he g
re s ig n e d  to  head smother body which he had been instrum ental in  crea­
t in g ,  th e  North o f  S cotland  H ydro-E lectric  Board, th e  aim o f which was 
to  b r in g  e l e c t r i c i t y  (and thereby i t  was hoped, new job s) to  many p a r ts  
o f  the Highlands f o r  the f i r s t  tim e. The H ydro-E lectric  Board had by  
1946 fo u r  major schemes -  the Loch S loy  P ro je c t , th e  Tummel-Garry and 
Loch Fannich Schemes and th e  Glen A ffr ic  P r o je c t . In  a d d itio n  th e
hBoard had many d is tr ib u t io n  schemes in clud ing  p r o je c ts  a t Loc^lsh,
Morar, G airloch and A ultbea, Bea and South Cowal, Orkney, North Cowal,
1Skye, Lochcarron and Arran.
The s itu a t io n  changed again  (and d ram atica lly ) in  1948 when
e l e c t r i c i t y  was n a t io n a lise d . The Board then  acquired s ix te e n  lo c a l
a u th o r ity  and p r iv a te  company undertak ings, w ith  1 8 ,4 2 4  consumers and
power s ta t io n s , w ith  a t o t a l  cap a c ity  o f  230,000 k ilo w a tts . The Board
a ls o  had i t s  o r ig in a l r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  extending e l e c t r i c i t y  su p p lie s
2to  another 100,000 consumers, most o f  them in  ru ra l a rea s. N ation a l­
is a t io n  p la ced  th e  Board in  charge o f  a l l  th e  H yd ro-E lectric  companies 
in  th e  North o f S cotlan d . Because o f th e  s p e c ia l problems o f  th is
»  :
i s o la t e d  area, th e  Hydro Board v/as perm itted  to  r e ta in  adm inistra­
t iv e  autonomy in  i t s  a f f a ir s ,   ^ i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  coverin g  over 
21,6 0 0  square m iles  -  from th e Mull o f  K intyre northwards to  Shetland.,
1. Ib id .
2. Ib id . The South o f  Scotland  Board d id  not come under the 
S c o t t is h  O ff ic e  u n t i l  1954. K e lla s , Modem S cotlan d , p . 101.
3. P o tt in g e r , p . 95.
4 . I b id . ,  pp. 91 and I 67- I 68 .
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from th e  outermost W estern I s l e s  to  Buchan Ness in  th e n o rth -ea st, and
2 Ss tr e tc h in g  south to  in c lu d e Dundee, P erth  and the I s la n d  o f  Arran.
Perhaps ra th er s tra n g e ly , con sid erin g  i t s  lead ersh ip  by  Johnston, th e %
Board saw i t s  primary duty as the gen eration  o f  energy and d id  not 
e n e r g e t ic a l ly  or d ir e c t ly  tr y  to  promote the s o c ia l  and economic w e l-  ||
fa r e  o f  th e  H ighlands, There were is o la t e d  p r o je c ts  according to  MIJohnston  -  'th e  encouragement o f stone quariying, a tr o u t lab oratory  
a t  P a sk a lly , and experim ents w ith  th e gas tu rb in e'^  -  but t h is  d id  n o t  
amount to  m ch . A lthough, th ere fo re , not an u n q u a lif ie d  su ccess, th e  
North o f  Scotland  H yd ro-E lectric  Board during th ese  y ea rs  d id  by i t s  
example pave the way fo r  th e  Highland and Is la n d s  Development Board 
crea ted  in  1965.^
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(b) The E arl o f  R osebery (1945)
In  1945 C h u rch ill appointed the s ix th  E arl o f  R osebery to
1be th e  S c o t t is h  Secretary  o f  S ta te  in  th e  Caretaker Government, an
e c c e n tr ic  ch o ice  fo r  the post-w ar era th a t r e c a lle d  e a r l ie r  days when
2the S c o t t is h  S ecretary  was g en era lly  a grandee. B efore he could  
show h is  paces, however, he was qu ick ly  rep la ced  in  J u ly  o f th a t  same 
year b ecau se of the v ic to r y  o f A t t le e ’s Government in  the B r i t is h  
General E le c t io n  o f  1945. He la t e r  served  as  Chairman o f  the S c o tt is h  
T ou rist Board.
There was never any se r io u s  thought o f  R osebery b ein g  anything  
more than an in ter im  S ecretary  o f  S ta te  during the Caretaker Government, 
Mr, McGuinness, a sen io r  r e t ir e d  c i v i l  servant a t  th e  S c o tt is h  O ff ic e ,  
who worked w ith  a l l  the post-w ar S e c r e ta r ie s  o f  S ta te , d escr ib ed  
Rosebery in  an o r a l-h is to r y  in terv iew  as 'an e f f e c t iv e  operator* , and 
*very  a s tu te ' b u t re in fo rced  th e  view  th a t Roseber«j's appointment was 
* t o t a l l y  a stop-gap  m easure'. McGuinness exp ressed  the popular b e l i e f
1 . See, Tom Jo h n sto n 's  Our S c o ts  Noble F a m ilie s . (Glasgow, Forward 
P u b lish in g  C o., 1919T^ 'The book was an u n d isgu ised  indictm ent  
o f  th e  landed c la s s e s  in  Scotland ' (P o ttin g e r , p .87 ). J o h n sto n 's  
s ta r t in g  comments on th e  Rosebery fam ily: 'The Prim roses, the
fam ily  to  which the E arl o f  R osebery b e lo n g s, have sprung up in  
com paratively recen t tim es; and consequently  they have not had 
many o p p o r tu n itie s  o f  p erp etra tin g  land rob b eries or o f  s teep in g  
them selves in  d e c e it ,  c r u e lty , and b lood ' (Johnston, p. 8 ) . The 
s ix th  E arl o f  Rosebery succeeded Johnston as R egional Commissioner 
fo r  th e  S c o t t is h  R egion in  1941, as S ecretary  o f S ta te  in  1945 and 
ev en tu a lly  as Chairman o f  th e  S c o tt ish  T o u rist Board. L a tte r ly  
Johnston adm itted th a t th e  s e r ie s  o f  t r a c t s  in  Our S cots Noble 
F am ilies  tended to  be on e-s id ed , and in  p u b lic  he and R osebery  
d isp layed  an appearance o f  re sp ec t fo r  each o th er. R osebery  
would add th a t he expected  to  see  Johnston fo llo w in g  him as  
S en ior Steward o f  the Jockey Club (P o ttin g e r , p. 88).
2 . P o ttin g er , pp. 100-101. I t  was during Rosebefu*-s months in  o f f i c e  
th a t the S c o t t is h  O ffic e  moved back to  i t s  o r ig in a l r e s id en ce  a t  
Dover House (London), which had been vacated  fo r  war-time purposes.
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a t  the tim e th a t the b e s t  th in g  Rosebery d id  in  o f f ic e  was not to  
oppose th e 1945 D is tr ib u tio n  o f  Industry Act -  th e  on ly  major p ie c e  
o f  l e g i s la t io n  passed  by the Caretaker Government, During h is  few  
weeks a t S t , Andrews House c i v i l  servants were known to  crowd round 
R oseb en y  a f te r  m eetings a t  th e S c o tt is h  O ffic e  not fo r  advice or  
debate, bu t f o r  t ip s  on h is  raceh orses.^
(c )  Joseph Westwood (1945-1947) I
Joseph Westwood became the S c o t t is h  S ecretary  o f  S ta te  by
v ir tu e  o f  h is  long se r v ic e  a s  a S c o tt is h  MP. fo r  P eeb les  and South
M idlothian from 1922, and f o r  S t ir l in g  and F a lk irk  from 1935 on, and ÿ
2as a Ju n ior M in ister . He was Parliam entary U nder-Secretary o f  S ta te  
fo r  S cotlan d  in  1931 and aga in  from 1941 to  1945 under Johnston ,
Westwood’ s tenure in  o f f i c e  demonstrated ra th er  c r u e lly  th e  d iffe r e n c e  
in  what was expected  o f  a J u n ior  M in ister  and o f  a S ecretary  o f  S ta te .
As a Ju n ior  M in ister  the a b i l i t y  to  g e t  a long w ith  o f f i c i a l s  p lu s  a 
good grasp o f  th e  ro u tin e  o f  the p o s it io n  were s u f f ic ie n t  q u a lif ic a ­
t io n s . But th e o f f ic e  o f  S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  requ ired  many d u t ie s  
th a t cou ld  not b e  d elega ted , in clud ing  C abinet b u sin ess , s e n io r  
appointm ents, the o v e r a ll  d ir e c t io n  o f p o l ic y  o f  the O ffic e  and h is  
a c t i v i t i e s  as S co tla n d 's  M in iste r .^  The fa i lu r e  o f  Westwood in  t h is  
resp ect c o n tr a s ts  d ir e c t ly  w ith  the numerous su ccesses  o f  Johnston, 
many o f  which were ach ieved  by d in t o f  h is  determ ination .
1. McGuinness In terv iew .
2 . P o tt in g e r , p .101.
3. I b id . ,  p . 102.
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1. I b id . ,  p .103. See, p p .133-136 on Housing.
2. Ib id . See a ls o , S .E .G .S ., 194-7, P .3 j and G .H .T.R ., I 95O, p . 29.
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I t  i s  ev ident th a t th e  p e r so n a lity  o f  the S ecretary  o f  S ta te  
yjas c lo s e ly  co rre la ted  to  th e  power o f the S c o tt is h  O ff ic e . But o th er  |
fa c to r s  worked ag a in st Westwood as w e ll .  One such b a r r ie r  was th e 4
resentm ent f e l t  by many o f  the E n g lish  departments over th e  fr e e  r e in  #
Johnston had had in  th e  S c o t t is h  O ff ic e  and o f  Joh n sto n 's  c lo s e  work­
ing r e la t io n sh ip  w ith  C h u rch ill. T h is f e e l in g  developed in to  r ea c tio n  
ag a in st th e  S c o tt is h  O ff ic e  during the 194-5-194-7 tenure o f  V^estwood.
A lso  th e removal o f  w ar-tim e co n d itio n s lim ite d  th e scope o f power 
th a t would be a v a ila b le  to  any post-w ar S c o tt is h  S ecre tary  o f S ta te .
The is s u e  o f  the housing shortage was paramount during th e se  
immediate post-w ar yea rs . T h is was Westwood's main concern during h is  
years in  o f f i c e .
The Government were ( s i c )  committed to  a 
strenuous campaign to  b u ild  both  temporary and 
permanent h ou ses. As an in c e n t iv e , the Housing 
(F in a n c ia l P r o v is io n s)(S c o tla n d ) B i l l  o f 194-6 
p r a c t ic a l ly  doubled th e  Exchequer su b s id ie s  on 
houses b u i l t  by  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s ,  and p a id  i t  
r e tr o s p e c t iv e ly  on houses com pleted a f te r  March
1 9 4 4 .1
U nfortun ately  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  were g r e a t . There were not enough 
tra in ed  te c h n ic a l s t a f f ,  and n early  a l l  the m ateria ls  requ ired , tim ber, 
s t e e l ,  s la t e s  and e l e c t r i c a l  components, were in  sh ort supply.
W estwood's rep u ta tion  was fu r th er  damaged when h is  ta r g e t  o f  24,000  
houses in  1947 was not met. Already, in  A p ril o f  th a t year, Westwood 
had to  admit th ere was no hope o f h is  ta r g e t  being  met, fo r  in  the f i r s t  
f iv e  months o f the yea r  on ly  7, 500 houses had been com pleted, and th ere
1. Ib id .
2. 'In q u ir ie s  in to  B u ild in g  C o sts ', The Econom ist. 152 (1 9 4 7 ), 954- 
955.
3. P o tt in g e r , p .103.
4 . P erson al in terv iew  w ith  S ir  P ro fesso r  Robert G rieve, former C hief  
Planner a t  the S c o t t is h  O ffic e  and former Chairman o f  the High- 
Isuids and Is la n d s  Development Board, a t  S tranraer on 13 A p r il 1982.
5. McGuinness In terv iew .
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was now a shortage o f b r ic k s  and cement.^ A lso , according to  the
14 June Economist, th e  b u ild in g  labour fo r c e , the p r ic e  and supply o f
2m a te r ia ls  to  s i t e s ,  were a l l  f ix e d  aind could  not e a s i ly  be a lte r e d .
A ccording to  P o ttin g e r , none o f  th is  was Westwood's f a u lt  but he was
se v e r e ly  c r i t i c i s e d  fo r  not securing b e t te r  co -o rd in a tio n  between th e  É
3 fSupply Departments. ij;
%-4
S ir  Robert Griye, C hief P lanner a t  th e  S c o t t is h  O ffic e  a t  t h is  
tim e and la t e r  Chairman o f  the Highlands and Is la n d s  Development 
Board, d escr ib ed  Westwood in  an o r a l-h is to r y  in terv iew  as  b e in g  "out
o f  h is  depth". G rieve f e l t  th a t  Westwood's h ig h ly  C h r istia n  and 4
1
i d e a l i s t i c a l l y  s o c ia l i s t  b e l i e f s  made him to o  i d e a l i s t i c  fo r  t h i s
p o s it io n . On th e  o ther hand. G rieve s tr e s se d  th at no one man could
have so lved  a l l  the problems he was confronted w ith  a t the con clu sion
o f  th e  Second World War  ^ -  although t h is  cannot absolve Westwood o f
a l l  blame. McGuinness a ls o  defended Westwood as "an honourable l i t t l e
man" and r e fe r r e d  to  him as 'Wee Joe". A lthough he was "the r ig h t  man
fo r  th e  wrong tim e", McGuinness gave him the c r e d it  f o r  h o ld in g  Glasgow
in  check (a t  a tim e when the Glasgow Corporation was thoroughly
obstreperous) by  h is  q u iet determ ination  not to  a llow  th e c i t y  to  con-
5tin u e  to  develop  outwards w ith ou t a green b e l t .  But in  a sad way,
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b o th  G rieve's  and McGuinness' comments serve to  r e in fo r c e  the f e e l ­
in g  th a t Westwood was e f f e c t iv e ly  a fa i lu r e  as S ecre tary  o f S ta te  fo r  
Scotlan d , a lthough he was by a l l  accounts a very n ic e  person. The 
manner o f h is  going eccphasises h is  in e f fe c t iv e n e s s .  In  a t e l e v i s io n  
in terv iew  A t t le e  r e c a lle d  how summarily he d ism issed  Westwood : he 
view ed t h is  a s  an example o f  a Prime M in ister ' having o f  n e c e s s ity
1to  b e  a good b u tch er, but the im pression  l e f t  was somewhat c a l lo u s ' ,
(d) Arthur Woodburn (1947-1950)
The appointment o f  Arthur Woodburn in  1947 was greeted  w ith  
much enthusiasm . Woodburn had been S ecretary  o f  the S c o tt is h  Labour 
P a rty  u n t i l  he en tered  Parliam ent in  1939 as Member fo r  Clackmannan
2and E ast S t ir l in g ,  a se a t which he h e ld  u n t i l  h is  retirem en t in  1970.
He w rote sev era l books (which in clu d ed  O utline o f Money (1928) and th e  
Mystery o f  Money (1 9 3 0 )) ,^  attem pting to  r e la te  S o c ia l i s t  theory to  
th e w orld  market.
U nfortun ately  fo r  u n ity  a t S t .  Andrews House t h i s  was a ls o  the 
tim e o f  th e  return  o f  p arty  p o l i t i c s .  A lso  th e  power o f  the S c o tt is h  
O ffic e  con tin u ed  to  d e c l in e , due in  g rea t p a rt to  A t t le e ' s  preoccupa­
t io n  w ith  n a tio n a l is s u e s  ra th er  than r e g io n a l ones. N a t io n a lisa t io n  
and s o c ia l  programmes were in  th e hands o f  th e  W hitehall m in is te r s , 
and on ly  th e  N ation a l H ealth  S erv ice  came w ith in  the S c o t t is h  S ecretary  
o f  S t a t e ' s  co n tro l a t  t h is  p o in t ,^
1, P o tt in g e r , p ,106 .
2, Ib id .
3. See, Arthur Woodburn, O u tlin e  o f F inance. (London, I 928) . See 
a ls o .  Who's Who 1977. (London, Adam and C harles B lack, 1977), 
p . 2646.
4 . P o tt in g e r , p. 107.
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During Woodburn's p eriod  o f  o f f ic e ,  r e la t iv e  le v e ls  o f unemploy­
ment was s t i l l  a major is s u e  as Scotland continued to  f a l l  behind  in
employment f ig u r e s  by o n e-h a lf in  comparison to  England, But by 1949 %
6i t  was 3*2 per cent unemployment in  Scotland  v ersu s 1 ,6  per cen t in  
England, whereas in  1946 i t  had been 5 .0  per cen t versu s 2 ,5  per  
cen t.^
A f e e l in g  o f  d isco n ten t over t h is  and other m atters had been
growing fo r  some tim e in  Scotland , The S c o tt is h  Labour P arty had
p assed  two r e s o lu t io n s , one in  1945 and the o ther in  1947, c a l l in g
f o r  an en q iir y  in to  S c o tt is h  m a tters , Woodburn's White Paper on
S c o t t is h  A ffa ir s  (Cmd. 7308) p u b lish ed  in  1948 took note o f  the
S c o t t is h  p e o p le 's  w idespread f e e l in g  o f  the need to  d ea l w ith  a f f a i r s
2o f  a  p u rely  S c o t t is h  nature. An important p roposal o f  th is  White 
Paper was to  extend  the powers o f th e  S c o tt is h  Grand Committee, so  
th a t  i t :
should  take the second reading (a s  w e ll  a s  the  
committee stage) o f  S c o tt ish  B i l l s  and should a ls o  
con sid er  S c o tt is h  E stim ates. The eventual amend­
ments made in  th e Standing Orders o f  the House to  
g iv e  e f f e c t  to  the White Paper provided  th at th e  
Committee should c o n s is t  o f the S c o t t is h  M.P, s  
p lu s  between ten  and f i f t e e n  other Members to  pre­
serv e  th e P arty b a la n ce . There were, however, 
some r e s t r ic t io n s .  The Speaker must f i r s t  c e r t i f y  
th a t  th e B i l l  r e la t e s  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  Scotland, ( i f  
th e  Exchequer i s  in vo lved  th is  i s  not as sim ple a s  
i t  sou n d s.) D esp ite  th ese  r e s t r ic t io n s  the White 
Paper in novations were an ingen ious dévolutio n a ryexperim ent. 3
S .E .C .S ,, 1946, p .7; 1949, p .5.
Pot t in g e r , p ,1 1 1 .
Ib id ,, p,113.
I
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GO I
The White Paper r e je c te d  th e  Labour id ea  o f an in q u iry  in to  
Parliam entary d ev o lu tio n , ad m in istra tiv e  d evo lu tion , f in a n c ia l  r e la -  J
t io n s h ip s  and genera l co n d itio n s in  S cotlan d  on th e  grounds th a t i t  
ccu ld  o n ly  be p rop erly  conducted by M.P. s , i t  would need the s e r v ic e s  
o f  f in a n c ia l  exp erts who cou ld  not be spared and th a t i t  would take |
up to  two years to  com plete. These were not very good arguments as
va r io u s Parliam entary reform s and the form ation o f  a r ep re se n ta tiv e  
S c o t t is h  Economic Conference.^
The main is s u e  during th e se  years fo r  Woodburn was housing. H is 
firm  stance a g a in st p r iv a te  b u ild in g , a s compared to  th e  p r e v a ilin g  
a tt itu d e  in  England, has been much c r i t i c i s e d .  P o tt in g e r ’ s v iew  was:
Woodburn took a very r ig id  l i n e  as regards to  
p r iv a te  b u ild in g . Few l ic e n c e s  were g iven , and 
a t one tim e th ere  were no l ic e n c e s  fo r  houses 
b u i l t  fo r  s a le .  (There was much more f l e x i b i l i t y  
in  England. ) In  t h is  Woodburn was much in flu en ce d  
by John ( la t e r  Lord) W heatley, a Lord Advocate o f  
strong l e f t  wing co n v ic tio n s  and impeccable 
S o c ia l i s t  a n cestry . The outcome was not e n t ir e ly  
b e n e f ic ia l .  B u ild in g  firm s v ie d  w ith  each o th er  
fo r  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  co n tra c ts , but combined to  
rep resent th a t th ey  could do fa r  more to  in cr ea se  
the ccu n try 's  housing stock  but fo r  the S ecre tary  
o f  S ta te ’ s d o c tr in a ir e  approach. More u n fortu ­
n a te ly , the p a ttern  o f in d u s tr ia l  in m o b ility , 
under which th e  co u n cil ten an t could  not move to  
another area l e s t  he lo s e  h is  p r iv ile g e d  tenancy, 
became more r ig id .  ^
But according to  McGuinness although Woodburn may have had th e strong­
e s t  d o c tr in a ir e  b e l i e f s  ag a in st p r iv a te  b u ild in g , in  e f f e c t  the
1. M ichael Keating and David Bleiman, Labour and S c o t t is h  
N ation alism , (London, Macmillan, 19797, P* 139.
2 , P o ttin g e r , p .108.
shown by th e s e t t in g  up o f  the Royal Commission in to  th ese  m atters b y  |
ithe C onservatives in  1951. But in  1948 a l l  th a t was proposed was •%
y
•à
i;
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p o l i c i e s  o f  Westwood, Woodburn and McNesI were th e  same.
There were changes in  the S c o t t is h  O f f ic e 's  a t t itu d e  towards 
in d u stry  during the Woodburn yea rs. Through the D is tr ib u t io n  o f  
Industry  P anel the S c o t t is h  O ffice  was con su lted  on th e s i t in g  o f fa c ­
to r ie s ,  th e  scheduling o f  development areas, and the a l lo c a t io n  o f  
gran ts to  in d u stry . The O ffic e  was a ls o  g iven  a se a t on the S c o tt is h  
Board fo r  In d u stiy  (ap p oin ted  by th e  Treasury) which gave general 
advice on th e in d u s tr ia l c lim a te . But th e body which in  tim e made
the most p u b lic  impact was the A dvisory P an el on the H ighlands and 
2Is la n d s . Thus th ere  was some p rogress made towards in d u s tr ia l  recon­
s tr u c t io n  during Woodward’s 1947-1950 tenure in  o f f i c e  a s  holder o f  
the G reat S ea l o f  S co tla n d .^
S ir  G rieve d escrib ed  Woodburn as a "man o f  genuine cap acity" , 
"tough w ithout b e in g  m a lic io u s" .^  But McGuinness d if f e r s  s l i g h t ly  
but in p ort ant l y  by  s ta t in g  th a t although Woodburn was " g en ia l, outgoing  
and popular, most o f h is  su c c e sse s  -  i f  he had any -  were ach ieved
5through g e n ia l ity " , thereby in fe r r in g  th a t Woodburn was not a man o f  
genuine ca p a c ity . According to  Anthony Seldon in  C h u rc h ill’ s Indian  
Summer The C onservative Government 1951-1955 th e reason th e  undynamic
1. McGuinness In terview . See p p .l69, 182 on th e loosen in g  o f  
Government c o n tro ls  on p r iv a te  b u ild in g  during the immediate 
post-w ar y ea rs  in  S cotlan d ,
2 . P o tt in g e r , p .110.
3. See, M ilne, p . 8 fo r  a d is c u s s io n  o f th e  S ea l o f  the 'S ecreta ry  
o f  S ta te  fo r  Scotland' ; th e se  are the a c tu a l words on th e  s e a l ,  
a s  w e ll  as th e t i t l e  th a t has been adopted fo r  th is  p o s it io n .
4* G rieve In terv iew .
5* McGuinness In terv iew .
—  ,
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Woodburn was rep laced  in  February o f  1950 by Hector McP^ lc^ l was to
X'p la y  out the n a t io n a l i s t i c  f e e l in g ' .
( e )  H ector McHerl (1950-1951)
H ector M cNeil became the la s t  Labour S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  o f  4
th e p eriod  in  February 1950. McNe'^ f"' had won acclaim  as a rep resen ta -
2t iv e  to  the U nited N ations during th e ' co ld  war*, and was b e t te r  
known abroad than a t  home when he was appointed S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te , 
although  he had been p rev io u sly  the Lord Provost o f Glasgow and was 4
one o f  th e i n i t i a l  members o f th e S c o t t is h  Council ( Development and 
In du stry) in  1946.^
As a protege o f  B evin, he was c a r e fu l ly  s e le c te d  by A t t le e  not 
only  b ecau se o f  h is  q u a lif ic a t io n s ,  but a ls o  as the co rr ec t choice to  
'p reserve th e balance o f  power between the great tr iu m vira te  o f  Cripps, 
Bevin, and Morrison, and t h i s  d e l ic a te  equ ilibrium  extended to  th e ir  
p ro teg es* ,^  McN^ i^t was considered  too  young fo r  the F oreign  O ffic e ,^  
so the S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  p o s it io n  was p a r t ia l ly  a c o n so la tio n  p r iz e  
to  McN#% 1 fo r  not bein g  named F oreign  S ecre tary ,
An in c r e a se  in  the l e v e l  o f  S c o tt ish  n a tio n a lism  loomed on th e  
horizon  at t h i s  p o in t and MoNg; 1.'s s e le c t io n  was a lso  seen as a means 
o f  d ea lin g  w ith  t h i s  is su e . One o f  the major reasons fo r  t h i s  r i s e  o f
1 . Anthony Seldon, C h u r c h ill's  Indian  Suimier The C onservative  
Government 1951-1955, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p .ljO .
2. Palmer, p . 90.
3. S c o t t is h  C ouncil (Development and In d u stry ), Annual Report 1946- 
1947. t i t l e  page and p . l .
4 . P o tt in g e r , p .118.
5. At 42 McNfiiJ, was th e youngest M in ister  ever to  be appointed to  
take charge o f the S c o t t is h  O ffic e , when he succeeded Arthur 
Woodburn in  February 1950 (P o ttin g er , p . 118).
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n a tio n a lism  was th e f e e l in g  th a t London d id  not understand th e nature
1o f  S c o t t is h  economic d ep ression , coupled w ith  d is s a t is f a c t io n  over ^
the ’a u s te r ity '  measures designed  hy S ir  S ta ffo rd  Cripps, the  
C hancellor o f  the Exchequer, The lea d in g  n a t io n a lis t  body a t th is  
tim e was not the S c o t t is h  N a tio n a lis t  P arty  (SînIP), but th e  group formed 
by John MacCormick -  th e  S c o tt is h  Convention, In  1949 th e  th ir d  assem­
b ly  o f  th e  S c o tt ish  Convention endorsed a r e s o lu t io n  demanding home 
ru le  fo r  Scotland, th e s o -c a l le d  'S c o t t is h  Covenant*. I t  v/as claim ed  
th a t two m il l io n  peop le s ign ed  t h is  mass p e t i t io n .  Although many o f  
th ese  s ig n a tu res  were forged , numerous in f lu e n t ia l  (and a lso  d iv erse)  
p eop le and groups backed th e  S c o tt ish  Covenant, such as  Tom Johnston, 
the Church o f  Scotland and the Coramnist P arty , This was indeed a 
case o f  ’p o l i t i c s  making strange bed f e l lo w s ' ,  Tom Johnston  was not 
a supporter o f  home r u le  and h is  s ign a tu re  on th e S c o t t is h  Covenant 
was r e p r e se n ta t iv e  o f  a g rea t many oth er S cots who s ig a ed  t h is  p e t i t io n  
th a t were not n e c e s sa r ily  pro-N ationalism  but f e l t  t h is  was an e f f e c ­
t iv e  way to  demonstrate t h e ir  f e e l in g s  th a t 'something needed to  be  
done* about S co tla n d 's  p o l i t i c a l  and economic problems,
MacCormick had c r i t i c a l l y  damaged the Covenanters p o s it io n  by  
having e a r l ie r  a lie n a te d  S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  Woodburn (who during the  
war had been very  sym pathetic to  d evolu tion ) and thus the S c o t t is h  
O ffic e  through h is  in ep t handling o f  a 1947 b y -e le c t io n  a t  P a is le y .
But most im portantly , i t  became p a te n tly  obvious th a t t h i s  type o f  
p o l i t i c a l  ’r e v iv a lism ’ was not capable o f  e x e r tin g  su sta ined  p ressure  
on th e  Government, In  a d d itio n , th e  Covenanters d id  not c a p it a l i s e  on
1. Palmer, p . 333- See a ls o , Arthur C. Turner, S c o tt is h  Home R ule. 
(Oxford, B a s i l  B lackv/ell, 1952).
1. R e lia s , The S c o t t is h  P o l i t i c a l  System, p. 122. C hristopher H arvie, 
S cotland  and N ationalism . (London, George A lle n  and Unwin, 1977), 
p p .235- 236. See a ls o , K eith  Webb, The Growth o f  N ationalism  in  
S cotlan d . (Glasgov/-, The Molendinar P ress , 1977) and a lso  Jack  
Brand, The N atio n a l Movement in  Scotland . (London, Poutledge and 
Kegan P au l, I 978) .
2. There i s  a charming s to iy  o f  the way in  which th e  Scotland Yard 
lo c a te d  the r in g lea d er  o f the Stone o f Scone in c id e n t , a f t e r  th ey  
had been tip p ed  to  check the Glasgow area : the Scotland  Yard 
In sp ecto r  enquired which was the b e s t  lib r a r y  in  Glasgov/, he 
then went to  th e  M itch e ll L ibrary where he had a lib r a r ia n  lo c a te  
every  p o s s ib le  book on the Stone o f  Scone, W estm inster Abbey, 
S c o t t is h  N ation alism , e tc .  One name appeared on every book as
a recen t borrower; the In sp ecto r  had id e n t i f i e d  th e  r in g lea d er  
o f  th e in c id e n t and proceeded to  make the a r r e s t .  (McGuinness 
In terv iew , )
3 . H arvie, S co tlan d  and N ationalism , p . 236,
I
th e o p p o r tu n itie s  a v a ila b le  to  them in  th e  1950 and 1951 e le c t io n s .
The r i s e  in  p o p u la r ity  o f  S c o tt is h  N ation alism  in  th e 1940* s d id  not 
weaken th e  tw o-party system  as  i t  was to  do in  the 1970* s .  In  the |
1950 e le c t io n  Scotland moved c lo se r  to  the C onservatives (a  2 ,6  per  
cent swing) in  much th e  same way as the E n g lish  (3 .0  per c e n t) ,^  II
MacCormick was in d ir e c t ly  in vo lved  in  the s t e a l in g  o f  th e  a n c ien t '%
Stone o f Scone from W estminster Abbey on Christm as Day 1950 and smug-
2g lin g  i t  north to  Arbroath, Although th is  was a popular in c id e n t , in  
the long run i t  was counter-productive as, according to  C hristopher  
H arvie, i t  * enhanced em otional n a tion a lism  ra th er  than the moderate 
concensus MacCormick was try in g  to  promote. I t  produced a c a th a r s is  
a f t e r  which the C onvention's e f f o r t s  seemed a n t i - c l im a c t ic ' ,
I t  i s  p op u larly  b e lie v e d  th a t th e  on ly  Government r ea c tio n  to  t h i s  
surge o f  in te r e s t  in  S c o tt is h  m atters was the form ation in  1952 b y  the
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new C onservative Government o f  the B alfour Commission on S c o tt ish
1A ffa ir s ,  which was in  f a c t  in s tr u c te d  to  avoid  the home ru le  is s u e .
But McNeil had met w ith  MacCormick in  1950 sh o r tly  b e fo re  the
N a t io n a lis t  p u b l ic i ty  stu n t o f  the Stone of Scone in c id e n t and had
a ls o  s e t  up th a t year  the Catto Committee which was to  in v e s t ig a te  f
2th e f in a n c ia l  and economic s i tu a t io n . The return o f  the Stone
removed S c o tt is h  n a tio n a lism  as a h ead lin e news item  and p o l i t i c a l  
is s u e .
The s ta tu to r y  powers o f the S c o tt is h  O ff ic e  were more lim ite d  
at t h i s  p o in t than th ey  were to  become la t e r ,  and c o n s is te d  m ainly o f  
s te e r in g  firm s to  chosen areas by gran tin g , or re fu s in g , in d u s tr ia l  
development c e r t i f i c a t e s .^  But McNeil h im se lf  made strenuous e f f o r t s  
to  a t t r a c t  new in d u stry  to  Scotland. The S c o tt ish  C ouncil (Development 
and In d u stry) under th e  lea d e rsh ip  o f  Lord B ils la n d  continued  a camp­
aign  to  a t t r a c t  in d u s tr ia l investm ent, e s p e c ia l ly  from abroad.
McNe.il's  backgrcund o f in te r n a t io n a l exp erien ce served him in  good 
stea d , e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  a t tr a c t io n  o f  fo r e ig n  in d u s tr ia l concerns, 
fo r  i t  was North American and Japsmese in d u stry  th a t were the most 
sought a f t e r .  One c o lo u r fu l example must b e  c i te d  to  dem onstrate 
M cN eil's d evo tion  to  new in d u stry  in  S cotlan d . McN 1 persuaded Tom 
Watson, magnate o f  I.B.M. ( in te r n a t io n a l B u sin ess M achines), who he had 
met in  New York some tim e e a r l ie r ,  to  come to  Scotland  to  in sp e c t  pos­
s ib le  s i t e s  f o r  a fa c to r y  Watson wanted to  s e t  up. But none o f the
1. Ib id . and R e lia s , The S c o t t is h  P o l i t i c a l  System, p . 122.
2. P o tt in g e r , pp. I l l ,  113 and 123-124.
3. I b id . ,  p . 127.
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p referred  lo c a t io n s  p lea sed  Watson.
Then Watson in d ic a te d  a ccuple o f  f i e ld s ,  saying  
t h i s  was th e  k ind  o f  area he wanted, McNeil d id  
n ot know who owned the land, but im m ediately he 
proposed a b arga in . He would provide an op tion  
on the s i t e  w ith in  a week i f  I .B .M ., f o r  t h e ir  
p a rt, would undertake to  accept i t .  Watson, 
though s k e p tic a l o f  whether th is  could be done, 
agreed, McNeil and h is  o f f i c i a l s  then roused a 
s ta r t le d  Tov/n C lerk and id e n t i f ie d  the owner as  
a Dowager l iv in g  in  Sussex, McNèll took o f f  in  
h is  chartered  p lane and b efore  the weekend was 
over he had h is  op tio n . In  the fa c e  o f strenu­
ous o p p o sitio n  from S ir  H artley Shawcross who, 
a s  P resid en t o f  the Board of Trade, was canvas­
s in g  a s i t e  in  S t .  H elens, McN6*l p rev a iled .
An in d u s tr ia l development c e r t i f i c a t e  was 
granted  and I.B .M . moved to  Greenock, An 
unorthodox, but im aginative, s o r t ie .  Morale 
r o se  in  the S c o t t is h  O ffice .^
But McN^'^l's enthusiasm fo r  new industry  in  Scotland  was not e n t ir e ly  
a l t r u i s t i c .  He earned th e  t i t l e  'S ecretary  o f  S ta te  f o r  Greenock and 
M.P. fo r  Scotland* by h is  r e je c t io n  o f th e New Town o f  Houston 
Bishopton because i t  was to  be next to  h is  con stitu en cy . McNeil defen­
ded h is  stance by saying he was im pressed by th e  h o s t i l i t y  o f  the people  
o f Greenock to  th is  scheme, which could have been tru e , and that he was 
try in g  to  'sa v e ' th e Cart V a lle y . But r e a l i s t i c a l l y  th ere  was no 
doubt in  anyone's mind a t  th e  time th a t McNc;« 1 was try in g  to  'save' 
h is  home co n stitu en cy  and p reserve h is  v o te r s . Even when he was s t i l l
in  New York a t  the U nited  N ation s he had se n t urgent telegram s try in g
2to  quash the Houston B ishopton  New Town.
McNeil went out o f o f f i c e  in  1951 w ith  th e  f a l l  o f  the Labour 
Government in  th e  October General E le c t io n . A lthough he had no
1 . Ib id .
2 . G rieve In terv iew  and McGuinness In terview ,
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coh esive  p o lic y  during h is  y ea rs  in  o f f ic e  he provided  many s o l id
ad hoc s o lu t io n s  to  p ressin g  problem s. H is n in e teen  months in  o f f ic e
l e f t  th e ir  mark on th e  S c o tt is h  O ffice ;  he was a very p r o fe s s io n a l
p o l i t i c ia n  who turned i t  in to  a more modern and b u s in e s s - l ik e  o rgan isa -
1t io n  than i t  had been h ith e r to ,
( f )  James S tu art (1951-1957)
James S tuart, th e  new C onservative S c o tt ish  S ecre tary  o f
S ta te , came in to  o f f ic e  in  1951 w ith  C h u r c h ill's  new Government, As
Prime M in ister  fo r  th e  second tim e (1951-1955) C hurchill appointed h is
o ld  C hief Whip as S c o tt is h  Secretary  and added a M in ister  o f  S ta te  and
a th ir d  Parliam entary U nder-Secreta iy  to  th e S c o tt is h  O ff ic e , making
2f iv e  m in is te r s  in  a l l .  As in  th e case o f Johnston, S tu art was ab le
3to  r e ly  on th e  support o f  C h u rch ill in  cab in et d isp u te s . The fin d in g s  
o f  the C atto Committee appeared in  J u ly  1952, L ater th a t year S tuart
1. I b id , ,  p .128.
2. R e lia s ,  Modem S co tlan d , p. 103,
3. James S tu art (V isco u n t), W ithin the F r in g e . (London, Bodley Head,
1967), p . 162.
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s e t  up the B alfour Commission,  ^ i t s  Chairman was th e E arl o f B alfou r,
2the nephew o f  A. J ,  B a lfou r (Prime M in ister  1902-1906).
Although S tu a r t 's  1951-1957 term of o f f ic e  comes beyond th e  scope
%o f  th is  paper, i t  would not be out o f  p lace  to  d isc u ss  here th e  ch o ice  3
o f  h is  s e le c t io n  as Secretary  o f  S ta te . Apart from h is  natural le a d e r­
sh ip  q u a lit ie s ,  S tu art was s in g le d  out because o f  h is  c lo s e  t i e s  w ith  
C h u rch ill. To c i t e  one s tr ik in g  example o f  th is :
In  1950 when lea d in g  sen ior  T ories began to  have 
doubts about w hether C hu rch ill, a t  h is  advanced 
age, should lea d  th e  party  a t i t s  next e le c t io n ,
S tu a rt was s e le c te d  as the on ly  one who could  
rep o rt t h e ir  m isg iv in g s  -  to  no purpose as i t  
turned out -  to  the grea t man. 3
1. The C atto Committee s e t  up by McNiel d id  not report u n t i l  J u ly  o f  
1952, by which time S tu a rt was S ecretary  o f  S ta te . In  a sense  
McNiel had 'bought tim e ' fo r  h im self by appointing an in v e s t ig a ­
t iv e  committee. This was in d ic a t iv e  o f  McNiel ' s l a i s s e z - f a i r e  
approach to  the N a t io n a lis t  is s u e . The Committee came to  few con­
c r e te  co n c lu s io n s , i . e .  th a t i t  was im p ossib le  to  id e n t i fy  S co tla n d 's  
im ports from, exports to , and balance o f  payments w ith  oth er coun­
t r i e s ,  in c lu d in g  the r e s t  o f the U.K. (P o ttin g er , p . l4 0 ) .  The 
Report d id  conclude, much to  the d isp lea su re  o f  th e  N a t io n a lis t s ,  
th a t S cotlan d  d id  r e c e iv e  a grea ter  share o f  dom estic expenditure, 
but th e  proportion  o f  gen era l expenditure ( fo r  the b e n e f it  o f the  
whole U nited  Kingdom, such as th a t on defence and Government con­
tr a c ts )  a c tu a lly  incurred  in  Scotland was probably sm aller  : the  
Catto Committee d id  not know (K ella s , Modern Scotland , p . 103), 
Housing, unemployment and h ea lth  were a l l  recogn ised  as ser io u s  
problems th a t were not b ein g  d ea lt w ith  sp e e d ily  enough (P o ttin g er ,
p .140) .
The B a lfou r  Committee was s e t  up la t e r  in  1952, Thus th e  S c o tt is h  
O ffic e  was once more under scru tin y , a long w ith  oth er departments 
(but not n a t io n a lise d  in d u stry) in  S cotlan d . The is s u e  o f  p a r lia ­
mentary d ev o lu tion  was excluded. When the Balfcxir Committee 
rep orted  in  1954 i t  su ggested  the tr a n s fe r  o f  highv/ays from the  
M in istry  o f  Transport to  the S c o tt ish  O ff ic e . O verall th e  Report 
was not designed  to  appease n a tion a lism . But by the m id-1950's  
t h is  became l e s s  n ecessary , due to  the economic recovery o f  th ese  
years and the r e a c tio n  a g a in st the N a t io n a lis t s  during th e se  years  
(K e lla s , Modern S co tlan d . p p .l0 3 , 104 and 1 05 ),
2 . Palmer, p p .34-35,
3. P o tt in g e r , p .133.
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Thus one might exp ect sp ecta cu la r  measures during the Stuart y ea rs , 
due to  h is  c lo se  t i e s  to  W h iteh a ll, But the prime r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  ' 
in i t i a t in g  p o lic y  r e s t s  w ith  the M in isters and S tu art was not an inno­
v a to r , And the C onservative P arty , in  S tu a r t's  own words, "was not 
n otoriou s fo r  i t s  an x iety  to  le g is la t e " .^
A p o s it iv e  elem ent in  S tu a r t’ s appointment was th a t he had fr ie n d s
on-both  s id e s  o f  the House, 'He was even con su lted  by  Nye Bevan, who
sought h is  advice on what l in e  he should  take to  counter Gait s k i l l  ' s
2b id  fo r  the lea d ersh ip  o f  the Labour P arty . ' And among the S c o tt is h  
p o l i t i c ia n s ,  Tom Johnston  looked on him w ith  r e sp e c t , S tu art was thus  
a fo r tu ito u s  ch o ice , fo r  t h is  was a major tr a n s it io n  fo r  the S c o t t is h  
O ffic e  in  1951, For S tu art was to  be the f i r s t  C onservative S ecre tary  
o f S ta te  fo r  S cotlan d  s in ce  E rnest Brown (1940-1941) -  t h is  i s ,  o f  
cou rse, excluding th e  few months' tenure o f Roseberu in  1945 during  
C h u r c h ill's  C aretaker Government.
1 . I b id . ,  p .138.
2, I b id . ,  p .133.
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4 . R eg ion a l P lans
F ollow in g  th e Second World War th ere was a tremendous f e e l in g  
o f  a n t ic ip a t io n  b oth  in  popular and o f f i c i a l  c i r c le s ,  a b e l i e f  th a t  
l i f e  cou ld  be made b e t te r , and th a t the way i t  was to  be done was 
through 'Town and Country P la n n in g ^  N ev er th e le ss , the concept d id  
not develop overn ight ; th e  y ea rs  1909 to  1939 vrere the most forma­
t iv e ,  though by 1939 i t  was c le a r  th a t planning had not y e t  accom plished
2th e r e s u l t s  th a t had been hoped. H iring th e war there was a renewed
5surge o f  in t e r e s t  in  the achievem ent o f  planned g o a ls .
Under the Town and Country P lanning Act o f  1932 th e preparation  
o f  p lanning schemes, b e t te r  known as reg io n a l p la n s , was l e f t  to  the  
i n i t i a t i v e  o f  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s .  The f i r s t  s te p  towards the prep­
a r a tio n  o f  a r e g io n a l p lan  was th e  p assin g  o f a r e s o lu t io n  to  prepare  
such a scheme by th e  lo c a l  a u th o r ity . In  1943 th e  In terim  Development 
A ct mandated th a t f o r  the immediate fu tu re i t  was to  be assumed th a t  
every  au th o r ity  had in  fa c t  p assed  such a r e s o lu t io n . Hence, t h is  
meant th at p lann ing co n tro l was to  be ex erc ised  over a l l  land. The 
1947 A ct went one stage fu rth er  ; a l l  planning a u th o r it ie s  were req u ired  
to  produce a p lan  by 1951. The o b je c t  o f  th ese  development p lan s was to  
show f o r  each area th e  fu tu re p o lic y  fo r  land use and a lso  to  provide a 
sim ple method fo r  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f  th is  co n tro l. T h is was th e  f i r s t
1. G rieve In terv iew . See a ls o ,  Robert G rieve, 'In  R etrospect : 40 "a
y ears o f  development and achievem ent', The P lann er , (May 1980),
62- 63. 3
2 . See p p .272-274. |
3. D. R i^ y  C h ild s , 'The F ir s t  H alf-Century o f  P la n n in g ', in  S ir  j
P a tr ic k  Abercrombie, Town and Country P lanning. (London, Oxford 
U n iv e r s ity  P r e ss , 1 9 5 ^ , p. 250. I
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1. I b id . ,  p p .259-261.
2 . See, th e  Report o f  th e  F i f e  County C ouncil P lanning A dvisory  
Committee, F ife  Looks Ahead A R egional Survey o f  th e  County, 
(Edinburgh, C. J .  Cous land and Son L td ., 1946).
3. G rieve In terv iew .
tim e that town planning had become a n a tio n a l o b je c t iv e . These new
planning powers were to  be e x e r c ise d  by 145 sep arate  a u th o r it ie s , E
which were e ith e r  County C ouncil or County Borough C ouncils. T h is
reduced by n in e -te n th s  the number o f  previous sep arate  planning -j
1a u th o r it ie s .
J
There were two t i e r s  o f  re g io n a l p lan s. The b e s t  p lans were -S
executed  by tra in ed  p lan n ers, most o f  th ese  p lans -  throughout 4
B r ita in  -  were subm itted  by 1947-1948. The lo c a l  a u th o r ity  p lans were 
due by 1951 but most were subm itted somewhat la t e r .  Most o f the sm aller  
a u th o r it ie s  could n ot a ffo rd  to  h ir e  a p r o fe ss io n a l p lanner to  research  
and w r ite  th e ir  R egional P lan . For example, t h is  was th e  case fo r  th e  ;
2 1R egional Survey o f th e  County o f F i f e ,  F i f e  Looks Ahead. Hence, th e
n ea rest lo c a l  o f f i c i a l ,  such as an engineer or a r c h ite c t ,  was te c h n i-  1
c a l ly  put in  charge o f  th e  p ro jec t  and a young tra in ed  planner (u s u a lly  ^
E n g lish  or Welsh) was brought in  -  o f te n  from th e  S c o t t is h  O ffice  I
Planning Department -  who was q u a lif ie d  y e t not so well-known as to be
u n afford ab le . The p la n n er’ s s a la r ie s  and a l l  o th er  c o s t s  o f  producing 4
3 !the reg io n a l p lan  were p a id  fo r  out o f  lo c a l  m onies. æ
•5
There were two la r g e - s c a le  reg io n a l p lan s done in  S cotlan d  a t t h is  *
tim e. The b e s t  known and most in f lu e n t ia l  p lan  was th at o f  S ir  P a tr ic k  ;
oth er  hand, d id  not pay c lo se  a tte n t io n  even to  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  boun­
d a r ie s  but gave a 'b ir d 's  eye' v iew  o f  a reg ion .
The S c o tt is h  O ff ic e  was in vo lv ed  w ith  the Clyde V a lle y  Plan in  
sev era l c a p a c it ie s .  Tom Johnston , on the recommendation o f  Mr. J ,  H. 
McGuinness, had s e t  up the Clyde V a lley  R egional P lanning Committee 
during the war.^ Upon com pletion o f  the p lan , th e lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
in  the Clyde V a lle y  re fu sed  to  pay fo r  the p u b lic a tio n  o f  th e p lan  as 
i t  contained  many p o l ic ie s  u n p a la tab le  to  them, such as o v e r s p i l l .  
Thus the S c o t t is h  O ffice  p a id  fo r  the p u b lic a t io n  o f  the Clyde P lan
1, S ir  P a tr ic k  Abercrombie and Robert H. Matthew, fo r  th e  Clyde V a lley  
R egional P lanning Committee, The Clyde V a lle y  R egional P la n  1946. 
(Edinburgh, H.M.S. 0. , 19 4 9 ). See a lso . S ir  W illiam  E, Whyte ( fo r  
th e) Clyde V a lle y  R egional P lanning A dvisory Committee, Report by  
A dvisory Committee to  th e  C onstituent L ocal A u th o r it ie s . (Hamilton, 
Hamilton Ad^ L td ., 1947).
2, Grieve In terv iew .
3. C hilds, pp. 252 and 254.
4 . McGuinness In terv iew . See a lso , Robert G rieve, 'The Clyde V a lley  
P lan  -  A R eview ', (a  paper d e liv ered  a t th e  Town and Country 
Planning Summer School h e ld  a t  th e  U n iv e r s ity  o f  S t . Andrews,
1954, under th e  au sp ices  o f  the Town P lanning I n s t i t u t e ) .
92 Î%41Abercrombie, The Clyde V a lle y  R egional P lan  1946. Abercrombie was g
a ls o  in vo lved  during th e la t e r  war years in  w r itin g  th e County o f
■iLondon P la n , form ulated a t  th e  same time as th e  Clyde V a lle y  P la n ; t;
he used  to  s h u tt le  q u ite  r e g u la r ly  between Glasgow and London during 
th ese  y ea rs . G rieve d escr ib ed  Abercrombie as a "sm all, dynamic, b ird ­
l ik e  man", a " c u ltiv a ted  man, a c o l le c to r  o f  Chinese ceram ics".
Abercrom bie's energy tr a n sferred  i t s e l f  to  h is  deputy p lanning con su l-
2ta n ts  and th ey  c r e d it  him fo r  th e  d e t a i l  and accuracy o f  th e  R eport.
There was a v a r ied  approach to  th e post-w ar r eg io n a l p la n s .
Thomas Sharp produced fo r  Durham, E xeter and Oxford very  m eticu lous
p la n s  o f  th ese  in d iv id u a l c i t i e s .  The Abercrombie approach, on the è
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and a ls o  arranged i t s  p r in tin g  a t  th e H.MS. 0, o f f i c e  in  
1Edinburgh, an in d ic a t io n  o f  th e ir  eagerness to  have i t  c ir c u la te d .
T his was the on ly  S c o t t is h  reg io n a l p lan  to  re c e iv e  such a tten tio n ;  
t h i s  was due p rim arily  to  the fa c t  th a t i t  was d ea lin g  w ith  a great 
d ea l o f  the C entral In d u s tr ia l B e l t .
S ir  Prank Hears produced a very d if fe r e n t  reg io n a l p lan  fo r  the
e a s t  o f  Scotland , the R egional P lan  fo r  C entral and South-East 
2Scotland . The son -in -la w  o f  the famous p lanner, P a tr ick  Geddes,
Hears approached h is  work in  a very  d if fe r e n t  manner than Abercrombie. 
The Hears p la n  was mi oh more vague than the Clyde P la n ; t h i s  was 
d e lib e r a te  s tr a te g y  as the main c r it ic is m  o f  th e  Clyde V a lle y  P lan  was 
th a t i t  d id  not le a v e  room to  manoeuvre. ^
There were se v e r a l o th er s ig n if ic a n t  S c o t t is h  reg io n a l p la n s which
should  be m entioned in  p a ssin g . One was the Tay V a lle y  P lan  (1 9 5 0 ),^
which encon^assed Dundee and i t s  surrounding area . The o ther, A C iv ic
Survey and P lan  fo r  Edinburgh (1949) -  which was a ls o  prepared b y
P a tr ic k  Abercrombie -  i s  most fo n d ly  remanbered f o r  i t s  su g g estio n  to
b u ild  an a lte r n a t iv e  road underneath P rin ces S tr e e t  to  r e l ie v e  t r a f f i c  
5co n gestion . T h is  was p u rely  a 'c o f f e e  ta b le ’ book, a C ivic Survey; 
i t  made no attem pt, nor was i t  in tended , to  be a re g io n a l p lan .
1 . G rieve In te rv iew  and McGuinness In terv iew .
2 . S ir  Prank H ears, fo r  the C entra l and South-East Scotland  R egional 
Planning A dvisory Committee, A R egional Survey and Plan fo r  C entral 
and South-East Scotland . (Edinburgh, M orrison and Gibb, L td ., I 948),
3 . G rieve In terv iew .
4 .  See, Robert L y le  and Gordon Payn^ fo r  th e Tay V a lley  R egional 
Planning Committee, The Tay V a lle y  Plan. (Dundee, Bum s and H arris, 
L td ., 1950) .
5 . P a tr ick  Abercrombie and Derek Plumstead, fo r  the Town C ouncil,
A C iv ic  Survey and P lan  fo r  th e  C ity  and Royal Burgh o f  Edinburgh. 
(Edinburgh, O liv er  and Boyd, 1949)» p .42 .
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The content o f  th e  reg io n a l p lan s v a r ied  both  in  character and 
s t y le .  The Clyde P lan  and Mears p lan  each d iscu ssed  the economic 
a c t iv i t y  o f  th e ir  area  and s tr e sse d  the n e c e s s ity  o f  new in d u stry .
But th e  Mears p lan  was mich more vague about s p e c if ic s  and consequently  
was b oth  l e s s  c o n tr o v e r s ia l and l e s s  e f f e c t iv e .  The main recoionenda- 
t io n s  o f  the Clyde P lan  were New Towns, Green B e lt , O v e r sp ill, e tc .
These concepts were n o t new to  the Clyde P lan  but th e in flu en ce  o f  the  
P lan  con tr ib u ted  to  th e  eventual acceptance o f th ese  id e a s  fo r  the  
Glasgow reg ion .
The heyday o f  th ese  p lan n in g  rep orts came ju s t  a f t e r  th e  war. But 
the gen era l p u b lic  q u ick ly  became disenchanted w ith  th e  concept o f  
planning when th e inm ediate r e s u lt s  -  such a s  b u ild in g  -  th a t th ey  had 
been prom ised in  the reg io n a l p lan s, e t c . , d id  not occur.
Although .White Paper p lanning fo r  post-w ar rec o n stru ctio n  began  
in  f u l l  fo r c e  b e fo r e  th e  war was over, and although  reg io n a l p la n s  were 
p ublished  in  th e 1945-1951 p eriod , i t  was not u n t i l  1951 th at th e  main 
reco n stru ctio n  programmes were a c tu a lly  begun. There was very ra p id  
development in  l e g i s la t io n  but th e  immediate ta n g ib le  r e s u lt s  were, 
according to  C h ild s, both  'meagre and lack ing  in  q u a l i t y ' .  ^ The Labour 
Government's p o l ic y  in  a c t io n  was focu ssed  on the s o c ia l  s id e  on hous­
in g , and on th e  economic s id e  on fa c to r y  b u ild in g  in  th e Development 
Areas and the major in d u s tr ia l cen tre s , on n a t io n a lisa t io n , and on the  
h y d r o -e le c tr ic i ty  schemes o f th e  Highlands. Economic con d itio n s d id  not 
a llo w  any b u ild in g  th a t was not s t r i c t l y  u t i l i t a r ia n  in  nature. Never­
t h e le s s ,  t h i s  d id  n ot prevent ra p id  d i s i l lu s io n  o f  th e  gen era l p u b lic
1
1 , C hilds, p p .266- 267 .
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Iw ith  p lanning; they were exp ectin g  the changes premised in  the |
reg io n a l p lan s and d id  not tak e  account o f the d i f f i c u l t y  in  p u ttin g  
them in to  a c t io n  in  b lea k  economic co n d itio n s .
In  1951 when th e T ories returned  to  power, members o f the P lann ing #
Department (a  pre-w ar body o f  the Department o f  H ealth) o f  the S c o t t is h  |
O ff ic e  were t o ld  by a C onservative o f f i c i a l  fo r  James S tu art, the new
S c o t t is h  S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  : "We now have a C onservative Government 
and i t  i s  not f o r  p lanning and my advice to  you i s  to  keep your heads 
down c o l le c t iv e ly " .  Although th e  P lanning Department, headed by  
Robert G rieve, was not disbanded i t  never rega in ed  the in flu en ce  i t  
had a f te r  the war : th e  r eg io n a l p lan s f e l l  from power in  the same 
manner. N ev er th e le ss , th e r e g io n a l p lans were s ig n if ic a n t  not o n ly  as  
a post-w ar phenomena but a lso  as a framework to  b ase  p o st-1951 
r eco n stru ctio n . ^
1 . G rieve In terv iew .
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Chapter Three
P op u la tion  and Unemployment P a tter n s
V
97
1 . P op u la tion  Growth and Movement
( i )  S co tla n d 's  P op u la tion
The estim ated  to ta l  p op u la tion  o f  Scotland  a t 30 June 1946 was 
5,135) 000. T h is represented  an in crease  o f  128 ,400  over the c o r r e s ­
ponding f ig u r e  ( 5, 006, 700) ,  a t  the same date in  1939. As in  th e  r e s t  
o f  B r ita in  th e  bu lk  o f  the in cr ea se  occurred in  th e  over-65  age group, 
but the number in  th e  15-65 age group in creased  by 43 ,500  from  
3 ,372,1 0 0  to  3 ,415,0 0 0 .  ^
The pop u lation  in  Scotland continued  to  r i s e  s t e a d ily  from 1946-
1950 . T his was due to  th e fa c t  th a t the pre-war b ir th  ra te  in  S co tla n d  
was m aintained throughout the Second World War, which was in  sharp 
co n tra st  to  the drop in  b ir th s  during the F ir s t  World War, N everthe­
l e s s ,  fo llo w in g  th e  Second World War the 'baby boom’ was o f th e  same 
order o f  magnitude as th a t a f te r  th e  F ir s t  World War, and thus i t  d id  
much more than m erely catch  up on b ir th s  postponed by war. The l a t t e r  
'baby boom' was, however, s h o r t - l iv e d  and on ly  th ree  years -  1946, 1947 
and 1948 had markedly h igher b ir th  r a te s .  From 1950-1955 the b ir th  
r a te  dropped so s ig n i f ic a n t ly  th a t i t  was on ly  m arg in a lly  above the  
h is t o r ic  low  l e v e l  o f  the 1 9 3 0 's .^
1 , I ,  and E . , 1946, p . 5. See, N inety-Second Annual Report o f th e  
R eg istra r  General fo r  Scotland  1946, (Edinburgh, H,M. S. 0. , 1948), 
p .20, Table g (2 ) ;  note d ecrease in  death r a te  o f persons 65 y ea rs  
o f  age and o ld e r .
2. Stephen Kendrick, Frank Bechhof er , David McCrone, Working Paper 1 ; 
Demography. S o c ia l  S tructure o f  Modern Scotland  P r o je c t , (S .S .R . G.
H.R, 6948, U n iv e r s ity  o f Edinburgh, unpublished stud y), p. 30. See  
a ls o ,  R osa lin d  M itchison, B r i t is h  P opu lation  Change S ince i8 6 0 . 
(London, Macmillan, 1977), e s p e c ia l ly  p p .33-34 and 59-60.
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Table 1 -  B ir th -R ate  in  S cotlan d . 1931-1951
Crude 
b ir th -r a te  
p er 1 ,000  
p op u lation
B ir th s  per  
1,000  women 
aged 1 5 -44
L egitim ate  
b ir th s  per  
1,000 married  
women aged 
under 45
I l l e g i t i n  
b ir t h s  E 
1 ,0 0 0  unmar 
women aged
1931 19 .0 7 9 .8 168 .3 1 0 .3
1932 18 .6 7 8 .4 16 4 .3 9 .9
1933 17 .6 7 4 .5 154 .7 9 .2
1934 1 8 .0 7 6 .5 156 .8 9 .4
1935 17.8 7 4 .9 1 5 2 .4 9 .0
1936 1 7 .9 7 5 .1 151 .4 9 .1
1937 17.6 73 .7 147 .2 8 .6
1938 17 .7 7 4 .0 146.1 8 .7
1939 1 7 .4 7 2 .1 141 .1 8 .3
1940 . 1 7 .1 7 1 .4 137 .0 8 .3
1941 1 7 .5 7 3 .5 138 .1 9 .6
1942 17 .6 7 4 .2 135 .9 1 0 .7
1943 1 8 .4 78 .7 140.6 1 2 .3
1944 18 .5 79 .9 141 .5 13 .1
1945 1 6 .9 7 3 .1 126.1 1 3 .3
1946 2 0 .3 8 9 .5 1 5 8 .0 12.6
1947 2 2 .0 99 .1 171 .5 1 2 .2
1948 1 9 .4 88 .7 150 .2 1 1 .5
1949 1 8 .5 8 5 .4 14 4 .0 1 0 .6
1950 17 .9 8 3 .4 139 .8 1 0 .0
1951 17 .7 80.2 1 3 2 .2 9 .6
Source; N inety-Seventh  ^ n u a l  Report o f  th e  R eg istra r  General fo r  
S cotlan d  1951/ "(Edinburgh. . 1953), P. 10.
The g en era l trend o f th e  b ir th -r a te  per 1 , CX)0 married women (column 3) 
was s im ila r  to  th a t o f  th e  crude b ir th -r a te  (column l )  and b ir th s  per  
1 ,000  women aged 15-44  (column 2 ) , although in  sev era l ca ses  i t  showed 
a d e c lin e  in  a year when g en era l f e r t i l i t y  in creased . The i l le g i t im a t e
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"birth-rate per 1, CXX) unmarried women r o se  s t e a d ily  from 1940-1945  
during th e war hut f e l l  during the immediate post-v/ar y ea rs .^
M o rta lity  was much h igh er  in  Scotland than in  England and Wales 
fo llo w in g  th e  Second World War, Although th e d ea th -ra te  had f a l l e n  
d ram atica lly  fo r  a l l  o f  Great B r ita in  s in ce  th e e a r ly  part o f  th e  
tw en tieth  century , the f a l l  was markedly more pronounced in  England  
and W ales. During 1950-1952 th e  d ea th -ra te  p er thousand o f  th e  popu­
la t io n  fo r  m ales was 13 .2  fo r  Scotland  and 1 2 .7  fo r  England and W ales. 
But t h is  type o f  crude d e a th -ra te  was not the b e s t  in d ica to r  o f  tru e  
m o rta lity  c o n d itio n s  as i t  was in flu en ced  by th e  a g e -d is tr ib u t io n  o f  
th e p op u la tion . Hence, th e  fo llo w in g  f ig u r e s  g iv e  the more standard­
is e d  ra te  o f  'e x p e cta tio n  o f  l i f e  a t b ir t h ’ and i t s  r e c ip r o c a l the
, 2' l i f e - ta b le *  d e a th -r a te ’ .
Table 2 -  E xp ecta tio n  o f  L if e  a t B ir th  and L ife -T a b le  Death-Rate
Males 
S co tla n d  England
Females
and Wales S cotlan d  ^ n d ^ a le s
E xp ecta tion  o f  
l i f e  (y e a r s)  
1948-1950
L ife - ta b le  
d eath -rate  
(p er  thousand)
64 .1
15 .6
6 6 .3
15 .1
67.8
14 .7
7 1 .0
1 4 .1
Source; F igu res taken from L eser, p . 22, F igure 8.
1 . N inety-Seventh  Annual Report o f th e  R eg is tra r  General fo r  Scotland
1951. (Edinburgh. H .M .S.Q.. 1953). p . 10.
2. C. E, V. L eser, 'B ir th s  and D eath s', in  G airncross, p p .21-22,
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The r a te  o f n a tu ra l in cr ea se  was, however, considerab ly  h ig h er  
in  Scotland than in  England and Wales due to  a h igher f e r t i l i t y  ra te  
in  Scotland . In  1950-1952 th e  le g it im a te  b ir th s  p er  thousand m arried  
women aged 15-44  was 134 fo r  S cotlan d  but on ly  105 fo r  England and 
W ales. N ev erth e less , abnormally h igh r a te s  o f  m igration  away from  
S cotlan d  accounted fo r  the imch lower ra te  o f  in crea se  in  the S c o tt is h  
p op u lation  from th a t o f  England and W ales.^ T h is, along w ith  th e  f a l l  
in  the b ir th -r a te  h e lp s to  account fo r  the fa c t  th a t in  1951 th e r e  was 
a c tu a lly  a s ig n if ic a n t  drop in  pop u lation  as ta b le  3 shoT/s.
Table 3 -  S co tla n d ’ s P opu lation
1939 5 ,006 ,700
1946 5 ,135 ,100
1947 5 ,138 ,600
1948 5 ,1 6 9 ,2 0 0
1949 5 ,2 0 7 ,0 0 0
1950 5 ,2 1 8 ,9 0 0
1951 5 , 113,900
Source; I .  and E . ,  1946, p . 5; 1947, p .8 ; 1948, p .7 ;  1949, p . 6;
1950, p .7 ;  1951, p .8 .
( i i )  D is tr ib u t io n  o f P op u lation  by Regions
There was a change in  th e  balance o f  p op u la tion  between the  
variou s reg io n s  w ith in  S cotlan d . I t  i s  remarkable th a t Glasgow and 
C lydeside grew no fa s t e r  than the country as a whole. T his v/as due in
1. Ib id ., pp.29-32.
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g rea t part to  m igration  both  to  England and o v ersea s . N on eth e less , 
th ere  was a very  marked movement away from the remote ru ra l a reas ; 
a p o rtio n  o f t h is  went in to  v i l l a g e s  and towns in  th ose  areas. *In 
th e  Highlands, fo r  example, th e  landward area showed a f a l l  o f  8^ 
between 1931 and 1951 ( in  C aith n ess, Sutherland and Shetland, a f a l l  
o f  about o n e -s ix th )  w hile  towns l i k e  Inverness, Stornoway and P ort
W illiam  continued to  grow. ,1
Table 4  -  Changes in  P op u lation  in  Great B r ita in , 1931-1951
D iv is io n *
P o p u la tion  o f  d iv is io n s  
a t  s e le c te d  censuses  
thousands
Percentage  
d is tr ib u t io n  
o f  pop u lation  
by areas
1931 1951 1951
West C entral 2 , 308 2,424 4 7 .5
E ast C entral 1, 305 1,416 28
Southern 251 256 5
Northern 979 1,000 19 .5
S cotlan d 4 ,8 4 3 5,096 100
England and W ales 35,952 43,745 -
* West C entra l d iv is io n  ; Dunbarton, Ayr, Renfrew and Lanark
B ast C entral d iv is io n  ; F i f e ,  Clackmannan, S t ir l in g ,  West 
L othian , M idloth ian , E ast Lothian, and C ity  o f  Dundee
C ounties to  the North and West and to  th e  South and E ast o f  
th e se  are in clud ed  in  Northern and Southern d iv is io n s  
r e s p e c t iv e ly .
Source; Census o f  P op u lation  (S cotlan d ) 1931 and 1951, in  R obertson,
p . 11. I*'14
I
1 . D. J .  R obertson, 'P opulation  Growth and Movement', in  G airncross, 
p. 11, See a ls o ,  Adam C o ll ie r ,  The C rofting  Problem. (Cambridge, 
Cambridge U n iv e r s ity  P r e ss , 1953), e s p e c ia l ly  pp. 128-141, on the  
'D eclin e o f  P op u lation ' in  th e  Highlands. See a ls o , R. S. B arclay  
and F. F raser  D arling , 'P o p u la tio n ', in  F , F raser  D arling , e d , , 
West Highland Survey. (Oxford, Oxford U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 1955),
p p .69- 149.
,,
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S cotlan d  was a h ig h ly  urbanised  country w ith  one la r g e  conurba­
t io n  and four large c i t i e s .  Although th ere  was on ly  one conurbation  
in  S cotlan d , a s compared to  s ix  in  England and Wales, t h i s  one conur­
b a tio n  contained  35 per cen t o f the p op u la tion . At th e  1951 Census, 
people d w ellin g  in  urban communities o f  over 1 ,000  persons to ta l le d  
83 per cen t o f  the S c o t t is h  p op u la tion .^  In  the c e n tr a l d iv is io n s  o f  
Scotland , as d efin ed  in  th e  fo llo w in g  ta b le , where th ree-q u a rters  o f  
th e p op u la tion  liv e d ,  92 p er  cent were urban d w ellers in  1951; in  the  
Northern and Southern d iv is io n s  th ese  f ig u r e s  were 62 per cent and 52 
per cen t r e s p e c t iv e ly .
1. Census o f  P op u la tion  (S co tla n d ), 1951, V ol. I I ,  in  Robertson, p .12. Î
Table 5 -  P opu lation  o f  Replions o f  S cotlan d . 1931-1951
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Percentage
Region*
P op u la tion
(thousands)
in crease  in  
p opulation
1931 1951 1931-1951
Glasgow and C lydeside 2,326 2 ,4 4 4 5
Edinburgh and Lothians 655 707 8
S t ir l in g  and Clackmannan 198 225 14
Dundee and E ast 675 717 . 6
Aberdeen and N orth-E ast 444 462 4
South-West 141 148 5
Borders 110 108 —2
C rofting  C ounties 293 286 -2
S co tlan d 4,843 5,096 5
England and Wales 39,952 43,745 9
* Glasgow and C lydeside ; Renfrew, Lanark, Ayr, Dunbarton
Bute
Edinburgh and Lothians : E ast Lothian, M id loth ian  and West 
Lothian
Hindee and E ast ; F i f e ,  K inross, Perth  and Angus
Aberdeen and N orth-East ; Aberdeen, B anff, Moray, K incardine 
and N a im
South-West : Wigtown, K irkcudbright, and Dumfries
Borders : P ee b les , S e lk irk , Berwick and Roxburgh
C rofting  C ounties ; Orkney, Shetland, A rg y ll, Inverness,
Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and C aithness
Source; Census o f P op u la tion  (S co tlan d ) I 931 and 1951, in  Robertson,
p. 12. •1
In  in v e s t ig a t io n  by th e  S o c ia l and Economic Research Department 
o f  Glasgow U n iv ers ity , i t  was found th a t in  1950-1951 Glasgow and the  
n o rth -ea st and so u th -ea st c o a s ta l reg io n s l o s t  s ig n if ic a n t  numbers o f
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people by m igration , s p e c i f i c a l ly  to  Edinburgh, Aberdeen, th e  Borders, |
1th e L oth ians and E ast S cotlan d . T his s h i f t  in  the in d u s tr ia l  popula-
t io n  can b e traced  to  th e  a tten p t to  b r in g  in  new in d u stry  and to  
r e lo c a te  e x is t in g  in d u s tr ie s ,  both  o f  which were aimed a t  b e t te r  
balan cin g  th e S c o tt ish  in d u s tr ia l  s e c to r .
( i i i )  Immigration
There was a g rea t d ea l o f  p op u la tion  movement which r e su lte d  not 
o n ly  in  m igration  b u t a ls o  in  im m igration in to  S cotlan d . Thus th e  
Census o f  P op u lation  (Scotland) 1951 showed th e in te r e s t in g  mix o f  
n a t io n a l i t i e s  r e s id e n t  in  Scotland th a t year. According to  the One P er  
Cent Sample Tables o f  th e  Census o f  P op u lation  1951, in  th a t year 8 out 
o f  every  1Ô0 (406,CX)0) were born o u ts id e  o f Scotland . This in clud ed  
4 .1  E n g lish -b o m  (more than h a lf  th e  t o t a l) ;  1 .6  Ir ish -b o rn ; 0 .2  
Welsh; 0 .6  b om  in  th e Commonwealth; and 1 .3  b o m  in  fo re ig n  coun­
t r i e s .  Among the 57, CXX) fore ig n -b o rn  r e s id e n ts  who were not B r i t is h  
su b je c ts  by reason  o f  th e ir  parentage, th e  most numerous groups were 
th e 11 ,000  from Poland; 8 ,000  from Germany; 7 ,0 0 0  from I ta ly ;  and 1^
5 ,000  from t e r r i t o r ie s  th a t had b een  included  in  R u ssia . The census  
showed f ig u r e s  on S c o ts  l iv in g  in  England in  1951 a s  w e ll .  In  th a t  
year th ere  were 560,000 Scots l i v in g  in  England -  a g a in st  211,000  
E n g lish  in  Scotland; but because th e E n glish  p op u la tio n  was la r g e r ,
S co ts  formed a low er proportion  o f  the E n glish  p op u la tio n  ( 1 .4  p er  
cen t) than E n g lish  o f  the S co ts ,^
1 . S .E .C .S ., 1950, p . 3.
2 , Census o f P o p u la tion  (S co tla n d ), One Per Cent Samples, in  
Robertson, p .17. w
1951. But even in  1951, presumably a normal post-w ar year, th e  n et 
l o s s  was 90 per cen t o f th e  n atu ra l in crea se . ^
Young people were an important category o f m igrants. O ne-third  o f  
th e  n e t l o s s  overseas in  th ese  y ea rs  f e l l  on the 25-54  age-group  
(a lth ou gh  t h is  group was on ly  a seventh  o f  the p o p u la tio n ), and over a
1. L eser , p .21.
2 . F ig u res  supplied  from R eg istra r  G eneral o f  S cotlan d , in  Robertson,
p . 17 .
3 . I b id . ,  p . 18.
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( iv )  Em igration
I t  was due to  lo s s e s  by  m igration  th a t th e  S c o t t is h  p op u lation  
in creased  a t  a much lower r a te  than  the p op u lation  o f  England and Wales, 
even though the r a te  o f  n atu ra l in crea se  was o f  a s im ila r  magnitude fo r
1 '3b o th . From 1946 to  the end o f  1951 Scotland  had a n et lo s s  from  
m igration  o f  177 ,000  peop le (9 7 ,0 0 0  overseas and 7 9 ,000  to  o th er  p a rts  
o f  th e U nited  Kingdom). The n et l o s s  by m igration  in  t h is  p er iod  
amounted to  84 p er cen t o f the n a tu ra l in crea se  (46 p er  cent through  
l o s s  overseas and 38 per cent through movement to  the r e s t  of th e  
U nited  Kingdom). There was a n e t lo s s  overseas in  each year o f  th is  
p er io d  which t o t a l l e d  17,000  in  1946; 20,000 fo r  1947, 1948 and 1949
each; and 10 ,000  both  in  1950 and 1951. The average lo s s  fo r  th e s ix  
y ea rs  was 16 ,000 . In  movement to  the r e s t  o f the U nited  Kingdom 1946 
was th e h ea v ie st year  w ith  40 ,0 0 0  peop le which was due to  post-w ar  
readjustm ents. T h is number dropped sharply to  6 ,0 0 0  in  1948. But the J
movement towards th e  south ro se  aga in  in  1949 and in  1951 i t  t o t a l l e d  
12 ,000 . The aggregate y ea r ly  l o s s  by m igration  away from S co tlan d  was
56,000 in  1946, 34 ,000  in  1947, 28 ,000  in  1949 and down to  22 ,000  in
-  " ' 1  
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f i f t h  was on the 35-44 age-group. Over f o u r - f i f t h s  o f  th e  n et lo s s  
to  o th er  p a r ts  o f th e  U nited  Kingdom came from the 15-34 age-group. 
Females tended to  h e more numerous ttmn m ales in  the n et movement 
overseas -  perhaps b ecau se o f the number o f  b r id e s  who l e f t  Scotland  
a f te r  th e  war. N ev erth e less , males were w e ll  in  the m ajority  in  the  
n et movement to  other p a r ts  o f  the U nited  Kingdom.^ One e f f e c t  o f  
t h i s  youth m igration  was th a t o f few er wage earners supporting a grow­
ing  number o f o ld er  p erson s. T his lowered p a r t ic ip a t io n  r a te  (th e  
proportion  o f  the p op u la tion  which was o f working age who were part o f  
the labour fo rce  o f the economy) and was d ir e c t ly  co r r e la te d  to  r eg io n a l
problems such a s  d if fe r e n c e s  in  enployment, income l e v e l s  and r a te s  o f  
2economic growth.
M igration d id  not proceed even ly  from a l l  reg io n s o f  S cotlan d .
1 . Ib id .
2 , See, C, E. V. L eser, ’Manpower', in  G airncross, e s p e c ia l ly  p p .36-  
39. See a ls o .  Bannock, B axter and Rees, p . 340,
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Table 6 -  Percentage Net Movement o f  M igrants from R egions o f  Scotland, 
1 J u ly  194-6 -  30 June 1950
Area
C iv il ia n
p op u la tion
194-6
(thousands)
Net movement a s  percentage o f  
194-6 population*
To To W ithin /
overseas England S cotlan d
R egions (exclu d in g  
c i t i e s ;
C lydeside  
Lothians 
S t ir l in g  and 
Clackmannan 
E ast
N orth-East
South-West
Borders
C roftin g  cou n ties
1 ,299220
212
511
270
143
105280
-1 .7- 1 .0
- 0 .9
—1 .4
-1 .1
+ 0 .4
- 1 .3- 1 .0
- 1 .1
- 0 .9
- 1 ,1
- 1 .0  
—0 ,4  
—1 .6  
—0 .4- 0 .6
+0.6
+1.6
+ 0 .8
+ 1 .5- 2 .8
- 0 .2
+1.8
+1.2
- 2 .2
- 0 .3
- 1 .2
- 0 .9
- 4 .3
- 1 .4+0.1
—0 .4
C it ie s ;
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Aberdeen
Dundee
1 ,055
459
177
169
—1 .6  
- 2 .0  
- 2 .5  -2 ,6
- 1 .5  —0 .6  
-1 .2  
—0 .8
-1 .9+1.6
+1.8
+ 0.9
- 5 .0
- 1 .0
- 1 .9
- 2 .5
Scotland 4 ,9 0 1 - 1 .5 - 1 .0 +0.2 - 2 .3
C it ie s  and la r g e  
burghs 2 ,6 4 8 - 1 .8 - 1 .2 - - 3 .0
Small burghs and 
landward areas 2 ,253 - 1 .2 -0 .9 +0.2 - 1 .8
* Minus sign  in d ic a te s  outward movements, p lu s s ig n  inward movements,
/  ‘W ithin S co tla n d ’ in c lu d es movement to  and from Northern Ire la n d , 
I s l e  o f  Man and Channel I s la n d s .
Source; F igures com piled by th e  R eg is tra r  General fo r  Scotland , in  
Robertson, p .19.
The above ta b le  shows th e n et outward movement from the e ig h t  reg io n s  
and four major c i t i e s  o f  Scotland , 1946-1950, to  o v erseas, England,
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w ith in  Scotland , in  t o t a l  and as a percentage f ig u r e  o f  the 194& 
c i v i l i a n  p op u la tion . I t  can be seen  from t h is  ta b le  th a t post-w ar  
em igration  proved more urban than ru ra l. I n d u s tr ia l reg ion s tended  
to  lo s e  to  England e s p e c ia l ly  more h ea v ily  than th e  farming and c r o f t ­
in g  reg io n s. P ost-w ar movements tended to  operate a g a in st Glasgow and 
C lydeside, but t h i s  proved b e n e f ic ia l  in  the sen se th a t i t  caused a 
b e t t e r  balance in  th e d is tr ib u t io n  o f  the p op u la tion  towards the o th er  
p a r ts  o f Scotland .^
1. Robertson, p p .18-19*
■f
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2 . U nemplo.vment
th e war was to  accentu ate  the dependence o f  the country on the heavy  
in d u str ie s . During th e  war, f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e in  twenty yea rs , unem­
ployment in  S co tlan d  f e l l  to  in s ig n if ic a n t  l e v e l s .  In  a d d itio n  to  the
1. Cole, p .x v i i i .
2 . I .  and E ,, 1947, p .5.
3. Ib id .
1
( i )  General Trends
Memories o f  th e  m assive unemployment o f  the in ter-w ar y ea rs  were |
a major fo r c e  behind the acceptance o f  the ' f u l l  employment' th e o iy  in  
the form o f  the 1944 White Paper on Employment P o l ic y , Cole w rote on 
t h is  is s u e  th a t 'th e  ex ten t o f  unemployment can be measured, th e  f e a r  
o f  i t  cannot b e* ,^  S cotlan d  had been dogged by constant and high  
unemployment throughout th e in ter-w ar yea rs , unen^loyment in  1933 
reaching 30 per cent o f the in sured  p op u lation . There was some in p rovs-  
ment in  the la t e  1930's  m ain ly  due to  the in crea sed  employment in  
engineering and other m unitions in d u str ie s , but in  J u ly  1939 unemploy­
ment s t i l l  t o t a l l e d  172, 000, rep resen tin g  1 0 ,5  per cent o f  th e  insured  
2population .
The war e f f e c t e d  sev era l dram atic changes in  th e  S c o tt ish  employ­
ment p attern . I t  brought down th e  number o f  male workers from 1 ,2 1 8 ,0 0 0  
a t  mid-1939 to  about 900, COO a t m id-1945. The w ithdrawal o f over
400 .000  men to  th e F orces was o f f s e t  by the en try  or return  to  in d u stry  
o f  la r g e  numbers o f men -who were not normally employed or who had 
r e t ir e d .  There was an in crea se  in  the number o f  fem ale workers from
460.000  in  1939 to  a peak o f  n ea r ly  600,000 in  1943.^  S ig n if ic a n t ly ,
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in creased  nuniber o f women in  industry , th ere  were over 15 ,000  S c o tt is h  
women tra n sferred  to  enployment in  England. At th e h eig h t o f  th e  war 
more than h a lf  o f th e  working population  in  B r ita in  were doing jobs  
and/or producing goods d if f e r e n t  from th ose  o f  p eace-tim e.^
The most remarkable fa c e t  o f  th e  fig u r e s  fo r  post-w ar B r ita in
was the v ir tu a l  a b o lit io n  o f  unemployment. T his was described  by Cole
( 1956) a s 'th e  very  great f a l l  in  long-term  unemployment, which has
2been  reduced to  n ea r ly  n e g l ig ib le  proportions s in c e  the w ar'. At no
tim e in  B r i t is h  h is to r y  was th ere  as high employment r a te s  as in  the
post-W orld War I I  y ea rs . Unemployment was at low  le v e ls  in  1945 due
to  war-time co n d itio n s , i t  then  r o se  q u ite  sharp ly  in  1946 and 1947 -
much o f  t h i s  was due to  d em o b ilisa tio n . T h ereafter  the r i s e  in  th e
3l e v e l  o f  unemployment was very slow .
The number cut o f  work rose  by  about a quarter o f  a m illio n  over  
th e w ar-tim e f ig u r e  o f  100,000, a g rea t deal o f t h i s  r i s e  was a t t r i ­
b u ta b le  to  the fa c t  th a t d ir e c t io n  o f  labour had b een  abandoned by th e  
Government fo llo w in g  th e war.^ Much o f  the unemployment was o f  short 
d u ration  and u su a lly  rep resen ted  no more than a week or two between one 
job and another. But not a l l  th e unemployment during th ese  years was 
f r i c t io n a l  in  nature. There was a ls o  a core o f long-term  unemployment, 
e s p e c ia l ly  in  c e r ta in  areas o f S cotlan d . The major th rea t 1945-1951 in  
terms o f  unemployment was a shortage o f  raw m a ter ia ls ,  ^ which the 1947
1. Wor swick, p. 4 ,
2. C ole, p .46 .
3 . Worswick, p . l é .
4 . T, W ilson, 'Manpower', in  Worswick and Ady, p .224.
5. I b id . ,  p p .224- 225 ,
" - g  
111 ' '
Coal C r is is  and th e subsequent m assive (though s h o r t - l iv e d )  wave o f  
unemployment ex em p lified .
Although B r ita in  enjoyed  the low est unemployment r a te  in  the  
post-w ar y ea rs  that i t  has ever m aintained, Scotland  s t i l l  f e l l  behind, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  re sp ec t t o  England, The ra te  of unemployment d iverged  
most sharp ly  from the r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in  in  1946-1948. 1946 was
the w orst year w ith  5 per cent unemployment fo r  S cotlan d  a s  opposed to  
2 ,5  per cen t fo r  the country as a w hole.^  In  1949 th e  r a te  o f unem­
ployment had been low ered to  3 .2  per cen t fo r  Scotland  and 1 ,6  fo r  v
Great B r ita in , s t i l l  e x a c t ly  o n e-h a lf, but a s ig n if ic a n t  red u ction  from  
the 1946 f ig u r e . By 1950-1951 unemployment was no lon g er  as major a 
concern in  Scotland  fo r  variou s reason s, in clu d in g  to  some degree, th e  
demand brought by the re-armament d r ive  fo r  the Korean War, But, most 
im portantly , i t  was due to  the general post-w ar readjustm ent f in a l l y  
b ein g  ach ieved .
A fte r  th e end o f th e  war the number o f  male insured  workers in
Scotland  in creased , la r g e ly  because o f th e  greater  numbers o f men
^  Vâcrî"
remaining in  th e  Forces as compared with^pre-war^ i t  remained below  the
le v e l  o f  1939» The number o f  fem ale workers decreased  fo llo w in g  the
war but remained w e ll  over the pre-war f ig u r e s .  These tren d s were
s im ila r  fo r  Great B r ita in  as a whole. In  th e  S c o tt is h  Development Area
more in sured  workers were employed in  J u ly  1946 than in  1939»^ For th e
whole o f  S cotlan d  th e  t o t a l  number of in sured  persons was a t  mid-1946
a l i t t l e  below  th e  raid-1939  l e v e l ,  but was g r e a te r  than any pre-war 
4year.
1 , S ,E ,C .S ,, 1946, p .7 .
2 . I b id . ,  1949, p . 5.
3 , See L eser , in  C airncross, p p .37-38.
4 . I .  and E . , 1946, p, 5.
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T able 1 -  Unemployment in  Scotland . 1945-1931
P op u la tion Insured Workers Unemployed
1939 5, 006,700 1, 676, 200 171,790
1945 N/A 1, 456,130 22,010
1946 5, 135,1 0 0 1, 549,890 73,920
1947 5 ,1 3 8 ,6 0 0 1 ,658 ,000 54,270
1948 5, 169,200 2 , 119,000 53 ,780
1949 5, 207,000 2, 132,000 52,630
1950 5, 218,900 2 ,1 08 ,000 58,550
1951 5, 113,900 2 ,0 6 6 ,0 0 0 54,000
Source; I ,  and E ., 1946 -  1951.
A d e ta ile d  year by year a n a ly s is  w i l l  serve both  to  e x p la in  what 
happened to  employment and a c t as a framework fo r  la t e r  co n sid era tio n  
o f  the economy.
(a )  1945-1946
During th e  war S co tla n d 's  tr a d it io n a l unemployment problem  
was n e g lig ib le .  In  J u ly  1944 th ere  were on ly  1 6 ,199 r e g is te r e d  unem­
p loyed  in  S cotlan d , which was on ly  1 .1  per cent o f  the t o t a l  number o f  
in su red  workers, a s  compared to  the 1938 w ith  i t s  241 ,123  unemployed, 
which was 14 .7  per cen t o f the working population . In  J u ly  1945, by  
which time peace had been d eclared  and a new p ost-w ar Government 
a lread y  e le c te d , th ere  was a s h i f t  upwards in  th e  unemployment r a te s  
to  25 ,326 (1 .7  per c e n t) . T his f ig u r e  almost t r ip le d  by the next year  
to  73,919  and r o se  on to  78,762 by th a t December. The t o t a l  number o f  
unemployed in  S co tla n d  in  the l a s t  te n  months o f  1946 was the h ig h est  
o f  any reg ion  in  th e  country. Although Wales had th e  h ig h est p erce n t- ?
age o f  unemployment th a t year, th e  d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  Welsh unemployment |;
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f ig u r e s  went down from 9 per cen t in  June to  7 .5  p er  cent in  
December o f  194-6. In  Scotland  th ere  was an in cr ea se  from 4 .5  per  
cen t to  5 per cen t in  these same months. The percentage fo r  th e  
U n ited  Kingdom as a whole was 2 ,5  per cen t.^  S e v e n ty -f iv e  per cen t  
o f  th e  unemployed in  Scotland  in  1946 were m ales, w ith  the average  
age o f  th ese  unemployed m ales low er than any o th er  reg io n  in  the
2country, about 50 p er  cent b ein g  between 21 and 41 y ea rs  o f age.
( t )  m z
In  1947, apart from th e months o f th e  f u e l  c r i s i s ,  th e
g en era l tren d  o f  r i s in g  unemployment began to  drop. S co tlan d ’ s f ig u r e s
f e l l  from 84,331 in. January o f  1947 to  52,760 in  December, But in
February and March, when the f u e l  c r i s i s  was a t i t s  peak, S c o t t is h
3unemployment numbers went from 93,849 to  101,264. The w in ter o f  1946- 
1947 was to  have th e  h ig h est unemployment r a te s  fo llo w in g  World War I I ,  
w ith  March o f  1947 the h ig h est month o f unemployment in  post-w ar  
Scotland . But although the la c k  o f  co a l in  the sp rin g  o f 1947 caused  
se v e r a l weeks o f h igh  unemployment -  which was compared to  th a t o f  th e  
1930*8 -  i t  o n ly  reached 6 .0  per cent in  March o f  th a t  year (a s  com­
pared to  3.5  p er  cen t, th e  1947 S c o t t is h  unemployment f ig u r e )  and d id
n ot s e r io u s ly  a f f e c t  the trend  o f  post-w ar recovery  and p r o g r e s s iv e ly
4h igh  eiïçdoyment r a te s .  I1N ev erth e less , S co tlan d  had once again  in  1947 th e  h ig h est unem- ||
ployment r a te s  o f  any o f  th e  M in istry  o f  Labour’s ad m in istra tiv e
1. S .E .C .S ., 1946, p .7 .
2 . Ib id .
3. I b id . ,  1947, p . 6 .
4 . I b id . ,  percentage reckoned from f ig u r e s  g iven  on p p .5 -6 .
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r e g io n s . But th ese  were tr a n s it io n  y ea rs  and a tim e o f much labour  
m o b ility  e s p e c ia l ly  in  Scotland , Not on ly  were servicem en and women 
coming home but a ls o  su b sta n tia l numbers were retu rn in g  from war job s  
in  the south, co n fid en t o f fin d in g  p o s it io n s  th a t were not always 
s t i l l  a v a ila b le  or even e x is te n t .  The nunber o f  unemployed ex- 
servicem en and women who had had no employment s in ce  r e le a s e  reached  
a peak in  August 1946 o f  8,859*^
S cotla n d  was p a r t ic u la r ly  vu lnerab le in  th is  p er io d  o f  rea d ju st­
ment due to  her extreme dependence on heavy in d u s tr ie s . T h is was in  
la rg e  measure resp o n sib le  fo r  a v e iy  s p e c ia l problem o f  th e  unemploy­
ment is s u e ,  i . e .  h igh unemployment o f  men and, o ften  con cu rrently , 
lo c a l  p ock ets  o f unemployment. There were in  1947 ra th er  su b s ta n tia l  
areas o f unemployment in  some areas o f  tr a d it io n a l in d u stry , e .g .  in  . 
Glasgow in c lu d in g  R utherglen 18,798 were r e g is te r e d  as unemployed in  
December 1947. In  M otherwell and Wishaw the t o t a l  was 2 ,6 9 3  and in  
IXindee 2 ,0 4 0 .  ^
( c )  1948
The number o f  unemployed in  S cotlan d  continued to  drop 
s te a d ily  from 3-5 per cen t in  1947 to  3 .0  per cen t in  1948 (o ld  b a s is )  
or 2 .5  per cen t (new b a s is ) .  For in  1948 th e N ation al Insurance  
Scheme came in to  e f f e c t ,  and a new method o f ev a lu a tin g  unemployment 
f ig u r e s  was d ev ised  on the b a s is  o f  in c lu s io n  o f  a l l  employees o f  a l l  
c la s s e s  and ages a s  shown by th e  number o f cards is su ed  by th e N ation a l 
Insurance Scheme. ’With the in tro d u ctio n  o f  N a tion a l Insurance in  J u ly ,
1. I .  and E . , 1946, p .6.
2. 8 .E .G .S ., 1947, p. 6.
3. I b id .,  1948, p . 5.
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1948, 452 ,000  persons who had been o u tsid e  th e  scope o f  th e  Unemploy­
ment Insurance A cts became in su red  aga in st unemployment. On th e  new 
b a s is  the in su red  employed p op u la tion  was 2 ,1 1 9 ,0 0 0 .* ^  The N ation a l 
Insurance Scheme was in d ic a t iv e  o f  a new a t t itu d e  o f r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
towards unemployment and the Labour Government’ s new goal o f  ’f u l l  
employment’ . T h is programme was s e t  up to  provide unemployment bene­
f i t s  along w ith  o th er  p r o v is io n s  such as s ick n ess  b e n e f it ,  f l a t - r a t e  
p en sion s, m atern ity  b e n e f it s ,  c h ild r e n ’s a llow ances, grants to  
widows, e tc .
Although th e  percentage o f unemployment among in su red  workers and 
th e p roportion  o f  lon g-term  unemployment (over 8 w eeks) were both  
g r e a te r  in  Scotland  than in  th e  r e s t  o f  the country, the d isp a r ity  was 
not a s  pronounced by 1948. There was a marked in crea se  in  15,000 job s  
fo r  m ales in  th is  y ea r . But th ere was s t i l l  s u b s ta n t ia l unemployment 
in  th e  development a rea s . Much o f  t h i s  was a ttr ib u te d  to  th e  housing  
sh ortage, which was a t  a c r i t i c a l  p o in t due to  a sh ortage o f  m a te r ia ls . 
T h is was s tro n g ly  connected w ith  th e  im m obility o f  labour and a ls o  the  
problem o f  u n f i l l e d  vacan cies e x is t in g  concurrently  w ith  h igh unemploy­
ment.
(d ) l a a
The same p a ttern  o f  d e c lin in g  unemployment, January to  June, 
and th en  r is in g  J u ly  to  December, was repeated in  1949 as had appeared  
in  th e  previous y e a r s , from 73 ,000  (January) to  52 ,600  (Ju ly ) and then  
r i s i n g  again  to  67 ,9 0 0  (December). I t  was a much b ig g e r  drop in  June
1 . I .  a n d E ., 1948, p .7 .
2 . I b id . ,  1949, p . 6.
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1. S .E .C .S ., 1950, p . 33 and I .  a n d E ., 1950, p . 8.
2. See p p .118-120.
3. S .E .C .S ., 1950, p . 33 .
than in  194-8 b u t a nuch steep er  r i s e  in  December and except fo r  th e  |
th ir d  quarter the l e v e l  o f  unenployment in  S cotlan d  was s l i g h t ly  I
h igh er than in  194-8. T his type o f  a f r ic t io n a l ,  and s p e c i f i c a l ly  
sea so n a l, employment p a ttern  was not considered a se r io u s  worry a s  
much o f  i t  was due to  fa c to r s  such as school v a c a tio n s  and h a rv est­
tim e. S co tla n d 's  r a te  o f unemployment was s t i l l  tw ice  th a t o f  Great 
B r ita in  as a whole in  D ecaiber 194-9, 3 .2  per cen t to  1 .6  per cen t, 
b u t had been low ered s ig n i f ic a n t ly  s in ce  194-5- 194-6 .
( e )  1950
The number o f unenoployed dropped in  1950 to  194-8 le v e l s .
Yet the seasonal in c r e a se  in  unemployment was much sm aller than in
1948. T h is inprovement occurred e n t ir e ly  among m ales; the number o f
1unemployed fem ales was h igher than in  any year s in ce  1946. This was
due in  p art to  th e  number o f  women le a v in g  employment fo llo w in g  the
war fo r  various reason s ; t h i s  f a c t  was shown q u ite  c le a r ly  by the
2tim e 1948 unemployment s t a t i s t i c s  were compiled.
N ev er th e le ss , economic a n a ly s ts  continued  to  f r e t  th a t  Scotland  
s t i l l  had th e h ig h est unemployment ra te  fo r  any reg ion  b e s id e s  Wales 
and r ep ea te d ly  was tw ice  th a t  o f  the country as a whole. The average 
age o f  th e  unemployed was younger in  Scotland  and th e percentage o f  
th ose  under 41 w ithout work fo r  long-term s s l ig h t ly  h igher than in  
other a r e a s .  ^ The employment s itu a t io n  in  th e in d u s tr ia l areas improved 
in  t h i s  y ear , and the major areas o f concern in  terms o f  unimproved
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unemployment l e v e l s  was not in  th e  Development Areas as expected  hut 
in  th e  le s s - h e a v i ly  in d u s tr ia l is e d  areas such as N orth-E ast Scotland  -  
Aberdeen in  p a r t ic u la r  -  and a ls o  th e H ighlands and Is la n d s  where th ere  
was l i t t l e  development o f new in d u stry .^
(f) 12a
The S c o t t is h  unemployment ra te  again fo llo w ed  the B r i t i s h
f ig u r e s  and in  1951 both  dropped to  the low est percentage s in ce  1945 .
But Scotland  d id  have the h ig h est  r a te  o f  male unemployment in  th e
country in  t h i s  y ear . The number o f  unemployed under 41 years o f  age
was s t i l l  h e a v ie s t  in  Scotland , b u t by 1951 i t  was foim ing a sm aller
percentage o f  the t o t a l  number o f in sured  workers in  Scotland. Mich
o f  the unemployment cou ld  b e a t tr ib u te d  to  th e ‘la c k  o f  orders in
in d u s tr ie s  m anufacturing consumer goods, p a r t ic u la r ly  t e x t i l e s ,  and to
a sm aller ex ten t by sh ortages o f  raw m a ter ia ls  in  the iron  and s t e e l
and en gin eerin g  in d u str ie s ;  th e se  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a ls o  le d  to  a c e r ta in
2amount o f  under-employment ‘ .
( i i )  Male Unemployment
One o f  the g r e a te s t  w orr ies  concerning employment p a tte r n s  in  
post-w ar S co tlan d  was th e  h igh  l e v e l  o f  male unemployment. T h is can 
be traced  to  some ex ten t to  the d e c lin e  o f heavy in d u s tr ie s  a ifter th e  
war which a f fe c te d  S cotlan d  more d ir e c t ly  than any oth er reg io n , 
S co tla n d 's  su rp lu s o f  male labour was not sim ply a fea tu re  o f  the tran s­
i t io n  from war to  peace, although recon version  was lim ite d  by the
1, See p . 295 on fa c to r y  b u ild in g . See a ls o ,  Adam C o llie r ,  The C roftin g  
Problem, e s p e c ia l ly  p p .93-95 on th e problem o f  adapting th e  p rov i­
s io n s  o f  n a tio n a l l e g i s la t io n  to  employment and unemployment in  the  
H ighlands.
2 . S .E .C .S ., 1950, p . 33.
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s c a r c i t ie s  o f  fu e l  and raw m a ter ia ls . Rather i t  was a r e f le c t io n  o f  
th e pre-war la ck  o f  ba lance in  the nature and d is tr ib u t io n  o f  S c o t t is h
in d u s tr ie s . C onsiderable new sources o f employment were needed to  p re -
1  ^v en t a return  to  th e  pre-war le v e l  o f  unemployment. Long-term male
unemployment was a m atter o f much concern notab ly  in  the West Coast
o f  Scotland  and e s p e c ia l ly  because a h igh  p roportion  o f  th e  men were
2o n ly  f i t  fo r  l i g h t  employment. T h is became more problem atic as th e  
West Coast o f  S cotlan d  d id  not have many forms o f  l i g h t  in d u s tr ia l  
employment a v a ila b le . Many o f  the unemployed m ales were simply in  
t r a n s it io n  from one job to  another but long-term  unemployment was a 
very  r e a l  problem. In  Glasgow in  1948 20 per cen t o f  a l l  unemployed 
men and boys had been  out o f work fo r  over a year, f o r  Scotland  as a 
whole th e  f ig u re  was 17 per cen t.^  By 1950 th ere  was 22 per cent male 
unemployment in  Glasgow w hile  the S c o t t is h  f ig u r e  remained at 17 per  
c e n t ,^  The problem o f  a d d itio n a l job s needed fo r  m ales in  the lo c a l  
p o ck ets o f unemployment and notab ly  in  the o u tly in g  p a r ts  o f S cotlan d  
was another c r i t i c a l  fa c e t  o f  t h i s  problem.
( i l l )  Female Employment P a ttern s
Any improvement in  th e  S c o t t is h  employment outlook  1945-1951 was 
much more marked in  male ra th er  than fem ale lab ou r. Correspondingly  
i t  was more pronounced in  th e  in d u s tr ia l d i s t r i c t s  and the Development 
Areas, as th e se  were t r a d it io n a l ly  cen tres o f  predom inantly male 
employment. Many heavy in d u stry  a reas -  in  p a r t ic u la r  the mining
1 . I .  and E ., 1951, p. 8.
2 . I b id .,  1948, p . 8.
3. Ib id .
4 . I b id .,  1950, p . 8.
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areas -  lacked  s u ita b le  o u t le t s  fo r  fem ale employment,^
At the con clu sion  o f  th e  war many women e ith e r  remained in  th e  ^
same jobs th ey  had h eld  during the war or r e lo c a te d  to  new peace­
tim e job s. There was a marked in crease  in  th e  nunber o f fem ales  
employed fo llo w in g  the war as compared to  th e  pre-World War I I  y ea rs .
The number o f  women employed in  Scotland d ec lin ed  s l ig h t ly  but s te a d ily
2in  the immediate post-w ar y ea rs  as compared to  the war y e a r s . An 
important fa c to r  in  the red u ctio n  o f  fem ale unemployment was th e dec­
l in e  in  th e number o f women en ter in g  employment. Many women who had 
s ta r te d  job s during the war -  o fte n  fo r  th e f i r s t  tim e -  sim ply ceased  
to  r e g is t e r  fo llo w in g  the war when they had exhausted th e  unemployment 
b e n e f it s  to  which they  were e n t it le d ,   ^ thereby reducing the number o f  
fem ale in su red  workers. The war undoubtedly r a ise d  the p rop ortion  o f  
women in  employment and during th e post-w ar y ea rs  i t  s e t t le d  down to  
a le v e l  somewhat h igher than b e fo re  the w ar.^
Although the employment p a ttern  improved much more fo r  m ales than  
fem ales, th is  was due to  the f a c t  th a t the employment s itu a t io n  was 
much more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  m ales. T h is was dem onstrated by th e f a c t  th a t  
fem ale labour was generally^ soarca  than male labour in  Scotland dur­
in g  the post-w ar y ea rs . In  1948 th ere  were f iv e  unemployed men aged 18 
and over fo r  e v e r y . two v a can cies, b u t fo r  women the proportion  was one
1. S .E .C .S ., 1946, p . 5 . See C liv e  Lee, e d ., B r i t is h  R egional g
Employment S t a t i s t i c s  1841-1971. (Cambridge, Cambridge U n iv e r s ity  
P re ss , 1979) Î see  # 4 5  -  #  63 f o r  I 93I  and 1951 on male and 
fem ale employment in  Scotland  during th ese  y e a r s ,
2. I b id . ,  1948, p . 5 .
3 . I b id . ,  1946, p .7 .
4 . Worswick, p . l 6 .
7 -------- -------------------- - — - r — 1, - r -- ' • “ r . r  - i  z r r v -  T - f — : ;—
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to  one,^ There was a h igh demand fo r  women and g i r l s  fo r  r e s id e n t
dom estic work in  h o s p ita ls , in s t i t u t io n s  and p r iv a te  households and
2fo r  the t e x t i l e ,  c lo th in g , h o te l and ca ter in g  in d u str ie s . T h is  
s c a r c ity  o f women fo r  dom estic r e s id e n t ia l  work continued throughout 
th ese  y ea rs . The h igh  demand fo r  women in  the t e x t i l e  and c lo th in g  
in d u str ie s  remained u n f i l l e d .  T his a ffe c te d  th e  h o siery , ca rp et, 
w oollen  and w orsted  and c lo th in g  in d u str ie s , ^ Much o f  th e fem ale  
unemployment was caused by th e  problems o f  th e  l o g i s t i c s  o f  work and 
home. Women in  th e Development and in d u s tr ia l areas were o fte n  unable  
to  f in d  work, w h ile  a t the same tim e th ere were many l ig h t  in d u s tr ie s  
desperate fo r  fem ale labour in  o th er areas -  th e  b e s t  example o f  th is  
was the ju te  in d u stry  in  Dundee.
( iv )  F r ic t io n a l  Unemployment
Much o f  th e  unemployment during th e  post-w ar y ea rs  was f r i c t io n a l  
or short-term  in  natu re. Thus the unemployed in clud ed  a la rg e  number 
o f  persons sim ply p a ssin g  from one job to  another. In  p a r tic u la r , 
unemployment among s k i l l e d  workers was u su a lly  o n ly  sh ort-term  due to  
the la ck  o f  s k i l l e d  labour. During th e post-w ar y ea rs  roughly one- 
quarter o f  th ose on the unemployment l i s t s  were on ly  to  be th ere fo r  
not more than two weeks and by 1951 i t  was c lo s e r  to  o n e - f i f th .^  
R e la t iv e ly  sm all in c r e a se s  in  unemployment o f  a season a l character
1 . I .  and E ., 1947, pp. 10-11 .
2. I b id . ,  1949, p .8 .
3. I b id , , 1951, p . 9* See pp. 264-270 on Dundee and th e  ju te  in d u stry .
See a lso , Alexander Smith, The County o f F i f e  Third S t a t i s t i c a l
Account o f  Scotland , (Edinburgh, O liv er  and Boyd, 1952).
4 . Ib id .
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o c c u rre d  each y e a r  r i s i n g  to  a  peak  each  June and th e n  ta p e r in g  o f f  
to  December. Thus i t  can b e  seen  th a t  th e  unemployment f ig u re s  
r e p re s e n te d  a f lo w  o f  a  g r e a t  many p eo p le  who a t  some p o in t  due to  
v a r io u s  c ircu m stan ces  w ere unemployed, in s te a d  o f  a  s t a t i c  b lo c k  o f  
th e  same p eo p le  who com prised ' t h e  unem ployed '. T hat th e r e  was so 
much f l u i d i t y  in  th e  employment m arket a t  t h i s  p o in t  was n o t s u r p r i s ­
in g  on accoun t o f th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  p o s t-w a r y e a rs  w ere a  t r a n s i t i o n  
tim e f o r  th e  S c o t t i s h  economy.
(v ) Long-Term Unemployment
A t th e  o p p o s ite  extrem e and  e x is t in g  o f te n  c o n c u rre n tly  w ith  
f r i c t i o n a l  unemployment th e re  was in  S co tlan d  a s iz e a b le  co re  o f  lo n g ­
term  unemployed. T h is  was more marked in  m ale r a t h e r  th a n  fem ale  
la b o u r. One obv ious cause f o r  t h i s  was th a t  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  c e n t r e s  
and th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  in d u s t r i e s  w hich h i r e d  m a in ly  men were th e  h a rd e s t  
h i t  by  th e  d e c l in e  o f  im portance o f th e  heavy in d u s t r i e s .  T h is  problem  
was most a c u te  in  th e  C e n tra l  I n d u s t r i a l  B e l t .  T h is  a re a  was n o t on ly  
in f lu e n c e d  b y  th e  d e c l in e  o f th e s e  in d u s t r i e s  b u t  was i n  a d d i t io n  
a d v e rse ly  a f f e c t e d  b y  th e  g ra d u a l e x h au s tio n  o f  L a n a rk s h i r e 's  c o a l  
r e s e rv e s .  L a rg e -s c a le  m ining developm ents i n  th e  e a s t ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in
F i f e ,  w hich n e c e s s i t a te d  some m ig ra tio n  o f  th e  m ining  p o p u la tio n  e a s t -
1ward, l e f t  a  s u rp lu s  o f  la b o u r  in  th e  L a n a rk sh ire  a re a .
Long-term  unemployment, p a r t i c u l a r l y  among th e  l e s s  p h y s ic a l ly  
f i t  and th e  e ld e r ly  who form ed a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f t h i s  group, was a  m ajo r
1. S .E .C .S .,  1946, p p .5-6 .
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source o f  concern.^ A lso  throughout the post-w ar y ea rs  th e in cidence
o f  long-term  unemployment o f  th ose under 41 y ears  o f  age was more
2severe than in  any o th er  reg io n  o f  Great B r ita in , In  1950 14 per 
cen t o f  a l l  the unemployed in  Scotland  had been so fo r  over a. year.  ^
By 1951 the f ig u r e  r o se  to  I 5 per c e n t.^
( v i )  Age ; As a F actor in  Employment
The age group o f  workers was an important determ ining fa c to r  in
th e  supply and demand o f  the labour fo r c e . The young and the e ld e r ly
u s u a lly  had the most d i f f i c u l t y  in  ob ta in ing  employment. During 1951,
205 peop le in  S cotlan d  s ta r te d  in d u s tr ia l  a p p ren ticesh ip s or le a m e r -
sh ip s  under th e S p e c ia l A ptitudes Scheme, which gave f in a n c ia l  h elp  to
young peop le w ith  s p e c ia l a p titu d es  who were unable to  ob tain  work
5su ite d  to  t h e ir  ca p a c ity  near t h e ir  homes. T h is was no more than a 
token e f f o r t .  But another more gen era l post-w ar programme was d esign ed  
to  a s s i s t  young u n sk il le d  w orkers. The M in istry  o f  Labour and N a tio n a l 
S erv ice  encouraged in d u str ie s  to  develop schemes fo r  the system atic  
tr a in in g  o f  th e ir  young workers : and by December 1951, 51 new tr a in in g  
schemes had been approved s in ce  th e  war,^ although th e value o f  th e se  
programmes varied  from in d u stry  to  in d u stry  and firm  to  firm  making an
1 . I .  a n d E ., I 950, p .8.
2 . S .E .C .S ., 1951, p . 36.
3 . I .  a n d E ,, 1950, p p .7 -8 .
4 . I b id .,  1951, p . 9 .
5. Ib id .
6 . Ib id . See a ls o ,  James Gunnison, 'Recruitment and T raining o f  
Young Workers fo r  Industry and Commerce ', in  C airncross, pp. 266-
279.
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o v e r a ll  judgement o f thi-s programme d i f f i c u l t .  N ev erth e less , th e se  
schemes were ingsortant as they represented  both  Government and in d u stry  
in t e r e s t  in  h e lp in g  both  s k i l l e d  and u n sk ille d  young people to  become 
employable.
C onversely, th ere  was during th e se  y ears a g en era l shortage o f  
young workers fo r  many in d u s tr ie s . From 1945-1950 the shortage o f 
young fem ale workers was more severe but by th e end o f  1951 th e sh ort­
age o f young males was w orse.
For e ld e r ly  workers tr y in g  to  lo c a te  employment th e ir  p rosp ects  
were o fte n  com plicated  by  such fa c to r s  as i l l  h ea lth ; or by having  
had one job a l l  th e ir  working l i f e  then b e in g  made redundant and not 
p o ssess in g  enough v a ried  s k i l l s  to  acquire a d if fe r e n t  type o f  p o s it io n .  
Others sim ply had a com plete la ck  o f  a marketable s k i l l ,  or su ffered  
from r e lu c ta n c e  or in a b i l i t y  to  r e lo c a te .
( v i i )  U n f i l le d  V acancies
Although th ere  were su b sta n tia l p ock ets o f unemployment in  cer­
ta in  areas o f  Scotland  th ere a lso  ranained many v a ca n c ies  u n f i l le d .  A 
g rea t d ea l o f the in d u stry  o f  the C entral In d u s tr ia l B e l t  c a l le d  fo r  
workers w ith  a h igh degree o f s k i l l  and/or p h y sic a l f i t n e s s .  This 
r e s u lte d  in  high demands fo r  labour even in  areas o f  severe unemploy­
ment. T his dichotomy had been p resen t in  pre-war S cotlan d  as w e ll and 
was a r e f le c t io n  to  some ex ten t o f  the la ck  o f  a p p ren tices  in  the heavy  
in d u s tr ie s  in  th e  D ep ression  years o f th e  1 930 's .^
1. S .E .C .S . ,  1946, p . 5.
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The labour a v a ila b le  was u s u a lly  f b l ly  s u ita b le  fo r  anything  
except heavy in d u stry , bu t u n t i l  some o f  th e  new l ig h te r  in d u s tr ie s  
were developed i t  was not ea sy  fo r  th ese  workers to  f in d  employment.
One Government measure taken  to  a l le v ia t e  t h i s  problem was th e  
M inistry  o f  Labour's Temporary Transfer Scheme. Under t h i s  scheme 
unemployed workers in  areas where there was con sid erab le  unemployment, 
but fo r  which th ere were to  b e new in d u s tr ia l developments in  th e near 
fu tu re , were ab le  to  v o lu n teer  fo r  work in  o th er  areas u n t i l  new 
developments in  th e ir  home a reas matured. Arrangements were made fo r  
them to  be considered  fo r  new employment o p p o rtu n itie s  when th ey  arose  
eq u a lly  w ith  workers rem aining in  the same area . T his scheme was used  
in  the immediate two to  th ree  years fo llo w in g  th e  war and by th e  end 
o f  January 1947 some 2 ,000  workers had been tra n sferred  by t h i s  scheme.^ 
T his was q u ite  an e f f e c t iv e  programme and h elp ed  to  r e l ie v e  some o f  the  
imbalance p resen t in  the immediate post-w ar y ea rs  o f u n f i l l e d  vacan cies  
and unemployment.
The war was r e sp o n sib le  fo r  d isru p tin g  th e 'normal' en%)loyment 
p a tte r n s . Most in d u s tr ie s  had been e ith e r  converted  t o t a l ly  to  war 
purposes, the fa c t o r ie s  used fo r  Government storage , or a t  th e  l e a s t ,  
t h e ir  output changed s l ig h t ly  to  meet war needs, i . e .  the ' u t i l i t y  
goods' produced by th e  m anufacturing in d u str ie s . These changes d ir e c t ly  
a f fe c te d  the em ployees -  some were made redundant and oth ers had to  
perform ta sk s  th ey  were not tra in ed  fo r . A lso  th e war had taken many 
s k i l l e d  operators d ir e c t ly  from t h e ir  jobs when th ey  jo in ed  th e  armed 
s e r v ic e s .
1 , I .  and E .,  1946, p .6,
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The acu te shortage o f housing was a major fa c to r  in  the co­
e x isten ce  o f  u n f i l l e d  v a ca n cies  and high unemployment. The C airncross  
book on th e  S c o tt is h  Economy cog en tly  argued th a t th e  genera l la ck  o f  
housing precluded  any la r g e - s c a le  movement o f  labour in  th e ea r ly  p o st­
war y ea rs .^  For example, th e  New Town of G lenrothes was b u i l t  in  
F if e  to  house m iners tr a n sfe r r e d  to  the e a s t  o f  Scotland  because o f  
the s h i f t  in  S co tlan d ’s  m ining cen tre . T his move had to  be delayed  
u n t i l  1948 so th a t a t  l e a s t  temporary houses could be con stru cted  fo r  
the miners and th e ir  fa m il ie s .  Thus in  1948 th ere  were 1 ,0 0 0  peop le
l iv in g  in  temporary houses in  G lenrothes, although o f f i c i a l  con stru c-
2t io n  o f permanent houses d id  not b eg in  th ere u n t i l  1951. On the other  
hand, some firm s e s ta b lish e d  branch f a c to r ie s  in  order to  take th e ir  
work to  areas where a s u ita b le  labour fo r c e  was a v a ila b le ,  ^ such as  
the Development Areas.
( v i i i )  Development Area
There were wide v a r ia t io n s  in  unemployment l e v e l s  throughout 
S cotlan d . In January 1947 unemployment v a r ied  from 38 .1  per cent a t  
Stornoway, 1 9 .5  per cen t a t  Wick and Thurso and 8 .5  per cent in  
Lanarkshire, to  n e g l ig ib le  prop ortion s in  the Borders and severa l areas  
in  th e  E ast o f S co tla n d .^  E ighteen  months la t e r  in  J u ly  1947 unemploy­
ment was 24 per cen t o f  th e  insured  p op u la tion  o f  Lewis, 10 per cent 
in  C aithness and Sutherland and 7 .5  per cen t in  L anarkshire, but was
1 . See m, :K,
2. See p p .280-282. i
3. S .E .C .S ., 1946, p . 5.
4 . I .  and E .,  1946, p .6 .
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again  n e g lig ib le  in  th e  Borders and a lso  in  P er th sh ire  and Angus.
N ev erth e less , unemployment was not at a l l  lim ite d  to  the North o f
S cotlan d  and the H ighlands and Is la n d s , Although the percentage o f
workers unemployed was h igh er than in  the South, th e  g r e a te s t  number
o f  unemployed workers were to be found in  the in d u s tr ia l cen tra l area  
2o f S cotlan d .
f ig u r e  1 -  Unemployment i n  S c o t la n d
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The S c o tt is h  Development Area in clud ed  th e e n t ir e  C entral 
I n d u s tr ia l B e l t .  The same seasonal trends were seen  in  the Development 
Area as in  the r e s t  o f the country but th e  movement was r e la t iv e ly  much 
g rea ter  in  the Development Area -  th e  l e v e l  o f  unemployment f a l l in g  
l e s s  u n t i l  June and r i s in g  l e s s  in  the l a s t  s ix  months o f each year  
than Scotland  as a w hole. T his i s  in d ic a t iv e  o f th e  r i g id i t y  o f  th e  
labour fo rce  in  the Development Area. The r a te  o f unemployment in  
th e Development Area remained ap p reciab ly  h igher and during the la s t  
s i x  months o f 1948 i t  was 3*5 to  4 .0  per cent as compared w ith  2 .5  
to  3 .0  per cent in  S co tlan d  as a w hole.^  By 1949 th e  l e v e l  o f unemploy­
ment was on ly  o n e -h a lf  per cent h igher in  th e  Development Area than in
S cotlan d  as a whole, b u t was s t i l l  2 ,0  per cent h igh er in  Great 
2B r ita in . i n  1950 b o th  th e improved seasonal trend  o f  employment fo r  
m ales and the great in cr ea se  o f  fem ale unemployment were more marked 
in  the Development Area. In  1951, aga in  fo llo w in g  th e  trend of th e  
country a s  a whole, the number o f  fem ales unemployed in  the S c o tt ish  
Development Area dropped sharply  to  reach i t s  low est s in ce  1945.
( Labour S u p p ly  and Demand
The p r in c ip a l manpower problem s were in  coal-m in ing and a g r ic u ltu r e .  
C onsiderable su ccess  was made 1946-1947 in  r e c r u it in g  new workers to  
th e  coal in d u stry  -  2, 500 new workers were added to  make a t o t a l  o f  
8 4 ,900. In  a g r ic u ltu r e  the main problems were th e  replacem ent o f  
re p a tr ia te d  p r iso n ers-o f-w a r  and th e  supply o f  labour to  meet season a l 
h arvest demands. One way th ese  two types o f  v a ca n c ie s  were f i l l e d  was
1 . I b id .,  1948, p . 8.
2 . I b id .,  1949, p .6.
,
1. I b id . ,  1947, P . l l .
2 . I b id . ,  1948, p . 9.
3. I b id . ,  1949, p p .8- 9 .
«128 iÿISw ith  fo re ig n  w orkers. There was a c e r ta in  amount o f  P o l is h  labour  
a v a ila b le  and a ls o  th e European V olunteer Workers scheme a llo c a te d  
some to  su ita b le  v a ca n cies.
At th e  end o f 1947, 19 European V olunteer Workers and 758 P o le s  
had been p laced  in  coa l-m in in g  and 777 European V olunteer Workers . and 
468 P o le s  in  a g r ic u ltu r e . ^  In  1948 measures were taken to  in crease  
the labour fo rce  in  a g r ic u ltu r e . These in clu d ed  the p r o v is io n  o f  
tr a in in g  h o s te ls  fo r  in exp erien ced  B r it is h  workers, th e  im portation  o f  
4 ,500  European V olunteer Workers and th e r e te n t io n  o f  about 2, 5OO 
German and 1 ,210  Ukranian ex -p r iso n ers-o f-w a r . A lso  emergency a s s i s ­
tance in  gathering th e  p o ta to  crop was g iv en  by the array and by
250,000 sch oo l ch ild ren . In  1949 no more male European V olunteer  
Workers were brought in  b u t there was s t i l l  2 , 9OO workers employed by  
the Department o f  A gricu ltu re  fo r  S cotlan d . The remainder o f  the  
5,300  employed in  th e  p rev io u s year e ith e r  entered  th e employment o f Iin d iv id u a l farmers or l e f t  a g r icu ltu re  fo r  o ther approved employment, 4
Emergency a s s is ta n c e  was g iven  in  th e  1949 harvest by 96O men employed , %
tem porarily  under the Emergency Harvest Scheme, 60,000 persons who Ï
3 ' 'took p art in  the H oliday V olunteer Scheme and 56,000 sch oo l ch ild ren ,
During 1950 th e number o f  European V olunteer Workers f e l l  from 2 ,900  
to  1 ,8 0 0 , The Women’s Land Array was disbanded in  November 1950 but 
550 o f  i t s  638 members continued  in  a g r ic u ltu r a l employment. A ss is ­
tance aga in  was given  b y  in c lu d in g , in  the 1950 h arv est, 830 men who 
worked tem porarily  fo r  th e  S p ec ia l Seasonal Labour F orce, over 5 ,000
v o lu n teers  involved  in  th e  S c o tt ish  H arvesting Scheme and 50,000  
sch ool ch ild ren , ^  By 1951 th ere  were o n ly  800 European V olunteer  
Workers s t i l l  employed b y  th e Department o f  A gricu ltu re and i t  was 
to  f a l l  s t i l l  fu rth er  in  1952.^
(x ) I n d u s tr ia l T raining and R e h a b ilita t io n
The Government s e t  up va r io u s schemes fo r  in d u s tr ia l  tr a in in g  
in  the post-w ar y e a r s . The V ocation a l Training Scheme was to  tr a in  
workers in  th e ir  employers estab lish m en ts and th ere were sp e c ia l  
arrangements fo r  a g r ic u ltu r e  and fo r e s tr y . In  1947 iu  view  o f  th e  
r e v ise d  c a p ita l investm ent programme, the tr a in in g  in  b u ild in g  tra d es  
was suspended.  ^ L argely  owing to  the sm aller demand from in d u stry  f o r  
tr a in e d  workers, f a c i l i t i e s  under the V ocational T rain ing Schemes were 
much reduced in  1950-1951 and tr a in in g  was d isco n tin u ed  a lto g e th e r  in  
v e h ic le  b u ild in g , stonemasonry, le a th e r  goods and la d ie s  h a ir d r e ss in g ,^  
Hence, because o f  th e  red u ction s in  funding very  l i t t l e  r e a l p rogress  
was ever ab le  to  be made by th ese  p a r tic u la r  in d u s tr ia l  tra in in g  pro­
grammes.
Many o f  the unemployed were so because they were se v e r e ly  d isa b led  
and thus incapable o f ord inary employment. The number grew progres­
s iv e ly  throughout th e  post-w ar years and by October 1950 th ere were 
88,514 people ( 79,279  m ales and 9,235  fem ales) r e g is te r e d  under the
'
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1. I b id . ,  1950, p .8 .
2 . I b id . ,  1951, p . 9.
3. I b id . ,  1947, p . l l .
4 . I b id . ,  1950, p . 9.
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D isab led  Persons (Employment) Act (1944), o f  th is  group 8 ,2 3 4  were |
unemployed (which was 373 l e s s  than the prev ious y e a r ) , In  t h i s  group 5
7 ,407  were deemed capable o f ordinary employment and 827 were c l a s s i ­
f ie d  as s e v e r e ly  d isa b led  and u n lik e ly  to  ga in  employment except under 
sh e lte r e d  co n d itio n s ,^
Thus 'R ^ loy*  fa c to r ie s ,  designed  to  prov ide sh e ltere d  employ­
ment, were in s t i t u t e d  by the Government. There were 9 such f a c t o r ie s  
during the 1945-1951 y ea rs . The f i r s t  In d u s tr ia l R e h a b ilita t io n  U nit
in  Scotland  was s e t  up in  Grant on in  November 1948 w ith  33 men in  
2attendance, A second u n it  was opened in  H ill in g to n  in  January 1949*
By the end o f  1949 329 persons (326 men and 3 women) had com pleted a
course o f  r e h a b il ita t io n  a t Grant on and 307 ( 300 men and 2 women) a t
'3H illin g to n , There were p la n s to  open ’R ep loy’ fa c to r ie s  at Springburn 
and Aberdeen b u t th ese  were delayed .
( x i )  C onclusion
These were years o f  e x c e p tio n a lly  h igh employment fo r  B r ita in  as  
a whole -  ’f u l l  employment’ had o f f i c i a l l y  a rr iv ed . But S cotlan d  lagged  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  behind the r e s t  o f the country during the immediate p o st­
war y ea rs , S c o t t is h  unemployment r a te s  were u su a lly  double th a t of 
the r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in  and were nuch h igher in  the S c o t t is h  D evelop- - 
ment Area and c e r ta in  p a rts  o f th e  North o f  Scotlan d . A nxiety  over the  
E n g lish /S c o tt ish  d iscrepancy in  unemployment f ig u r e s  gave r i s e  to
1. Ib id .
2 . I b id .,  1948, p .9. I
3, I b id .,  1949, p .9.
c r i t ic i s m s  from v a r io u s  b od ies such a s  the S c o tt is h  Trades Union 
C ongress, But in  a broader con text the degree o f  unemployment in  
the immediate post-w ar years lo o k s t r i v i a l  when compared to  what 
happened e a r l ie r  in  the 1930’s or imch la t e r  in  the 1970 ' s .
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Chapter Four
Housing
I
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1. Post-War Housing Needs
( i )  S iz e  o f Problem
E stim ates supp lied  to  th e  Barlow Commission by th e M in istry  o f  
Health and th e Department o f  H ealth  fo r  S cotlan d  showed th a t th e num­
b er  o f  a d d itio n a l houses in  1939 needed to  remedy slums and over­
crowding to  be 300,000 fo r  England and Wales and 230,000 fo r  S cotlan d  
a lon e.^  T h is p a ttern  o f  more c r i t i c a l  housing shortages in  Scotland  
a s  con5>ared to  th e  r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in  continued  throughout th e  war­
tim e y ea rs . According to  P o lla r d , housing su ffe red  more than any other
2s o c ia l  elem ent as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  war.
The acute shortage o f housing in  Scotland, th ere fo re , was even  
more evident fo llo w in g  th e Second World War due to  the suspension  o f  
most c i v i l i a n  b u ild in g , the number o f  houses becoming u n f it  betw een  
1938 and 1943, as w e ll  as the number (7,000)'^ o f  houses th a t were damaged 
or destroyed during th e  war. There were approxim ately 1, 320,000 houses 
in  Scotland  at the con clu sion  o f  World War I I ,  o f  which a l i t t l e  over
250,000 were owned by lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s .^  The S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory  
Committee estim ated  in  th e ir  1944 rep ort e n t i t le d  ’Planning Our New 
Homes’ th a t sim ply to  meet S co tla n d ’ s immediate needs a h a lf  a m il l io n
1. Barlow Report, pp. 67-68. See a ls o , Marian Bowley, Housing and the
S ta te  1919-1944, (London, George A llen  and Unwin L td ., 1945j •
Bowley’s book i s  m ainly concerned w ith  England and Wales but has a 
good appendix on housing problem s in  Scotland .
2 . P o llard , p .402.
3 . Department o f H ealth  fo r  S cotlan d , Report o f  the Committee on
S c o tt ish  B u ild in g  C osts. (Ediii)urgh, H. M, S. 0. , 1948), p. 7.
4 . I .  and E ., 1946, p . 65.
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a d d it io n a l houses were required  -  100 ,000 to  rep la ce  u n f i t  houses;
200,000 fo r  fa m il ie s  from overcrowded houses ; and 200,000 fo r  the
1gen era l needs o f  fa m il ie s  who had no separate homes.. These f ig u r e s
d id  not even take in to  account th e  houses which, a lthough they  had no
sa n ita r y  conveniences or in te r n a l w ater supply fo r  example, were not
regarded as u n f it .  There were at t h i s  tim e 405,000 houses w ith  no
sa n ita r y  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  any kind and on ly  a very m inute proportion  o f
th e se  were c l a s s i f i e d  as u n f i t .  Thus the t o t a l  o f  500,000 new houses
fo r  Scotland  was con sid ered  'basic* fo r  i t  d id  not even consider the
a d d it io n a l housing demands a f te r  December 1943 a-s a r e s u lt  o f  fu r th e r
m arriages and w astages o f  e x is t in g  p ro p er tie s , nor was i t  ab le to  take
in to  account p ro g ress iv e  improvements in  housing standards which might
make p u b lic  op in ion  req u ire  the term ination  o f the e f f e c t iv e  l i f e  o f
e x is t in g  d w ellin gs ra th er  e a r l ie r  than might have been expected in  
21944. T his in  f a c t  d id  not happen, i t  was not u n t i l  the 1950’ s th a t  
The Housing (R epairs and R ents) (S cotlan d ) Act (1954) was passed ,^  
Throughout th e  post-w ar years 'P lanning Our New Homes' was c i te d  as 
the d e f in i t iv e  work on S co tla n d 's  housing needs.
In  1951 th ere were n ea r ly  as many p eop le  l iv in g  more than two to  
a room in  S cotland  as th ere  was in  England and W ales, where the popula­
t io n  was n in e tim es as g r e a t .
1. Ib id .
2. S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory Committee, P lanning Our New Homes, 
(Edinburgh, H. K 8. 0 . ,  1944), p .11.
3 . R. D. Cramond, Housing P o lic y  in  S cotlan d  1919-1964 A Study in  
S ta te  A ss is ta n ce . (Edinburgh, O liver  and Boyd L td ., U n iv e r s ity  o f 
Glasgow O ccasional P apers, I 966) ,  p .122, Appendix I .
"1135 !
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Edinburgh and Aberdeen, th e  r a te  o f  overcrowding was on ly  h a lf  
G lasgow's and in  some o f  the tovms and ru ra l areas i t  was a great d ea l 
low er.  ^ In  1951 S cotlan d  had s t i l l  f a i l e d  to  reach a standard o f  occu­
pancy a lread y  reached in  England and Wales fo r ty  years p rev io u s ly . In  
1951 S co tlan d  had 1 .0 4  persons per room, w h ile  England and Wales had 
already had 0 .9 5  persons per room in  I 9I I .  In  1951 in  the s ix  E n g lish
conurbations only  one ro se  above the n a tio n a l average o f  0 .8  persons
2per room and th a t one, T yneside, was 0 .8 8 .
Table 1 -  P ercentage o f  P op u la tion  L iving more than Two to  a Room
Scotland  England and Wales
1931 3 5 .0  6.9
1951 1 5 .5  2 . 2
Source; Census o f  Scotland  (P op u lation ) 1951 P relim inary  Report o f  
Scotland  in  Robert B aird, 'H ousing', in  A. K. C airncross, 
e d ,, The S c o t t is h  Economy. (Cambridge, The U n iv ers ity  P r e ss ,
195^ ), p .197 .
Overcrowding was not eq u a lly  bad in  a l l  p arts  o f  S cotlan d  but was 
almost un iform ly worse than in  England and W ales, R ates o f  overcrowding
s im ila r  to  Glasgow's were common in  th e in d u s tr ia l tovms such as
i
M otherwell, Coatbridge and P a is le y  but in  the other la r g e  c i t i e s ,  e .g .
1. Robert Baird, 'H ousing', in  C airncross, p .197.
2. I b id . ,  p .198.
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Year S cotlan d
Persons  
per house
Rooms 
per house
P ersons  
per room
1911 4 .5 5 3 .1 4 1 .45
1931 4 .0 8 3.21 . 1.27
1951 3 .53 3.37 1 .0 4
Table 2 -  D en sity  o f  Occupation in  S cotlan d  and in  England and Wales, 
1911-1951
England and Wales 
P ersons per room
0 .9 5
0 .8 3
0 .7 3
Source; Report on the Tw elfth  D ecennial Census o f  Scotland , I 9I I ;
Report on the Fourteenth Census o f  S cotlan d  1931; Census 
o f S cotlan d  (P opu lation ) 193T ; in  B aird, p .197.
In  Scotland  a fa r  h igher prop ortion  than in  England and Wales l iv e d  
in  houses o f one room ( ' s in g le  en d s') or two rooms ('b u t and b e n s ') .
In  1951 th e  proportions were 26 per cent and 2 .6  per cent r e s p e c t iv e ly  
and th ere  were a c tu a lly  more people l i v in g  in  th ese  sm all houses than  
th ere were in  the whole o f England and W ales. Only 3 7 .4  per cent o f  
S c o t t is h  homes had more than th ree rooms, w h ile  in  England and Wales 
the prop ortion  was 84 . 7 *^
The problem was not r e s t r ic t e d  to  r e l ie v in g  overcrowding in  the  
slum -congested areas, but in v o lv ed  as w e ll  the d e c e n tr a lisa t io n  o f whole 
communities and in d u str ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly  to  the new coa l developm ents 
o f F if e ,  M idlothian  and A yrsh ire . Thus th ere  was in  post-w ar Scotland  
not ju st  one type o f housing need, i . e .  c le a r in g  the slums, but th ere  
were sev era l d iv e r se  and i^ e c i f i c  areas o f  housing requirem ents.
1. I b id . , pp. 198 and 199.
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( i i )  Areas o f S p e c if ic  Need
(a ) Glasgow
I t  was oornnon knowledge a t t h is  time th a t Glasgow required  
a minimum o f  100,000 new houses. T h is f ig u r e  was g iven  o f f i c i a l l y  by  
the Glasgow Corporation in  answer to  a q u estion naire sen t out by the  
Clyde V a lle y  P lanning Committee in  1944 and was endorsed by Mr. Joseph  
Westwood ( 1945- 1947) when he was appointed Secretary  o f  S ta te  fo r  
Scotland , There were in  Glasgow 98,000  fa m ilie s  on the w a itin g  l i s t  
and i t  was known th at many other fa m il ie s  made no a p p lic a t io n  because  
they  hoped to  be removed under the slum clearance le g is la t io n .^
Table 5 -  Glasgow Housing L is t  ; Number o f  A p p lica tion s lodged s in ce  
1945
Number o f a p p lic a tio n s  lodged
Tenants o f houses S in g le
persons
Over­ Not over­ about to
Year H ouseless crowded crowded be married T o ta l
1945 9,073 2,322 1, 327 1 ,654 14,3761946 8,577 2,013 1, 321 2 ,393 14,1 0 41947 6 ,8 3 4 1 ,834 953 2,587 12, 2081948 6 ,060 1,963 1,058 2,603 11 ,684
1949 5 ,438 2,481 1,347 2 ,085 11,3511950 5,162 1 ,8 7 3 1,496 1 ,988 10,519
1951 5 ,085 1,475 1,949 2,227 10,7361952 4,991 1,202 1,916 2,059 10 ,1681953 4 ,562 1,506 2,173 2,148 10,3891954 4,153 1,617 2,914 2,046 10,7301955 4 ,203 1,361 3,466 2, 222 11,252
T ota l
1945/55 63 ,938 19,647 19,920 24,012 127, 517
Source; T, Brennan, Reshaping A C ity . (Glasgow, The House o f  Grant L td .,
1959) ,  p . 21 .
1 . Harry McShane, G lasgow 's Housing D isgrace. (Glasgow, Kirkwood
(P r in te rs)  L td ., date not g iv e n ) , p .4 . A ro u sin g  Communist pamphlet, 
few fa c t s  but co lo u r fu l read ing . See a ls o , pp.177-180 o f t h i s  sec ­t io n  on Glasgow and O v e r sp ill ..
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Ten years was considered  to  b e th e  normal period  fo r  rehousing in  
Glasgow. In  1959 i t  was thought th a t ' some o f the ap p lican ts who 
f i r s t  r e g is te r e d  in  1945 w i l l  by  now have been rehoused' I t  was 
estim ated  in  1959 th a t o n e-th ird  o f  the a p p lic a tio n s  on the Glasgow  
housing l i s t  had been there fo r  ten  years or more (1949 or e a r l ie r ) ,  
though th ere  were some a p p lica n ts  who had been on th e w a itin g  l i s t  fo% 
f i f t e e n  or twenty years ( 1959-1944 a p p lic a n ts ) .
In fe r io r  housing standards and overcrowding were th e  worst prob­
lem s in  Glasgow. The h ig h est r a te s  o f  overcrowding in  the U nited Kingdom 
were in  Glasgow. In  some wards such as Hutchesonto-<7m, Dalmarnock, 
G orbals, and Cowcaddens almost h a lf  th e  population  l i v e d  a t a d e n s ity  
o f  over two per room.  ^ G lasgow's overcrowding was so severe th a t th ere  
was never any q u estion  o f employment rep lacin g  th e resid en ce  req u ire ­
ments when ob ta in in g  C ouncil hou sing .^  The Corporation o f  Glasgow and 
th e  C oun cillors were under strong p u b lic  pressure to  d ea l w ith  the p o s t­
war need fo r  housing. But the house w a itin g  l i s t  s t i l l  had 80-90 ,000  
fa m il ie s  in  the e a r ly  1 9 5 0 's .  ^ In  1952 th e new C ity  A rch itec t o f  
Glasgow sta ted  th a t the n e t r e s id e n t ia l  d e n s ity  o f over h a lf  the houses  
in  th e c i t y  was n in e ty - f iv e  d w e llin g s  to  the acre .^
1. T. Brennan, Reshaping A C ity , (Glasgow, The House o f  Grant L td .,  
1959), P .21.
2. Ib id .
3. B aird , p .197. See a ls o , Frank W orsdall, The Tenement : A 7fay o f  
L if e , (Edinburgh, Chambers, 1979).
4 . R. D. Cramond, A llo c a tio n  o f C ouncil Houses A Report o f Methods o f  
A llo c a tio n  o f Tenancies by L ocal A u th o r it ie s  in  S cotlan d , (Edinburgh, 
O liv er  and Boyd L td ., U n iv ers ity  o f  Glasgow O ccasional Papers N o .l ,
1964) ,  p .36.
5. S. G. Checkland, The Upas Tree Glasgow 1875-1975. (Glasgow, The 
U n iv ers ity  o f Glasgow P ress , I 976) ,  P«67.
6. A. J .  Jury, Glasgow C ity  A r c h ite c t, Report on G lasgow 's Housing 
Needs, (August 1952).
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(b) Mining Areas
Housing was in e x tr ic a b ly  t ie d  up w ith  the issu e  o f  in d u stry  
and the m o b ility  o f  labour. The com plicated housing problem in  
Scotland hampered p lans to  develop  new in d u s tr ia l s i t e s .  The most 
obvious example o f  th is  was in  th e  mining in d u stry , fo r  the housing  
shortage h indered p lan s to  r e lo c a te  miners from th e  w est to  th e  ea st  
o f Scotland to  the new co a l m ines. Local a u th o r it ie s  in  c o n su lta tio n  
w ith  the M in istry  o f  Fuel and Power and a f te r  1 January 1947 w ith  the  
N ational Coal Board made sp e c ia l p ro v is io n s  fo r  th e  housing o f  m iners. 
In  a d d ition  to  the su b s ta n tia l b u ild in g  programmes o f  the lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s  in  mining areas th e  S c o tt is h  S p e c ia l Housing A sso c ia tio n  
(SSHA)^ was g iv en  th e ta sk  o f  b u ild in g  houses in  c e r ta in  areas fo r  
tran sferred  m iners. The f i r s t  SSHA programme o f  houses fo r  miners v/as 
begun in  1946 and a second progranme o f 2 ,000  Weir and A th o ll s t e e l  
houses in i t i a t e d  in  1947* Both o f  th ese  programmes were to  tak e  on ly  
a year but each was delayed fa r  beyond i t s  expected  com pletion d ate . 
Follow ing the war a ta rg et o f 12 ,750  new houses fo r  miners was s e t .
In  1951 on ly  3 ,183  o f th ese  houses from the i n i t i a l  programme had been  
f in is h e d  and the ta r g e t number o f houses was q u ie t ly  lowered from  
12,750  to  10, 500.2
(c )  Development Area
Of the 500,0 0 0  houses requ ired  in  S cotlan d  in  1945, some
290,000 o f  them were needed in  th e  Development Area ( t h i s  f ig u r e  
in c lu d es  Glasgow), "where the unplanned development o f the p ast has l e f t
1. See pp.146-147 on th e  S c o t t is h  S p ec ia l Housing A sso c ia tio n .
2. I .  and E . , 1946, p.&7; and 1951, p . 53.
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an ap p a llin g  le g a cy  o f overcrowding and worn-out housing’ .^  Much
sp e c ia l a t te n t io n  was g iven  to  the Development Area and in  1947 i t
was estim ated  th at 72 per cen t o f  the new permanent and temporary
houses com pleted and 53 per cent o f the permanent houses under con-
2s tr u c tio n  in  Scotland  were in  th e  Development Area. Much o f  th e  SSHA 
b u ild in g  programme was concentrated  in  the Development Area as  th e  
reg ion  o f g r e a te s t  need.
S p ec ia l arrangements were made by the Department o f  H ealth, the  
Board o f  Trade and lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  to  a s s i s t  key workers who m igrated  
to  new l o c a l i t i e s  w ith in  S cotlan d  w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  in d u stry . The key 
workers programme was e s s e n t ia l  to  the Development Area in  th a t i t  pro­
v id ed  s k i l l e d  w orkers w ith  immediate housing in  a new area. A lthough  
t h i s  programme on ly  housed a l im ite d  number o f p erson s, w ithout i t  many 
in d u s tr ie s  could  not have r e lo c a te d  or begun in  a new area and th u s a 
con sid erab le  number o f jobs fo r  sem i- and u n sk il le d  workers would not 
have been a v a ila b le .
(d ) Rural Housing
House b u ild in g  in  ru ra l areas had always been more d i f f i c u l t  
than in  urban areas, p a r t ly  because o f  increased  c o s t s  r e su lt in g  from  
tran sp ort o f m a ter ia ls  and components and the r e la t iv e ly  sm all s iz e  o f  
ru ra l housing schemes and p a r t ia l ly  due to  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  secu rin g  
an adequate supply o f  lo c a l  labour. Thus the Housing (Scotland) A cts  
were to  provide s p e c ia l  su b s id ie s  where c o s ts  were s u b s ta n t ia lly  
in crea sed  because o f  the rem oteness o f  the s i t e  from the cen tres  o f
1. I .  and E ., 1946, p . 67 .
2. Ib id .
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supply o f  b u ild in g  labour and m aterdals. To overcome th e s c a r c ity  
o f  ordinary b u ild in g  labour, s p e c ia l  a l lo c a t io n s  o f  houses o f  non- 
t r a d it io n a l co n stru ctio n  were made to  ru ra l a rea s.^
B u ild in g  op era tion s in  1951 s t i l l  had not e f f e c te d  any t o t a l  so lu ­
t io n  to  S co tla n d 's  acu te housing shortage, which remained a ser io u s  
s o c ia l  problem and th e p r in c ip a l l im it in g  fa c to r  in  the major develop­
ment schemes. The number o f houses completed never even came c lo s e  to  
th e  g o a ls  s e t .  L ocal a u th o r it ie s  were concerned about the con tin u in g  
s te e p  r i s e  in  b u ild in g  c o s t s  and in  mounting d e f i c i t s  in  th e ir  housing  
accou n ts. In  an e f f o r t  to  reduce t h e ir  balance o f  expenditure charged
to  th e  lo c a l  r a te s ,  many a u th o r it ie s  had already in  1951 ra ised  r e n ts  
2con sid erab ly .
2. Government L e g is la t io n
There were se v e r a l rep o rts  p ublished  during the war which sought 
to  prov ide a p lan  fo r  th e  post-w ar b u ild in g  programme. In  1944 both  
'P lanning Our New Homes' and 'D is tr ib u tio n  o f New Houses in  Scotland* 
were p u b lish ed . The recommendations o f the la t t e r  rep ort d e a lt  w ith  
the need to  co-ordinate housing programmes w ith  in d u s tr ia l development 
and th e p lanning o f  housing schemes as in teg ra te d  communities. I t  a ls o  
argued th a t the r e s t r ic t io n  o f the Exchequer subsidy to  the replacem ent 
o f u n f it  houses and to  th e  r e l i e f  o f  overcrowding w ith in  th e  area o f  
a u th o r ity  prevented lo c a l  au th ority  housing from b ein g  a v a ila b le  to
1. I b id . ,  1951, p .31.
2. S .E .C .S ., 1951, p .3 .
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workpeople transfeirred from other a reas.^  The report recommended 
th a t th e  Government's announced in te n t io n  to  grant a subsidy fo r  
genera l needs during a two year post-w ar tr a n s it io n  p er iod  should  
in s te a d  be extended to  ten  years a f te r  peace was d eclared . T his was 
to  cre a te  more m o b ility  o f  the populace by a llow ing housing au th ori­
t i e s  to  provide fo r  fa m il ie s  moving from one area to  another. The
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th is  recommendation was th a t i t  reco g n ised  th a t the
2housing problem could no lon ger be so lv ed  in  p u rely  lo c a l  term s. I t  
was no lo n g er  viewed as e i th e r  p r a c t ic a l or e f f ic ie n t  fo r  each lo c a l  
a u th o r ity  to  d ea l e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  i t s  own a f f a ir s .  By 1944 constant 
movement o f  the in d u s tr ia l  population  was p erce ived  as an in te g r a l part 
o f th e  economy and hence should be d ir e c te d  on a n a tio n a l s c a le .
However th e  1944 Housing (Scotland) Act on ly  provided two years  
o f  subsidy to  cover gen era l needs and d e a lt  w ith  permanent houses on ly . 
The Government p o lic y  on temporary housing was to  be found in  the  
Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Act, 1944. In  t h is  Act i t  was 
d e lin e a ted  th a t the M in istry  o f  Works would organ ise  th e  manufacture 
o f  temporary, p r e -fa b r ic a ted  houses which would then be g iven  to  the  
lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s ,  who in  turn would p lace  th e houses on s i t e s  th ey  had 
s e le c te d . L ocal a u th o r it ie s  made annual payments to  the Exchequer as  
long as they  p o ssessed  th e  hou ses. T his was a complete break w ith  any 
p rev ious or subsequent enactm ent, fo r  i t  had always been the lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s  who b u i l t  and owned as w e ll as le a se d  the houses w ith  S ta te  
a s s is ta n c e . Under t h is  scheme Scotland r e c e iv e d  32,000, more than a
1, Cramond, Housing P o lic y  in  Scotland , p. 26, and S c o tt is h  Housing 
A dvisory Committee, D is tr ib u t io n  o f New Houses in  S co tlan d , 
(Edinburgh, H.iLS. 0 , ,  fo r  the Department o f  H ealth fo r  Scotland , 
1944), p . 11.
2, Cramond, Housing P o l ic y  in  Scotland , pp. 26-27 .
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f i f t h ,  o f  th e  157,000  temporary houses con stru cted .^
I t  was b ecau se  o f th e  g e n e ra l r i s e  in  b u i ld in g  c o s ts  th a t  th e  
H ousing (F in a n c ia l  P ro v is io n s )  (S c o tla n d )  A ct, 1946 in c re a se d  th e  sub­
s i d i e s  from  £10 1 0 s . Od. to  £21 1 0s . Od. f o r  a house o f  th r e e  a p a r t ­
m ents o r  l e s s ;  from  £11 15s. Od. to  £23 Os. Od. f o r  a  house o f fo u r
ap a rtm e n ts ; and from  £13 Os. Od. to  £25 10s. Od. f o r  a house o f  f i v e
2apartm ents or more. T his Act was passed  by the new Labour Government 
and not on ly  rep laced  the 194^ f- Act but a ls o  made th e  new su b s id ie s  
a v a ila b le  r e tr o s p e c t iv e ly  fo r  any house completed a f t e r  7 March 1944, 
the day b efo re  th e  housing p o lic y  statem ent by th e  v/artirae C o a lit io n  
Government. A lso  i t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  s e t  no exact tim e l im it  on th e  a v a i l ­
a b i l i t y  o f  the su b s id ie s  fo r  the genera l needs o f  the ’working c l a s s e s ' .
In  t h is  sense th e  1946 Act f i n a l l y  implemented the recommendations o f
3the 1944 ’Report on th e D is tr ib u t io n  o f New Houses in  S co tla n d '.
The purpose o f th e Housing (S cotlan d ) Act, 1949 was not to  r a is e  
the su b s id ie s  but m s  to  encourage the improvement o f  e x is t in g  homes.
The S c o t t i s h  Housing A dv iso ry  Committee i n  t h e i r  1947 r e p o r t  on 
'M odern ising  Our Homes' had e s tim a te d  th a t  over 400 ,000  houses, ap p ro x i­
m a te ly  3 0  p e r  c e n t, o f  a l l  houses in  S c o tla n d  had no s e p a ra te  w a te r 
c l o s e t s  w h ile  many more had no bathroom , o r  had a  bathroom  o r  w a te r
1. I b i d . ,  p .27 .
2. H ousing (F in a n c ia l  P ro v is io n s )  (S c o tla n d )  A ct, 1944.
3 . Cramond, Housing P o l ic y  in  S co tlan d , p . 29.
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c lo s e t  w ithout s u f f ic ie n t  n a tu ra l l ig h t in g  or v e n t i la t io n .^  But many
o f  th ese  houses were o f  sound stone con stru ctio n  and were not c la sse d  ^
a s u n f i t .  Thus th e  194-9 Act was to  o f fe r  f in a n c ia l  a s s is ta n c e  from
th e  Exchequer to  improve e x is t in g  houses. T his was th e  f i r s t  tim e
th a t th e Exchequer had o ffe r e d  f in a n c ia l  a id  so w id ely  and on such a
la r g e  sc a le  fo r  th e  improvement o f  e x is t in g  houses as d is t in c t  from
2th e  b u ild in g  o f new ones.
A lso  in  th e  194-9 Act the term 'working c la s s e s '  -  a phrase never  
d efin ed  -  was d e le te d  and no subsequent enactments u sed  t h is  term. ^
B efore  194-9 lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  were to ld  by the S c o t t is h  Board o f  H ealth  
th a t i t  was not p r a c t ic a l  to  d e fin e  th e  term 'working c la s s e s '  but th a t  
i t  should  be in te r p r e te d  l ib e r a l ly .  Because o f  th e  e lim in a tio n  o f  t h i s  
term the subsidy became a v a ila b le  f o r  a l l  houses b u i l t  by lo c a l  autho­
r i t i e s ,  no m atter to  whom th ey  were a llo c a te d .^
By 1950 there was a m u lt ip l ic i t y  o f  Housing A cts fo r  S cotlan d  on 
the s ta tu te  book, the p r in c ip a l a c t -  The Housing (S cotlan d ) A ct,
1925 -  was a quarter o f a century behind. Thus the 1950 Act was sim ply
1, See a ls o ,  S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory Committee, M odernising Our 
Homes, (Edinburgh, H. Tkï. S. 0 . , fo r  th e  Department o f  H ealth  fo r
S co tlan d , 1947)• See, Robert B aird, 'H ousing', in  A. K. C airncross,
e d . , The S c o tt ish  Economy, p .l9 7 . Table 95, ’S iz e  o f  d w ellin g -  
houses in  Scotland and in  England and W ales, 1951’ and Table 96, 
'Households in  S co tlan d  and in  England and Wales w ith  no p iped  
w ater, k itch en  sin k , w ater c lo s e t ,  f ix e d  bath  and cooking stove '. 
Source; Census o f  P op u lation , 1951 : One Per Gent Sample T ables.
2 . Cramond, H ousin g  P o l i c y  in  S c o t la n d , p. 31.
3* S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory Committee, S co tla n d 's  Older Homes Report
o f  th e  Sub-Committee on U n fit Housing! (Edinburgh, H. lU S. 0. , I 967) ,
p . 1 9 .
4. See a l s o .  F i r s t  A nnual R ep o r t o f  th e  S c o t t i s h  B oard  o f  H e a lth , 
(E d in b u rg h , H .I v tS .0 . , I 919) .
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a c o n so lid a tin g  measure making no changes in  p o lic y  or su b s id ie s .
This Act in  turn stayed  on the books fo r  a long p eriod . U n til 1^62 
S ectio n  184 o f  the 1950 Act was the on ly  re feren ce  s ta tu to r y  guide on 
the u n f itn e s s  o f b u ild in g  m a ter ia ls .^
With th e  cheap money p o l ic y  abandoned in  1951 by the new 
C onservative Government, th e  C o a lit io n  Government’s p o lic y  statem ent 
o f  June 1944 was f i n a l l y  d iscard ed . Several su c c e ss iv e  in c r e a se s  b e t ­
ween November 1951 and February 1952 ra ised  the ra te  o f  in t e r e s t  on 
long-term  lo a n s  by  the P u b lic  Yforks Loan Board from 3 per cent to  4& 
per cen t. T h is a f fe c te d  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s '  housing accounts which 
were a lready su ffe r in g  from th e r is in g  b u ild in g  c o s t s .  The C hancellor  
o f  the Exchequer agreed to  a rev iew  o f housing su b s id ie s . Thus, again  
as in  1946, h igh er  c o s ts  brought ad d ition s in  th e  housing su b s id ie s  
which were expressed  in  the Housing (Scotlan d ) A ct. 1952.
3 . A dm in istrative  Framework
In  a d d itio n  to  the le g a l  framework s e t  up to  d ea l w ith  t h i s  i s s u e  
th ere  was a complex a d m in istra tiv e  system designed  to  deal w ith  th e  
housing programme. There were a t  t h i s  time va r io u s b od ies  in vo lved  in  
the post-w ar housing programme ; governmental -  S c o t t is h  O ffice ; qua s i -  
governmental -  S c o t t is h  Council (Development and In d u stry ), S c o t t is h  
I n d u s tr ia l E s ta te s  and SSHA; corporate -  B u ild in g  Trade Union, Housing 
A sso c ia t io n s  and S o c ie t ie s ;  and p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise . The N ational
1. S co tla n d 's  O lder Homes, p .20.
1
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1 . P lanning Our New Homes, p . 6.
2. S c o t t is h  B u ild ing  C osts, p .42.
3. Report o f  the Commissioner fo r  the S p ec ia l Areas in  Scotland  fo r  
the p er io d  7 th  J u ly  1956 to  31st August 1937. (Edinburgh, H,ivL S. 0 , ,  
1937), p . 35.
B u ild ing  Programme was thus implemented in  S cotlan d  by means o f  a l l  «Ith ese  various ty p es  o f  a d m in istra tiv e  b o d ies . 4
Pre-W orld War I I  most o f the n a tio n a l d ir e c t io n  on S c o tt ish  
housing problems came from the Commissioner fo r  the S p e c ia l Areas in  
S cotlan d  in  con ju n ction  w ith  th e  S ecretary  o f S ta te  f o r  Scotland.
During the war, 25 August 1942, the S c o tt is h  Housing A dvisory Committee
was r e c o n s t itu te d  to  work on post-w ar reco n stru ctio n  p lan s. T his was
the group th a t produced the in f lu e n t ia l  'Planning Our New Homes' t
The most in n ovative  work during the post-w ar years was done by the
S c o tt is h  S p ec ia l Housing A sso c ia tio n  (SSHA). The SSHA was a Government ^
sponsored body whose aim was to  supplement the e f f o r t s  o f  th e  lo c a l
a u th o r it ie s  in  provid ing houses fo r  l e t t i n g  under the Housing A cts.
The A sso c ia t io n  was a p r iv a te  coup any incorporated  under th e  Companies i
A ct, but i t  had no share c a p ita l  and was e n t ir e ly  fin an ced  by Government
funds. I t s  Council o f  Management was appointed by th e S ecre ta ry  o f
2S ta te  fo r  Scotland . The SSHA was o r ig in a l ly  s e t  up by th e  Commissioner 
fo r  S p e c ia l Areas in  S co tlan d  as the S p e c ia l Areas Housing A sso c ia tio n  
in  th e Housing (Scotland) A ct. 1935.^ In  November 1938 i t  was r e c o n s t i­
tu ted , renamed the S c o t t is h  S p ec ia l Housing A sso c ia tio n  and charged to  i
b u ild  5 ,000  new houses in  s e le c te d  areas. T his was to  ex p ed ite  the two 
A cts o f th a t year -  The Housing (A g r icu ltu ra l P op u lation ) (S cotlan d ) A ct. 
1938 and th e Housing (F in a n c ia l P r o v is io n s)  (S cotlan d ) A ct. 1938 -  which  
were passed  w ith  the o b je c t iv e  o f both  a c c e le r a tin g  slum clearan ce and 41
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rep la c in g  u n f it  hou ses.^  F ollow in g  the war th e  scope o f the SSBA's
d u tie s  was widened to  in clud e th e  b u ild in g  o f n o n -tr a d it io n a l typ es o f
con stru ction  so a s  to  in crea se  the output o f houses w ith the minimum
2demand on b u ild in g  labour, e s p e c ia l ly  s k i l le d  labour.
The SSHA was re sp o n sib le  fo r  100,000 houses in  th e  post-w ar hous­
in g  programme, o n e - f i f t h  o f  the t o t a l  S c o tt is h  b u ild in g  p r o je c t . I t s  
main fu n c tio n  was to  provide houses in  the areas of g r e a te s t  need as  
determ ined by the S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te . Daring th ese  y ea rs  the subsidy  
was p a id  d ir e c t ly  to  the SSHA. from the Secretary  o f  S ta te  in stea d  o f  
through the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  as w e ll as th e  eq u iva len t o f  the r a te  con­
tr ib u t io n  which a l o c a l  a u th o r ity  was required  to  pay in  resp ect to  i t s  
own houses. The houses provided by the SSHA. under th ese  arrangements 
were owned and managed by the A sso c ia t io n  and thus augmented the housing  
reso u rces  o f  the areas o f  g r e a te s t  need a t no c o s t  to  the lo c a l  housing  
a u th o r it ie s .  The SSHA had to  have th e ir  tenders ( o f f e r s  to  supply a t  a 
f ix e d  r a te )  fu rn ish ed  by the co n tra cto rs  and approved b y  the Department 
o f  H ealth  in  th e form o f  b u ild in g  l ic e n c e s ,   ^ a s d id  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
and p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise . Thus the e x is te n c e  o f  the A sso c ia t io n  d id  not  
d ir e c t ly  add to  the b u ild in g  ca p a c ity  a v a ila b le  in  S cotlan d  but i t  d id
a f f e c t  the d is tr ib u t io n  o f a v a ila b le  ca p acity  so  as to  a s s i s t  the a reas  
4o f  g r e a te s t  need.
1. S .E .C .S ., 1939, p . 19.
2. S c o t t is h  S p ec ia l Housing A sso c ia tio n , A C hronicle o f Forty Years 
I 937- I 977, (Edinburgh, Macdonald P r in te r s  L td ., 1977),  P.7.
3. I t  was by means o f  th e  b u ild in g  l ic e n c e s  that th e  Government was 
a b le  to  co n tro l the amount o f  b u ild in g  under p ro g ress . This was 
v ery  important e s p e c ia l ly  in  r e la t io n  to  the r e s t r i c t io n  o f  
p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise  in  the post-w ar era. See pp. 80-81 on Woodburn, 
th e S c o tt ish  S ecre ta ry  o f S ta te  1947-1950 and p p .169-176 on p r iv a te  
enterp)rise.
4 . S c o t t is h  B u ild in g s  C osts, p .43.
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In  ma ch o f W estern Europe and Scandanavia housing a s so c ia t io n s ,  
s o c ie t i e s  and co op era tives  p layed  a major r o le  in  th e ir  post-w ar  
reco n stru ctio n  programmes.^ These variou s housing a s s o c ia t io n s  were 
organised  on a non-profit-m aking b a s is  fo r  th e  b e n e f it  o f  members who 
rented  or had a share in  houses under the terms of a tenancy agreement 
or a le a se  granted to  them by th e s o c ie ty . In  the ea r ly  p art o f  th e  
tw en tieth  cen tu iy  s o c ie t i e s  and a s so c ia t io n s  in  England p layed  a u se­
f u l  part in  provid ing d w ellin g s fo r  genera l fa m ily  l e t t i n g  and a lso  
fo r  se c t io n s  o f  the p op u la tion  w ith  s p e c ia l  needs which could  not be 
met by  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r . Housing s o c ie t i e s  and a s so c ia t io n s , designed  
to  con stru ct and manage house property, never gained prominence in  the  
immediate post-w ar yeaurs in  Scotland  and, indeed, d id  not become a 
v ia b le  housing a lte r n a t iv e  fo r  Scotland  u n t i l  the 1 9 6 0 's . But i t  i s  
the fa c t  th a t Scotland d id  not have strong housing a s so c ia t io n s  which 
i s  s ig n if ic a n t ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  r e la t io n  to  S co tla n d ’s c r i t i c a l  housing  
shortages and a lso  the sm all amount o f p r iv a te  housing.
4 . L ocal A u th o r it ie s
I t  was the Housing. Town P lanning, e tc . (S cotlan d ) A ct. I 919 which 
gave the f i r s t  im petus to  th e development and co n stru ctio n  o f co u n c il 
housing in  Scotland . I t  was by imposing on lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  a s p e c if ic  
duty to  provide fo r  general housing needs th a t th e  Government made pro­
v is io n  for  d ir e c t  s ta te  in te r v e n tio n  in  th e housing market. I t  was at  
t h i s  time th at th e lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  became th e  p r in c ip a l prom oters o f
1. Douglas N iven, The Development o f Housing in  Scotland . (London, 
Groom Helm, 1979), PP. 54, H 6  and I 27 .
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housing in  Scotland^ and t l i i s  was ju s t  as tru e  a quarter o f a century  
la t e r  in  1945-1951.
C learly  one o f  th e  most im portant fa c to r s  in  th e S c o tt is h  housing
programme was the r o le  o f  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s . The lo c a l  housing
a u th o r it ie s ,  be i t  c i t y  or county c o u n c ils , depending on the reg ion ,
had co n tro l not on ly  over the co n stru c tio n  and management o f c o u n c il
houses but a ls o  over the a llo c a t io n  o f  the co u n cil houses. U n t i l  1947
b u ild in g  lic e n c e s  were granted by the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  as w e ll, b u t
t h i s  was a lte r e d  and the approval o f the Department o f  H ealth fo r
S co tlan d  was requ ired  in  a d d itio n . The Department o f  H ealth m aintained
c e n tr a l con tro l o f  the is su e  o f  h ou se-b u ild in g  l ic e n c e s  from October
21947 u n t i l  January o f 1951, ten  months b efore th e  General E le c t io n .
T h is was to  ensure Government c o n tr o l o f the s iz e  and d ir e c tio n  o f  the 
n a t io n a l b u ild in g  programme.
A ccording to  Douglas Niven in  The Development o f  Housing in  S co tlan d , 
th ere was a move towards a complete programme of m u n ic ip a lisa tio n  o f a l l  
p r iv a te ly  rented  housing a t  the end o f th e  Second W or Id V/ar, e s p e c ia l ly  
in  th e  West o f  Scotland . Some even b e lie v e d  i t  to  be p o s s ib le  and p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  d e s ira b le  fo r  a l l  houses in  a burgh or c i t y  to  be owned by th e  
lo c a l  a u th o r ity .  ^ W hile th ese  n otion s were never r e a l is e d  they  do 
in d ic a te  the d ir e c t io n  o f  the con tro l th a t was g iven  to  th e  lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s .
1. N iven, p .68.
2 . I .  and E ., 1951, p . 55.
3 . N iven, p .77. U n fortun ately , th ere  i s  very l i t t l e  p r in ted  m ateria l 
on th ese  more r a d ic a l a sp ects  o f  p u b lic  co n tro l. Further research  
needs to  be done b efo re  an a n a ly s is  can be made o f  th e  d ir e c t io n s  
in  which lo c a l  a u th o r ity  con tro l could  have moved during th ese  
y ea rs .
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I t  was s ta te d  in  the House o f  Commons on 6 June 1944 in  response  
to  a q u estion  on housing th a t ' I t  i s  th e  in te n tio n  o f th e Government 
to  m aintain  a cheap money p o lic y  by which lo c a l  and p u b lic  a u th o r it ie s  
w i l l  b e n e f i t ' .^  Housing su b s id ie s  from the Exchequer were r a ise d  in  
1946 but were not in creased  again  u n t i l  1952 w ith  the end o f  the cheap 
money p o lic y .  However, during th ese  years, 1946-1952, b u ild in g  c o s ts  
ro se  ra p id ly , b u ild in g  m a te r ia ls  became dearer, wages h igh er, th ere  
was an in crea sed  purchase ta x  on household equipment, and h igher in te r ­
e s t  r a te s  were even charged on advances from the L ocal Loan Fund which
was supposed to  in crease  th e  amount o f funding to  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  fo r
2th e ir  housing programme. Follow ing the war the average S c o t t is h  ten ­
ant p a id  approxim ately 20 per cent more in  gross ren t than in  1937-1938  
due to  h igh er o ccu p ie r 's  r a te s ,  but the la n d lo r d 's  average net ren t  
amounted to  l e s s  than i t  d id  b efo re  the war, t h is  was a ls o  due to  the  
S c o tt is h  r a t in g  system. Thus, many lo c a l  c o u n c ils  v/ere forced  to  r a is e  
th e ir  ren ts  u n t i l  they were p r o h ib it iv e  fo r  many p ro sp ectiv e  ten a n ts.
S c o tt is h  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  amassed a debt o f approxim ately  
£ 2 0 ,000 ,000  each year. To supplement Government funding a great deal 
was borrowed from p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls , large  f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  and 
in te r n a tio n a l in v e s to r s  in  Europe and the M iddle E ast. Repayments on 
money boirowed by th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  to  fin a n ce  housing programmes 
were made over a p eriod  o f s ix t y  years from th ree  main sources : house 
r e n ts . Government subsidy and lo c a l  r a te s ,^
1 . O f f ic ia l  Report o f the House of Commons, (6 June 1944), C ol. 1204.
2. S .E .C .S ., 1948, p .27.
3 . Baird, p. 207.
4 . Niven, p . 92.
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One o f  th e  problems o f  co u n c il housing not very  o fte n  exp lored
was that o f 'p a tern a lism ', in  which th e  Council beccxnes the u n iv e r sa l
provider, the 'm unicipal f a ir y  godmother' .  ^ T h is  was coupled w ith  the
a tt itu d e  th a t many S cots expected  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  to a c t as the
p r in c ip a l su p p lier  o f  housing and b e lie v e d  th a t th ey  had l i t t l e  ch o ice
2in  the m atter o f  how they were housed or where th ey  l iv e d .  Much o f  
t h i s  was due to  the fa c t  th a t th o se  l iv in g  in  p u b lic  se c to r  housing  
u s u a lly  su ffe red  from u n sta b le  employment, earned low wages and could  
not or would not own property,  ^ although t h i s  became l e s s  true as more 
houses were b u i l t .
When a p ro sp ec tiv e  tenant d id  g et a house he had to  s ig n  a form  
s e t t in g  out h is  o b lig a t io n s  to  th e C ouncil, th ese  cou ld  be changed a t  
any tim e and w ithout n o t ic e , and the house i t s e l f  cou ld  be rep o ssessed  
a t any tim e. The C ouncil, on th e other hand, was n ot a t a l l  o b lig ed  to  
s e t  out i t s  o b lig a t io n s  to  i t s  te n a n ts . Although many cou n cil houses  
were improved by t h e ir  occu p iers, th e  ten an ts were never reimbursed 
even i f  they moved a f t e r  a l i f e t im e  o f  occupancy.
There were some te n a n ts ' a s s o c ia t io n s  in  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  areas but 
they  were o fte n  haphazard, u su a lly  ignored or at b e s t  to le r a te d  by th e  
lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s .  Many a u th o r ity  areas had no ten a n ts' a s so c ia t io n s  a t  
a l l  to  make rep resen ta tio n  to  the Council on m atters which a ffe c te d  
lo c a l  communities, and no c r i t e r ia  by which they could judge the stand­
ard o f  f a c i l i t i e s  in  a p a r t ic u la r  d i s t r i c t .^
1. I b id . ,  p .78.
2. I b id . ,  p . 11.
3. I b id . ,  p .7 8 .
4 . See pp. 165-166 on n o n -tr a d it io n a l b u ild in g .
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To e lim in a te  com petition  or r iv a lr y  betw een lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
and p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise  a com paratively new method o f  o rg a n isa tio n  was 
introduced fo llo w in g  the war -  d ir e c t  labour. T h is was the d ir e c t  
employment by the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  o f  the o p e r a tiv e s  engaged in  b u ild ­
ing  new houses. I t  was f i r s t  adopted by th e Glasgow Corporation in  
1921 but d id  not become a reg u la r  fea tu re  u n t i l  1937. F ollow ing the 
war, the Glasgow D irec t Labour Department employed over 4, 000 men, 
thus accounting fo r  on e-th ird  to  on e-h a lf o f  Glasgow’s housing work 
fo r c e . Most o f the work was on n o n -tra d itio n a l^  houses but th e  D irec t  
Labour Department was a lso  r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  the maintenance work on the
63,000 houses owned by the Glasgow Corporation, Among other S c o t t is h  
lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  the d ir e c t  employment o f  maintenance s t a f f s  fo r  the  
se r v ic in g  p f m unicipal houses was f a ir l y  common. A lso , a few county  
co u n c ils  employed craftsm en in  one or more separate trad es on new 
b u ild in g . But apart from Glasgow only  a very few  S c o tt ish  a u th o r it ie s
b u i l t  any new houses by d ir e c t  labour, although a great number were in
2th e  process o f developing such an organ isa tion  fo llo w in g  the war.
5. A llo c a tio n  o f Council Houses
( i )  The Law and A dm in istrative P ra c tic e
The s ta tu to r y  r ig h t  o f  a u th ority  to  manage and thus a llo c a te  
housing was c le a r ly  v e s te d  in  th e  housing co u n c ils . T his was to  be  
found in  th e various pre-vrar enactments and w a s.to  be c le a r ly  seen in
1. I b id . ,  p .79 .
2 . S c o t t is h  B uild ing C o sts , p p .40-42 .
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the co n so lid a tio n  a c t o f  1950, the Housing (Scotland) A ct, 1950. The 
s e le c t io n  o f  ten an ts was p r im a rily  in  th e  hands o f  the lo c a l  au th ori­
t i e s  hut the Government expressed  i t s  view s in  two ways ; d ir e c t ly ,  by  
is su in g  statem ents o f  guidance on a llo c a t io n  p o lic y , and in d ir e c t ly  by  
making a lt e r a t io n s  in  th e  co n d itio n s  fo r  r e c e ip t  o f  subsidy fo r  new 
houses. In  1950 th e S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory Coirmittee is su e d  
’Choosing Council T enants'. But i t s  recommendations, e .g .  th e  adoption
o f th e ’groups p lu s p o in t s ’ schemes and the a b o lit io n  o f res id en ce
1requirem ents were not b in d in g  and were la r g e ly  ignored. T his report
was the on ly  d ir e c t  guidance on a llo c a t io n  p o lic y  g iven  to  the lo c a l
a u th o r it ie s .  One o f  the few  oth er Government d ir e c t iv e s  had been the
wartime 'D is tr ib u tio n  o f  New Houses in  S co tla n d ’ by the S c o t t is h
Housing A dvisory Committee in  1944. I t  recommended not on ly  th a t lo c a l
a u th o r it ie s  house fa m il ie s  from o u tsid e  th e ir  d i s t r i c t s ,  but a ls o  th a t
p referen ce be g iven  to  fa m il ie s  whose c h ie f  breadwinner was in  a nearby 
2fa c to ry  area.
Owing to  th e  fa c t  th at th ere  were no p h y s ic a l housing surveys  
during th ese  y ea rs  th e w a itin g  l i s t s  fo r  a u th o r ity  housing were o fte n  
th e  on ly  index o f  need. But th e se  were o ften  not u p -to -d a te  and d id  
not always a cc u r a te ly  d escrib e th e  a p p lica n t’ s need, based on fa m ily  
s iz e ,  age com position , e tc . Many w aitin g  l i s t s  were f i l l e d  w ith  names 
o f  people sim ply d es ir in g  to  l i v e  in  a cou n cil tenancy over some o th er  
type o f  housing, w h ile  the names o f o ther persons much more d esp era te ly  
needing proper housing d id  not even appear on th e  r o s te r . W aiting l i s t s
1 , S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory Committee, A llo c a tin g  Council H ouses, 
(Edinburgh, H. IvL S. 0 . ,  I 967) ,  pp. 9-10.
2. Cramond, A llo c a tio n  o f C ouncil Houses, pp. 8 -9 .
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were review ed ’when n ecessa ry ’ or ’a t regu lar in t e r v a l s ’ hut in  
r e a l i t y  t h i s  was u s u a lly  a t in te r v a ls  o f f iv e  y ea rs  or more. ^
( i i )  Types o f A llo c a tio n  Schemes
There were two main ty p es  o f  a l lo c a t io n  schemes during the p o s t­
war y ears -  the ’ s t r a ig h t ’ p o in ts  scheme and the ’groups p lu s  p o in t s ’ 
scheme, a lthough th ere  were many overlapping v a r ia tio n s . There were as 
w e ll th ree  o th er methods th a t were on ly  used  in  s p e c ia l is e d  circum stan­
c e s . One was the date o f a p p lic a t io n  schem e(s), under which houses 
were s t r i c t l y  a llo c a te d  according to  the ch ron o log ica l order in  which 
a p p lic a tio n s  were lodged : no account was taken o f  the a p p lic a n t’s 
p resen t housing con d itio n s, fam ily  circum stances or employment. This 
scheme was' on ly  used  in  very  sm all communities, the 1949 S c o t t is h  Hous­
ing A dvisory Committee on ly  recorded s ix  sm all burghs u s in g  t h i s  method. 
In  th e  m erit schemes used by 46 sm all burghs and 18 co u n ties  in  1949, 
w aitin g  l i s t s  were su b-d iv id ed  by  the c o u n c il lo r s  and o f f i c i a l s  who 
supposedly had a personal knowledge o f  the in d iv id u a l circum stances of 
each a p p lica n t and the g rea te r  f l e x i b i l i t y  was to  ensure th a t the r ig h t  
s iz e  and type o f  house was a llo c a te d  to  each fam ily . The obvious d is ­
advantage o f  th is  method was i t s  lack  o f  a d efin ed  s e t  o f  v a lu es  by  
which any p a r tic u la r  d e c is io n  could  be defended. The Dual Scheme d ea lt  
only  w ith  the houses b u i l t  under the 1919 and 1924 A cts . These houses 
were a llo c a te d  in  a d if f e r e n t  manner than the remainder o f  houses in  
stock . But as the p rop ortion  o f  these houses in  to ta l  s to ck  dim inished  
t h is  d is t in c t io n  ceased  to  have any p r a c t ic a l  purpose and th e analagous
1. I b id . ,  p p .20-21, See a ls o ,  P a tr ick  Dunleavy, P o l i t i c s  o f Mass 
Housing in  B r ita in  1945-1975, (Oxford, Clarendon, I 98Ï ) .
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s itu a t io n  in  1945-1951 was th a t o f  r e - l e t t in g  e x is t in g  1919 and 1924 
houses as a g a in s t  a llo c a t in g  brand new ones.^
D iring  th e post-w ar y ears the 's tr a ig h t ' p o in ts  and the 'groups 
p lu s  p o in ts ' schemes were deemed to  be the b e t te r  a l lo c a t io n  methods.
In  th e  's tr a ig h t '  p o in ts  scheme th ere  were no sep ara tin g  groups o f  
needs, in stea d  p o in ts  were awarded on the b a s is  o f len g th  o f  r e s id en ce , 
m a rita l s ta tu s  or r a te  paying, and in  some cases a combination o f  the  
th r e e . In  t h is  p la n  a l l  th e  a p p lica n ts  were p la ced  on one l i s t  th a t
supposedly measured a l l  types and degrees o f housing need which the
housing a u th o r ity  considered  r e le v a n t . A pp licants aggregated p o in ts  
awarded under any heading o f  which th ey  were e l i g i b l e ,  e .g .  le n g th  o f
res id en ce , and were rehoused in  turn  as they came up the l i s t .  The
most s tr ik in g  in e q u ity  o f t h is  system  was dem onstrated by the fo llo w in g  
example.
In  a sm all burgh i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  accumulate te n  
p o in ts  s o le ly  fo r  having l iv e d , and p a id  r a te s , in  
th e  tovai fo r  twenty y ears, w hile [o n ly ]  a maximum 
o f  th ree  p o in ts  f o r  even the s e v e r e s t  degree o f  
overcrowding. 2
Other o b je c t io n s  to  the 's tr a ig h t*  p o in ts  schemes were that th ey  could  
not e a s i ly  be f i t t e d  in to  a planned programme o f  slum clea ra n ce  or 
adapted to  a lte r a t io n s  in  housing p o lic y . Thus i t s  major f a u l t  was 
lack  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y .^
In  the ' groups p lu s  p o in ts ' scheme a much more humane approach 
was taken, in  which the lo c a l  a u th o r ity  im p lic i t ly  accepted  th a t whether
1 . S c o tt is h  Housing A dvisory Committee, A llo c a tin g  Council H ouses, 
p p .12 and 13.
2 . Cramond, A llo c a tio n  o f C ouncil Houses, p .28.
3. I b id . ,  p p .28 and 29.
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fa m il ie s  were overcrowded, hom eless or l iv in g  in  slums they  a l l  were 
in  genuine need o f  rehousing and th a t i t  was v ir t u a l ly  im p ossib le  to  
gauge the ex ten t o f  want on any a r ith m etica l b a s is  when needs were o f  
varying n a tu res . Consequently th ey  a llo c a te d  to  each group or type  
o f  housing need, according to  th e ir  estim ate o f i t s  r e la t iv e  g r a v ity ,  
a proportion  o f  th e  houses which became a v a ila b le  annually . The order  
o f  each a p p lica n t in  h is  own separate group was determined by a sc a le  
o f  p o in ts  p e c u lia r  to  th at group and he was rehoused as he ro se  to  the  
top  o f  h is  p a r t ic u la r  l i s t ,  as f a s t  as th e  p rop ortion  o f houses se t  
a s id e  fo r  th a t group p erm itted .^  The ‘groups p lu s  p o in ts ' method was 
considered  to  be the most s a t is fa c to r y  method o f  a llo c a t in g  houses.
But th ere was one major d e fe c t  in  t h is  system :• lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
included  a ,r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  percentage o f houses which they in tended  
should be a l lo t t e d  each year to  every group o f  a p p lica n ts . These per­
centages tended to  become sacrosan ct as fa r  as th e p r in ted  word v/'as
2concerned but were soon e n t ir e ly  d isregarded in  p r a c t ic e .
( i i i )  R e s id e n t ia l Requirements
A major is su e  o f  th e  lo c a l  a l lo c a t io n  p o l ic ie s  was th a t o f  r e s i ­
d e n t ia l requirem ents, i .  e . th e  tim e an a p p lican t had to  w a it b efore  
h is  name could  be added to  th e cou n cil l i s t  ; in  some ca ses  th e  w a itin g  
tim e was s ix  months, in  o th er d i s t r i c t s  i t  was anywhere up to  ten  years. 
Thus even i f  the 'groups p lu s p o in ts ' system  had been un iform ly adapted  
throughout Scotland i t  would s t i l l  have been im possib le in  most areas
1. I b id . ,  p p .22-23.
2, S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory Committee, A llo c a tin g  C ouncil Houses. 
p p .13-14 .
fo r  an a p p lican t to  have been considered  fo r  a cou n cil house, regard­
l e s s  o f  th e  urgency o f  h is  housing need, u n t i l  he had l iv e d  fo r  some 
co n sid erab le  time in  th e  area. I f  a newcomer's a p p lic a t io n  was accep­
ted  fo r  in c lu s io n  a t a l l  i t  would sim ply l i e  w ith  no fu r th e r  actio n  
p o s s ib le  u n t i l  he had s a t i s f i e d  th e  resid en ce  requirem ents. One sm all 
burgh even required  a t o t a l  p r io r  res id en ce  by husband and w ife  of 
twenty years between them.^ Cramond w rote on t h is  is s u e  in  A llo c a tio n  
o f  C ouncil Houses;
I t  i s  i l l o g i c a l  but n a tu ra l that lo c a l  r e s id e n ts  
should  re se n t newcomers g e tt in g  houses ahead o f  
them. Length o f res id en ce  in  an area i s  regarded  
as having some in t r in s ic  v ir tu e , a lthough i t  i s  
p a lp ab ly  ir r e le v a n t to  housing need,^
The o b jec tio n s  to  resid en ce  requirem ents were many. I t  condemned many 
fa m ilie s  to  a d d it io n a l years in  w retched co n d itio n s  w hile  o th ers  who 
were r e la t iv e ly  fa r  b e t te r  o f f  were rehoused ahead o f  them. Many peop le  
had to  turn down b e t te r  jobs because they  d id  not dare lea v e  t h e ir  d is ­
t r i c t ,  f o r f e i t  hard earned p o in ts  and r e s id e n t ia l  requirem ents, and 
s ta r t  a l l  over aga in  a t  the bottom o f  a l i s t  w ith  a handicap o f  y ea rs . 
Many s k i l le d  workers who were b a d ly  needed by a p a r tic u la r  new or 
expanding in d u stry  were unable to  r e lo c a te .
I n s is te n c e  upon the resid en ce  requirem ents even h e ld  up slum 
clearan ce in  a t l e a s t  one area, where i t  was found th a t  some o f the  
fa m il ie s  to  be r e lo c a te d  d id  not s a t i s f y  the res id en ce  t e s t  and so were 
in e l ig ib l e  fo r  the new houses b u i l t  fo r  them. They were l e f t  in  t h e ir  
slum d w e llin g s  u n t i l  some expedient was contrived , such as moving them
1, N iven, p. 81, See a ls o , Cramond, A llo c a tio n  o f  C ouncil Houses, 
pp. 32, 34 and 35.
2. Cramond, A llo c a tio n  o f  Council Houses, p. 34.
158
in to  a ’p r e -fa b ’, or in to  an o ld  tenement house from which th e o’jvner- 
occu p ier  had been rehoused on the co n d itio n  that he a llow ed  the lo c a l  
a u th o r ity  to  nominate th e f i r s t  can d id ate. Yfhole b lo ck s  in  t h is  area  
o f  Glasgow were l e f t  d e r e l ic t  w ith  on ly  a few  ten a n ts  in  ju st  such a 
way u n t i l  some a lte r n a t iv e  to  a normal cou n cil house becajne a v a ila b le .^
( iv )  S p ec ia l Groups
There were many sp e c ia l groups needing housing who had d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in  q u a lify in g  fo r  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  housing, e s p e c ia l ly  due to  the r e s i ­
dence requirem ents.
(a )  Servicemen
L ocating housing was a problem not on ly  fo r  the veteran s who
returned  fo llo w in g  th e  war but a ls o  fo r  peace-tim e servicem en d isch arged
during the post-w ar y ea rs  a fte r  a long-term  engagement. U su a lly  a
servicem an would have severed  h is  connections w ith  h is  home town and
h is  w ife  moved v/ith  him through a s e r ie s  o f m arried quarters. When he
was discharged  he had to  f in d  both  a job and a house, but o fte n  th e  job
was found in  an area where he was expected  to  s a t i s f y  a r e s id e n t ia l
q u a lif ic a t io n  b e fo re  he could o b ta in  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  housing. In  th e ir
1950 rep ort 'Choosing S c o tt is h  Tenants' th e  S c o t t is h  Housing A dvisory
Committee advised  housing a u th o r it ie s  th a t where an ex-servicem an had
found employment in  an area, or had fam ily  con n ection s w ith  i t ,  h is
a p p lic a tio n  should be p laced  a t no disadvantage because o f h is  absence  
2on se r v ic e .
1 , I b id .,  p . 35.
2. I b id .,  p . 37 .
1. I b id .,  p p .38, 39 and 40.
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(b) Key Workers
Many lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  contended th a t the p referen ce  given  
to  r e s id e n ts  was not a com plete b a rr ier  to  in d u s tr ia l  m o b ility  because  
th ey  d id  a l lo c a te  houses to  key workers. The exact d e f in it io n  o f a 5
’key worker' was not determ ined o f f i c i a l l y  u n t i l  I 96O in . th e  Depart­
ment o f  H ealth  fo r  Scotland  C ircu lar No. 3 7 /l9 6 0 , but was assumed in  
the post-w ar y ea rs  to  be r e s t r ic t e d  to  'someone sponsored by th e  Board 
o f  Trade as b ein g  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e estab lishm ent o f a new in d u stry  or 
to  the expansion o f an e x is t in g  industry  in  a development d i s t r i c t ’ .
A s p e c ia l subsidy was p a id  fo r  houses b u i l t  fo r  those who q u a lif ie d  as 
key workers in  t h is  way, although  the ra te  o f  • subsidy was not u su a lly  
higher than th e  ordinary housing subsidy, th e  fa c t  th at th ere  was a 
sp e c ia l subsidy pa id  fo r  a s p e c ia l  purpose was u se fu l in  ex p la in in g  to  
ordinary a p p lica n ts  why key workers were g iven  p r io r it y  and were not 
su bject to  the normal r u le s  o f a llo c a t io n . Even though t h i s  scheme 
d id  not h e lp  th e  ordinary worker i t  was in  f a c t  e s s e n t ia l ,  fo r  i f  i t  
had been b lock ed  i t  vfould have denied  employment to  many in  a n c il la r y  
p o s it io n s . Hence, the immediate housing o f  key workers in  a new area  
was necessary  to  the development o f  new and r e lo c a te d  in d u s tr ie s , but 
i t  should not be viewed as^the so lu t io n  to  th e  housing problems o f  a l l
Xr e lo c a te d  lab ou rers, on ly  th a t of a few h ig h ly  s k i l le d  w orkers.
(c )  Occupants o f  Tied Houses
Throughout th e post-w ar years there was confusion  about the  
p o s it io n  o f  peop le in  t ie d  houses, a house granted  to  an employee fo r  
th e  len g th  o f  employment, u s u a lly  as part o f h is  payment. T ied houses
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were g e n e r a lly  on ly  found in  ru ra l areas. Some lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
ru led  th a t peop le in  t ie d  houses whose l i v in g  con d ition s were s a t i s ­
fa c to r y  cou ld  not be accep ted  on a w a itin g  l i s t ,  whereas th e correct  
in te r p r e ta t io n  should have been th a t subsidy fo r  rehousing was on ly  
p a y a b le  when th e  t ie d  house was g iven  up, e .g .  on retirem en t, when 
the occupants would go in to  the 'hom eless’ category .
(d) Engaged Couples
A p p lica tio n s  from engaged couples fo r  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  
housing were n o t u su a lly  con sid ered . Only a f t e r  the date o f  m arriage, 
and then o fte n  not b efore  a s e t  p eriod  (u su a lly  one year) had elapsed , 
would a p p lic a t io n s  be accep ted . Hence, th is  q u a lif ic a t io n  co n tr ib u ted  
fu rth er  to  overcrov/’ding, as young couples -  o fte n  w ith  ch ild ren  -  were 
forced  to  l i v e  w ith  th e ir  p aren ts or in -la w s,
(e )  S in g le  P ersons
There was never any coherent p o lic y  fo r  th e a llo c a t io n  o f  
housing to  s in g le  p erson s. One reason  was th a t t h i s  group was so 
d iv e r se , in c lu d in g  widov/s, widowers, unmarried person s and coup les  
l i v in g  togeth er . Some a u th o r it ie s  would award no p o in ts  a t  a l l  to  
s in g le  persons, having thus a r b it r a r i ly  decided th a t a l l  s in g le  persons  
would be happier in  some type o f  lo d g in g s . Most a u th o r it ie s  im p l ic i t ly Iassumed th a t a l l  a p p lica n ts  would be married or widowed. Thus one |
a u th o r ity  s ta te d  s p e c i f i c a l ly  th a t two o f  the f iv e  y ears  o f r e s id en ce  -i
.q u a lif ic a t io n  should  have been as  a married person . The same a u th o r ity  |
made sp e c ia l p r o v is io n  fo r  a l lo c a t io n s  to  s in g le  persons, but o n ly  to  ?|
■Imen aged over 65 and to  s in g le  women aged 45 or more. There were many tj"1arguments in  the C ouncil Chambers about a llo c a t in g  housing to  fa m il ie s  3
'■ 'Iwhere th e parents were not married. Some a u th o r it ie s  sim ply would not %
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o f f e r  such cou p les a house u n t i l  th ey  were married le g a l ly ,  but most 
f e l t  the Housing Committee was n o t th e correct v e h ic le  to  correct  
p u b lic  morals and th a t th e c h ild r e n s ' needs should be attended to  a s  
w e ll .  Housing p o l ic y  d e c is io n s  were in c o n s is te n t  not on ly  from one 
lo c a l  au th ority  to  another, but a ls o  w ith in  an in d iv id u a l a u th o r ity , 
in  regard to  i t s  ovm d e c is io n s . N everth eless , in  most cases unmarried  
cou p les were awarded s u f f ic ie n t  p o in ts  fo r  res id en ce , ch ildren , e t c . ,  
to  ev en tu a lly  enable them to  ob ta in  cou n cil housing, even w ithout the  
p o in ts  g iven  fo r  married s ta tu s . In  most areas i f  s in g le  a d u lts  f a i l e d  
to  get a co u n cil house i t  was u s u a lly  because th ere were not enough 
s u ita b le  sm all houses, or because th e p o in ts  scheme was w eighted in  
favour o f  overcrowding ra th er than because the a u th o r it ie s  refu sed  in  
p r in c ip le  to  a l lo c a te  houses to  th ose  not p r e se n tly  m arried.^
( f  ) High Earners
Housing need was not always synonynous w ith  f in a n c ia l  need  
but most a llo c a t io n  schemes assumed th ey  were. Although a l l  lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s  were b u ild in g  houses w ith  Government subsidy very few o f  
them req u ired  any type o f  f in a n c ia l  t e s t  on a p p lica n ts . Some a u th o r it ie s  
had a maximum ' income b ar' and would not accept a p p lica n ts  who earned  
over t h is  f ig u r e . In  some cases an ap p lica n t would sim ply be p e n a lise d  
a se t  number o f  p o in ts  per the amount he earned over the 'income b a r ' .  
Other Housing Committees had a sc a le  of income s e t  according to  the  
number o f  ch ild ren . But most C ouncils accepted a p p lic a tio n s  w ithout 
any f in a n c ia l  b a r r ie r s  except fo r  a p p lica n ts  who were ow ner-occupiers.
I t  was g en era lly  argued th a t a t e s t  fo r  f in a n c ia l need was unnecessary,
1, I b id . ,  pp .40 -41 . ' %
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a t le a s t  in  very  poor housing con d itio n s where the w ait fo r  tenancy  
was so long th a t v ir tu a l ly  anyone who could b e t t e r  th e ir  f in a n c ia l  
con d ition  would do so, to  the p o in t that he would come out o f th e  
'urgent* ca tegory  and thus would be in e l ig ib le  fo r  su b sid ised  housing.
Thus the u su a l reasoning was th a t  anyone who cou ld  a fford  to  buy 
a house, i . e .  an ow ner-occupier, should be in e l ig ib l e .  But t h is  d i s ­
regarded the fa c t  th a t many o f  th e  tenement f l a t s  were s ta tu to r i ly  not 
u n f it ,  bu t were w e l l  below  modern standards and were bought sim ply  
because they were n o t a v a ila b le  to  l e t .  A p o s s ib le  so lu tio n  to  t h i s  
dilemma o f h igher income persons seek in g  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  housing might 
have been an income bar on a p p lica n ts  th a t would have charged d if fe r e n ­
t i a l  r en ts  r e la t in g  to  income, but t h is  p o s s i b i l i t y  was not even
1exp lored  during th e se  yea rs . R ebate p lans and d i f f e r e n t ia l  rent
schemes t e n ta t iv e ly  introduced when r e n ts  were r a is e d  met w ith  strong
o p p o sitio n . &Iany S c o t t is h  a u th o r it ie s  were ag a in st such a p lan  in
p r in c ip le ,  f e e l in g  i t  was a g a in st the b e s t  in t e r e s t s  o f  the m ajority .
The o p p o sitio n  seemed in  p art to  sp rin g  from memories o f  the 'means
t e s t ' ,  though i t  i s  doubtfu l i f  many o f  the younger a p p lica n ts  fo r
2co u n c il houses cou ld  even remember t h i s  pre-war scheme.
6 . House B u ild in g
The S c o tt is h  b u ild in g  programme was part o f the N a tio n a l B u ild ing  
Programme which in clud ed  in d u s tr ia l  as w e ll  as house b u ild in g , both  o f
1, I b id . ,  p p .41, 42 and 43 .
2. Cramond, Housing P o l ic y  in  S cotlan d , p . 85.
I
1. S c o tt ish  B u ild in g  C osts, p . 7 .
2. I ,  and E ., 1946, p .65.
3. G.H.T.R., 1950, p . 29.
4 . S c o t t is h  B u ild in g  C osts, pp. 2, 4  and 5.
5. Baird, p .199»
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which were d ir e c t ly  dependent on c a p ita l  investm ent. The post-w ar  
b u ild in g  s itu a t io n  was frau gh t w ith  s c a r c ity  o f m a ter ia ls , d elays in  
d e l iv e r ie s ,  shortages o f  s k i l le d  labour and a steep  r i s e  in  b u ild in g  
c o s ts . There was a pent-up  demand fo r  new houses and lon g -d ela y ed  i
r e p a ir s , but resou rces were inadequate to  f u l f i l l  them. The vrar had 
dim inished  S co tla n d 's  b u ild in g  labour fo rce  from a pre-war f ig u r e  o f
X26,000 to  3 ,600 in  1945; one-seventh  o f  i t s  previous stren g th . In
the f i r s t  two years fo llo w in g  the war German p r iso n ers-o f-w a r  were
employed in  s i t e  p rep aration  work to  supplement the reduced work fo r c e .
But by January 1947 31 ,700  men were engaged on new housing, exceeding
2the number b efore  th e war, many o f  them servicem en returned  home from 
the fo r c e s . But th ere remained a shortage o f  s k i l le d  lab ou rers, 
e s p e c ia l ly .jo in e r s  and p la s te r e r s .^
N inety  per cent o f a l l  the houses b u i l t  in  Scotland  fo llo w in g  the
war were con stru cted  by and/or fo r  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s .  S e v en ty -fiv e
per cent o f  th ese  were apartment houses c o n s is t in g  o f 3 bedrooms,
k itc h e n e tte  and bathroom.^ The proportion  o f  new houses b u i l t  in
Scotland  w ith  more than fo u r  apartments was con sid erab ly  below  the
5corresponding proportion  fo r  England and W ales.
I t  co st tw o-an d -a-h a lf tim es more to  b u ild  a four apartment house 
in  1947 than i t  had in  1939 -  E473 to  £1 ,1 4 3 . The a c tu a l p r ic e  o f  the  
m a te r ia ls  included  in  the average house in creased  125 per cent betw een
ïg
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1939 suQd 1947.^  But even tender p r ic e s  ceased to  b e a r e l ia b le  
in d ic a to r  o f the f in a l  cost o f b u ild in g  a house in  th e  post-vrar y e a r s .
A h igher le v e l  o f management and improved standards o f  area, con stru c­
t io n  and equipment added to  th e b u ild in g  overheads. There was a lso  
the added co st o f b r in g in g  workmen from a d is ta n ce , w h ile  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in  ob ta in in g  m a te r ia ls  le d  to  d ela y s and o ften  made i t  necessary  to  
u se  a more expensive su b s titu te  m a ter ia l.
The b a s ic  shortages were o f  timber and s t e e l .  Some tim ber was I
imported from Sweden and F in land. G enerally , s in ce  th e tim ber sh ort­
age was m ainly o f softw oods, the a u th o r it ie s  suggested th a t hardwoods 
be used  as an a lte r n a t iv e  to  softwoods. T h is economy measure was
2n ecessary  because much o f the softwood came from the d o lla r  areas.
The jo in e r y  industry  agreed to  u se  softwood fo r  an en larged  range o f  
cupboards, f itm en ts  and doors. There were a lso  p e r s is te n t  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  in  th e supply o f  e l e c t r ic a l  equipment, c a s t - ir o n  goods, f ir e c la y  
p ip es, and plumbers' m a te r ia ls .^  The n a tio n a l fu e l  shortage in  1947 
a ffe c te d  th e b u ild in g  programme along w ith  a l l  other in d u s tr ie s .
There were lo c a l  shortages o f  cement and b r ic k s  in  1950."^ Arrangements
were made w ith  the Cement Makers F ed eration  fo r  su p p lies  o f cement to
5be imported from Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and Germany.
The t r a d it io n a l  houses u s u a lly  requ ired  s p e c ia l is e d  labour and 
o fte n  scarce m a ter ia ls  to  co n stru c t, and could  take up to  two y ea rs  to
1 . S c o tt ish  B u ild in g  C osts, p. 19»
2. G.H.T.R., 1950, p .29.
3 . I .  and B . , 1946, p .66.
4 . I b id . , p . 52.
5 . G.H.T.R., 1950, p .29.
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com plete. Thus w ith  housing needs so desperate in  Scotland during  
th ese  years th e  n o n -tr a d itio n a l or *pre-fab' houses began to be  
regarded w ith  favour. The S3HA used  n o n -tr a d it io n a l methods alm ost 
e x c lu s iv e ly  so a s  to  avoid u sin g  s k i l l e d  b u ild in g  workers and to  speed  
up the co n stru ctio n  tim e,^
The term 'n o n -tr a d it io n a l' im p lied  a house b u i l t  not in  b r ick  
or sto n e , but in  an a lte r n a t iv e  m a ter ia l, e ,g .  s t e e l  or aluminium, 
such as a stee l-fra m ed  house or a con crete  or concrete-fram ed house, 
which d ispensed  w ith  b r ic k la y in g  and p la s te r in g . The variou s k inds o f  
n o n -tr a d it io n a l ou ter  s h e l l s  -  o f  poured con crete, con crete  b lo ck s , 
p re fa b r ic a ted  s la b s , p a n e ls , tim ber, aluminium, s t e e l  and other mate­
r i a l s  were used e x te n s iv e ly  in  th e immediate post-w ar y ea rs . Non- 
t r a d it io n a l  methods were not n e c e s s a r ily  any cheaper but they helped  
in  c a se s  o f shortage. By the e a r ly  1950 's  th is  was g iv in g  way to  th e  
c a v ity  b r ick  w a ll, a lthough a g rea t d ea l o f  n o n -tr a d it io n a l d esign s, 
m a te r ia ls , b u ild in g  p r a c t ic e s  were s t i l l  used  in  th e in te r n a l s tru c­
tu r e s , no longer because o f  s c a r c ity  but because by t h i s  time they  had
2been proved more e f f i c i e n t .
On a population  b a s is  more houses were completed in  Scotland  than 
in  England during th e  post-w ar years, but temporary and 'p re -fa b ' 
accommodations accounted fo r  a much h igher proportion  North o f  the 
Border, 32,106 temporary houses were a l lo t t e d  to  S cotlan d  a t th e  end 
o f the war to  meet immediate needs. A ll  o f the major ty p es  o f tempo­
rary houses were three-room ed houses w ith  an estim ated  l i f e  o f not l e s s
1 . C hronicle o f Forty  Years 1937-1977. p. 7 ,
2. B aird, p .196.
3. S .E .C .S ,, 1950, p . 30 ,
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1 . I .  and E ., I 946, p .67 .
than te n  years, and were designed  to  provide accommodation fo r  
fa m il ie s  o f  not more than th ree or four p erson s. They were con stru cted  
la r g e ly  o f  n o n -tr a d it io n a l m a ter ia ls  and in  th e  case o f the aluminium 
houses which came from the fa c to ry  alm ost f u l ly  p r e -fa b r ic a te d , com­
p a r a t iv e ly  l i t t l e  labour was required fo r  th e ir  co n stru ctio n  on the
1s i t e .
A v e iy  apparent problem in  the post-w ar S c o tt is h  b u ild in g  pro- 
gramme was the a p p a llin g ly  slow  com pletion r a te  o f  houses under con­
s tr u c tio n . The most extreme f i g i r e  o f  imbalance between houses under 
con stru ctio n  and com pletions was 47,000 in  January o f 1949.
:
T a b le  4  -  New H ouses i n  S c o t la n d  C om pleted  and U nder C o n s tr u c t io n .  
1943-1951
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Completed
Year
Permanent
*Local
a u th o r it ie s
P r iv a te
en terp r ise
Temporary
T ota l
1945
1946
19471948
19491950
1951
T ota l
s in c e
1945
1,428  3,635 
10 ,573  
19,396  
24,661  
25,007  
21,773
106,471
138 
497 
1,309  1 ,5 0 0  1,038  
742 
1,006
6,230
437 12,119 
11 ,994  7 ,5 5 0  
76
2 ,0 0 3
16,24923,876
28,446
25,775
25,749
22,779
32,176 144,877
Under C onstruction
Permanent Temporary
End *Local P r iv a te
o f a u th o r it ie s e n te r p r ise T ota l
1945 5,888 703 1,576 8,1671946 29,619 2,182 3,114 34,915
1947 43 ,775 2,610 3,009 4 9 ,3 9 41948 36,582 1 ,683 103 38,368
1949 29,924 1 ,238 - 31,1621950 30,518 1,250 - 31,768
1951 37,096 2 ,360 - 39,456
In clu d es S c o tt is h  S p ec ia l Housing A sso c ia t io n  
Housing A sso c ia tio n s  -  Government Departments
Source; S.E.C.8 , 1949, p .28 and I 951, p . 31 .
168
In  1947, when Cripps is su e d  h is  'F in ish  th e Houses' campaign, the  
Government decided to  con cen trate  b u ild in g  resou rces by l im it in g  the  
number o f new houses th a t were begun. T his was fo llo w in g  the Govern­
m ent's p la n s to  r e s tr a in  c a p ita l  investm ent. When i t  became n ecessary  
to  c u r ta i l  c a p ita l investm ent again in  1949, s tep s  were taken  to  e f f e c t  
the sav in gs requ ired  in  th e  t o t a l  c o st  o f new houses b u i l t  by lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s  fo r  le t t in g  w ithout d im in ish ing th e ir  numbers. B u ild in g  
economies were introduced and lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  in creased  the propor­
t io n  o f  houses o f  th ree apartments or l e s s  in  th e ir  housing programmes.^
These r e s t r i c t iv e  measures allovred the cu ts  in  c a p ita l expenditure on
2housing imposed in  October 1949 to  be re s to r e d  in  A p r il o f  1950.
B u ild in g  trade unions d id  not p lay  as s ig n if ic a n t  a r o le  in  the 
S c o tt ish  post-w ar housing programme as was th e ca se  in  Europe and 
Scandinavia a t t h is  tim e, e s p e c ia l ly  in  Sweden and Germany, In  
Scotland th e promotion and management o f bu ilder-w ork  o p era tion s was 
not considered  a p r io r ity .  They were content to  fo llo w  the tr a d it io n a l  
rou te o f sim ply securing employment, wage standards, and adequate con­
d it io n s  fo r  t h e ir  members. T his was in  keeping w ith  the S c o t t is h  trade 
movement as a whole, fo r  th e b u ild in g  unions supported the id e a  th a t
housing was a s o c ia l  s e r v ic e  and thus accepted  the id ea  th a t ' s o c ia l
3housing' was e n t ir e ly  the duty o f  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s .
In  the f i r s t  post-w ar y ea rs  i t  was shortages o f  m ater ia ls , la ck  
o f  labour ( e s p e c ia l ly  s k i l l e d  workers) and the dram atic r i s e  in
1 . I b id .,  1949, P .48 .
2 . I b id .,  1950, p . 52.
3 . Niven, p .l0 9 .
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"building c o s ts  th a t hindered house b u ild in g . Prom 1947 to  1949 th e  
emphasis was on com pleting houses a lread y  under co n stru ctio n . 1949 
was the record year fo r  post-w ar housing com pletions. In  1951 the  
new C onservative Government i n i t i a l l y  cut back on lo c a l  a u th ority  
b u ild in g , but t h is  was more than made up in  the fo llo w in g  year. The 
number o f ow ner-occupiers and th e  amount o f  p r iv a te  b u ild in g  both  ro se  
under the new atmosphere o f le n ie n c y  towards p r iv a te  en terp r ise .
7 . P r iv a te  E n terp rise
In  1948 lim ite d  a u th o r ity  to  grant l i c e n c e s  fo r  p r iv a te  b u ild in g  
was r e sto red  in  England and Wales, but t h is  was not extended to  Scotland  
u n t i l  1951. The reasons fo r  t h i s  were th e  much g rea ter  shortages o f  
labour and m a ter ia ls , and th e wider margin to  be made up in  the b u ild ­
ing programmes. The p r iv a te  secto r  in  S cotlan d  was u n iq u ely  sm all not 
on ly  when compared to  England, but a ls o  in  comparison w ith  many Yfestern 
European cou n tr ies  vdiere much o f  the p r iv a te  b u ild in g  was done by  
housing a s so c ia t io n s . T h is was r e f le c te d  in  the much low er number o f  
ow ner-occupiers in  S cotlan d . Many S co ts never even considered  them­
s e lv e s  as p o te n t ia l ow ner-occupiers and were seem ingly conten t to  r e ly  
on ren ted  housing in  the p u b lic  sec to r , a s  the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  housing  
in  the p r iv a te  ren ta l s e c to r  ra p id ly  d im inished  fo llo w in g  the Second 
World War. Betv/een th e  wars the number of new houses b u i l t  in  Scotland  
was on ly  s l ig h t ly  l e s s  per ca p ita  than the number b u i l t  in  England and 
Wales, But S co tla n d 's  housing need was so much g rea ter  th a t th is  was 
not s u f f i c ie n t .  A much la r g e r  proportion  o f in ter-w ar b u ild in g  in  
Scotland  was on lo c a l  government account -  67 per cent in  Scotland  as
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1compared to  25 per cen t in  England and W ales. The number o f  houses 
provided  from 1 January 1919 to  31 March 1939 i s  shorn below  in  
Table 5-
Table 5 ~ Houses Completed in  Scotland , 1919-1939
England  
and Wales Scotland
By lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s 1, 112,505 212,866
By p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise  w ith  S ta te  
a ss is ta n c e 430,327 43,067
By p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise  w ithout 
S ta te  a s s is ta n c e 2 ,449 , 216 . 61,444
T ota l 3 ,9 9 2 ,0 4 8 317,377
4 ,3 0 9 ,4 2 5
Source; Barlow R eport, p .67 .
Post-W orld War I I  house production was d elega ted  alm ost exclu ­
s iv e ly  to  the lo c a l  housing a u th o r it ie s . The March 1945 White Paper on 
'H ousing* s ta te d  that:
There was a se r io u s  r i s e  in  b u ild in g  c o s ts  a f te r  th e  
l a s t  war because demands went fa r  beyond th e r e a l  
c a p a c ity  o f  the b u ild in g  in d u stry . In  order to  check  
such a tendency th e  Government w i l l  t h i s  time c o n tro l 
th e volume o f co n tra c ts  l e t  by lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s , the  
b u ild in g  and r e p a ir  work done on p r iv a te  account and 
the p r ic e  o f  m a te r ia ls , standard components and f i t ­
m ents. ^
1. N iven, p . 96 .
2. White Paper on Hoi s in g  . (London, H. K 8. 0 . ,  Gmd. 66O9, 1945).
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I t  was made q u ite  c lea r  b y  th e  report o f the Department o f H ealth  
fo r  Scotland , 1945-194-6,  ^ th a t in  August 1945, when lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
were s t i l l  ab le  to  au th orise  l i c e n c e s  fo r  p r iv a te  house b u ild in g  th a t  
t h i s  was to  be done only to  th e ex ten t th a t the a v a ila b le  labour  
supply and the needs o f t h e ir  own programmes seemed to  j u s t i f y .  L ocal 
programmes were la r g e  and s in c e  each a u th o r ity  was to  judge i t s  own 
needs, p r iv a te  b u ild in g  took a very poor second p la ce .
By the end o f  1950, according to  'Housing R eturns fo r  S c o tla n d ', 
p r iv a te  b u ild e r s  had completed o n ly  5,224- homes s in c e  the war, as 
a g a in st 83, 273 by th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  and the SSHA.. 1947 brought an 
even more r igorou s con tro l o f b u ild in g  lic e n c e s  fo r  p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise . 
But by 1950 t h i s  was relaxed  to  th e p o in t th a t o n e-ten th  o f th e  t o t a l  
housing a llo c a t io n  fo r  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  was a llow ed  to  be used fo r  
p r iv a te  b u ild in g . In  1951 the proportion  was in crea sed  to  o n e - f i f t h  
and the system o f  l im it in g  l ic e n c e s  to  persons ,in  s p e c ia l c a te g o r ie s  
was ended. P ro g r ess iv e  r e la x a tio n s  were made by the C onservative  
Government u n t i l  in  November 1954 b u ild in g  l ic e n s in g  was com pletely  
a b o lish ed .^
The 1945 Housing White Paper had promised s u b s id ie s  to  both  
houses b u i l t  by lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  and p r iv a te  e n te r p r ise . T his p o lic y  
was e lim in a ted  im m ediately when th e Labour Government came in to  power 
fo llo w in g  the General E le c t io n . Never again did any Government prom ise 
gen era l su b sid ies  fo r  new houses b u i l t  fo r  sa le  by p r iv a te  en te r p r ise .
1 . Report o f the Department o f  H ealth  fo r  Scotland 1945-1946, 
(Edinburgh, H. îvî. S. 0 . ,  fo r  the Department of H ealth fo r  Scotland, 
Gmd. 7188, 1947) .
2. Gramond, Housing P o l ic y  in  S co tlan d , p p .102 and 103.
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s
S u b sid ies  fo r  new b u ild in g  were e x c lu s iv e ly  id e n t i f ie d  w ith  lo c a l  
a u th o r ity  housing and a f t e r  1945 were not a v a ila b le  to  any p r iv a te  
b u ild e r s  except housing a s so c ia t io n s ,^
There were on ly  two ex cep tio n s to  t h is  p o lic y  o f  no government 
su b s id ie s  fo r  p r iv a te  b u ild in g . One was fo r  houses b u i l t  fo r  a g r ic u l­
tu r a l workers. The Housing (A g ricu ltu ra l P op u lation ) (S cotlan d ) Act. 
1958 enabled lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  to  g ive  lump sums to  p r iv a te  persons  
who b u i l t  houses to  rep la ce  u n f i t  houses on farms. The o th er  excep­
t io n  was th e  improvement g ran ts  made a v a ila b le  under the Housing 
(Scotlan d ) A ct, 1949. T h is Act to  a la rg e  ex ten t ' implemented the
recommendations o f  the S c o t t is h  Housing Committee's rep ort 'M odernising 
2Our New Towns'.
A ssista n ce  had been a v a ila b le  ever s in ce  1923 fo r  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  
to  grant loan s to  p r iv a te  persons to  enable them to  purchase a home. 
In d iv id u a ls  cou ld  ga in  loans under the Small D w ellings (S cotlan d ) A cts , 
1899- 1923  ^ or under se c t io n  75 o f  the Housing (Scotland) A ct. 1950. Not 
o n ly  p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls  but b u ild in g  s o c ie t ie s  were ab le to  ob ta in  
l o c a l  au th ority  lo a n s  under s e c t io n  77 o f the Housing (Scotland) A ct. 
1950 but v e iy  l i t t l e  u se  was made o f t h i s  power u n t i l  a scheme o f  
guarantees was agreed on by th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  in  conjunction  w ith  
the b u ild in g  s o c ie t i e s  in  1954.
1. I b id .,  103- 104.
2. Ib id .
3 . The Small D w ellin gs A c q u is it io n  (Scotland) A c ts , I 899 to  1923,
i . e .  The Small THrellings A c q u is it io n  Act, 1899, The House. Town 
Planning, e tc .  A ct. 1919, P t .  I l l ,  The Housing, e tc . A ct. 1923, % 
from Cramond, Housing P o l ic y  in  Scotland, p. 122, Appendix I .
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B u ild in g  s o c ie ty  lo a n s gave many peop le the opportun ity  to  
become ow ner-occupiers fo r  th e f i r s t  tim e in  th e ir  l i v e s .  In the  
la t e  1930 's  sp e c u la tiv e  b u ild e r s  in  Scotland  began to  take r e a l in t e r ­
e s t  in  the housing manket fo r  the f i r s t  tim e s in ce  I 9IO. Encouraged 
by th e Government and w ith  the a s s is ta n c e  o f  a growing number o f  
b u ild in g  s o c ie t ie s  who were prepared to  lend  money on sm all in d iv id u a l 
p r o p e r tie s , p r iv a te  b u ild e r s  began to  b u ild  tw o -sto rey  and s in g le ­
s to r e y  detached or sem i-detached v i l l a s  on p er ip h era l burgh and c i t y  
s i t e s  a l l  over S cotlan d  from 1934 to  1939. The outbreak o f  th e  war 
brought a l l  lo c a l  a u th o r ity  and p r iv a te  house b u ild in g  to  an end. The 
b u ild in g  s o c ie t i e s  never regained  t h e ir  1930* s' prominence u n t i l  th e
1960 ' s ,  thus the e n t ir e  post-w ar era was w ithout e f f e c t iv e  b u ild in g
1s o c i e t i e s  in  Scotland .
The g rea te r  co st o f  p rovid in g  house-room in  S cotland  was an
obvious d eterren t to  p r iv a te  en-tierprise. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  demonstrate
in  p a r t ic u la r  why the c o s t  was greater  in  Scotland  because th ere  were
no f ig u r e s  fo r  e x a c tly  comparable houses in  the d if fe r e n t  reg ion s o f
B r ita in  a t  t h is  tim e. N ev erth e less , s in c e  the average S c o t t is h  house
was la r g e r  than that in  England and Wales (S cotlan d  : four-apartm ent
house -  £1 , 293 average tender p r ic e  as opposed to  England and Wales :
three-bedroom house -  £ 1 ,170  average tender p r ic e )  i t  was a lso  reckoned
2to  be more expensive. The l e v e l  o f  b u ild in g  c o s t s  in  S cotlan d  was 
approxim ately 10 per cent h igh er than in  England and W ales. There was 
a lso  in  Scotland  a imch low er demand fo r  house-room and a g rea ter
1. N iven, p p .30-31 and 120-121.
2, S c o t t is h  B u ild ing  C osts (Report o f th e  Laidlaw Committee, 1948) and 
The Cost o f H ouse-B uilding (Report o f  the Girdwood Committee, 1948), 
in  B aird , p . 201.
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r e lu c ta n c e  to  pay f o r  i t .  Long b e fo re  W orld War I I  S c o t t i s h  f a m i l ie s  
were accustom ed to  a  s ta n d a rd  o f  housing  f a r  below  th e  s ta n d a rd  f o r  
f a m i l ie s  i n  England. O vercrow ding was n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y  th e  f a u l t  o f  
th o se  who b u i l t  S c o t t is h  homes b u t ,  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y ,  r e f l e c t e d  th e  
p re fe re n c e  o f  many S c o t t i s h  f a m i l ie s  f o r  sm a lle r  houses. T here was a  
s tro n g  c o n s e rv a tiv e  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  a g a in s t  a  change to  a  new en v iro n ­
ment, a  p o s s ib le  change o f p a t t e r n  o f l i f e ,  and h ig h e r  r e n t s .  A lso ,
S c o t t i s h  f a m i l ie s  p a id  a much sm a lle r  p ro p o r tio n  o f  t h e i r  e a rn in g s  on 
r e n t ,^  N e v e r th e le s s , though th e  S co ts  may have b e e n  'accu sto m ed ' to  
such h o u sin g  c o n d itio n s , th e  su ccess  o f  th e  Independent L abour P a r ty  
(iL P) Programme in  th e  in te r - w a r  y e a rs  showed th a t  th e  S c o ts  were no t 
' s a t i s f i e d '  w ith  t h e i r  overcrow ding , a c c o rd in g ,to  M elling  in  Housing,
S o c ia l P o l ic y  and th e  S t a t e . Indeed , th e r e  wa:s a  b ro ad  b a s e  o f  support 
f o r  th e  ILP housing  demands. T h is  was d em o n stra ted  by  th e  r e n t  s t r i k e s  
o rg a n ise d  by  ILP le a d e r s  ( u s u a l ly  s k i l l e d  w orkers) a t  Glasgow, Clydebank 
and e lsew here  d u rin g  th e  1 9 2 0 's. The s t r i k e s  w ere i n  p r o t e s t  o f
Government r e la x a t io n  o f c o n t ro l s  w ith o u t any form  o f S ta te  p r o te c t io n
2o f  te n a n ts  a g a in s t  s c a r c i t y  in c re a s e s .
Hence, th e  S c o t t i s h  R ent R e s t r i c t i o n  A cts  a lo n g  w ith  th e  system  o f 
r a t i n g s  and v a lu a t io n  were a n o th e r  p o in t o f  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  h e lp e d  
account f o r  th e  backw ard s t a t e  o f  housing  and  th e  sm all amount o f  
p r iv a t e  housing  in  S co tlan d . I n  S co tlan d  r a t e s  w ere n o t p a id  e x c lu s iv e ly  
b y  th e  te n a n t  a s  was done i n  E ngland  b u t w ere d iv id e d  betw een th e  la n d lo rd
I
1, B a ird , p p .200-202,
2. F o r a  more d e t a i l e d  accoun t o f  th e  r o le  o f  th e  H P  in  th e  i n t e r ­
war S c o t t i s h  housing  programme see Jo seph  M e llin g , e d . . H ousing. 
S o c ia l P o l ic y  and th e  S ta te .  (London, Groom Helm, • I 9 8 O), p p .19-20 
and 2 7 - 2 9 .
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and the ten an t (who remained resp o n sib le  fo r  the occup iers r a t e s ) .
In  the 1920 Rent R e s tr ic t io n  Act the co n tra ctu a l rent o f  a c o n tr o lle d  
house, i ,  e. one w ith  a r a te a b le  value o f  under £45, was pegged a t  
140 per cen t o f  the 1914 co n tra ctu a l ren t, in  a d d itio n  to  any in crease  
in  owner’ s r a te s  between 1914 and 1920. Any subsequent in crea se  in  
o ccu p ie r 's  r a te s  f e l l  on th e  tenant, but not any in crease  in  owner’s 
r a te s , which had to  b e met by the land lord  out o f  th e  f ix e d  con tractu a l 
r en t. Thus, as owner's r a te s  rose , the n et retu rn  to  the lan d lord  from 
h is  property  f e l l ,  and he had a d im in ish ing in c e n tiv e  to  m aintain  and 
improve i t . ^
Housing c o n d itio n s  improved in  the 1950 's and some o f the r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  were grad u a lly  re laxed . But most houses w ith  a ra tea b le  va lu e  
under £55 were not d eco n tro lled  even in  1959. R e s tr ic t io n s  were 
reimposed w ith  the outbreak o f war, and t h is  tim e w ith  a r a tea b le  va lu e  
o f  under £90, thus covering a l l  ren ted  houses in  Scotland , except th ose
b u i l t  and owned by lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s .  There were no r e la x a tio n s  during
2th e  post-w ar y e a r s . By th e  mid to  la t e  1940' s no p r iv a te  lan d lord  
cou ld  a fford  to  b u ild  houses fo r  l e t .  Although over 1 m illio n  o f  
S co tla n d 's  1 .4  m il l io n  houses during th ese  y ears were in  p r iv a te  owner­
sh ip  th ere was very  l i t t l e  In cen tiv e  to  lan d lord s to  m aintain t h e ir
property  as i t  v/as su bject to  a co n tr o lle d  ren t fa r  lower than in  
3England and Vfales.
1 . I b id . , p p .204“ 205. See a ls o , Joseph M ellin g , 'C lydeside y
Housing and the E vo lu tion  o f  S ta te  Rent C ontrol ', in  M ellin g , 4
p p .159- 160. I
2 . Ib id .
5. I b id .,  p . 211.
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1. B aird , p p .205-206,
2. Gheckland, p .45.
A fte r  1945 b u ild in g  b y  p r iv a te  e n terp r ise  was so r e s t r ic t e d  
th a t even i f  p r iv a te  lan d lord s had w ished to  b u ild  la r g e  numbers o f  
houses fo r  ren t, they  would not have been  granted l i c e n c e s ,  fo r , i f  
they had gained l ic e n c e s  th e  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  would have had to  cut 
th e ir  programmes acco rd in g ly . Thus the main impact o f  th e  d iffe r e n c e  
in  the r a tin g  system was on the maintenance and improvement o f e x i s t ­
ing  p r iv a te ly  ov/ned houses ra th er than on new b u ild in g . The S c o tt is h  
r a tin g  system  not on ly  tra n sferred  the fu n c tio n  o f  b u ild in g s  to  l e t  y
from p r iv a te  en terp r ise  to  p u b lic  a u th o r it ie s  but a ls o  gave the  
tenant cheaper house-room than he could  ren t under the E n g lish  system  
o f  r a t in g . The lower the ren t, the more d i f f i c u l t  i t  was fo r  newcomers 
to  f in d  a home. From t h is  p o in t o f view  ren t r e s t r ic t io n ,  re in fo r ced  >1
by th e  r a t in g  system, operated  in  the same d ir e c t io n  as the housing  
su b s id ie s . Although th e se  fo r c e s  were p resen t in  England and Wales,
Scotland  proved to  be a much more extreme example.  ^ According to  
S, G, Gheckland in  The Upas Tree w r itin g  on th e  immediate post-w ar
years, 'Housing had become to  a con sid erab le  degree a su b s id ised  s o c ia l
2se r v ic e , and the p r iv a te  s e c to r  brought under rent c o n tr o l ' .  So, in  
general th e  very low l e v e l  o f  p r iv a te  investm ent must be reckoned to  
be a r e s u l t  o f Labour's economic c o n tr o ls . T his was a reasonable p o l ic y ,  
as i t  would not have been  r e a l i s t i c  to  expect p r iv a te  en te r p r ise  to  
meet post-w ar needs w ithout some form o f Government c o n tr o l.
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1, According to  the 1951 Census ; Scotland -  5 .0 9  m illio n  and Glasgow -
1 .08  m illio n ;  England and Wales 4 3 .74  m il l io n  and London 3. 34
m illio n . See, Ronald M ille r  and Joy Tivy, e d s . , The Glasgow Region. 
(Glasgow, prepared fo r  th e m eeting o f th e  B r i t is h  A sso c ia tio n , h e ld  
from 27 August to  3 September 1958), e s p e c ia l ly  pp. 242-269, 
'P opu lation  D is tr ib u tio n  and Change' by Joy  Tivy and pp. 270-273,
'The Glasgow O v ersp ill Problem' by B eren ice  Baker. A lso  Robert 
G rieve, 'The Clyde V a lley  P la n  -  A Review^ a paper d e liv e r e d  at the  
Town and Country P lanning Summer School h e ld  a t the U n iv e r s ity  o f  
S t. Andrews, 1954, under the a u sp ic ie s  o f  the Town P lanning  
I n s t i t u t e .  And a lso , J .  Cunnison and J . B. S. G i l f i l la n ,  Glasgow
(Third S t a t i s t i c a l  Account o f S cotland). 1958, e s p e c ia l ly  th e
chapter on 'P opulation ' by D. J . Robertson.
2, Brennan, p . 25.
8. Glasgow and O v e r sp ill
Out o f  a t o t a l  S c o tt is h  p opulation  o f about 5 m illio n  approxi­
m ately 2 m il l io n  l iv e d  in  the d en sely  developed Clyde b a sin , and o f  
t h i s  G lasgow's share was about 1 m illio n . In  r e la t io n  to  th e  concen­
tr a t io n  o f  th e  cou n try 's  p op u la tion , Glasgow was more im portant to  
Scotland, w ith  21 per cent o f  th e  t o t a l  p op u la tion , than London ( in c lu ­
ding both  the c i t y  and county o f  London) was to  England and W ales, w ith  
l e s s  than 8 per cen t.^  In  S co tlan d  24.6 per cent o f  th e  p op u la tion  
l iv e d  in  houses o f  l e s s  than th ree rooms; in  England and Wales the  
proportion  was 1 ,7  per cen t. In  Glasgow no few er than 50 .8  per cent 
su ffered  in  overcrowding in  t h i s  way; in  London (in c lu d in g  both  th e  
c i t y  and county o f London) the f ig u r e  was 5 .5  per cen t. One cause fo r  
t h is  was the geographic r e s t r ic t io n  o f the s i t e  on which Glasgow was 
b u i l t  which p resen ted  l i t t l e  opportunity fo r  expansion. The b u ilt -u p  |
area o f the c i t y  already jo in ed  up w ith  P a is le y ,  Renfrew, Clydebank, IIB ishopbriggs and Barrhead. Not on ly  Glasgow but the e n t ir e  Clyde b a s in  
was com pletely  f i l l e d ,  |
.1
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The c i t y  o f  Glasgow D is t r ic t  was the la r g e s t  p u b lic  sector  
lan d lord  in  post-w ar Scotland, fo llo w ed  next by th e  SSHA. The w a itin g
l i s t  fo r  Glasgow was so la rg e  in  proportion  to  the t o t a l  number o f  |
*
households th at the m ajority  o f  households not a lread y  in  corporation  
houses were rep resented  on the w a itin g  l i s t  in  one category  or another.
The w a itin g  l i s t  grew so ra p id ly  (a t  a n et r a te  o f  7 ,5 0 0  a p p lica n ts  a 
yea r) th a t accommodations could  on ly  be g iven  to  p r io r ity  ca ses , e .g .
1a p p lica n ts  who had tu b e r c u lo s is  or were l iv in g  in  condemned p rop erty .
G lasgow 's d e f i c i t  on b u ild in g  o f  new housing added to  i t s  p rogres­
s iv e ly  la r g e r  d e f i c i t  accumulated over a p eriod  of y ea rs . I t  had an
2annual d e f i c i t  o f £ 1 .1  m il l io n  on i t s  housing account 1952- 1953, 
incurred  during the preceding post-w ar y ea rs . T h is f a c t ,  along w ith  
the gen era l in crease  in  re n ts  and the r e d is tr ib u t io n  o f  r a te  burdens 
th a t were seem ingly unavoidable in  th e la t e  194-0 ' s and e a r ly  1950' s, 
needs to  be kept in  mind when analysing  the extreme housing shortages  
in  S cotlan d , The d e f i c i t  r e s t r ic t e d  housing a u th o r it ie s  in  th e  amount 
o f b u ild in g , ren ovation , and r e lo c a t in g  they  were a c tu a lly  ab le to  
accom plish.
There were present in  Glasgow two d if f e r e n t  approaches to  the  
c i t y ’s housing problems fo llo w in g  the war. T h is debate over correct  
housing development p o lic y  was between two d if fe r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  govern­
ment ; the Corporation o f th e C ity  o f  Glasgow and the S c o tt is h  O ffic e .
The p o l ic ie s  o f  the S c o tt is h  O ffice  were a d ir e c t  r e s u lt  o f th e  Clyde 
V alley  P lan . In  194-3 the S ecre ta ry  o f S ta te  fo r  Scotland  convened a
1. I b id . ,  p . 23. , I
2. Baird, pp. 2 0 9 -2 1 0 .
•!-a
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committee o f  a l l  the lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  of th e  reg ion  under the lea d er­
sh ip  o f  S ir  P a tr ic k  Abercrombie : in  1946 i t  produced the Clyde V a lley  
P lan, T h is rep ort urged 'planned d e c e n tr a lisa t io n  o f both  p op u la tion  
and in d u str y '.^  To keep th e  c i t i e s  o f the reg io n  from growing in to  
each other th e  Clyde P lan  recommended a 'green  b e l t '  which would  
envelop th e  c i t y  and d efin e  c i t y  l im it s .  Thus when boundaries were 
made, w ith  con gestion  a lread y  so great th ere had to  be a mass movement 
o f  people out o f the c i ty .  T h is came to  be knov/n as the 'o v e r s p i l l ' .
D ecanting o f  the population  was to  be accom plished by means o f  the
2New Towns and w ith  agreements w ith  o ther nearby towns. This was a l l  
in  keeping w ith  th e  recommendations o f the I 94O Barlow Report.
The Glasgow C orporation and i t s  C ity  E ngineer, Robert B m ce, 
d isagreed  w ith  th e slimming o f  the c i ty  in  th is  way : h is  arguments 
were presented  in  the Bruce P lan . He f e l t  Glasgow should ' f i l l  in '  
l e s s  d en sely  b u i l t  p a r ts  o f  the c i t y  and reb u ild  where necessary  at 
e x is t in g  or even h igh er d en sities," ^  The C orporation, or rather, i t s  
le a d in g  Labour group, advocated th e p o lic y  o f b u ild in g  houses wherever 
th ere  was space w ith in  the e x is t in g  boundaries and **tae h e l l  w ith  
planning", as one o f  th e  Glasgow d e le g a te s  was rep orted  to  have exclaim ed  
a t  a meeting o f th e  J o in t  P lanning Committee.^
But by 1951 a l l  a v a ila b le  s i t e s  in  the c i t y  had been e i th e r  b u i l t  
on or earmarked fo r  b u ild in g  and th e c o u n c illo r s  were fo rce d  to  agree  
w ith  the p lanning exp erts and th e  cen tra l and lo c a l  government o f f i c i a l s
1. Gheckland, p p .65- 66,
2. Brennan, p . 25.
3. See pp. 278- 279.
4 . Ô f  O , 3_”7 ^
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th a t the tim e had a rrived  fo r  mass tra n sfers  o f  the population  away 
from Glasgow. In  1952 a new C ity  A rch itect was appointed who recom­
mended th at 133,000  houses would have to  he b u i l t  o u tsid e  th e  c i t y ,^
The New Towns were the most obvious d e p o s ito r ie s  fo r  the p op u la tion  
tr a n s fe r . E ast K ilb r id e , f i f t e e n  m iles e a st  o f Glasgow, was th e f i r s t  
New Town d esign ated  under the New Towns Act o f  194-6. In  1947-194-8 
when i t  came in to  ex isten ce  the b a t t le  between the Secretary  o f  S ta te
and th e  Glasgow C orporation was a t  i t s  heigh t, and E ast K ilb r id e  was
2opposed by th e  a n t i - o v e r s p i l l  sch o o l.
I t  was not u n t i l  th e  la t e  195 0 's  th a t the p o lic y  o f  comprehen­
s iv e  development, in  which th e slum areas such as Gorbals-Hutche sont own
3were attacked , began. However, during the 1945 to  1951 years the  
Corporation d id  p lan  and execute la r g e  housing e s ta te s  around the  
perim eter o f the c i t y ,  on g r e e n - f ie ld  s i t e s ,  u sin g  d e n s it ie s  much 
h igh er than o r ig in a l ly  thought appropriate. Many o f  th ese  schemes con­
ta in ed  a la rg e  p rop ortion  o f c o tta g e s  but g en era lly  the trend was 
towards rows o f th ree  and fc u r -s to r e y  walk-up f l a t s .  I t  was in  th is  
way th a t  Drumchapel, Sasterh ouse, C astlem ilk , P o llo k  and P r i e s t h i l l  
came in to  e x is te n c e . These p erip h era l e s ta te s  absorbed 10 per cen t o f  
G lasgow 's p op u la tion .^
1. Ib id .
2. See, H, R, Smith, 'The D isp ersa l o f  P opulation  from Congested  
Urban Centres in  S co tla n d ', P u b lic  A dm in istration , 34 (1956),
pp. 125- 134. Note e s p e c ia l ly  s e c t io n s  on the ch aracter  o f problems 
in  Glasgow, and methods o f  d ea lin g  w ith  o v e r s p i l l .
3 . See, Frank W orsdall, The C ity  th a t Disappeared ; Glasgow's 
Demolished A rch itec tu re , (Glasgow, Molindan P re ss , I 98I ) .
4 . Gheckland, p .67 .
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9. How W ell Did The Government Do?
D ouglas N iven in  th e  Developm ent o f H ousing in  S c o tla n d  was 
ex trem ely  h a rsh :
S co tlan d  a ls o  en jo y s  some o f th e  most inhuman, 
d re a ry  and u n im ag in a tiv e  p o s t-w a r  housing  in  th e  
w hole o f  E urope. The o v e r - a l l  s ta n d a rd  o f  hous­
ing  f o r  w orking p eo p le  i s  p o o r; env ironm en ta l 
c o n d itio n s  e x i s t  i n  many S c o t t i s h  housing  a re a s  
w hich would sim ply n o t h e  t o l e r a t e d  in  many 
European c o u n t r i e s . !
An assessm en t o f  th e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  A t t l e e 's  Government on th e  housing  
i s s u e  must ask  i f  th e  Government d id  a l l  i t  cou ld  o r  a l l  i t  shou ld  
have done f o r  S c o tla n d . Most c r i t i c s  o f  th e  Labour G overnm ent's p o l i ­
c i e s  on p o s t-w ar ho u sin g  f a i l e d  to  n o te  i n i t i a l l y  t h a t  th e  housing  
s i t u a t i o n  in  S c o tla n d  -  e s p e c ia l ly  in  Glasgow -  had b e e n  n o to r io u s ly  
b ad  f o r  g e n e ra tio n s . No one Government cou ld  b e  ex p ec ted  to  have so lv e d  
such  deep ro o te d  problem s and im balances o v e rn ig h t. T hat th e  p o s t-w a r  
h ousing  s i tu a t io n  was much b e t t e r  in  E ngland  and W ales was to  b e  expec­
te d , a s  t h i s  was th e  p re -w a r  p o s i t io n  a s  w e ll . S u b s ta n t ia l  though slow 
p ro g re s s  was n e v e r th e le s s  made i n  th e  S c o t t i s h  housing  s i t u a t io n  
fo llo w in g  th e  war. I t  was n o t u s u a l ly  th e  housing  p o l i c i e s  which v/ere
«
-
a t  f a u l t  : any blam e sh o u ld  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  la c k  o f  c o o rd in a tio n  A
w hich o f te n  p re v e n te d  th e s e  p o l i c i e s  from  b e in g  im plem ented.
D uring  th e  im m ediate p o s t-w a r  y e a rs , ch o ice  o f h o u sin g  i n  S co tlan d  
was a lm o st t o t a l l y  l im i te d  to  th e  p u b lic  s e c to r  (c o u n c il  houses. New 
Towns and houses b u i l t  b y  th e  S c o t t is h  S p e c ia l  H ousing A s s o c ia t io n ) ,
1, N iven, p . 32.
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1. G .H.T.R., 1949, p .29.
2. Gheckland, p , 94.
3. N iven, p . 84.
w ith  v e ry  few o p tio n s  from  th e  h ig h ly  c o n t ro l le d  p r iv a t e  s e c to r .  |
]The number o f c o n tro ls  and checks on p o s t-w a r  “b u ild in g  was phenom enal.
Many businessm en  were concerned  about th e  is s u e  o f b u i ld in g  in c e n tiv e s  |
and th e  la c k  o f  a u n i f i e d  scheme, a s  w e ll  as w ith  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  ,1
e f f e c t  o f th e  b u i ld in g  in d u s try ,  e s p e c ia l ly  on sm all b u s in e s s e s ,  when
th e  c o n t ro l s  w ere l i f t e d  and government in c e n t iv e s  and s u b s id ie s  w ith -  
1drawn. The Labour Government was, o f  co u rse , r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  W■ ■ ■ ■ i
c o n t in u a t io n  o f c o n t ro ls  in to  th e  p o s t-w a r  e ra , b u t i n  1 9 3 1  th e  
C o n se rv a tiv e  Government, a lth o u g h  r e la x in g  m a tte rs  f o r  p r iv a te  e n te r ­
p r i s e ,  s t i l l  r e ta in e d  b a s ic  c o n tro l ,  th ro u g h , f o r  exam ple, b u i ld in g  
l i c e n s in g  and s u b s id ie s ,  over th e  h ousing  in d u s try .  The two m ajor 
p a r t i e s  in  th e  Glasgovf C o rp o ra tio n , Labour and P ro g re s s iv e  (C onserva­
t i v e ) ,  r e f l e c t e d  th e  n a t io n a l  s p l i t  on th e  housing  i s s u e .  T h e ir  
d i f f e r e n c e s  la y  in  th e  view s ta k en  on p r iv a t e  housing  and th e  l e v e l  o f  
r e n t s  : th e  Labour view  has  b een  d is c u s se d  e x te n s iv e ly , b u t  what th e  
C o n se rv a tiv e s  w anted was a d d i t io n a l  la n d  made more a v a i la b l e  f o r  p r i ­
v a te  e n te r p r i s e  and vrould have charged  h ig h e r  r e n ts ,  c lo s e r  to  th e
2t r u e  c o s t o f housing  p ro v is io n .
I n  1951, th e  C onservative P arty  promised to  b u ild  a minimum o f  
3CX), 000 houses a year in  B r ita in , During th e p eriod  1951-1961, t h is  
f ig u re  was on ly  exceeded once, in  1954 vfhen 308, 952 houses were com­
p le te d . The eq u iva len t S c o t t is h  f ig u r e  fo r  th a t year was 38 ,653 .
These f ig u r e s  compared v e ry  fa v o u ra b ly  to  th e  re c o rd  o f  th e  p re v io u s  
Labour a d m in is tr a t io n  -with 206,405 com ple tions in  1 948 .  ^ Prom 1950
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u n t i l  1955, th e  main emphasis in  both  England and Scotland was on 
lo c a l  a u th o r ity  housing. By 195^ the p r iv a te  market in  England and 
Wales was b eg inn ing  to  catch  up w ith  s ta te  housing com pletions but 
the S c o tt ish  p a ttern  was going in  the op p osite  d ir e c t io n , to  in crea sed  
lo c a l  a u th o r ity  housing.^
1. I b id . , p .89.
2. K e lla s , The S c o t t is h  P o l i t i c a l  System, p. 15. See a ls o , Ian Hugh 
Adams, The Making o f  Urban Scotland , (London, Groom Helm, 1978).
Housing was a major p o l i t i c a l  is s u e  in  S cotlan d  and no p o l i t i c a l
p a rty  could  a ffo rd  to  o ffen d  the la r g e  number o f  * co u n cil-h o u se-
v o t e r s ' .  Most lo c a l  p o l i t i c s  was dominated by th e need to  p la c a te
e i th e r  cou n cil ten a n ts  or ow ner-occupiers, depending on the s o c ia l
com position  o f  th e  community, and S c o tt is h  housing was g iven  s p e c ia l
2a t te n t io n  i f  not treatm ent w ith in  B r i t i s h  housing p o lic y .
4
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1. In tro d u ctio n
S c o tla n d ’s heavy in d u s t r i e s  came back  in to  t h e i r  own d u rin g  th e  
Second W orld War. B ut th e  o b v io u s  need f o r  w a r - r e la te d  p ro d u c ts  i n  
1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5 , w hich  caused  a r e v iv a l  o f  S c o t t i s h  b a s ic  in d u s t r i e s  -  
sh ip b u ild in g , i r o n  and s t e e l ,  c o a l and o th e r  heavy e n g in e e rin g  -  to  
some e x te n t m ere ly  masked th e  i n s e c u r i t i e s  o f  an u n balanced  i n d u s t r i a l  
economy. R e p e a te d ly  in  jo u r n a ls  p r in te d  d u rin g  and ju s t  a f t e r  th e  w ar 
th e re  was e x p re s se d  th e  f e a r  t h a t  S c o tla n d 's  economy m ight v i r t u a l l y  
c o l la p s e  when w ar o rd e rs  w ere d is c o n tin u e d . T h is  p roved  n o t to  b e  th e  
c a se . One e x p la n a tio n  f o r  t h i s  was th a t  i n  th e  im m ediate p o s t-w a r  
y e a rs  th e re  was a  good d e a l o f i n d u s t r i a l  r e c o n v e rs io n  work to  b e  done, 
as  a lm ost a l l  th e  f a c t o r i e s  had  been  c o n v e rted  f o r  w ar u se . C oal and 
s t e e l ,  two o f  S c o t la n d 's  p rim ary  in d u s t r ie s ,  w ere b o th  in  v e ry  h ig h  
demand fo llo w in g  th e  w ar n o t o n ly  a t  home b u t  ab ro ad , a lth o u g h  dom estic  
sh o r ta g e s  l im i t e d  fo re ig n  e x p o r t .  S c o t la n d 's  economic p ro g re s s  d u rin g  
th e s e  y e a rs  was slow  b u t s te a d y . There was no p o s t-w a r boom i n  S c o tla n d  
o r  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom compared to  th a t  o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  d u rin g  th e se  
y e a rs .  But S c o tla n d , in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  was s t a r t i n g  from  a p o in t  much 
f u r t h e r  b e h in d  in  r e l a t i v e  te rm s o f p ro d u c tio n  due to  th e  slump o f  th e  
1 9 3 0 *3 ,  th a n  was America a t  t h i s  tim e. The K orean War gave f u r t h e r  
im petus to  th e  p o s t-w a r  economy, re-arm am ent c a l l e d  f o r  th e  heavy 
in d u s t r i e s  a g a in , a lth o u g h  t h e i r  o rd e r  books had a lre a d y  been  f i l l e d  
p r e - 1 9 5 0 . I t  i s  co n v e n ie n t, even i f  n o t t o t a l l y  a c c u ra te ,  to  view  th e  
re-arm am ent d r iv e  f o r  th e  K orean War a s  a  p re lu d e  to  th e  1 9 5 0 's, a 
decade o f  much economic grow th f o r  S c o t t i s h  in d u s try .  ^
1 . F o r  more developm ent o f th e  1950* s see , G avin McCrone, S c o t la n d 's  
Economic P ro g re s s  1951-1960. (London, George A lle n  and  Unwin, L t d . ,
19657:
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Government in terv e n tio n  was viewed by businessm en and p o l i t ic a n s  
a lik e ,  in  vary ing  degrees and on d if fe r e n t  l e v e l s ,  to  be the co rr ec t  
means o f  'propping up* heavy in d u stry  in  Scotland  as w e ll  as in  the  
r e s t  o f the country. The most obvious form o f  Government d ir e c t io n  
came by means o f  n a t io n a lisa t io n , but th is  on ly  occurred in  th e so -  
c a l le d  b a s ic  in d u s tr ie s  which had already been h e a v ily  reg u la ted  p re-  
1939«^ The coal-m in ing in d u stry  i s  the b e s t  example o f t h is .  Another 
form o f  continued  post-w ar Government con tro l was th a t o f in d u s tr ia l  
r a tio n in g , i . e .  o f  iron  and s t e e l ,  whereby th e  Government r e ta in e d  
th e  p o s it io n  o f  su p p lier  o f  raw m a ter ia ls  fo llo w in g  the con c lu sio n  o f  
th e  Second World War u n lik e  in  I 9I 8 . A lso  th e  1945 Government, w ith  
th e n a t io n a lisa t io n  o f  the ra ilw a y s in  1948, c o n tr o lle d  in d u s tr ia l  
tran sport.
T h is chapter in ten d s to  con cen trate on four dom inating s e c t io n s  
o f  t r a d it io n a l in d u stry , the importance o f which i s  rev ea led  by  the  
Census o f  Production  F igures fo r  1948.
1. See pp. 41 -44  on N a tio n a lis a t io n  o f  B a sic  In d u s tr ie s .
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Table 1 -  Employment F ig u res  and Value o f the Coal, Iron  and S te e l .  
Shipbuild ing  and Ju te  I n d u s tr ie s  fo r  Scotland  and Great B r ita in , 1948
Coal Mines
S c o tla n d  
G re a t B r i t a in
T ota l Value 
o f  S a le s  (£ '000)
45,251  
364,630
P e rso n s
Employed
87,191
763,025
Iron  and S te e l
( in c lu d in g  M elting and R o llin g , and 
Iron  Foundries but exclu d in g  T in p la te  -  
none in  S cotland  -  and Wrought Iron and 
S te e l  Tubes, no f ig u r e s  a v a ila b le )
Scotland  
Great B r ita in
6 2 ,624  
488,197
44,223  
318,240
Shipbuild ing
S c o tla n d  
G rea t B r i t a in
71,279
235,921
55,935  
231 ,374
J u te
Scotland  
Great B r ita in
21, 336 
21,765
17,006 
17 ,215
Source: Census o f  P ro m o tio n  fo r  1948, (London, H. M.S, 0 , ,  1951),
Volume 1, p. 1/ a/ 5; Volume 3, P P .3 /B /35  and 3 /C /27;
Volume 4 , p .4 /A /22 ; and Voume 6, p ,6 /G /l5 .
N ev erth e less , th e  in d u s tr ia l stru ctu re  o f  S co tlan d  vms a complex web, 
more e la b o ra te  and in tercon n ected  than a stra igh tforw ard  account o f  
co a l, iron  and s t e e l ,  sh ip b u ild in g  and ju te  a lon e  would su g g est.
T- ——. - - . . . . . . . .  ' - - — , r. . » • - . ’-i
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IAmong the m anufacturing in d u s tr ie s  the m etal tra d es  -  in c lu d in g  'i-
Îa l l  en g in eerin g , sh ip b u ild in g , v e h ic le  manufacture and rep air , s t e e l  j
m anufacture, instrum ent manufacture, p reciou s m eta ls , e tc ,  -  were |
in d is s o lu b ly  lin k e d  and accounted fo r  o n e-s ix th  o f  th e  S c o tt ish  work- %
ing p op u lation  and enployed n early  h a lf  o f  the t o t a l  o f th ose employed 1
in  m anufacturing. S cotlan d  s p e c ia l is e d  in  the h ea v ier  branches o f  
en g in eerin g , p a r t ic u la r ly  the b u ild in g  o f  sh ips and locom otives. The i
Clyde was i t s e l f  r e sp o n sib le  fo r  o n e -th ird  of the tonnage launched from ®
B r i t is h  shipyards ; in  1949-1951 15 per cent o f th e  new tonnage b u i l t  
a l l  over the world was from S c o tt is h  yards. On the o th er hand, c e r ta in  
o th er  branches o f th e  m etal and en gin eerin g  trad es were very p oo r ly
rep resen ted  or e n t ir e ly  absent in  Scotland , e .g .  the b u ild in g  of a ir ­
c r a f t ,  passenger cars and t in p la te .^
O utside o f  the Glasgow area, the next la r g e s t  con cen tration  o f  
m etal in d u s tr ie s  was in  the F a lk irk  area . This reg ion  was th e cen tre  
o f  th e  S c o t t is h  ironfounding in d u stry , which produced l i g h t  c a stin g s  
such a s  s to v e s , g r a te s , and sa n ita ry  ware. In  some o f  th e se  products i
S cotlan d  had th e  lea d in g  share o f  th e  t o t a l  B r it is h  ou tput. F a lk irk  
a lso  had an aluminium s h e e t -r o l l in g  m il l ,  b u i l t  during the war, which 
a t l e a s t  p a r t ia l ly  u sed  aluminium produced in  K in loch leven  and Lochaber.
T his was th e most im portant S c o tt is h  cen tre  o f non -ferrou s m etal manu­
fa c tu r e , but was very  sm all when compared to  th ose  in  England and "/j
2W ales. •1•Ï
E ngineering was more w id e ly  d isp ersed  than primary m etal manufac- /;=
tu re . Some o f  the sm aller towns such as Kilmarnock, Arbroath,
' '1 . L ese r , p . 118. J
2 . I b i d . ,  p .  124. I
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Fraserburgh, B rechin , and In vern ess had important en g in eerin g  firm s  
and a l l  the la r g e  c i t i e s  had an en gin eerin g  in d u stry  separate from  
sh ip b u ild in g  and marine en g in eerin g . In  Aberdeen th e emphasis was on 
cranes, s to n e -c u tt in g  and a g r ic u ltu r a l machinery; in  Dundee on 
t e x t i l e  and b u s in e ss  machinery; in  Edinburgh on e le c t r ic a l  en g in eer­
in g  and paper-making machinery; th e  Glasgow area a lso  had o ld  e s ta b ­
lis h e d  s p e c i a l i t i e s  such as sewing machines, sugar r e f in in g  and mining  
machinery. Other m etal trad es lo c a l is e d  in  t h i s  area included  o ld er  
in d u str ie s  such as locom otive, ra ilw ay  carr iage and wagon works, the  
manufacture o f b o l t s  and n u ts, a s  w e ll  as new in d u s tr ie s  l ik e  th e  
manufacture o f  aero -en g in es, caravans, typ ew riters  and c lo ck s. “ But 
n ot a l l  th ese  en g in eerin g  and heavy m etal in d u s tr ie s  can be d isc u sse d  
in  d e ta i l  here.
There were o f course a lso  many sm aller in d u str ie s  e x is t in g  in  
Scotland  during th ese  yea rs , which can again  on ly  be mentioned. They 
in clud ed  fa c to r y  tra d es  such as the production  o f  chem icals and b u ild ­
ing  m a ter ia ls , and consumer goods in d u s tr ie s  such as th e food, drink  
and tobacco tra d es, woodworking, paper and p r in tin g , and th ose u s in g  
m iscellan eou s m a ter ia ls  such as rubber. These to g e th e r  absorbed one-
e ig h th  o f  the labour fo r c e  both in  S cotland  and in  B r ita in  as a whole
2and about o n e -th ir d  o f  a l l  fa c to r y  workers. N ev erth e less , b e fo r e  the  
war the amount o f  development o f  l ig h t  in d u stry  in  S cotlan d  was not 
comparable to  th a t  occurring in  England. F ollow ing the war th ere  was 
a change in  a t t itu d e  tov/ards S cotlan d  and b oth  the Government and the
1. Ib id .
2. L eser, p .118,
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p r iv a te  sec to r  a c t iv e ly  encouraged the development o f l ig h t  indu s tr y  
in  the in te r e s t  o f  in d u s tr ia l s t a b i l i t y ,  though w ithout irrmediate 
dram atic r e s u lt s ,^  The three b e s t  known l ig h t  in d u s tr ie s  in  the p o s t -
1 . L igh t In d u str ie s  in  Scotland  A Case fo r  Development, p p .7-9 ,
war years were probably whisky, and good q u a lity  fu rn itu re  and g la s s .  >■ !f 
1
S cotland  had a v ir tu a l  monopoly o f  th e  B r it is h  w hisky industry , 'I
Scotch  enjoyed not on ly  a w orld-w ide rep u ta tion  fo r  e x c e lle n c e  but 
a ls o  p ro v id ed  the la r g e s t  s in g le  B r i t i s h  d o lla r -ea rn in g  export.
Scottish-m ade fu rn itu re  and g la s s  were both  up-market goods, h ig h ly  
sought a f te r  abroad -  such as the fu r n itu r e  designed by B a s il  Spence 
and the g la s s  produced by Edinburgh C ry sta l. But both  o f  th ese  sm all 
in d u s tr ie s  were so s p e c ia l is e d  th a t they  produced no u t i l i t a r ia n  goods : 
most g la s s  and fb m itu r e  fo r  use in  Scotland  had to  b e imported from  
England. There was a lon g  way to  go b e fo re  th ese  goods, or the p la s ­
t i c s ,  chem icals and e le c tr o n ic s  that th e o r is t s  con sid ered  'th e  hope fo r  
th e  fu tu r e  ' ,  even began to  f u l f i l l  th e ir  prom ise. T his d id  not happen 
between 1945 and 1951•
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2. GoaÊ
( i )  Coal In du stry  Follow ing th e  War
The e f f e c t iv e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  fu e l  resou rces  was more widespread  
fo llo w in g  the war than b e fo r e  1939, and th e  co incidence between c o a l-  
producing and high power consuming areas was no lon ger so v a lid , due 
p a r tly  to  a lte r n a t iv e  sources o f power, such as o i l ,  h y d r o -e le c tr ic i ty  
and (p o te n t ia l ly )  n u clear  power. Coal n e v e r th e le ss  con trib u ted  over  
90 per cen t o f  the primary fu e l  requirem ents o f  the U nited  Kingdom in  
the post-w ar yea rs . T herefore reco n stru ctio n  o f  the co a l in d u stry  was 
v i t a l  to  the B r i t is h  in d u stry , fo r  in  1945 the B r it is h  c o a l output was 
the lo w est o f the century ( l7 5  m illio n  to n s) and was a c tu a lly  on ly  40  
per cent o f th e  1913 f ig u r e . Not on ly  Great B r ita in  but Europe as w e ll  
was su ffe r in g  from an extreme power shortage during th ese  years; c o a l  
was needed fo r  both dom estic reco n stru ctio n  and fo r e ig n  ex p o rts .^
There were an estim ated  20 b i l l i o n  ton s o f  re ser v es  in  the  
2S c o tt is h  C o a lf ie ld s  fo llo w in g  th e  war, which made i t ,  in  terms o f  
importance of B r i t is h  C o a lf ie ld s , second only  in  p o te n t ia l to  Yorkshire  
and the E ast M idlands. S co tlan d  was r e la t iv e ly  sh ort of h igh-grade  
coking coa l; about 80 per cen t o f the coal produced was free-b u rn in g ,
1 . E. S. Simpson, Coal and th e  Power In d u str ie s  in  Post-War B r ita in . 
(London, Longmans, 1966), p p .x v ii  and 2, See a ls o  G. L. Reid, 
Kevin A lle n  and D, J ,  H arris, The N a tio n a lized  Fuel In d u s tr ie s , 
(London, Heinemann E ducational Books, 1973) on the gas and e le c -  
t r i c i t y  supply in d u s tr ie s  and a lso  the concept of a f u e l  p o lic y  
th a t developed a f t e r  the post-w ar y ea rs .
2. The word 'C o a lf ie ld ' ( c a p ita l is e d )  was used during th ese  years to  
r e fe r  to a major N ation a l Coal Board (NCB) d iv is io n .  There were 
fou r  such C o a lf ie ld s  in  post-w ar S cotlan d . See pp.
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which was p a r t ic u la r ly  su ite d  fo r  export demand. ^ Some coking co a l
was, however, to  he found in  the K ilsy th  and S t ir l in g  areas and sm all
q u a n tit ie s  o f  a n th ra c ite  and low v o la t i l e  c o a ls  were present in  the  
2C entral Area.
The co a l c r i s i s  o f  the w in ter  o f  1947-1948 dem onstrated the  
dependency o f  the B r i t is h  economy on co a l, and during th ese  months 
unemployment b r ie f ly  reached le v e ls  comparable to  th a t o f  the ea r ly  
1930' s .  N ev erth e less , th e  problem was one o f short-term  underproduc­
t io n  in  terms o f  demand and, i t  can be argued that th e  coa l c r i s i s  had 
a g rea te r  impact on th e  general p u b lic  and industry , who were inconve­
n ienced  fo r  sev era l months, than on th e long-term  fu tu re  o f  the co a l 
in d u stry  i t s e l f .  These were t r a n s it io n  years fo r  th e  in d u stry  on many 
l e v e l s  : the end o f the war, n a t io n a lisa t io n , the im petus o f  new ca p i­
t a l ,  and the development of new tech n ology . In  t h is  p ersp ectiv e  the 
c r i s i s  was sim ply an in c id e n t in  th e  m idst o f  adapting to  change.
1 , Oakley, p. 130. Non-coking co a ls  were p a r t ic u la r ly  su ited  fo r  
export demand because upon carb o n isa tio n  th ese  free-b u rn in g  c o a ls  
y ie ld e d  chars (o r  cokes) s u ita b le  fo r  the production  o f sm okeless 
f u e l s  fo r  the dom estic markets.
2. I b id . , p p .129- 130. For more in form ation  on the v ariou s typ es o f  
c o a l in  Scotland, th e  q u a lity  o f  each type p resen t in  Scotland
in  th e  post-w ar y ea rs , the d is t in c t io n  between su rface ( d r i f t  and 
o p en -cast) and deep mining, the v a r ia t io n  between th e  th ick  and 
th in  seams o f  c o a l and a lso  where they  were to  be found in  
Scotland , and a ls o  q u a lity  co n tro l t e s t ,  see Y /illiam  Warren Haynes, 
N a tio n a liz a t io n  in  P r a c t ic e  ; The B r i t is h  Coal In du stry . (London, 
B a ile y  Bros, and Swinfen L td ., 1933), pp. 11-15 on the v a r ie t ie s  o f  
B r i t i s h  co a ls , and N ation al Coal Board S c o tt ish  D iv is io n , A Short 
H isto ry  o f  the S c o t t is h  Coal-M ining Industry. (Edinburgh, P i l la n s  
and W ilson Ltd. , 1958), pp. 101-110 on the t ^ e s  and u se  o f  
S c o t t is h  co a ls  and a ls o  th e G. H. T. R ., 1950, p . 50 on q u a lity  
c o n tro l t e s t s ;
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Consumption, in c lu d in g  exports, was much g rea ter  than production  
in  1945 and 1946 and as a r e s u lt  the 1947 co a l stock s en d -o f-th e -y ea r  
inventory  were lower than a t  any other tim e in  th e  tw en tie th  century. 
Thus the r a p id ly  r i s in g  consumption o f  the post-w ar y ea rs , as opposed 
to  the f a l l i n g  consumption o f th e  in ter-w ar years, along w ith  record  
storms and extrem ely co ld  w eather o f January and February o f 1947, 
caused th e  v ir tu a l stoppage o f  production  in  1947. S tock s were rep len ­
ish ed  s w if t ly ,  y e t  a t the expense o f  exp orts . In  1948 in  an attem pt to  
s a t i s f y  European demand, sto ck s  d ec lin ed  once more. In  1949 the stock  
s itu a t io n  remained the same but th ere  was another coa l c r i s i s ,  a lb e it
much sm aller than th at o f  1947 and p lan s were made once more to  import
1co a l from th e U nited S ta te s .  During th ese  years the House Coal
D is tr ib u t io n  (Emergency) Scheme functioned , la r g e ly  v o lu n ta r ily ;  a lso
r e l i e f  su p p lie s  o f opencast coa l were a llo c a te d  to  Scotland  by the
2M inister  o f  Fuel and Power from the Northumberland C o a lf ie ld . Two 
s p e l l s  o f  ex c e p tio n a lly  good weather in  1949 and in  e a r ly  1950 were 
u se fu l in  keeping home demand fo r  coa l down. T h is helped  p u b lic  u t i l i ­
t i e s  and in d u str ie s  s to c k p ile d  su p p lies  so th a t when bad weather struck  
again in  the w inter o f  1951-1952, although stock s fo r  dom estic u se  ran  
very low, th ere were s u f f i c ie n t  su p p lies  th a t n e ith er  the in d u s tr ia l  
nor the Government sec to r  had to  r e s t r i c t  t h e ir  production  le v e l s .
B efore th e  F ir s t  World War S co tla n d 's  share o f  B r it is h  co a l pro­
duction  was r i s in g  but th e World Wars brought about a markedly sharp 
f a l l  in  S co tla n d 's  production  and in stea d  o f  on e-seventh  S cotlan d  was 
producing in  1952 on ly  on e-n in th  o f the B r i t is h  t o t a l  output o f co a l. ^
1 . Haynes, pp .133-136.
2 . G.H.T.R., 1950, p .15.
3. Ib id . and S .E .C .S ., I 95I ,  p .17 .
'Ï
The fo llo w in g  diagram shows th e  s tr ik in g  d e c lin e  o f  S c o tt is h  co a l  
output from the m id -n ineteen th  century to  the m id -tw entieth  century.
Figure 1 -  Coal Production in  Scotland . 1854-1932
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Source: S e le c ted  y ea rs  from L eser, p . 110, F igure 10 : Coal Produc­
t io n  in  S cotlan d , 1854-1952.
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N ev erth e less  th e d ep ression  o f  the in ter-w ar years^ was even more 
d istu rb in g  to  th e  c o a l in d u stry  than even th e  upheavals caused by the  
World War such as d isru p tio n  o f  normal work p a ttern s , l o s s  o f  many 
s k i l l e d  workers and a ls o  (u n lik e  in  th e m e ta llu r g ic a l in d u s tr ie s  so  
v i t a l  to  w ar-tim e products, i . e .  w eld in g), th e  re ta rd a tio n  o f  techno­
lo g ic a l  advances w ith in  th e  c o a l in d u stry . Yet i t  was the D epression  
th at damaged most the e f f ic ie n c y  o f  the in d u stry . So l i t t l e  new cap i­
t a l  was in v e s te d  in  the in d u stry  from 1914-1945 th a t not on ly  cou ld  no 
new advances be taken but many o f i t s  productive a s s e t s ,  machinery, 
e tc ,  were a llow ed  to d e te r io r a te ,
( i i )  N a t io n a lisa t io n
Goal-mining was th e  most h e a v ily  reg u la ted  'b a s ic '  industry , by
2the Government, long b efo re  i t s  n a t io n a lis a t io n  in  1947. As e a r ly  as
1. L eser, p .109. For another p e r sp e c tiv e  on t h is ,  compare the p o s t­
war years in  F igure 1 w ith  the percentages of r i s e  in  coa l produc­
t io n  fo r  the same y ea rs  on p, *41^ The importance o f the export 
market to  coal-m in ing was one o f  the primary d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  th e  
in d u stry  in  the in ter-w ar y ea rs . See Reid, A lle n , H arris, pp. 9-13  
on the in d u stry  b e fo re  n a t io n a lisa t io n ;  Roy Campbell, R ise  and 
F a l l  o f  S c o tt is h  Industry. 1707-1939. (Edinburgh, John Donald,
1980) ,  p p .11-118 on Coal : labour and d epression ; a ls o  B, R, 
M itc h e ll, A bstract o f  B r i t is h  H is to r ic a l S t a t i s t i c s , (Cambridge, 
Cambridge U n iv ers ity  P r e ss , I 962) ,  pp. 108-123, fo r  s e le c te d  s ta ­
t i s t i c s  on the pre-W orld War I I  B r i t is h  coa l in d u stry , a few  o f  
the ch a rts  are broken down by reg ion , e .g .  Scotland.
2 , Perhaps the b e s t  h is to r y  o f co a l co n tro l during the Second World 
War i s  W. B. H. Court, Coal, (London, H. M .S.0 . ,  I 951) .  There i s  a 
p le th o ra  o f  o r ig in a l sources and secondary works on th e n a t io n a lis ­
a t io n  o f  co a l. Most o f i t  d ea ls  w ith  th e B r i t i s h  in d u stry  as a 
w hole, but some do r e fe r  to  th e  S c o t t is h  d iv is io n  i f  on ly  in  p a ss in g . 
R e q u is ite  Government p u b lica tio n s  : Coal Industry N a tio n a lisa t io n  
A ct ( 1946) and D ebates in  Parliam ent on th e  Coal Industry  
N a tio n a lisa t io n  B i l l  in  1946, p a r t ic u la r ly  the speech by the 
M in ister , Mr. Emmanuel S h inw ell, moving th e Second Reading in  the  
Commons, 29 January 1946,
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6 /ve of erf
1919 /\the Sankey Commission had advocated n a t io n a lis a t io n  fo r  th e  c o a l­
m ining in d u stry .^  Strong support fo r  the n a t io n a lis a t io n  o f the indus­
tr y  came from various quarters in c lu d in g  the m iners them selves, the
2N ation al Union o f  Mineworkers, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), and th e
3m ajority  o f the Labour P arty .
When th e  N ational Coal Board (NCB) was s e t  up in  1947 i t s  primary
fu n ction  was to  improve ou tp ut. This remained i t s  f i r s t  duty u n t i l  the
mid-1950' s .^  I t  was a lso  mandated to  r e c r u it  new labour, open p i t s  w ith
more so p h is t ic a te d  machinery, and to  in troduce more modern technology
in to  th e e x is t in g  p i t s .  Thus th e  NCB was the f in a l  a u th o r ity  on m atters
5such as which mines were to  be c lo se d  and which new s i t e s  developed.
I t  was to  concentrate i t s  e f f o r t s  on the most e f f i c i e n t  mines and to  
c lo se  th e l e s s  productive c o l l i e r i e s ,  based on su p p lie s  and c o s t  
a n a ly s is . There was no d ir e c t  form o f Government r a tio n in g  o f  coa l to
1. See, R e p o rts  o f  th e  Sankey Commission, (London, H .M .S.O ,, 1919) 
and a ls o  R e p o rts  o f th e  Samuel Commission. (London, H .M .S.O .,1926) .
2. See, R. P age A rnot, The M iners : One U nion, One In d u s try ,  A ;|
H is to ry  o f  th e  N a tio n a l U nion o f  M inew orkers, (London, George J
A llen  and Unwin, 1979). S
3. For more background on th e movement towards n a t io n a lis a t io n  see ,
TUG Annual R eports 1892, 1893; M ichael F oot, Aneurin B evin  1897- 4
1945, (th e  f i r s t  o f  two volum es), (London, Granada P u b lish in g , 4
1975) ;  Robert Foot, A P lan  fo r  Goal, (M ining A sso c ia tio n  o f Great |
B r ita in , January 1945), w ith  Supplement to  a P lan  fo r  C oal, (Mining '|j
A sso c ia tio n  o f  Great B r ita in , March/April 1945); E le c t io n  |
M anifesto , (The Labour P a rty , 1945) j Harold W ilson, New D eal fo r  ;|
Coal, (London, Contact, 1945 ). 1
4 . Parker, Labour Marches On, p p .61-62, o f  th e o r ig in a l members o f  
the NCB on ly  two o f the n in e  had a labour background, the o th ers  
were former C o llie r y  company d ir e c to r s . John G ollan, The S c o t t is h  
P rosp ect, p . 36, on the S c o t t is h  R egulatory Board th ere were four  
company d ir e c to r s , one trad e  u n io n is t , and one p r o fe s s io n a l man,
5. See a ls o , R. Vance P resth u s, 'B r it is h  P u b lic  A dm in istration , The 
N ational Coal Board', P u b lic  A dm in istration  Review, IX, No, 3 
(Summer 1949); and N atio n a l Coal Board. The F ir s t  Ten Y ears, (a  
C o llie r y  Guardian P u b lic a tio n , undated but presumably 1957).
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in d u stry  (a s  th ere was o f  iron  and s t e e l  during th e immediate p ost­
war y e a r s ) , hut th ere was a system o f  a l lo c a t io n  fo r  dom estic u se . 
P r ic e  s e t t in g ,  always an e f f e c t iv e  in d ir e c t  con tro l, was reg u la ted  by  
the Government through th e au sp ices o f  the NCB.^
Although th e N ational Coal Board never succeeded in  reach ing  the
production  g o a ls  s e t  fo r  i t  by th e Labour Government, th ere was a r i s e
2in  production  under Government ownership.
1945-1946 3 per cent
1946-1947 3 p er cent
1947-1948 5 per cent
1948-1949 3 per cent
1949-1950 1 per cent
The 1947 Economic Survey s e t  a ta r g e t  o f  200,000,000  ton s o f coa l per
3year fo r  Great B r ita in  a s  a whole, which each year was m issed  or ju s t  
b a re ly  met, as t h is  f ig u r e  re fe rred  to  deep-mined co a l on ly . T his was 
because the NCB was not re sp o n s ib le  fo r  opencast mining, which was 
supervised  by the M in ister  o f  F uel and Power, ^
1 , See a ls o .  N ation al Coal Board, Annual Report and Statem ent o f  
Account fo r  the year ended 31 December 1946 and a s im ila r  report  
fo r  19^ ^  (London, H.M, S. 0. , 1946 and I 947) ; ‘N ation a l Coal M ines', 
(The C o llie r y  Guardian. 3 January 1947), p .13, included  an account 
o f  V estin g  Day cerem onies and speeches; a lso  H, ToiAnshend-Rose,
The B r i t is h  Coal In du stry , (London, George A llen  and Unwin, 1 9 5 l) .
2, Haynes, p .133*
3. Economic Survey 1947, (London, H, K  8 ,0 , , Cmd. 7046), p . 20.
4 . U n less o therw ise s ta te d  a l l  f ig u r e s  on output w i l l  exclude opencast
coa l because o f  th is  d iv is io n  o f  power betw een th e  NCB and the
M in istry  o f  F uel and Power,
 ^ -  If:
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%
Output o f  Deep-Mined and Opencast Coal,
Deep-mined Open-cast
T ota l output 
(deep-mined  
and o p en -ca st)
%
$
.4.1'i
187,203 ,000 10, 245,000 197 ,448 ,000
197,6 4 6 , 000 11 ,748 ,000 209, 3 9 4 ,000 i202 ,678 ,000 12, 440,0 0 0 215,118,000
20 4 ,124,000 1 2 ,1 8 5 ,000 216 ,185 ,000 11)
211 ,100 ,000 11,000, 000 222,100,000
1947 200, 000,000
1948
1949
1950
1951
Source; S e le c te d  y ea rs  from Haynes, p .134, Table IX. Annual output 
o f  Deep-Mined and Opencast Coal : 1937-1952, in  M in istry  o f  
Fuel and Power, S t a t i s t i c a l  D ig est. 1948 and 1949, (London,
H.IvL S. 0. , 1 9 5 0 ) ,  p p .20 and 7 5 J N ational Coal Board, R eport, 
1950, pp. 188-189; Labour and Industry in  B r ita in , X 
(September 1952), 120. The o f f i c i a l  ta r g e t  go a l from 
Economic Survey fo r  1947, p .20, although o th er  f ig u r e s  
quoted during th ese  y ears c a l le d  fo r  230-250 m illio n  to n s.
The 1950 N ational Coal Board P lan fo r  Coal o u tlin ed  the proposed modern­
is a t io n  and development schemes fo r  the country fo r  th e  next f i f t e e n  
y ea rs . I t  was d esigned  to  be more f l e x i b l e  than th e  ta rg et output 
f ig u r e s  proposed in  the m id-1940' s and attem pted to  tak e in to  co n sid er­
a t io n  to  a g rea ter  ex ten t the d iv e r se  fa c to r s  th a t cou ld  and d id  slow  
production .
When the S c o tt is h  D iv is io n  of the N ation a l Coal Board took co n tro l 
on 1 January 1947 i t  assumed r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  275 S c o t t is h  mines th a t  
had p r e v io u s ly  been owned by over 120 separate c o l l ie r y  managements. 
Included in  th e  former f ig u r e  were 79 sm all mines which were sca ttered  
working 'pockets* o f c o a l , which were l e f t  under the d ir e c t io n  o f  t h e ir
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p revious owners, to  whom they  granted a s p e c ia l l ic e n c e .^  The other  
196 m ines came under the d ir e c t  a u th ority  o f  the S c o tt is h  D iv is io n . /
There were fou r major d iv is io n s  (o r  C o a lf ie ld s )  in  Scotland  ;
( 1 ) C entra l, s tre tch in g  a cro ss  Lanarkshire, We s t  Lothian, S t ir l in g s h ir e ,  
and in to  p a r ts  o f IXahbartonshire; (2 ) F i f e  and Clackmannan; ( 3) the  
Lothians; and (4) A yrsh ire and D um friessh ire,
More than h a lf  o f the S c o t t is h  mines were in  a s ta te  o f  severe |
exhaustion  o f  th e ir  workable resou rces and a l l  o f  them, i t  was reckoned |
2fo llo w in g  th e war, would be c lo se d  by I 965. A lready by 1954 n ea r ly
h a lf  o f S co tla n d ’s coa l came from the eastern  C o a lf ie ld s  and t h i s  p at­
tern  was expected  (and did) con tin u e throughout th e  next decade. In  -4
consequence s ig n if ic a n t ly  over h a lf  of the expenditure o f the S c o tt is h  
D iv is io n  o f th e  NCB was a llo c a te d  to  the E astern  Area C o a lf ie ld s .
1. A Short H isto ry  o f the S c o t t is h  Coal-Mining Industry, p . 85.
2. C. A. Oakley, e d . , S c o t t is h  Industry. (The S c o tt is h  C ouncil 
(Development and In d u stry ), 1953), p. 132. The e a r l ie r  e d it io n  * 
S c o tt is h  Industry  Today. (Edinburgh, Moray P re ss , 1937) i s  q u ite  
in te r e s t in g , i t  vfas d iv id ed  by reg ion a l areas as opposed to  th e  
l a t e r  e d it io n  which was d iv id ed  by in d u stry . Oakleysbooks o fte n  
read l ik e  tr a v e l brochures, f u l l  o f  'b la ta n t se I f-a d v e r t is in g *
ior  s p e c if ic  companies, in d u s tr ie s , or S co tlan d  in  gen era l, as  
Oakley h im se lf  remarked about some o f the co n tr ib u tio n s  to  the  
1953 e d it io n . N ev erth e less , th ese  books, and e s p e c ia l ly  th e  
la t t e r  e d it io n , remain one o f th e  b e s t  sou rces o f  in form ation  %
regarding post-W orld War I I  S c o tt is h  in d u stry .
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Table 2 -  A ctual and Planned Output of Coal in  Scotland  by Area. 
1950 and 1961-1965 (proposed) (m il l io n  to n s )
Output in  1950 
Planned output
1961-1965
Percentage
in c r e a se /
decrease
Ayr and Lanark- 
Dum fries sh ire
4 .4
7 .1
+61
7 .8
6 .7
-14
F ife  and 
C lack- L othians T ota l
mannan
7 .3
11.0
+51
3 .8
5 .8
+53
23.3
30.6
+31
Source; L eser, p. 114, Table 55, from N ation a l Coal Board, P lan  
fo r  Coal and Annual Report fo r  1950.
Although underconsumption was the o v e r a ll problem o f the in te r ­
war years, th e  pre-V/orld War I I  in a b i l i t y  o f  th e  c o a l in d u stry  to  meet 
even th e  e x is t in g  consumer demand was caused by underproduction. To 
combat t h is  the NCB' s e t  a very h igh  annual n a tio n a l production f ig u r e  
o f  which the S c o t t is h  share was 30 m illio n  (o f  th e  n a tio n a l 200 m il l io n ) ,  
which would in  e f f e c t  r a is e  the S c o t t is h  l e v e l  by  6 m illio n  to n s . This 
r i s e  in  S c o tt ish  production  was to  be achieved p r im a r ily  by the s in k in g  
o f  new mines, s p e c i f i c a l ly  in  th e  C entral and E astern  C o a lf ie ld s , Nine 
o f  th e  22 la r g e  new underground mines envisaged in  the P lan  fo r  Coal 
were to  be in  Scotland , but i t  took  5-10 years from th e  i n i t i a l  b u ild ­
in g  o f  a new mine to  the p o in t i t  reached e f f e c t iv e  production le v e l s .  
E x is t in g  mines, which were deemed in e f f i c ie n t ,  were to  be e ith e r  c lo se d  
or modernised e x te n s iv e ly .^  The lo s s  o f  output from the c lo s in g  o f
1 . Oakley, p .132.
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i n e f f i c i e n t  mines was ap p ro x im ate ly  7 m i l l io n  to n s  a  y e a r  of s a le a b le
c o a l ,  much o f  t h i s  was from  th e  L a n a rk sh ire  a re a .  Thus s h o r t- te rm
p o l ic y  in c lu d e d  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  60 new su rfa c e  d r i f t  mines so
S c o tla n d  cou ld  keep up h e r  p ro d u c tio n  f ig u r e s  w h ile  new c o l l i e r i e s  
1w ere b e in g  b u i l t ,
S c o tla n d  had im plem ented v a r io u s  form s o f new te ch n o lo g y  in  th e  
in te r -w a r  y e a rs  to  a  much g r e a t e r  e x te n t th a n  was done in  E ngland .
T h is  was ex trem ely  h e lp fu l  d u rin g  th e  p o s t-w a r  y e a rs  in  k eep ing  S c o t t is h  
la b o u r  p r o d u c t iv i ty  f ig u r e s  above th o se  o f  E ngland  in  a  tim e when p ro ­
d u c tio n  l e v e l s  w ere a  r e c o rd  low. The in t ro d u c t io n  o f a u to m a tic  lo a d -  
2in g  m achines in  th e  p i t s  and o f  m echanised w ashers f o r  th e  c o a l were 
th e  two m ost n o ta b le  t e c h n ic a l  advances in  th e  p o s t-w a r S c o t t i s h  m ines. 
Thus hando lean in g  o f  th e  mine o u tp u t was v i r t u a l l y  r e p la c e d  by  mechan­
i s a t io n ,  a new c e n t r a l  c o a l p re p a ra t io n  p la n t  o f  4 0 0 - to n s -a n -h o u r-  
c a p a c ity  was b u i l t  a t  D ^k e ith  to  re p la c e  fo u r  sm all o u t - o f - d a te  w ashers. 
A lso  fo llo w in g  th e  war th e  c o a l ' f i n e s ’ w ere f lo c c u la te d  o r  f r o th -  
f lo a te d  a s  a s te p  to  p re v e n t r i v e r  p o l lu t io n .  The h ig h e r  c o s t  o f  
m ining equipm ent added to  r i s i n g  c o s ts  b u t th e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f la b o u r  
sav ing  d e v ic e s  was a b le  to  b o th  in c re a s e  th e  p ro d u c t iv i ty  o f an
1 . A Short H istory  o f  the S c o t t is h  Coal-M ining Industry, p . 86,
2. Haynes, p,47* The 1945 R eid  Report had p laced  heavy emphasis on 
u n sa t is fa c to r y  haulage arrangements in  B r i t is h  mines, which auto­
m atic lo a d er s  came to  r e p la c e . The R eid Report i s  p rop erly  
e n t i t l e d  Coal-M ining. Report o f the T echn ical A dvisory Committee, 
(London, II. IL S, 0 , ,  March 1945, Cmd. 66lO) .
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in d iv id u a l miner and e v en tu a lly  r a ise  th e l e v e l  o f  production  
i t s e l f . ^
( i i i )  Review o f  the Area Programmes
The C entral West and C entral E ast area C o a lf ie ld s , which in clud ed  
Lanarkshire, were in  a s ta te  o f gradual d ec lin e . T h is area had produced 
20 m il l io n  tons a year in  I 9IO; t h i s  had f a l le n  to  under 7 m il l io n  ton s  
a year  fo llovfing  th e Second World War. Although the decrease in  
Lanarkshire was dram atic th ere were s t i l l  many seams o f undeveloped  
coking coa l which had never been developed in  th is  area . Thus, w h ile  
the S h o tts  and Clyde V a lle y  sub-areas had exhausted t h e ir  once p r o l i f i c  
r e se r v e s  o f both co a l and lim eston e, on ly  a few m ile s  south o f  S h o tts  
the f i r s t  major S c o t t is h  NCB p r o je c t . King s h i l l  No, 3, was b u i l t  to  
develop  an area w ith  a I 5 m il l io n  ton  p o te n t ia l o f coking coa l, a lthough  
th e fa c t  th a t t h is  mine was not b u i l t  u n t i l  1953 dem onstrated how s lo w ly  
post-w ar reco n stru ctio n  was ach ieved . Severa l o th er s i t e s  near Glasgow, 
Q ueenslie , Torrance (which was north  o f  Cardowan), D am ley  (near  
Barrhead), and v a r io u s p i t s  in  the C hryston-K ilsyth  d i s t r i c t  were b ein g  
t e s te d  by b orings in  th ese  years fo r  p o s s ib le  development in  the e a r ly  
1950’ s . C onstruction  was begun a t  a new G lenochil mine in  the A llo a
1 , See a lso , Haynes, p p .46-50 on m echanisation and mine la y -o u t, and 
A Short H istory  o f  the S c o tt ish  Coal-M ining In du stry , p p .89-100  
on mining hazards and the development o f sa fe ty  p recau tion s.
According to  the S .E .C .S ., 1949, p .7 : Fuel con serva tion  was 
s tr e s s e d  h e a v ily  in  th ese  years o f coa l shortage. The S c o tt is h  
F u el E ff ic ie n c y  Committee propounded various schemes such as more 
econom ical methods o f in d u s tr ia l b o i le r  f ir in g .  Over 3 ,000  men 
attended  courses arranged by the S c o t t is h  Fuel E f f ic ie n c y  Committee i  
and c r e d it  v/as g iv en  to  the Committee fo r  subsequent red u ction s in  
co a l consumption o f 30 per cent fo r  various la r g e  consumers and up 
to  50 per cent f o r  sev era l sm aller  en terp r ise s .
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d i s t r i c t  in  January 1952, which was to  produce 3 ,000  ton s a day o f  
su rface d r i f t .  Other s i t e s  a t A irth , K in n e il, and the area  between  
P lean  and the R iver F orth  were pending planning perm ission , th e ir  
even tu a l aggregate production  was to  be 3 m illio n  to n s  but t h is  would 
not b e r e a l is e d  u n t i l  15 years a f te r  i n i t i a l  co n stru ctio n  was begun. ^
The d e c lin e  o f coal-rain ing in  Lanarkshire caused variou s s o c ia l  
and economic problems in  th e  West o f S co tlan d . There was a grea t d ea l 
o f  s o c ia l  d is lo c a t io n  r e s u lt in g  from th e c lo s in g  o f  the p i t s .  In  the  
in ter-w ar years th is  most commonly took the form o f severe  unemployment. 
One mining area ju s t  south o f  Glasgow, B lan tyre , s t i l l  had compara­
t iv e ly  h igh  unemployment during the 1945-1951 years. But fo llo w in g  the  
war th e  c lo s in g  o f  a mine u s u a lly  meant another type o f  d is lo c a t io n  fo r  
the m iners such as a move to  another mining area o f a tr a n s fe r  to  
another type o f  employment. Although, r e la t iv e ly  speaking, th ere was 
a great d ea l o f  movement betw een mining areas, the n et movement was 
q u ite  sm all as there were few er miners employed fo llo w in g  World War I I ,  
Hence, th e  more dramatic change was a movement away from the mining 
industry  a lto g e th e r . F o r tu it io u s ly  in  Lanarkshire t h is  s o r t  o f  job
m o b ility  was made p o s s ib le  by a large  number o f f a c to r ie s  b u i l t  in  that
2area fo llo w in g  the Second World War.
The coa l r e se r v e s  o f  F i f e  were p r in c ip a lly  concentrated  near th e  
North Sea in  th e area between Leven and Kirkcaldy; however, there were 
a lso  la r g e  reserv es  in  the West o f  F i f e  which were rained by the  
V a lle y f ie ld  and Comrie C o l l i e r ie s .  The la r g e s t  new sin k in g s were to  be
1. Oakley, p .134.
2. L eser, p p .113-114.
204
found in  th e  ea st o f  F i f e  a t the R othes C o llie r y , near Thornton. In  
a d d itio n  major rec o n stru c tio n  was planned fo r  the 195 0 's  a t the  
M ichael C o llie ry , and a com pletely new sink ing was planned near the  
co a st to  the south-w est o f th e  e x is t in g  c o l l i e r i e s  o f  Frances, M ichael 
and W elles ley , which would include th e  co a ls  under th e  Forth, ^  During  
th e se  years mioh o f  the F i f e  area was run by the S c o t t is h  D iv is io n  o f  
th e NCB under th e  sh ort-term  p o lic y  o f  surface m inings, as was done by  
i t s  former p r iv a te  owners, so as to  ga in  immediate r e s u l t s  -  there  
were tw elve such mines in  the F i f e  area.
The N atio n a l P lan  c a l le d  fo r  two major s in k in g s  to  be made in  th e  
L othians a t  B ils to n  Glen and Monktonhall and a th ird  was t e n ta t iv e ly  
planned in  th e n o r th -e a st , although i t  was not mentioned in  the N ation a l 
P lan , Twelve c o l l i e r i e s  a lready e x is t in g  in  the L oth ians were to  be 
reco n stru cted  during the immediate post-w ar years. There was a lso  an 
unexplored b a sin  o f  coa l extending n ine m iles  from near R osew ell to  
the F ir th  o f  Forth which contained  19 or 20 seams o f workable th ick ­
n e sse s . A con cen tration  scheme a t N ew battle had by 1953 a lread y
2doubled the 1947 cxitput.
The s in k in g s  in  A yrshire were much more s c a tte r e d  than in  the  
oth er major C o a lf ie ld s . P rep ara tion s were made during th ese  y ea rs  fo r  
sin k in g  new c o l l i e r i e s  a t K illo c k  (w est o f  Cumnock), Barony R ig fo o t  
and p lans were made fo r  an a d d it io n a l sh a ft fou r  m iles  south  o f  Barony 
a t  the e x is t in g  L it t le r a i l l  C o llie r y  by 1954. There were a ls o  8 recon­
s tr u c tio n  schemes in  the Ayr-Dumfries area which would crea te  20 new
1. I b id .,  p .135.
2 . Oakley, p .136.
• % . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . , • •
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surface d r i f t  mines; by 1955 11 o f the 20 were already in  produc­
t io n .  ^
T his was q u ite  l i t e r a l l y  a tr a n s it io n  p eriod  fo r  the S c o t t is h  
coal-m in ing in d u stry . P lans were b ein g  drawn fo r  new s i t e s  and reno­
v a tio n  schemes fo r  e x is t in g  c o l l i e r i e s  were d ev ised  but very few  o f  
th ese  were implemented u n t i l  the e a r ly  19 5 0 's . In  terms o f a c tu a l pro­
d u ction  the output o f  th e  va r io u s areas o f the S c o t t is h  D iv is io n  o f  the  
N ation a l Coal Board was as fo llo w s:
Table 3 -  Output o f  S c o tt ish  D iv is io n  of the NCB. 1947-1951 ( to n s )
1947* 1948 1949 1950 1951
F if e  and 
Clackmannan 6 ,538 ,000 6, 994,700 7 ,31 8 ,1 0 0 7 ,3 1 1 ,5 0 0 6 ,5 5 8 ,8 7 0
L oth ians 3 ,481 ,000 3, 638,600 3 ,742 ,000 3 ,806 ,900 3 ,852 ,637
C entral West 4, 903, 500 4, 563,200 4 ,1 8 7 ,3 0 0 3 ,164 ,501
9 ,2 7 8 ,6 0 0
C entral E ast 3, 862,900 3,744 ,700 3 ,6 3 9 ,0 0 0 3 ,766 ,470
Ayr and 
Dumfries 3 ,676 ,300 4, 384,300 4 ,4 6 7 ,2 0 0 4 ,3 4 8 ,9 0 0 4 ,402 ,347
A llo a - - — 1 ,8 6 7 ,6 5 0 1 ,8 60 ,369
* 53 weeks
Source; S.E. C .S ., 1947, p .8; 1950, p .7 ; 1951, p . 7.
I t  i s  q u ite  obvious from the above ta b le  th a t S co tla n d  never reached  
i t s  30 m il lio n  to n s a year production  ta rg et g o a l. Apart from th e  many
1 . Ib id .
'1
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causes S cotlan d  had in  common w ith  other B r i t is h  mines which f a i l e d  
to  reach production  goa ls  ( e .g .  shortage o f w orkers), S cotland  was a lso  
hampered by the sm all average s iz e  o f  S c o tt is h  m in e s .. For example 79 
o f  the 275 c o l l i e r i e s  in  S co tlan d  a t V estin g  Date were allov/'ed to  sta y  
under p r iv a te  management, by sp e c ia l l ic e n c e  o f  the S c o tt is h  D iv is io n  
o f  the NCB, because they were so sm all. According to  L eser in  1945 
only  58 per cen t o f  S c o t t is h  m iners, as compared w ith  83 per cen t in  
B r ita in  as a whole, were working in  c o l l i e r i e s  employing pOO or more 
w age-earners. The average output o f S c o tt is h  c o l l i e r i e s  in  1950 was
120,000 ton s per annum, th e  low est fo r  any d iv is io n  in  B r it ia n  and fa r  
below  th e  average fo r  the E ast Midlands (420, 000) or the N orth-Eastern  
D iv is io n  (3 7 1 ,0 0 0 ).^  But in  th e  ea st o f S co tlan d  c o l l i e r i e s  were 
g en era lly  much la r g er  than in  th e  west and the average was not fa r
1. L eser, p p ,ll6 -1 1 7 .
I
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beyond th a t o f th e  country a s  a whole.^
1. Buxton argued in  a 1970 Economic H istory Review a r t ic le  th a t
'sm all*  was n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  ’ i n e f f i c i e n t  ' in  te rm s o f  th e  i n t e r ­
w ar B r i t i s h  c o a l m ines. B uxton defended th e  e n tre p re n e u rs  
a g a in s t  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a c c e p te d  charge w hich h e ld  i t  re sp o n ­
s ib l e  to  a g r e a t  e x te n t f o r  th e  r e l a t i v e l y  p o o r perform ance o f 
th e  in d u s try  betw een th e  w ars  by  showing t h a t  ' i t  was n o t p o s­
s ib le  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  f irm  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een  th e  s iz e  o f  a 
mine and  i t s  l e v e l  o f  e f f ic ie n c y *  (E .H .R ., 1970, p p .4 78 -479 ). 
A ccord ing  to  B uxton l a r g e r  m ines were n o t -  in  p r a c t ic e  -  
cap ab le  o f  g e n e ra tin g  te c h n ic a l  economies o f  s c a le  o f a s ig n i ­
f i c a n t  n a tu re  d u rin g  th e  in te r - w a r  y e a rs  (E .H .R ,, 1972, p . 662). 
Two y e a r s  l a t e r  in  a  d is c u s s io n  a r t i c l e  K irby  a t ta c k e d  Buxton 
f o r  m is in te r p r e t in g  th e  R eport of th e  R oyal Commission (1925) 
and th e  R eid  R ep o rt (1945 ), on th e  is s u e  o f  th e  c r i t e r i a  ( s iz e  
o r  age) on w hich m ines w ould b e  c lo sed . T hat th e re  was p ro ­
d u c tiv e  c a p a c i ty  su rp lu s  to  req u irem en ts  d u r in g  th e  in te r -w a r  
y e a rs  was a c c e p te d  by  b o th  Buxton and K irb y , A lthough B uxton 
s t r e s s e d  th a t  th e  1925 Committee was n o t a s  concerned  w ith  th e  
e l im in a tio n  o f  su rp lu s  c a p a c i ty  as  nuch as w ith  ' t h e  amalgama­
t io n s  o f  u n d e rta k in g s  and th e  c lo su re  o f red u n d an t u n i t s  o f  
p ro d u c tio n ' (E .H .R ., 1972, p . 6 5 6 ) ,  Yet what b o th  th e  R oyal 
Commission and  th e  R eid  Commission s t r e s s e d  was in e f f i c ie n c y  
o f  th e  m ines a s  th e  d e c id in g  f a c to r ,  most o f  w hich vrould b e  
o ld e r  -  n o t sm a ll -  m ines (R ep o rt o f th e  R oyal Commission on 
th e  Coal I n d u s tr y  ( 1 9 2 5 ) ,  1, Cmd, 2600, p . 2 3 0 ). Hence, much 
o f  th e  B uxton -  K irby  d e b a te  i s  w orking a t  c ro s s  p u rp o ses . 
Johnson  w ro te  a r a th e r  vague Second Comment to  t h i s  d eb a te  
w hich re a d s  v e ry  much a s  i f  he d id  n o t w ant to  o ffen d  e i t h e r  
Buxton o r  K irb y . N e v e r th e le s s , a s  K irby  re m a rk e d ,a t l e a s t  
Jo h n s o n 's  comments in d ic a te d  th a t  in te r -w a r  e n tre p re n e u rs  
would 'n o  lo n g e r  b e  found g u i l t y  w ith o u t t r i a l ' (E .H .R ., 1972, 
p . 6 6 9 ) .  See, N e il K. B uxton, 'E n tr e p re n e u r ia l  E f f ic ie n c y  in  
th e  B r i t i s h  G oal In d u s try  betw een  th e  W ars ', Economic H is to ry  
Review. 23 ( l9 7 0 ) ,  p p .476-497 ; M. W. K irby , 'E n tr e p re n e u r ia l  
E f f ic ie n c y  i n  th e  B r i t i s h  C oal In d u s try  betw een  th e  Wars : A 
Comment', p p .655-657; N e il  K. Buxton, 'E n tr e p re n e u r ia l  
E f f ic ie n c y  i n  th e  B r i t i s h  C oal In d u s try  betw een  th e  'Wars : 
R eco n firm ed ', p p .658-664; W. Johnson, 'E n tr e p re n e u r ia l  
E f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  B r i t i s h  C oal In d u s try  betw een  th e  Wars ; A 
Second Comment ' ,  pp . 665-668; N e il K. B uxton, 'A void ing  th e  
P i t f a l l s  ; E n t r e p re n e u r ia l  E f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  C oal In d u s try  
A g a in ', p p . 6 6 9 - 6 7 3 , Economic H is to ry  Review. 25 (1972). See 
a ls o ,  M. W. K irby , The B r i t i s h  Coal-M ining In d u s try  1870-1946. 
(London, M acm illan, 1977 ) .
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Thus there were a m u lt ip l ic i ty  o f  reasons why S cotlan d  f a i l e d  
to  meet i t s  production  g o a ls  such as reconversion  to  p eace-tim e, 
in s t a l la t io n  o f  new machinery and the change to  new te c h n o lo g ic a l pro­
cedures, There was a ls o  th e  added com plication  o f s h if t in g  the m ining  
cen tre  from Lanarkshire to  F ife ,  which e n ta ile d  not on ly  b u ild in g  new 
c o l l i e r i e s  and/or m odernising the e x is t in g  mines b u t a ls o  moving th e  
m iners and th e ir  fa m il ie s  to  a new area. The l a t t e r  was, o f  course, 
compounded by the housing shortage although miners rec e iv ed  p r e fe r e n t ia l  
treatm ent in  the a l lo c a t io n  o f co u n c il houses. A lso  the S c o tt ish  S p e c ia l 
Housing A sso c ia tio n  was a c t iv e  in  the con stru ction  o f  housing fo r  the  
m iners e s p e c ia l ly  th e  *pre-fab* houses which could be constructed  r e la ­
t i v e l y  qu ick ly  by u n sk il le d  b u ild in g  workers. Not th e  le a s t  o f the  
reason s exp la in in g  S c o tla n d 's  'underproduction' in  terms o f  NGB ta r g e t  
g o a ls  was th at th ese  g o a ls  were s e t  u n r e a l i s t ic a l ly  h igh . Perhaps 
t h e o r e t ic a l ly  th ese  ta r g e t  f ig u r e s  might have been reached in  a con­
t r o l l e d  economy, b u t th e  post-w ar y ea rs  in  Scotland  were anything but 
s t a t i c .  Too many important v a r ia b le s  were ignored when the ta rg e t  
f ig u r e s  were s e t .
Table 4  -  S c o tt ish  D iv is io n  o f  NGB Target Production  Goals and A ctual 
Output, 1939 and 1947-1951 ( to n s )
1939 -  30 ,528 ,900
1947 30 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  2 2 ,9 7 8 ,4 0 0
1948 2 3 ,7 8 4 ,0 0 0
1949 23 ,835 ,000
1950 23 ,293 ,600
1951 T 23 ,605 ,200
Source; S.E.C, S , , 1939, P - 8 ;  1946, p. 9; 1948, p. 8 ;  1950, p .7;
1951, p .7; 1952, p .10.
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Thus the 1947-1951 years were a tim e o f  planning ra th er than a ctu a l 
p h y sica l reco n stru ctio n  or p a r t ic u la r ly  h igh output,^
( iv )  Consumption
The f a l l  in  S c o t t is h  output had the g r e a te st  e f f e c t  on exports  
b ecause dom estic consumption remained r e la t iv e ly  stea d y .
Table 5 -  Consumption and Production o f  Coal in  S cotlan d , 1915. 1955 
and 1951 (m illio n  to n s)
1913 1935 1951
Consumption 2 7 .0 1 9 .4 22 .1
Net Exports 1 5 .5 11 .9 1 .8
Production 4 2 .5 31.3 23.6
(1 )  Includ ing a l l  consumption o f  opencast co a l.
(2 ) In clu d in g  a l l  bunker shipm ets and n et movements to  r e s t  
o f  U nited Kingdom.
( 3) Excluding 600,000 to n s o f opencast co a l and in c lu d in g
300,000 ton s o f co a l added to  stock .
Source; L eser, p . I l l ,  Table 51, from M in istry  o f F u el and Power, 
S t a t i s t i c a l  D ig e s t ,
The g r e a te s t  proportion  o f  S c o tt is h  coa l was consumed w ith in  the country  
i t s e l f .  The post-w ar annual output and le v e l  o f  home demand were much 
c lo se r  than b efore th e  war, w ith  th e r e s u lt  th a t a much sm aller  p ercen t­
age was a v a ila b le  fo r  exp ort.
1. See a ls o .  R egional Surveys o f  C o a lf ie ld s , (London, H, M .S.0 .,  a 
s e r ie s  o f  Government p u b lic a tio n s  is su e d  between 1944 and 1946).
1
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Table 6 -  D is tr ib u t io n  o f S c o t t is h  Coal, 1956-1958 and 1947 (m il l io n  
ton s)
1936-1938 1947
Cas 1.86 2 .29
E le c t r ic i t y 1 .08 2 .31
R a ilroad s 2 .13 2 .33
Coke Ovens 0 .91 1 .3 0
Industry 6 .7 0 6 .9 4
Domestic 5 .00 3 .4 9
C o llie r y  Consumption 2 .5 0 2 .05
Export Cargo and F oreign  Bunkers 6.90 0 .9 5
England 2 .8 0 0 .7 2
Northern Ire la n d 1 .3 0 0 .8 8
T ota l Consumption 31.18 23.26
Source; A Short H isto ry  o f  the S c o tt is h  Coal-M ining In du stry ,
p . 106, Coal Consumption in  Scotland; and p . 108, D isp o sa ls  
to  Markets outw ith  Scotland.
The demand fo r  more gas and e l e c t r i c i t y  fo llo w in g  the war in  turn put 
more demands upon the c o a l industry , and thus l e s s  in  i t s  primary form 
cou ld  be exported abroad.
The p a ttern  o f fu e l  consumption w ith in  S co tlan d  d id  not vary  
g r e a t ly  from th a t o f  B r ita in  a s  a whole.
■1II
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The consumption o f  coke was below  the le v e l  in  th e  r e s t  o f th e country  
( 10.7  per cen t to  16 ,7  per cen t) and the consumption o f gas and e le c ­
t r i c i t y  l e s s  than in  the r e s t  o f  the country. Scotland  used more coal 
and coa l-b ased  fu e l  per head o f  population  than th e  r e s t  o f B r ita in ,
the d iffe r e n c e  b ein g  g r e a te s t  in  th e  consumption by ra ilw ays and by
1th e  c o l l i e r i e s  them selves.
Table 8 -  Consumption o f  F uel by Major Consumers, 1951 (m il l io n  to n s)
Coal or co a l equ iva lent  
S cotlan d  Great B r ita in
Households
Iron and s t e e l
Other in d u str ie s
R ailw ays
C o ll ie r ie s
P u b lic  a u th o r it ie s
Commercial
Other
T ota l
6 ,6
3 .3
6 .1
2 . 2  
1 .8
1 .4 5
1 .2 5
0 .0 2
23.0
59.7
32.3
5 9 .4
15.7  
12.1 
11.6 
1 1 .9
1 .9
204.6
Scotland  as a 
proportion  o f  
Great B r ita in  
(percentage)
11,1
10.2
1 0 .3
14.0
14.9
1 2 .5
10 .5
10 .5
11.2
Source; L eser, p. 112, Table 53, from R id ley  Report and M in istry  o f  
F uel and Power.
Increased  demand was made by the expanding ir o n  and s t e e l  in d u stry . 
The production o f  s t e e l  requ ired  p ig  iron  from b la s t- fu r n a c e s  and th ese  
req u ired  iron  ore and m eta llu r g ic a l coke. M eta llu rg ic a l coke was pro­
duced in  coke ovens from co a ls  w ith  su ita b le  coking p ro p ertie s; t h i s
1. L eser, pp. 110- 111.
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type o f  co a l a ls o  being in  h igh  demand from th e  gasworks. Unfortu­
n a te ly , S cotlan d  was very short o f th is  p a r t ic u la r  type o f c o a l.
Hence, tonnages o f coking c o a l had to  be imported from abroad, w h ile  
a t the same tim e tonnages o f  d if fe r e n t  typ es o f co a l were b e in g  expor­
ted . T his f a c t  was viewed as  in t r in s ic a l ly  'wrong' in  m a te r ia ls  pub­
l is h e d  throughout the post-w ar years by the S c o t t is h  D iv is io n  o f the  
NGB. Yet i t  was on ly  'wrong' i f  Scotland  was expected to  be an i s o la ­
t io n i s t  in  terms o f  sa le a b le  goods in  a world o f  expending in te r ­
n a tio n a l commodity markets and 'fr e e  trade*. Post-w ar documents 
w ritten  by S c o ts  o ften  tended to  deplore the la ck  o f  any n a tu ra l 
resource, i . e .  coking co a l, a s  a personal a ffr o h t  to  th e ir  country and 
to  blame the d e p le tio n  o f  th e ir  resou rces on B r it is h ,  and s p e c i f i c a l ly  
E n glish , economic im perialism  o f  previous y e a r s .^  But S co tlan d  had 
never p o sse sse d  more than a lim ite d  amount of . coa l seams and i t  was 
true th at a grea t number o f  them were exhausted by the post-w ar y ears.
I t  was not on ly  counterproductive but a lso  lu d icro u s  fo r  the S co ts  to  
have expected  reg io n a l s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y  in  term s o f n a tu ra l reso u rces.
I t  i s  a ls o  in te r e s t in g  to  n o te  that there were never any com plaints  
about exports on ly  im ports, and th a t th ere was a c tu a lly  resentm ent th a t  
so h igh a percentage o f th e  annual coal output had to  go to  s a t i s f y  
dom estic demand ra th er  than fo r e ig n  markets.
The co st o f sa le a b le  co a l in  Scotland  exceeded th e  average c o s t  
in  England and W ales by an in cr ea sin g  margin during the 1947-1951 years. 
In  1947 S c o t t is h  c o s t s  were w e ll below  the n a tio n a l average, by 1952 
th ey  were o n e -th ird  h igher than in  the E ast M idlands, the low est c o s t  
Area in  B r ita in .
1 . For example, see  The N ation a l Coal Board’s A Short H istory  o f  th e  
S c o tt is h  Coal-M ining In d u stry , p .106, T his a t t itu d e  a ls o  predomin­
a te s  in  th e S c o t t is h  C ouncil (Development and Industry) 1955 book  
ed ited  by C. A. Oakley, S c o t t is h  Industry.
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F igure 2 -  Cost P er Ton o f  S a le a b le  Coal in  S co tlan d  and in  B r i t a in ,
1947-1952
S cotlan d
Great B r ita in
60
3  50
45
40
L .________I_________ I_________ L1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
SourceÎ L eser, p , l l 6 .  F igure 11 ; Cost per ton o f  sa le a b le  coa l in  
Scotland  and in  Great B r ita in , 1947-1952.
A c o n s is te n t  p r o f it  was earned in  S cotlan d  u n t i l  1950, but in  1951 and 
1952 a marked lo s s  was r e g is te r e d . T his may be p a r t ia l ly  exp la ined  by  
the l o s s  o f  S co tla n d 's  pre-war le a d  in  m echanisation fo llo w in g  the war. 
In  1935 72 per cent o f  the S c o tt ish  output was cut by machinery as com­
pared to  50 per cent fo r  B r ita in  as a wholej in  1951 th ese  p roportions  
were 86 per cent and 81 per cent r e s p e c t iv e ly . S c o tla n d 's  s l ig h t  1935 
lea d  (48 per cent : 42 per cent) in  co a l conveyed by machinery was l o s t  
by 1951 as w e ll (80 per cen t : 88 per ce n t) .^
1. L eser, p . l l 6 .
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The f a l l  in  coal production  was a ls o  due to  various fa c to r s  
regarding the employment s itu a t io n , namely a a n a ller  labour fo rce , 
absenteeism  and in d u s tr ia l d isp u te s . There was a great f a l l  in  the  
1939 f ig u r e  o f  30 m il l io n  ton s o f  coal to  the post-w ar f ig u r e s  which 
never surpassed 23 m il l io n .
Table 9 -  S c o t t is h  Coal-M iners and Coal Output, 1938-1952
Output in  ton s Average wage earners
1938 30, 479,100 89,900
1939 30, 528,900 • 88,303
1940 29, 698, 500 .86,395
1941 26, 561,700 . 82,929
1942 26,188 ,800 83,761
1943 24, 701,800 81,746
1944 23, 366,300 80,328
1945 21, 395,053 80 ,328
1946 22, 510,700 79,130
1947* 22, 978,400 81,073
1948 23 ,7 8 4 ,0 0 0 82,397
1949 23, 835,000 82,683
1950 23, 293,600 81,492
1951 23, 605, 200 82,162
1952 23, 300,000 84,766
* 53 weeks
Source: S. B.C. S .,  1939, p .8 ;  1946, p .9; 1948, p .8; 1950, p .7 ;  
1952, p .10.
The post-w ar le v e l  o f  labour p r o d u c tiv ity , output p er man in  to n s, was 
d ec id ed ly  low. In  England one fa c to r  con tr ib u tin g  to  t h i s  was the  
apparent re lu ctan ce  b e fo re  th e war to  in v e s t  in  labour saving d e v ic e s  as
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1. 8 .E .G .8 ., 1950, p .7 ;  1951, p . 9-
I
i t  f e l t  such m odernisations were unnecessary to  meet demand. However 
in  S cotlan d  the in v er se  s itu a t io n  was p resen t, fo llo w in g  the war 
labour p ro d u ctiv ity  was h igher in  Scotland  than in  England, much o f  
t h i s  was because S cotlan d  had in s t a l le d  a great d ea l o f new technology  
b e fo r e  the war, but th e  aggregate production  le v e l  in  Scotland  was much 
low er than England fo llo v /in g  the war.
(v )  Employment and In d u s tr ia l R e la tio n s
The slow  r a te  o f  recovery o f  the S c o t t is h  m ines, un fortunate in  
view  o f  th e  in crea sed  amount o f  c a p ita l  in v e s te d  in  m echanisation  and 
tech n ica l p rogress w ith in  the in d u stry , was p a r t ia l ly  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  
th e ex ten s iv e  amount o f  absenteeism . In the la t e  1940's , a f t e r  the 
passage o f th e  5-day-work-week, th e 11 day fo r tn ig h t  v/as in troduced  
in  order to r a i s e  production . During th e th ree  years, 1950-1952  
in c lu s iv e , Saturday working produced 1 ,5  m il l io n  tons annually . But 
absenteeism  was so widespread on Saturday mornings th at the expected  
in crease  in  output was con sid ered  to  be v ir t u a l ly  negated. A lthough  
the 11 day fo r tn ig h t  Y/as te c h n ic a l ly  continued u n t i l  30 A pril 1952, 
the Saturday s h i f t  was cut by h a lf  an hour in  1951 and the months o f  
June, J u ly  and August excluded from the agreement a lto g e th e r  in  an 
attem pt to  appease the m iners and encourage them to  come to  work regu­
la r ly .  A bsenteeism  throughout th e week a ls o  continued  to  be a problem  
during th ese  y ea rs .^
U n o ff ic ia l stoppages were both  widespread and numerous during 3i
th e s e  y ears. In  J u ly  o f 1950 th ere  were 60 S c o t t is h  c o l l i e r i e s  on $
-il
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s tr ik e  fo r  in creased  wages. T his le d  to  th e  N ational R eference  
Tribunal in  October o f th a t  year granting a bu lk  wage in cr ea se  o f  
£ 3.5  m il l io n  to  b e d iv id ed  among the lower pa id  workers by n e g o tia t io n .  
This d is tr ib u t io n  provided an in crea se  o f  5s. Od, a væek to  th e  m ini­
mum ra te  fo r  adu lt workers, t h is  ra ised  the minimum ra te  fo r  co a l­
miners on th e  surface to  £5 5 s. Od, and to  £6 Os, Od, fo r  th o se  under- 
1ground. T h is was ju s t  s l ig h t ly  lower than th a t o f  th e n a tio n a l aver­
age fo r  mine-workers.
In  a d d itio n  th ere  was a marked f a l l  fo llo v /in g  the ?/ar in  younger 
workers jo in in g  th e  co a l in d u stry . A dd itional manpower was sought by  
s p e c ia l  deferment and r e le a se  from the Armed F orces o f  former raine- 
workers as w e ll as men who d e s ir e d  to  jo in  th e  in d u stry . There was a 
much greater  need fo r  workers underground than in  the surface d r i f t  
mines as su rface  workers were f a i r l y  easy fo r  th e  mines to  o b ta in . 
Improved c o n d itio n s  o f  employment such as the b u ild in g  o f r e c r e a tio n  
cen tres  and p r io r it y  in  th e  housing programme were a l l  hoped to  a t t r a c t  
new workers. Coal-m ining was in  fa c t  a post-w ar example o f  an in d u stry  
a c t iv e ly  seek ing fo r e ig n  workers as a stop-gap measure. Not u n t i l  1952, 
however, d id  th e  flovf o f  new r e c r u it s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  o f younger men, to  
th e  S c o tt ish  coal-m in ing in d u stry  improve markedly. In  1952 double  
s h i f t s  were q u ite  h appily  in troduced  by the mines to  accommodate the  
new workers. But the in tro d u ctio n  o f  the 5-day-work-week, wage in crea ­
s e s  and improvements o f  working con d itio n s caused coal-m ining p r ic e s  to
1 . S.E. O.S. , 1950, p .7 . The h igh er average annual income o f  S c o t t is h  
mine-workers in  comparison to  the r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in  was a t t r i ­
buted to  the lon ger hours worked by the S c o ts . D. J . R obertson in  
C aim cross, pp. 159 and 162 .163 .
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r i s e  s u b s ta n t ia lly .^  The reduced labour force  was even prevented  
from ach ieving  the r a te  o f production  th a t i t  cou ld  have produced, 
because o f  r e s t r i c t iv e  p r a c t ic e s  such as absenteeism  and u n o f f ic ia l  
stoppages. In  January o f 1951 A t t le e  made h is  l a s t  appeal to  the  
coal-raining in d u stry  b efo re  le a v in g  o f f ic e .  In  a l e t t e r  to  a l l  
B r it is h  miners he wrote:
I  ask you on b eh a lf  o f  the Government and o f  the  
country to  go to  work on every reg u la r  working day 
throughout the next fo u r  months, and to  a tten d  a l l  
the Saturday s h i f t s  fo r  which your p i t  i s  open, or 
to  work an extra  h a lf  hour fo r  f iv e  days, whichever 
i s  th e  custom in  your d i s t r i c t . 2
The appeal was not heeded.
( v i )  "Conclusion
I t  i s  easy  to  w r ite  o f f  th e  S c o tt ish  coal-m in ing in d u stry  o f  the  
post-w ar y ea rs  as, according to  L eser, 'By 1951 i t  was a lread y  obvious
1. F ollow ing th e war a l l  new workers coming in to  the coal-m in ing  
in d u stry  had to  a tten d  a tr a in in g  programme. These courses  
covered a l l  a sp ects  o f  coal-m ining from haulage and o th er  b a s ic  
underground work to  work at th e  coa l fa c e . Furthermore, r e s id en ­
t i a l  tr a in in g  courses were s e t  up fo r  ju v e n ile s  which included  
both  th e o r e t ic a l  classroom  work and p r a c t ic a l  underground exp eri­
ence a t  a tr a in in g  cen tre  nearby. L ikew ise, th ere  were sim ilar  
n o n -r e s id e n tia l courses fo r  a d u lts . F in a n c ia l a s s is ta n c e  was 
a v a ila b le  fo r  th ose who wished to  a tten d  th ese  programmes. There 
was another programme designed  to  g iv e  p r a c t ic a l  exp erien ce to  
u n iv e r s ity  tra in ed  mining engineers in  th e  c o l l i e r i e s .  The NOB 
was q u ite  proud o f  th e  sch o la rsh ip s i t  gave each year to  four  
m iners to  do a degree in  mining en g in eerin g  -  although t h i s  ges­
ture was g en era lly  thought to  be ra th er  d er iso ry . I .  and E .,  
1946, p .26 and G.H .T.R., 1950, p .15.
2. S .E .C .S ., 1950, p .8 .
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th a t output was f a l l in g ,  consumption r is in g , p r o d u c tiv ity  low er than  
ev er  and the margin between S c o t t is h  and B r i t is h  c o s t s  continuing to  
r i s e ’ ,^ Although the S c o tt ish  D iv is io n  did compare unfavourably w ith  
th e  improvement ach ieved  in  th e o th er  C o a lfie ld s  o f  the N ational Coal 
Board, such a statem ent rounds o f f  the post-w ar y ea rs  in  general nega­
t iv e  terms and evokes images o f  economic d e c lin e  and reg io n a l f a i lu r e .
On the contrary, although output in  Scotland d id  f a l l  1950-1951 t h i s  
was in d ic a t iv e  o f the B r i t is h  co a l shortage o f  t h i s  w in ter  and t h i s  
argument was not v a l id  as i t  i s o la t e s  th is  year as an example o f  the  
post-w ar years as a whole; consumption was r i s in g  ra p id ly  but t h i s  was 
g e n e r a lly  f e l t  to  be a p o s it iv e  s ig n  o f a post-w ar economy rea d ju stin g  
i t s e l f  to  p eace-tim e demand e s p e c ia l ly  from heavy industry; a lthough  |
p r o d u c tiv ity  was low  throughout Great B r ita in , i t  was notably h igh er  |j
2 '  1 in  Scotland  than England and L e se r 's  statem ent took no account o f  i1t h i s  fa c t;  th e  w idening margin betw een S c o tt ish  and B r it is h  c o s ts  was |
3 'ia v a l id  c r i t ic is m , although, to  c i t e  probably th e  b e s t  exp lan ation , #
4Scotland  was in  th e  midst o f tr a n sferr in g  the b u lk  o f  i t s  coa l in d u stry
Ifrom one s id e  o f  the country to  the other dur'ing th ese  years. jj
1 . L eser, p ,117.
2. See p .2 0 1 .
3. See F igure 2, p . 214.
220
3. Iron and S tee l
( i )  H is to r ic a l Background
The S c o t t is h  iron  and s t e e l  industry developed in  th e  County o f
Lanark, famous fo r  i t s  la r g e  d e p o s its  o f blackband iro n sto n e . The ore
was o r ig in a l ly  sm elted  w ith  lo c a l  co a l in  lo c a l  b la s t  fu rn a ces . By
the time the Lanark d e p o s its  had become exhausted  th e  Clyde had developed
in to  a la r g e  consumer o f iro n  and s t e e l .  Hence the steel-m ak in g  in d u stry
remained in  t h i s  area, sw itch in g  to  imported ore and making in creased
1u se  o f  scrap m etal. For some tim e the ample supply o f  lo c a l  coking  
c o a ls  in  Lanarkshire enabled th e  area to  r e ta in  some o f  i t s  lo c a tio n a l  
advantages. But the supply o f  coking co a ls  had dwindled ap p reciab ly  by  
the post-w ar years; t h i s  was demonstrated by the s h if t  o f  the co a l­
mining in d u stry  away from Lanarkshire to  the e a s t .  N otw ithstanding the  
d ep le tio n  o f  b oth  the iro n sto n e  and coking c o a l d ep o s its  in  Lanark, 
th e  s t e e l  in d u stry  continued, to  expand and a c tu a lly  reached a peak o f  
2*4 m il lio n  in g o t tons in  1950. The main S c o t t is h  steelw orks fo llo w in g  
the war remained in  or on th e  border o f Lanark; th e la r g e s t  was
C lydebridge, s itu a te d  on th e o u tsk ir ts  o f Glasgow, a lso  in  M otherwell,
2and a t Glengarnock in  North Ayr.
The experience o f  the S c o t t is h  p ig  iron  in d u stry  in  th e 1950*8 
had been d isa s tr o u s . In  1950: 'B u sin ess throughout th e year was in  a
dep lorab le s ta te ,  and a t no tim e was th ere even th e  appearance o f any 
ground fo r  hope o f  improvement',"^ and in  1951 and 1932 on ly  one furnace
1. L eser, p p .121-122.
2. Ib id .
3. Campbell, p,159«
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was in  b la s t  a t a tim e. The 20 per cent duty on fo r e ig n  (n o n -B r itish  
Empire) iron  was counteracted  b y  th e  imports from England and In d ia .
As w e ll as having to  face com p etition  from E n g lish  steelw ork s, th e  
p r o f ita b le  production  o f  p ig  ir o n  was d ir e c t ly  dependent on th e p o s i­
t io n  o f  the s t e e l  trade, which in  turn was dependent on the fo r tu n e s  
o f  the sh ip b u ild in g  trade. But by 1937, when the heavy in d u s tr ie s  began 
to  recover, th e  iro n  and s t e e l  in d u stry  s t i l l  had to  d ea l w ith  se v e r a l  
inherent problems, i .e .^ t h e  need f o r  new markets fo r  t h e ir  products, 
shortages o f  scrap and the com petition  caused by heavy im portation  o f  
E n g lish , Indian and R ussian p ig  iron . The in cr ea se d  demand fo r  p ig  
iro n  could not be met by th e  S c o t t is h  steelw ork s. The o p p osite  problem  
was caused in  1938 when demand f e l l ,  fo r  th ere was then a surp lus o f  
p ig  iron , most o f  i t  imported from abroad. F o llow in g  the war th ere  
were very severe shortages both  o f  s t e e l  and o f  scrap m etal. T h is was 
compounded in  th e  West o f  S cotlan d  by th e  exh au stion  o f  Lanarkshire 
resou rces and th e  growing demand fo r  the heavy in d u s tr ie s , e .g .  sh ip ­
b u ild in g , which in  turn c a l le d  fo r  both  s t e e l  and scrap.
( i i )  Post-War P lanning and R econstruction
During th e f in a l  war y ea rs , 1943-1945, p lanners o f  th e  post-w ar  
s t e e l  in d u stry  expected c o r r e c t ly  th a t the post-w ar y ea rs  would be a 
s e l l e r s  market. But th ere was a lso  undue B r i t i s h  fe a r  o f  b oth  American
1. Ib id , See a lso  the Glasgovf Herald Trade Review fo r  th e years 1934 
and 1936. M. W, K irby, The D eclin e  o f B r i t is h  Economic Power S ince  
1870. (London, George A lle n  and Unvd.n, I 98I )  , pp. 57-81 on the  
B r i t i s h  economy in  th e  1930*s . Kirby d is c u s se s  th e  iro n  and s t e e l  
trad e, in  i t s  r o le  a s  a key exporting in d u stry , and i t s  la g  in  
e f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  1930 *s as in d ic a t iv e  o f  the s ta t e  o f  th e economy. 
See a ls o ,  N ie l K. Buxton, 'E ff ic ie n c y  and O rganisation  in  S co tla n d 's  
Iron  and S te e l  Industry during the Interw ar P e r io d ', Economic 
H istory  Review. 29 ( I 976) ,  p p .107-124.
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and C ontin en ta l com p etition  fo llo w in g  the war,  ^ no doubt caused by
the g lu t  o f  p ig  ir o n  in  1938 a ttr ib u ta b le  to  over- im portât io n  o f
fo r e ig n  p ig  iron . Some o f the s t r e s s  on low  fo r e ig n  p r ic e s  may have
been c a lc u la te d  by B r i t i s h  p lanners so  as to  urge the ca se  fo r  modern- |
i s a t io n  and new technology  in  the in d u stry . Although American exports
were much h igher than b e fo r e  the war, as B r i t is h  steelm akers had
feared , t h i s  was due to  h igh  demand and w orld shortages o f iro n  and
s t e e l  ra th er  than because the American s t e e l  industry  had found new
o u t le t s  fo r  surplus ca p a c ity  and/or were s e l l in g  t h e ir  products a t
2p r ic e -c u t t in g  l e v e l s .  The volume o f  U nited  S ta te s  s t e e l  exports was 
g r e a te s t  in  the ea r ly  post-w ar yea rs . In  1949-1950 American dom estic  
demand f e l l ,  as most o f  the wartime d eferred  purchasing, reconstru c­
t io n  and world s c a r c i t ie s  had been d e a lt  w ith .
Table 1 -  Exports o f  in g o ts , 'se m is ', and f in ish e d  s t e e l  (thousand  
to n s )
U nited Kingdom U nited  S ta te s
194.6 1, 722 .0 4 ,1 1 0 .2
1947 1 ,2 8 0 .0 5, 663.3
1948 1, 452 .0 3, 793.9
1949 1 ,7 3 8 .0 4 ,1 2 8 .5
1950 2 ,3 5 6 .7 2, 396.5
1951 1 , 915.7 2 ,7 5 6 .3
Source; S e le c te d  co u n tr ies  and years from Burn, p. 141, Table 9,
E xports o f  in g o ts , 'sem is' and f in is h e d  s t e e l  (by country  
o f  consignment) (thousand to n s) .
1. Dincan Burn, The S te e l  Industry 1939-1959 A Study in  Com petition  
and P lann ing. (Cambridge, Cambridge U n iv ers ity  P re ss , I 96I ) ,  p. 129.
2. I b id . ,  p .29.
3. I b id . ,  p .133.
i
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The U nited  S ta te s  s t e e l  in d u stry  was in d ic a t iv e  o f  th e  w orld econoiry 
a t th is  p o in t , as 1949 marked a slump in  output and the end o f  p o s t­
war in f la t io n ,  which B r ita in  and Scotland  shared in  to  a l im ite d  
degree. Both B r i t is h  output and exports o f  s t e e l  rose  slow ly  but 
s te a d ily  throughout these y e a r s . There was no dramatic f a l l  in  pro­
duction  in  1949-1950 in  B r ita in  a s  occurred in  America, a lthough a 
sm aller drop d id  occur in  1950-1951 in  B r ita in .
Table 2 -  P roduction  o f  crude s t e e l ,  1937. 1943, 1945-1951 (m il l io n  
to n s )
U nited  Kingdom U nited  S ta te s
1937 12.98 50.57
1943 13.03 79.32
1945 11.82 71.16
1946 12.70 59.47
1947 12.72 75 .80
1948 14.88 79.14
1949 15 .5 5 69.62
1950 16.29 86.46
1951 15.64 93.93
Source; Burn, p .132, Table 6 , S e le c te d  co u n tr ies  and years from  
World P roduction  o f  Crude S te e l ,  1937, 1943, 1945-58  (m il lio n  to n s ) .
Although B r i t i s h  consumption alm ost reached the pre-war peak in  I 946 
the output o f  crude s t e e l ,  in g o ts  and c a s t in g s , d id  not exceed the 1937 
f ig u r e  u n t i l  1948, when i t  d id  so q u ite  s t r ik in g ly  (1937 : 1 2 ,9 8  m il lio n  
in got ton s; 1948 : 14 .88  m il l io n  to n s ) .  ^ These p a ttern s were ty p ic a l
1 . Burn, p .136.
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1. Burn, p .134 .
2 . C hristopher Harvie, No Gods and P reciou s Few Heroes. (London, 
Edward Arnold, I 98I ) ,  p . 41 .
3 . C o lv i l le 8 Ltd. Statem ent o f  John Craig to  th e  Fourteenth Annual 
General M eeting, 24 May 1945, P e te r  Payne, C o lv i l le s  and the  
S c o tt is h  S t e e l  Industry. (Oxford, Clarendon P re ss , 1979), p .262. 
See a ls o , Payne, p .263, T able 10 .1 , 'In got Output : U nited  Kingdom, 
the C o lv i l le  Group, and Lanarkshire S te e l  Works, 1939-1945 '.
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o f  the B r i t is h  and American economies as a whole, s t e e l  production  
and exports proved to be good in d ic a to r s  of th e  h ea lth  o f  a n a tio n a l  
economy, in  t h i s  era  o f  demand fo r  heavy in d u s tr ie s .
R ationing, b ased  on th e war-time ^ stem  o f  a l lo c a t io n s  to  in d u stry  
a t  the d is c r e t io n  o f  th e Government, continued throughout the post-w ar  
y e a r s . During t h is  p er iod  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  was p a id  to  'p r ice  
mechanism' or the variou s a sp ec ts  o f  handling p r o f i t s  and p r ic e  p o l i ­
c i e s ,  the emphasis in  s t e e l  p r ic e  p o lic y  was in s te a d  on keeping p r ic e s  
b oth  low and s ta b le .  Government su b s id ie s  were used  in  a s so c ia t io n  
w ith  other pre-war and wartime d e v ic e s  to  b rin g  t h is  about. By 1949 
the Government began to  phase out in d u s tr ia l s u b s id ie s , as i t  had been
meant to  be on ly  a t r a n s it io n  measure from war to  p eace-tim e, and by
%t h is  time the most immediate s c a r c i t ie s  had been d e a lt  w ith .
( i i i )  C o lv i l le s  and Post-War M odernisation
The main cen tre  o f the S c o t t is h  steelw ork s v/as owned and managed
by the C o lv i l le s  Group in  L anarkshire. In  1934 amalgraations produced
2C o lv i l le s  L td . , which had 95 p er cent o f  th e  S c o tt is h  ca p a c ity . %
During th e  war C o lv i l le s  Ltd, and i t s  s u b s id ia r ie s  r o l le d  over 9 m ill io n  
tons o f s t e e l .   ^ In  1943 post-w ar planning began in  th e  C o lv i l le s  
management m eetings. The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  d iv e r s ify in g  in to  the
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development o f  p la s t i c s  was in v e s t ig a te d  but e v e n tu a lly  d ism issed  as  
too  g rea t o f  a change or a l t e r n a t iv e ly  because th e  by-products from 
the coke ovens were too  va lu ab le . One type o f  post-w ar in n ovation  th a t  
was implemented was th e supply o f sh eet s t e e l  needed by the housing  
in d u stry , e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  the co n stru ctio n  o f pre-fab  and various tempo­
rary  hou ses.^  C o lv i l le s  spent approxim ately £3 , 200 ,000  on p lan t ex ten ­
s io n s  and improvements in  th e  f i r s t  f iv e  years a f te r  the war and were 
alm ost ab le  to  a t ta in  t h e ir  post-w ar ta r g e t  goa l by  1950, when th ey  
produced 1 ,8 87 ,170  to n s  o f  s t e e l  in g o ts  and 488,303 to n s  o f  p ig  ir o n .
Table 3 -  Crude S te e l  Output ; U nited  Kingdom, Scotland , and the  
C o lv i l le  Croup; and P ig  Iron  Production  o f  the C o lv i l le  Group, 1946-
1251
Note; Crude S te e l  Output rep resen t th e t o t a l  tonnage o f s t e e l  produced 
b y  th e  open-hearth, Bessemer, and e le c t r ic  p ro cesses , togeth er  
w ith  a l l  o ther in g o ts  and c a s t in g s , in  each ca lendar year.
Source; Payne, p . 316, T able 11 .6  in  Crude S te e l  Outputs, U.K. and 
S cotlan d  ; B r i t is h  Iron and S te e l  F ederation , subsequently  
Iron  and S te e l  Board and the B, I , S. P . , Annual S t a t i s t i c s .
Crude S te e l  and P ig  Iron  outputs o f  th e C o lv i l le  Group i 
C o lv i l le s  L td ., Annual R eports and A ccounts.
1 . I b id . ,  p p .275-320 a d e ta i le d  account o f  C o lv i l le s  Ltd. in  th e  p o st­
war y ea rs , i t s  m odernisation  programme, and some d is c u s s io n  o f  
C o lv i l le s  r e la t io n sh ip  w ith  the Government, the B r i t i s h  F ederation  
o f  Iron  and S te e l  and th e  F ir s t  Iron  and S te e l  Board. P ayn e's book 
i s  an e x c e lle n t  b u s in e ss  h is to r y  o f the C o lv i l le s  S teelw ork s, but i t  
on ly  makes is o la te d  attem pts to  f i t  the in d u stry  in to  some type o f  
n a tio n a l much l e s s  in te r n a t io n a l framework.
U.K. S cotlan d The C o lv i l le  Group 1
Thousand
tons
Thousand
ton s
% o f  
U.K.
Crude
S te e l
(to n s)
^  o f  P ig  Iron  
Scotland  ( to n s ) 1
1946 1 2 ,6 9 4 .3 1 ,7 6 4 .5 1 3 .9 1 ,4 10 ,824 8 0 .0 375,121
1947 1 2 ,7 2 4 .5 1 ,8 7 8 .9 1 4 .8 1 ,489 ,513 7 9 .3 341,640
1948 1 4 ,8 7 6 .6 2 ,2 5 3 .9 15.2 1 ,734 ,675 7 7 .0 521,564
1949 15, 552.9 2 ,3 8 1 .8 1 5 .3 1 ,8 5 3 ,6 5 0 7 7 .8 511,142
1950 16 ,292 .7 2 ,4 2 6 .2 14 .9 1 ,8 8 7 ,1 7 0 7 7 .8 488,303
1951 1 5 ,6 3 8 .5 2 ,1 1 4 .8 1 3 .5 1 ,664 ,922 7 8 .7 546,335
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Post-w ar p lanning was a ls o  b ein g  done by th e  Post-W ar R econstruc­
t io n  Committee o f  th e  B r i t is h  Iron  and S te e l  F ed eration , which in  1943 
asked C o lv i l le s ,  along w ith  every o th er B r it is h  s tee lw o rk s , to  provide  
e stim a tes  o f t h e ir  probable c a p ita l  expenditure in  th e f i r s t  f iv e  
y ea rs  a f t e r  the European A rm istice*^ The p lan  C o lv i l le s  subm itted to  
th e  F ed eration  in clud ed , most im portantly , the c o n stru c tio n  a t D a lz e l l  
o f  a modern sm elting  shop c o n s is t in g  o f  s ix  100-to n  fu rn aces; t h is  
rep resen ted  a grea t advance in  th e  m odernisation o f th e  in d u stry  which  
had been  in terru p ted  by th e  war.
M odernisation p lan s fo r  th e post-w ar S c o t t is h  s t e e l  in d u stry  were 
designed  to  make Scotland  l e s s  o f  a t r a n s it  area, dependent on imports 
from abroad and other areas o f  Great B r ita in , and more r e l ia n t  on lo c a l  
su p p lie s  o f  p ig  iron  and scrap. J u st b e fo re  the war C o lv i l le s  had b u i l t  
a com plete p la n t fo r  the manufacture o f  p ig  iron  w ith  a combined capa­
c i t y  o f  600 ,000  ton s o f steel-m ak in g  iro n  per year, to  take the p la ce  o f  
th e ir  Glengarnock and Clyde Iron  Works both  o f which were an tiq u ated  in  
terms o f  technology and q u ite  l i t e r a l l y  worn out. The e x is t in g  b la s t  
furnaces, p r im arily  a t th e  B airds and S c o t t is h  G artsherrie Works which 
manufactured hem atite and foundry iron , were o b so le te  and a t the conclu­
s io n  o f  th e  war were rep la ced  by modern p la n ts . The n ecessa ry  f a c i l i t i e s  
fo r  ore p rep aration  and s in te r in g  were a ls o  b u i l t .  L im ited  expenditure  
was made to  reconvert th e C o lv i l le  steelw ork s a t Glengarnock, Lanark­
sh ire  and C lydebridge, The steel-m aking p la n ts  o f  the S t e e l  Conpany o f  
Scotland, a su b sid iary  o f  C o lv i l le ,  were scrapped a lto g e th e r  as i n e f f i ­
c ie n t .  A l l  the post-w ar p ro p o sa ls  were d esigned  to  con cen trate  th e
1. Payne, p. 2?6,
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variou s forms o f production  in  p a r tic u la r  p la n ts . Thus r a i l  and 
s le e p e r -r e la te d  manufacture was concentrated  a t Glengarnock, the  
heavy s e c t io n  and j o i s t  trad e a t Lanarkshire, and consequently  the  
r o l l in g  m i l l  a t H all s id e  was c lo sed . A ccording to  the 1945 Report to  
the M in istry  o f Supply on th e  Iron  and S te e l  Industry by  the B r it is h  
Iron  and S te e l  F ederation , o th er n o n -C o lv ille s  p la n ts , such as B airds  
and S c o t t is h  Steelw orks, were allow ed to  s ta y  in  b u s in e ss  but were man­
dated to  make str in g en t e f f o r t s  a t g rea ter  economy in  t h e ir  operating  
c o s ts . Other proposals in c lu d ed  the e x ten s io n  o f  the Beardmore's p lan t  
a t  Parkhead o f the s t e e l  foundry and arrangements fo r  the manufacture o f  
th e heavy forged  r o l l s  needed fo r  the continuous hot and co ld  r o l l in g  
m il ls .  The s t e e l  sm eltin g  shop a t Parkhead was designed  to  meet the  
needs o f th e  B r i t is h  A dm iralty fo r  the post-w ar naval f l e e t .^
B a s ic a l ly ,  s t e e l  was made in  a cru c ib le  where the in g r e d ie n ts ,
u su a lly  a lread y  in  a m olten m etal s ta te , were heated  to  a very  h igh
temperature and oxygen was blown through the 'melt* to  crea te  th e
chem ical r e a c t io n  to  make s t e e l ,  w ith  scrap added to  act as a coo lan t.
I t  was th e chem ical r e a c t io n  which took p la ce  w ith  the in tro d u ctio n  o f
2oxygen to  the iro n  that caused th e iro n  to  be r e f in e d  in to  s t e e l .  Most 
o f  the S c o t t is h  steelw orks used  co ld  m etal ra th er  than hot m etal, the
1. B r i t is h  Iron  and S te e l  F ed eration , Report to  the M in istry  o f  
Supply on th e  Iron and S te e l  Industry^ ( S t e e l  House, London, 
December 1945), p p .11-12 . A lso  Payne, p . 277.
2, B r it is h  Scrap A sso c ia tio n  J u b ile e  Issu e . May I 969, p .21, See a lso ,  
George E. Dinner, Welding M etallurgy Carbon and A llo y  S t e e l s , (New 
York, American Welding A sso c ia tio n , I 565) ,  pp. 13-49 on ty p es  o f  
s t e e l  and t h e ir  manufacture, a very  good summary o f  th e  v a r io u s  
p ro cesses  o f  steel-m ak ing and the d if fe r e n t  ty p es  o f  s t e e l  ( i . e .  
carbon, a l lo y ,  h ig h -a llo y  and t o o l - s t e e l )  produced.
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more modem technique. No oth er steel-rproducing reg io n  in  Great 
B r ita in , not even S h e f f ie ld ,  used  so l i t t l e  hot m etal in  th e post-w ar  
y ea rs . In  1950 2 ,5 5  m il l io n  tons o f  co ld  p ig  iro n  and s t e e l  and c a s t  
iron  scrap were used and on ly  110,000 ton s o f hot m eta l. However, the  
p o s it io n  was slow ly  changing fo r  in  1937 no hot m etal was used at a l l  
and by 1951 the f ig u r e  had r is e n  s ig n if ic a n t ly  h igher ( 194,000  ton s)  
than th e  previous year, thus the sw itch  was b ein g  made q u ick ly  fo llo w ­
ing the war. Only one steelw ork  in  S cotlan d  could cla im  to  be in te ­
grated , making u se  o f  both  co ld  and hot m etal; t h i s  was, p red ic ta b ly , 
the main C o lv i l le s  u n it  a t  C lydebridge, Another post-w ar te c h n o lo g ic a l 
change w ith in  the in d u stry  was th e trend  towards a h igh er charge o f  
p ig  ir o n  per ton  o f  s t e e l ,  th e  shortage o f  scrap in  th e se  y ea rs  having  
forced  S c o tt is h  stee l-m ak ers to  make them selves l e s s  dependent on 
imported scrap by b u ild in g  new b la s t  fu rn aces,^
U n til 1937 th ere was a fr e e  market op eratin g  in  the purchase o f  
2scrap m eta ls . At th is  p o in t th ere were fa r  few er grades o f  scrap  
a v a ila b le  than in  the post-w ar yea rs . Each year  the p roportion  o f  
wrought ir o n  was le ssen ed  w ith  s t e e l  in c r e a s in g ly  rep la c in g  i t .  There 
was, as w e ll ,  a change in  th e  typ es o f s t e e l  scrap c o l le c te d . A llo y  
s t e e l s  had come in to  common u se , and w ith  them th e constant problem o f  
contam ination. In  a d d itio n  th ere was a growing proportion  o f  s t e e l  
in g o t output devoted to  sh eet r o l l in g ,  so th a t both  th e  new p rocess
1 , L eser, p .122.
2. R eclam ation In d u str ie s  Review, B r it is h  Scrap F ederation  J u b ile e  
Issu e , p p .4 -5 .
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4 :I1 -51scrap and 'ca p ita l*  scrap became on average p r o g r e ss iv e ly  l ig h t e r .  >4I
( iv )  Output
Most o f the S c o tt is h  output was p la te s ,  heavy r o l le d  products, 
wrought iron  and s t e e l  tu b es. In  l ig h t  r o l le d  products, such as  w ire  
and sh ee ts , S cotlan d  had a r e la t iv e ly  sm all share o f  the B r i t is h  
t o t a l .  S cotlan d  was the second la r g e s t  producer o f  a llo y  s t e e l ,  ju s t  
behind S h e f f ie ld .^
1. I b id . , p p .18 and 9-10. Pre-1937 th e  main cen tre  in  B r ita in  fo r
buying and s e l l in g  o f scrap was th e  Birmingham Iron  Exchange 
which ran weekly s e s s io n s  every Thursday. The B r i t i s h  Iron  and 
S t e e l  F ederation  approached th e B r i t is h  Scrap A sso c ia t io n  
(form ed in  1919 and reorganised  in  1935) w ith  an o f f e r  o f  a 
guaranteed market and f ix e d  p r ic e s  in  exchange fo r  the merchants 
surrendering th e ir  r ig h t  to  fr e e  trade and export. Although I
th ere  was su b s ta n tia l op p o sitio n  w ith in  the B r i t is h  Scrap Asso­
c ia t io n  to  such closed-m arket co n d itio n s  the m ajority  voted  to  
accep t the new system . The im p lied  th rea t o f  the steel-m ak ers  
to  implement c e n tr a l buying, which would have 'knocked the  
bottom  out o f f r e e  trad e anyway' made acceptance o f  th e f ix e d  
p r ic e  agreement in e v ita b le .  There was a very  h igh  demand fo r  
s t e e l  not on ly  from B r it is h  steel-m ak ers but a ls o  from abroad 
b eg in n in g  in  the e a r ly  1 930 's, a s  the w orld 's in d u s tr ie s  began  
to  recover from the w orst e f f e c t s  o f  the D epression  y ea rs . Thus 
th e agreement not to  export was th e w orst p art o f  th e B r it is h  
Iron  and S te e l  F e d e r a t io r /b r it is h  Scrap A sso c ia tio n  n e g o tia tio n , 
to  the minds o f  the scrap merchants who had hoped fo r  con sid erab le  
o v ersea s  s a le s ,
2. L eser, p .122.
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Table 4  -  Output o f  F in ish ed  S te e l Products in  Scotland  and in  Great 
B r ita in . 1949-1951 (thousand to n s)
Product
P la te s
Other heavy r o l le d  products  
Tubes, p ip es  and f i t t i n g s  
C astings
L ight r o l le d  products
S h eets
Wire
Average output 
per annum,
1949-1951
S cotlan d
636.4
422.5  
1 7 8 .3  
46 .5
326.1
7 4 .0
24.1
Great
B r ita in
2, 090.1  
2, 618.8 
1 ,0 8 1 ,8  
248.8 
4 ,4 6 5 . 7  
1, 608.9 
822.8
S cotlan d  as  
% o f  Great 
B r ita in
30.4  
16.1
1 6 .5  
18 .7
7 .3
4 .6
2 .9
Source: B r i t i s h  and Iron  and S te e l  F ed eration  S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook
in  L eser, p .122, Table 59.
Two attem pts to  make t in p la te ,  a t Coatbridge and M otherwell, were both  
u n su cc ess fu l and Scotland  was never ab le to  capture t h is  important sec ­
t io n  o f  th e  post-w ar s t e e l  trad e.^
The S c o t t is h  sheet trade was noted fo r  th e  v a r ie ty  in  s iz e  o f  i t s  
products Î S co tlan d  in  fa c t  produced the la r g e s t  s t e e l  sh ee ts  r o l le d  in  
B r ita in , The development o f  the continuous s t r ip  m il l  in  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  had grov/n, u n t i l  fo llo w in g  the war t h i s  was the most important 
procedure o f  the American s t e e l  trade. T h is method was p red ic ted  to  
rep la ce  a l l  other forms o f  manufacture, w ith  the p o s s ib le  exception  o f  
sm all p la n ts  to  make h ig h ly  s p e c ia l is e d  a l lo y  or other products fo r  a .
1 . Oakley, p .142.
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sm all but steady market. There were no continuous s t r ip  m il ls  in  
S cotlan d  a t t h is  p o in t  except fo r  aluminium,^ T his was obv iou sly  th e  
n ext s tep  fo r  the S c o t t is h  s t e e l  sh ee tin g  trade in  terms o f  develop­
ment.
S in ce  the ea r ly  days o f  foundry work, ir o n  p ip es  and p ip e f i t ­
t in g s  were t r a d it io n a l exp orts o f  the S c o t t is h  in d u stry . In  honour o f  
the S c o t t is h  rep u ta tio n  fo r  ex ce lle n c e  in  t h is  trade the name ' Scotch- 
casin g  ' was g iven  to  the f i r s t  tubular goods used in  North America fo r  
the o i l  p ip e lin e s ,  which c o n s is te d  o f  sh ort len g th s o f  l i g h t  ca st iron  
p ip e . The lead in g  products o f the post-w ar S c o tt is h  in d u stry  were o i l  
w e ll ca s in g  and tubing; w ater, gas, a ir  and sewage mains; b o i le r  
tubes and steam p ip es; tubes fo r  s tr u c tu r a l and m echanical pu ip oses; 
s h ip 's  d err ick s and m asts; p o le s  fo r  tran sm ission  or l ig h t in g  purposes; 
b u tt-w eld in g  f i t t i n g  and fla n g es; pipe-work fo r  o i l ,  steam, water and 
oth er in s t a l la t io n s .  The diam eters o f  th ese  tiibes ranged from s ix  f e e t ,  
formed from a s t e e l  p la t e  w ith  the seam welded, to  sm all seam less tubes  
made from a s o lid  bar. The procedures employed in clud ed  hydrau lic la p -  
w eld ing, r o l le d  lap -w eld in g , seam less and cold-draw ing. The most modern 
pre-war seam less m il l  was lo c a te d  a t Stewart and Lloyds C lydeside Works 
near B e l l s h i l l ,  which was an in teg ra te d  s t e e l  and tube p la n t . Then 
a f te r  th e  war S tew art’ s and Lloyds b u i l t  a second seam less m il l ,  a
ro tary  fo rg e  m il l  w ith  a cap acity  o f  100,000 tons per annum a t  t h is  
2s i t e .  The Clyde sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  r e l ie d  on th e  lo c a l  s t e e l  tube 
in d u stry  to  supply them w ith  t h e ir  d err ick s, m asts, d a v its  and deck 
r a i l in g s .  Throughout th e U nited  Kingdom and the Commonwealth, S c o tt is h
1 . Ib id .
2 . Oakley, p .143.
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tubular p o le s  c a rr ied  tran sm ission  ca b le s, te leph on e and te legrap h  
l in e s ,  and a lso  l ig h t in g ,  tramway and tr o lle y -b u s  standards,^
The production  o f  heavy fo rg in g  and c a s t in g s  in  Scotland  was
la r g e ly  determined by th e  demands o f  th e  sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  fo r
h u ll  and p r o p e llin g  machinery. Yet th e  same firm s w hich produced the
h e a v ie s t  s t e e l  fo r g in g s  and c a s t in g s  a ls o  manufactured other heavy
components not r e la te d  to  marine en g in eerin g , such as forged  ro to r
b o d ies  fo r  land  s ta t io n  turbo a lte r n a to r s , c a s t in g s  fo r  steelw ork
p la n ts ,  m il ls ,  p r e s s e s , e tc .  L ess than s ix  post-w ar S c o tt is h  firm s
made heavy c a s t in g s , ( t h i s  term r e fe r r e d  to  products w ith  a f in is h e d
w eight o f 20-120 to n s , on ly  o c c a s io n a lly  did i t  surpass t h is  f ig u r e ) .
The o n ly  forg in g  in  Scotland  was p r e ss  forg in g , th e  top l im it  was 160
2in g o t ton s at Beardmore's Parkhead Forge. The production  o f heavy 
s t e e l  ca stin g  req u ired  firm s to  make t h e ir  own s t e e l ,  e ith e r  open- 
hearth  or e l e c t r ic .  The heavy c a p ita l  th a t was a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e  pro­
d u ction  o f  heavy s t e e l  forg in g  and c a s t in g  such as locom otives, steam  
b o i le r s ,  gas producers, annealing fu rn aces, forge  h ea tin g  furnaces, 
fo rg in g  p resses  and hammers, cranes and heavy machine to o ls ,  and v a r i­
ous b u ild in g  and tran sp ort ap p lian ces were a l l  m od ified  as v /e ll so as  
to  b e ab le  to  handle th e in crea sin g  s iz e  o f the c o m p o n e n ts .T h e  u su a l  
products o f  a heavy c a s t in g  works comprised m il l  housing, turbine  
ca sin g , stern  fram es, rudders, p r o p e lle r  b ra ck ets , e tc .  V arious improve­
ments were made in  th e heavy fo rg in g  and c a s t in g  trade fo llo w in g  th e  war, 
many o f  which were suggested  in  th e  report o f  th e  S te e l  Founding Team o f
1. Oakley, p . 144.
2 . I b id .,  p .146 ,
3. I b id .,  p . 147 .
1. I b id . ,  p p .149- 152.
2. I b id . ,  p p .148- 149.
..............................................................................
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th e  Anglo-American C ouncil on P r o d u c tiv ity . The w hole spectrum o f  
s t e e l  ca stin g  products were produced in  Scotland from t in y  a llo y ed  
c a s t in g s  to  the very  h ea v ie st c a s t in g s  produced a t  Beardmore's and 
th e  S c o tt is h  S te e l  Company. The c a s t in g s  were produced both  in  p la in  ÿ
carbon s t e e l s  and a l lo y  s t e e l s ,  from l i g h t l y  a llo y e d  to  s t a in le s s  s t e e l .
The p ro sp er ity  o f  th e l i g h t  s t e e l  c a s t in g  trade was based  on th e b u ild ­
in g  in d u stry , although during 1959-1945 i t  was commandeered in to  th e  
p roduction  o f  wartime goods. F o llow ing  the war the S c o t t is h  s t e e l  
fo u n d r ies  in  aggregate contributed  one-quarter o f  th e  B r it is h  t o t a l .^
Making drop fo rg in g s  was a com paratively new in d u stry  to  Scotland .
The f i r s t  impetus came from the post-W orld War I  autom obile in d u stry  in
England which needed drop ’fo rg in g s  to  rep la ce  c a s t in g s  and hand fo rg in g
fo r  th e  mass production  o f  cars and tru ck s. Other branches of the
en g in eerin g  industry  soon c a l le d  fo r  drop fo rg in g  products and demands
came from the makers o f locom otives, wagons, d ie s e l  en g in es, sh ip s,
b o i le r s ,  a g r ic u ltu r a l implements, e tc . During th e  Second World War the
th ree p r in c ip a l drop fo r g e r s , th e Garron Company a t F a lk irk , James
D ick ie  and Sons and th e  S c o t t is h  Stamping and E ngineering Company, both
a t Ayr, a l l  m u ltip lie d  t h e ir  cap acity  and produced some o f  the h ea v ie st
hanraers and forging machines in  Great B r ita in . Follow ing the war th ese
fo rg es  d id  not run a t  a l l  near cap a c ity  due to  a shortage o f  q u a lity
forg in g  s t e e l  and la ck  o f  demand fo r  S c o t t is h  fo r g e s  which r e su lte d  in
2S cotland  producing on ly  8 per cen t o f  the B r i t is h  t o t a l .
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(v ) Consumption
Although th ere  was no f ig u r e  fo r  s t e e l  consumption in  S cotlan d  
comparable to  th a t fo r  production, th e Monthly S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l le t in  
o f  the B r i t is h  Iron  and S te e l  F ed era tion  estim ated  th a t in  th e l a s t  
quarter o f  1950, when d e l iv e r ie s  o f  f in is h e d  s t e e l  from S c o tt ish  s t e e l ­
makers were ju s t  under 500,000 to n s, th e t o t a l  consumption o f  s t e e l  in
1S cotlan d  amounted to  289,000 to n s, or 60 per cent o f  t o t a l  d e l iv e r ie s .  
Thus, Scotland was a la r g e  net exp orter  of s t e e l ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  o f heavy  
r o l le d  products. The consumption o f  p la te s  and heavy r o l le d  products  
was about h a lf  the t o t a l  output and about the same percentage a p p lied  
to  s t e e l  c a s t in g s , tu b es, p ip es  and f i t t i n g s ,  and to  a l lo y  s t e e l ,  A 
su b s ta n t ia l number o f the few l i g h t  r o l le d  products manufactured in  
S cotlan d  were exported  out o f th e  country. C onversely, Scotland  was 
fo rce d  to  be a net im porter o f s t r ip ,  t in p la te ,  w ire , ty r e s , w heels  
and a x le s .
1, B r i t i s h  Iron and S t e e l  F ederation , Monthly S t a t i s t i c a l  B u lle t in  
26 (June 1951), n o .6.
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Table 5 -  Consumption o f  s t e e l  by industry  in  Scotland  and the U nited  
Kingdom, a t fou rth  quarter 1950 r a te s  (thousand ton s)
Industry U nitedKingdom Scotland
S cotlan d  
a s % o f  
U nited  
Kingdom
M echanical en g in eerin g 1,356 172 13
Motors, c y c le s  and a ir c r a f t 1,156 36 3
C onstru ctiona l en g in eerin g 1,010 • 182 18
Sh ip b uild in g , rep a ir in g  and 
marine en g in eerin g 950 234 25
R ailways and r o l l in g  stock 842 98 12
Hollow-ware 608 20 3
Goal-mining 578 68 12
B o lt s ,  n u ts, screw s 496 54 11
M etal fu r n itu r e , windows, e tc . 480 26 5
E le c t r ic a l  machinery and 
apparatus 458 14 3
Drop fo r g in g s 448 42 9
Iron and s t e e l 416 56 14
B u ild in g  and co n tra ctin g 392 4 4 11
Wire m anufacturers 302 36 12
A g r icu ltu ra l machinery 
(ex c lu d in g  tr a c to r s ) 196 24 12
Other B r it is h  consumers and 
sm all u se r s 708 50 7
T ota l 10,396 1,156 11
Source; L eser, p. 123. E stim ates by th e B r i t is h  Iron  and S te e l  
F ederation ,
These f ig u r e s ,  again  com piled by th e  B r i t is h  Iron  and S t e e l  F ederation , 
show some o f  the s tr ik in g  d if fe r e n c e s  between the m etal and en gin eerin g  
in d u s tr ie s  o f  S cotlan d  and th e U nited Kingdom, There was a conspicu­
o u sly  low  proportion  o f  S c o t t is h  to  B r i t i s h  consumption in  motors, c y c le s  I
236
î
' . .1 and a ir c r a f t ,  hollow -w are, m etal fu rn itu re , and e l e c t r i c a l  machinery, t
Iand a ju s t  as con sp icu ou sly  h igh proportion  in  m echanical and con­
s tr u c t io n a l en g in eerin g , ir o n  and s t e e l  and sh ip b u ild in g .
( v i )  Government In terv en tio n
The Government su perv ised  the iro n  and s t e e l  in d u stry  very  c lo s e ly  
from the D epression  years onwards. This was not on ly  because as a 
'basic* in d u stry  i t s  w e lfa re  concerned the e n t ir e  n a tio n a l economy, but 
a ls o  because o f  the s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  th e  in d u stry  to  th e trade market, 3
which caused i t  to  su ffe r  more sev ere ly  than oth er in d u str ie s  from 
f lu c tu a t io n s  in  the market. In  th e  ea r ly  1930’ s the in d u stry  was faced  
w ith  not on ly  shrinking markets a t home and abroad, but a ls o  w ith  com­
p e t i t i v e  fo r e ig n  r iv a lr y . In  1931 the g o ld  standard was suspended^ and 
the fo llo w in g  year B r ita in  abandoned i t s  t r a d it io n a l p o l ic y  o f  fr e e  
trad e. As p art o f a comprehensive p o lic y  to  encourage in d u stry  to  
recover i t s  lo s s e s ,  a t a r i f f  was p laced  on a l l  imported iro n  and s t e e l  
products. The Government meant t h is  a c tio n  to  be viewed as more than  
merely a p r o te c t iv e  d ev ic e . In  1934 the B r i t i s h  Iron and S te e l  Federa­
t io n  was formed, encouraged, as i t  were, by the Government's d es ire  fo r  
stronger c e n tr a l o rg a n isa tio n . The Import D u ties  A dvisory Committee
was in s tr u c te d  by the Government to  m oniter th e F ed er a tio n 's  p rogress,
2e s p e c ia l ly  w ith  regard to  t a r i f f s  and changes in  p r ic e .
In  1939 t h i s  ra th er  lo o se  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een the Government and 
th e  in d u stry  was rep laced  by a more d ir e c t  form o f  con tro l s u ita b le  to
1, See Kirby, p . 33 on p o lic y  co n sid era tio n s  beh ind  the abandonment o f  
th e go ld  standard in  March o f  I 919.
2 . Iron  and S t e e l  Board, The Iron  and S te e l  Board What I t  I s  And What 
I t  Does, (R ochester, S ta p le s  P r in te r s  L im ited, undated but most 
probably 1 June I 960) ,  p p .5 -6 .
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a war economy. The Iron and S te e l  Control^ o f  the M in istry  o f  Supply
reg u la ted  th e  in d u stry  and th e M in istry  o f  Supply i t s e l f  f ix e d  the
maximum ir o n  and s t e e l  p r ic e s .  The Iron and S te e l  Control was d is so lv e d
fo llo w in g  the conclusion  o f  the war hut the M in istry  o f Supply continued
2to  s e t  the ir o n  and s t e e l  p r ic e s .
The f i r s t  Iron  and S te e l  Board was s e t  up by th e Government pend­
ing  th e  preparations fo r  th e n a t io n a lis a t io n  o f  th e  in d u stry . The 
d u t ie s  o f  the f i r s t  Board included  su p erv isin g  the development and 
m odernisation  o f  the in d u stry , and, i f  necessary , c o n tr o llin g  production , 
d is tr ib u t io n  and p r ic e s .  The B oard's members c o n s is te d  o f  rep resen ta ­
t iv e s  from the s t e e l  producers, consumers and the trade unions; th e  
Board s t i l l  remained under the a u th o r ity  o f  the M in istry  o f  Supply. 
U nlike th e 'Ir o n  and S te e l  Board o f  1953 the 1946 Board was not a s ta tu ­
to ry  a u th o r ity  and had on ly  d e leg a ted  povrers. The 1946 Board was not 
even expected  to  in te r a c t  w ith  th e  Government regarding the p lan s fo r  
p u b lic  ov/nership, and on 31 l^Iarch 1949 th e f i r s t  Iron  and S te e l  Board 
ceased  to  e x i s t .  In  November o f  1949 th e  n a t io n a lis a t io n  a c t became 
law and came in to  e f f e c t  in  February 1951. The sh ares o f  th e  e x is t in g  
producing companies were v ested  in  th e newly formed Iron  and S te e l  
C orporation o f Great B r ita in , which was to  manage th e n a t io n a lise d  com­
p an ies in  th e p u b lic  in t e r e s t .^
1 . The Iron  and S t e e l  Control was infamous, even among the other  
Government departm ents, fo r  never b ein g  able to  tr a n s la te  ' l e g a l  
jargon' on i t s  in te n t io n s  o f c o n tro l in to  language understandable 
b y  mere m orta ls. I t s  most d e l ig h t fu l  faux  pas was an Order immor­
t a l i s e d  in  'Punch' which read, 'No person s h a ll  t r e a t ,  use or  
consume any tramway r a i l ' ,  which appeared under the heading 
'A u s te r ity '.  B r i t i s h  Scrap F ed eration  J u b ile e  Issu e  . p p .10-11 ,
2 . The Iron  and S t e e l  Board Y/hat I t  I s  And What I t  Does, p .6.
3. Ib id ,
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The Iron  and S te e l Act o f  1953 changed the stru ctu re  o f th e  
management aga in  : th e Iron  and S te e l  Act o f  1949 was repealed , the  
Iron  and S te e l  C orporation o f  Great B r ita in  d is so lv e d , the Iron  and 
S te e l  Holding and R e a lisa t io n  Agency e s ta b lish e d  fo r  the purpose o f  
return ing to  p r iv a te  ownership th e  n a tio n a lise d  companies, and, most 
notab ly , the appointment o f a new Iron and S te e l  Board which was to  
'e x e r c ise  a gen era l su p erv is io n  over the iro n  and s t e e l  in d u stry  
w ith  a view  o f  promoting th e e f f i c i e n t ,  economic, and adequate supply  
under co m p etitive  co n d itio n s o f ir o n  and s t e e l  p ro d u cts'. Thus, 
although th e in d u stry  was t e c h n ic a l ly  de-n a t io n a lis e d  in  1953, th e  
second Iron and S te e l  Board, which was created  a t  the same tim e, was 
a llo c a te d  more powers than th e  f i r s t  Board, I t  was charged w ith  the  
review  o f  the productive c a p a c ity  o f  iron  and s t e e l  producers, th e  
p r ic e s  charged fo r  iron  and s t e e l  products, the supply and d is tr ib u t io n  
o f  raw m a te r ia ls  and fu e l ,  and arrangements fo r  promoting, research , 
tra in in g  and education  and th e  s a fe ty , h ea lth  and w elfare  o f em ployees 
in  the in d u stry , and fo r  jo in t  c o n su lta tio n .^
When the Labour P arty  came in to  power in  1945 i t  was not ready  
im m ediately to  n a t io n a lis e  the iro n  and s t e e l  in d u stry . Rather i t  
req u ested  th a t the B r i t is h  Iron and S te e l  F ed eration  com plete i t s  p o s t­
war rec o n stru ctio n  p lan , which was based on in form ation  sent to  them by  
th e variou s companies, such as  C o lv i l le s ,  regarding m atters concerning
1. I b id . , p . 7 .
J
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1post-w ar expenditure and p ro jec ted  production  l e v e l s .  When th e  war- #
tim e S te e l  C ontrol was d isco n tin u ed  in  1946 th e Iron  and S te e l  Board 
was s e t  up more in  the cap acity  o f  a holding company tlian a s  th e  con­
t r o l l e r s  o f  a n a t io n a lise d  in d u stry . The Government and the Labour 
P arty  were even l e s s  u n ited  on th e  is su e  o f n a t io n a lisa t io n  fo llo w in g  
th e  1945 e le c t io n ,  and when trade union r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  were in clu d ed  
a s  members o f th e  f i r s t  Iron and S te e l Board the union no lon ger advo­
cated  more r a d ic a l measures, such as n a t io n a lisa t io n  of the in d u stry , 
so stro n g ly . There had never been the w idespread d e s ir e  for  n a tio n a l­
is a t io n  o f  the iron  and s t e e l  in d u stry  among th e  steelw orkers or the  
trade un ions, as th ere was in  th e  coal-m ining .indu stry .
Why then was ir o n  and s t e e l  n a tio n a lised ?  I t  was, o f course, a 
'b asic*  industry , h ig h ly  regu la ted  even b efo re  th e  war, as was th e  co a l 
in d u stry . Thus, a very  r e a l argument was th a t th e  in d u stry  was n a tio n ­
a l i s e d ,  to  a not in co n sid era b le  e x te n t , because o f the momentum to  
n a t io n a lis e  a l l  'b a s ic '  in d u s tr ie s . In  ad d ition , the n a t io n a lis e r s  had 
stron g  leadersh ip  from Mr. Aneurin Be van and very  s o l id  support from  
S ir  S ta ffo rd  Cripps and Mr. E rnest B evin  which enabled  the b i l l  to  
become an Act in  November 1949» But a lready by 1949 th e Government was 
lo s in g  support and, hence, a fra id  i t  could not f in d  enough peop le to
1. T h is development p lan  was one o f the f i r s t  achievem ents o f th e  
post-w ar in d u stry . I t  was p resen ted  to  th e  Government as the  
B r it is h  Iron  and S te e l  F ed eration  Report to  the M in istry  o f  
Supply on the Iron  and S te e l In du stry  and was p u b lish ed  in  May 
o f  1946 a s  R eports by the B r i t is h  Iron and S te e l  F ederation  and 
th e J o in t  C ouncil to  the M in istry  o f Supply, (London, H. IvL S. 0 , ,
Cmid, 6811, May 1946 ). See a ls o . F ir s t  Report o f  th e Committee on 
Indu s t r ia i  Produ c 11 v i  t y . (London, H.M.S.O., Crad. 7665, A pril 1949), 
p . 21, para, 72 -74  on post-w ar B r i t is h  s t e e l  requirem ents.
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run the n a t io n a lis e d  iro n  and s t e e l  in d u stiy  e f f e c t i v e ly ,  i t  delayed  
b r in g in g  the Act in to  fo rce  u n t i l  1951. Although th e  industry  was 
d e -n a tio n a lis e d  in  1953 by a C onservative Government, t h is  does not 
b e g in  to  exp la in  why the Iron and S te e l  Board was d is so lv e d . I f  every  
oth er  industry n a t io n a lis e d  under th e Labour Governments had been de­
n a t io n a lis e d  by C h u r c h ill's  new Government, then a case might have been  
made fo r  a Tory b e l i e f  in  fr e e  en terp r ise  w ithout Government in terv e n ­
t io n .  T his, o f  course, proved not to  be the c a se . The f i r s t  Iron  and 
S t e e l  Board (1946) was d isso lv e d  because i t  had no s ta tu to ry  -  on ly  
d e leg a ted  -  powers. But even though the f i r s t  Board was e f f e c t i v e ly  
a f a i lu r e  in  terms o f management, t h i s  does not ex p la in  why th e  concept 
o f  n a t io n a lis a t io n  i t s e l f  was d iscard ed . There were no dramatic chan­
ges in  the in d u stry  during the two y ears o f n a t io n a lis a t io n , 1951-1953, 
from the p o l ic ie s  pursued 1946-1951 by the f i r s t  Iron  and S te e l  Board. 
One p o s s ib le  answer to  t h is  q u estio n  i s  th a t n a t io n a lis a t io n  became 
in c r e a s in g ly  l e s s  n ecessary . The second Iron and S te e l  Board (1953)  
had nuch more r e a l  power than the f i r s t ,  even though the in d u stry  was 
no lon ger , t e c h n ic a l ly  speaking, n a tio n a lise d . A lso  th e in d iv id u a l  
s t e e l  companies, i , e .  C o lv i l le s ,  kept an extrem ely c lo se  command o f  
t h e ir  own in t e r e s t s .  Thus, n a t io n a lisa t io n  was not considered a 
r e q u is it e  co n tro l f o r  iro n  and s t e e l  by e ith e r  the Government or th e  
in d u stiy .
At the op p osite  extreme, coa l had been duly n a t io n a lise d  on 
1 January 1947, V estin g  Day. Pamphlets were handed out to  the miners 
who, alm ost to  a man, e n th u s ia s t ic a l ly  g ree ted  n a tio n a lism  as the  
dawning o f  a 'new a g e '. Although th e  N ation al Coal Board was never  
ab le to  f u l f i l l  a l l  th e  m iners' demands or th e ir  own ta r g e t  g o a ls  fo r  
production , there was n ever any se r io u s  d isc u ss io n  o f  d e -n a t io n a lis in g
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the in d u stry . In  a d d itio n , the r a ilr o a d s , aeroplanes, e l e c t r ic i t y ,  
and gas in d u str ie s  had a l l  been duly n a t io n a lise d  between 1946-1949. 
Sh ip b u ild in g , on th e  o th er  hand, had fought n a t io n a lis a t io n  through 
the au sp ices  o f the S h ipbuild ing  Conference u n t i l  1977. The sh ip ­
b u ild in g  industry , dominated by sev era l fam ily - con tro l le d  p r iv a te  
lim ite d  companies in  c lo s e  contact w ith  the Government b y  means o f  
the Sh ip b uild in g  C onference, was ab le  to  e f f e c t iv e ly  f ig h t  n a tio n a l­
is a t io n  and r e ta in  p r iv a te  ownership fa r  beyond the p ost-w ar yea rs . 
There was a s im ila r  power' stru ctu re in  the S c o tt ish  iro n  and s t e e l  
in d u stry , w ith  C o lv i l le s  Ltd, and i t s  su b s id ia r ie s  dom inating the  
in d u stry . These forms o f  d ir e c t  p r iv a te  con tro l o f  a s p e c if ic  indus­
tr y , c lo s e ly  m onitered by the Government in  the form o f  post-w ar  
r a t io n in g ,^ e tc . , were considered  a ccep tab le  to  the Government in  t h i s  
era o f  c e n tr a lis e d  co n tro l o f in d u stry .
%242 i
1
4 . Shipbuild ing
( i )  S h ip b u ild in g  Following: th e  Second W orld War
The post-w ar y ears  were a s e l l e r s  market fo r  both  B r i t is h  and
S c o tt is h  • sh ip b u ild ers . War had so lved  th e  in ter-w ar. problem o f too
l i t t l e  demand and surplus cap a c ity . Not on ly  had th e outcome o f  th e
war been favourable f o r  B r ita in  but i t  e lim in a ted  fo r  th e  tim e b ein g
two o f  i t s  r iv a ls  in  th e  sh ip b u ild in g  trad e, Germany and Japan, The
temporary American demand fo r  co a l and th e  expanding w orld demand fo r
o i l  tran sp ort both  con trib u ted  to  the B r i t is h  shipping market. Order
books were f i l l e d ,  not on ly  w ith  replacem ents o f  war lo s s e s ,  but a lso
th ere was a su sta ined  demand fo r  new tonnage as th e world ccxnmodity
1trade began to  recover and expand ra p id ly  a f t e r  1947*
In  December 1948 alm ost com plete freedom was resto red  to  the sh ip ­
p ing in d u stry  a f t e r  n early  n in e  years o f  Government co n tro l. By 1948 
U.K. merchant shipowners had b u i l t  up th e ir  f l e e t  in  th e  aggregate to  
w ith in  about 1 m il l io n  ton s g ro ss  o f  the t o t a l  o f  17, 377,000 to n s reg­
is t e r e d  a t th e  outbreak o f  war in  1939. But not a l l  the tonnage was 
y e t  e f f e c t iv e ,  fo r  c lo se  on 3 m il l io n  tons were s t i l l  undergoing rep a ir
1 , Anthony S lav en , 'Growth and S ta g n a tio n  i n  B r i t i s h / S c o t t i s h  S h ip ­
b u i ld in g  1 9 1 3 - 1 9 1 7 *, in  S c o t t i s h  and Scandanav ian  S h ip b u ild in g  
Sem inar, Development P rob lem s in  H is to r ic a l  P e r s p e c t iv e ,  (Glasgow, 
U n iv e rs i ty  o f  Glasgow, 21-23 Septem ber 1980 ), p . 27. T here was no 
a p p a re n t s ig n  in  th e  e a r ly  1 9 5 0 's o f th e  'J a p a n e se  menace ' to  th e  
w orld  s h ip b u ild in g  s t r u c t u r e .  No one c o u ld  have p r e d ic te d  i n  
1 9 5 0  when Ja p a n  had an in f i n i t e s i m a l  p e rc e n ta g e  of th e  w o rld  sh ip ­
b u i ld in g  m arket th a t  in  I 9 6 3  Jap an  would h o ld  h a l f  th e  w orld  o rd e rs . 
Not oni.y was th e re  no t h r e a t  from  Jap an  i n  th e  p o s t-w ar y e a r s  b u t  
th e re  was a ls o  no c o m p e tit io n  from  Germany a s  i t s  s h ip y a rd s  were 
a lm ost a l l  in o p e ra b le  o r  l im i te d ,  e i t h e r  p h y s ic a l ly  o r  l e g a l l y ,  
in  c a p a c ity .
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1or conversion . Replacement was the most pronounced in  cargo l in e r
and tanker tonnage -  th e  tanker f l e e t  in  1949 exceeded th a t o f  1939-
The r i s in g  c o s t  o f  both  replacem ent and o p era tion  was a cause o f  m ch
concern in  th e  industry , e s p e c ia l ly  w ith  regard to  th e  la t t e r ,  the
2slow  turn around o f  sh ipping in  the p orts  o f th e  world. P ort conges­
t io n  slowed turn  around tim es  b r ie f ly  fo llo w in g  th e  war and reduced the  
carrying e f f ic ie n c y  o f  th e dry cargo f l e e t  by 20 per cen t from i t s  1938 
l e v e l .  T h is had the e f f e c t  o f  adding 9 m il l io n  gross r e g is te r e d  tons  
( g .r ,  t ,  ) to  new world ord ers as B r it is h  sh ip b u ild ers  attem pted to  d ea l 
w ith  t h i s  back log .
B r i ta in 's  p r e -F ir s t  World War share o f 60 per cen t o f the w orld  
sh ip b u ild in g  was n ea r ly  halved by  the end o f  th e 1 9 3 0 's, t h i s  f ig u r e
3was almost com p lete ly  regained  f o r  a b r ie f  p er io d  in  the la t e  1940* s .
In  1946-1948 B r ita in  b u i l t  and launched 50 per cen t o f  the w orld tonnage 
o f  merchant v e s s e l s .  The post-w ar years were a tim e o f  f i l l  order books 
f o r  the sh ipping in d u stry  and reg u la r  work fo r  th e  men enployed in  the  
B r i t is h  sh ipyards. Unenployment in  the sh ip b u ild in g  industry  never  
exceeded 7 per c e n t .^  But a lthough  B r it is h  sh ipping was in  a p a r tic u ­
la r ly  favourab le p o s it io n , i t s  production  record  in d ica te d  a c le a r  
f a i lu r e  to  c a p it a l i s e  on renewed dominance. In  th e  f i r s t  f iv e  p o s t ­
war years, 1945-1950, B r ita in  b u i l t  and launched 6 .07  m illio n  g . r . t .  o f  
merchant sh ip s; 31 per cent o f t h i s  was fo r  export and th is  t o t a l l e d
1 . 'Freedom R estored  to  B r i t is h  Shipping : In d u str y 's  Problem o f  
R isin g  C o sts ',  G .H.T.R., 1949, p .21.
2 . Ib id .
3 . Slaven, Sh ipbuild ing Seminar, p . 18.
4 . L eser, p .120,
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h a lf  o f  a l l  th e  w orld  orders, o f  which the S c o t t is h  share was approxi­
m ately  15 per c en t. However, in  the next f iv e  y ea rs , 1951-1955, t o t a l  
B r i t i s h  output grew on ly  by 1 2 .5  per cen t to  6 ,8  m il l io n  g . r . t .  f o r  
th e se  years, w h ile  t o t a l  world production  grew by 80 per cent over th e  
f i r s t  f iv e  year p er io d , B r i t a in ’ s share o f sh ip b u ild in g  output dec­
l in e d  to  28 .7  per cen t. The d e c lin e  could be marked in  other ways a s  
w e ll ,  by 1954 Germany had d isp la c e d  the U nited Kingdom from her p o s i­
t io n  a s  the major sh ip b u ild er  fo r  fo r e ig n  m arkets. Two years la t e r ,  
in  1956, Japan launched more tonnage than B r ita in  and by 1958 B r ita in  
was c le a r ly  in  th ir d  p la ce . T his downward p ro g ressio n  in  the w orld  
market was ir o n ic a l ly  p a r a lle l le d  by B r ita in 's  b e s t  output s in c e  b e fo re  
th e  F ir s t  World War. B r ita in , th e  world lead er in  sh ip b u ild in g  output 
u n t i l  th e  m id -1950's, alone o f  a l l  the major sh ip b u ild in g  n ation s  
f a i l e d  to  in crea se  i t s  output above the I 92O f ig u r e .^  This accounts  
fo r  phrases l ik e  'd ec lin in g  s ta p le '  and 'o ld  b a s ic '  in d u stry  b ein g  used  
to  d escr ib e  sh ip b u ild in g  as e a r ly  as the in ter-w ar yea rs .
( i i )  S c o t t is h  Sh ipbuild ing  Industry
S c o t t is h  sh ip b u ild ers thus produced in  th e  post-w ar y ea rs  one-
2seventh  o f  th e  tonnage o f  sea -go in g  sh ip s b u i l t  throughout th e  w orld.
The output o f  new sh ip s from the S c o tt ish  yards in  a normal post-w ar  
year (1948) was valued  at £45  m illio n , o f  which £12 m illio n ^  was fo r  
export. Thus sh ip b u ild in g  was not on ly  one o f  S co tla n d 's  primary indus­
t r i e s  in  terms o f  employment cap acity  and p r o d u c tiv ity  but was a lso  
extrem ely im portant in  term s o f  fo re ig n  markets and exp orts, u n lik e  the
1. S laven , Sh ipbuild ing Seminar, p .27.
2. Oakley, p . 52.
3. L eser, p .120.
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c o a l in d u stry  which operated p rim arily  fo r  dom estic consumption.
There was l i t t l e  change in  th e  stru ctu re o f  th e S c o tt is h  in d u stry  
fo llo w in g  the war, th e  West o f  S co tlan d  r e t a in e d  roughly 30 per cent 
o f  U.K. cap acity . Amalgamations were alm ost com p lete ly  absent; in  
S cotlan d  the on ly  merger was th e lin k a g e  o f  th e B u rn tislan d  Ship­
b u ild in g  Company w ith  the yards o f  A lex  H all and Company and H all 
R u s s e ll  and Company in  1951* Thus ownership remained in  the tr a d i­
t io n a l  p attern , w ith  fam ily  c o n tr o lle d  p r iv a te  l im ite d  companies as the  
most common typ e.^
The S c o tt is h  sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  was lo c a te d  on two r iv e r s  and 
two e s tu a r ie s ,  the more famous o f  the two r iv e r s , the Clyde, was a 
minor stream th a t had been  p r o g r e ss iv e ly  deepened to  meet the demand 
fo r  la r g e r  and s t i l l  la r g e r  sh ip s. Although the main cen tre  o f the  
in d u stry  was on the Clyde, on e-seventh  o f  the S c o t t is h  output, exclud­
ing  th e work done a t th e  Rosyth naval dockyard, came from oth er areas,
2in c lu d in g  Aberdeen, Dundee, L e ith , B u rn tislan d  and Ardrossan.
Not o n ly  sh ip bu ild in g  but a ls o  b o a t-b u ild in g , r e fe r r in g  to  sm aller  
c r a ft , was to  be found in  S cotlan d . There were over s ix ty  b o a t-b u ild in g  
yards throughout Scotland. These yards were much more w id e ly  d isp ersed  
than th a t o f  th e  sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  which was centred  in  th e  West 
Coast o f  S cotlan d . B o a t-b u ild in g  yards were to  be found in  Orkney and 
Shetland, down the w est c o a s t  to  the Solway F ir th , and a l l  down the  
e a s t  coast to  Tweed. The West was p r in c ip a l ly  a sso c ia te d  w ith  yach ts  
and l i f e b o a t s ,  w h ile  the E ast s p e c ia l is e d  in  f is h in g  c r a f t .  A side from
1. Slaven, Sh ipbuild ing Seminar, p . 29.
2. Oakley, p . 52.
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producing f in is h e d  sh ip s and b o a ts  Scotland  was a ls o  in vo lved  w ith
marine en g in eerin g  by the production  o f  b o i le r s ,  steam gen era to rs,
ksteam v a lv e s , n a u tic a l equipment o f  almost i n f i n i t e  v a r ie ty , s te e r in g  t
( i i i )  Production. D esign  and C osts o f  Ships
S c o t t is h  production r e ta in e d  i t s  o n e-th ird  o f  the U nited  Kingdom 
output fo llo w in g  th e  war. G ross tonnage under co n stru ctio n  more than  
doubled as con tra sted  w ith  th e in ter-w ar y ea rs .
1 . I b id . , pp. 58, 60, 61, 64 and 67 .
2 . Leser, p . 120.
gear, and o th er  marine a u x il ia r y  machinery. The phrase ’C lyd e-b u ilt*  
on t h is  equipment was accepted  as a hall-m ark o f  e x ce lle n c y  and much 
o f  th ese  were exported to  sh ipyards o u tsid e  o f  Scotland , e s p e c ia l ly  to  
th e  r e s t  o f B r ita in  and the Commonwealth. ^
The heavy en g in eerin g  trade in  Scotland  was dominated by sh ip ­
b u ild in g  which, w ith  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  a l l  the a n c il la r y  in d u s tr ie s  on - ^
which i t  drew, had an output la r g e r  than coal-m in ing and much g rea te r  |
than th a t o f th e  m anufacturing tr a d e s . Even the s t e e l  industry , which  
ranked second in  th e  heavy en g in eerin g  trad es, came w ith in  th e sphere 
o f  sh ip b u ild in g  as a su p p lier  o f  p la t e s  and a s  a source o f  m ater ia l 
b o th  fo r  the en g in es, b o i le r s ,  pumps, deck-gear, and f i t t i n g s  and a ls o
2f o r  th e d err ick s, s te e l- tu b in g , e tc .,  used by th e sh ipyards th em selves. ■J
-I
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Table 1 -  Merchant V e sse ls  under C onstruction  in  S c o tt is h  Yards
Clyde E ast Coast
Year Number t o % g e  t o t e l
1938 72 337,000 4 3 .2  23 46 ,000  5 .9
1946 143 622,000 32 .1  37 87 ,000  4 .5
1947 142 730,000 33 .6  42 .91,000  4 .2
1948 141 699,000 3 3 .0  44  97,000 4 .6
1949 119 692,000  34 .7  44  93,000  4 .7
1950 lŒf. 694,000  34 .0  35 83,000  4 .1
1951 117 785 ,000  35 .5  37 82 ,000  3 .9
Source: S .E .C .S ., 1948, p .12; 1950, p .11; 1952, p .15.
S h ipbuild ing  was p a r t ic u la r ly  v u ln erab le  to  in d u s tr ia l  f lu c tu a t io n s  as 
i t  was dependent on th e  demand fo r  investm ent ahd not consumption and 
was a ls o  dependent on the demand o f  a few  customers in c lu d in g  q u ite  
o fte n  the p u b lic  s e c to r . T his type o f  market s itu a t io n  catered  to  
in d iv id u a l b u yer's  wants and sh ip b u ild ers  became h ig h ly  s p e c ia l i s t  
producers w ith  numerous a n c il la r y  in d u s tr ie s  n ecessary  fo r  sh ip  con­
s tr u c t io n , Because o f  t h is  h ig h ly  in te g r a te d  stru ctu re  of heavy indus­
t r i e s  and th e r e la te d  trad es the 1930 ' s d is a s te r  was not con fined  to  
sh ip b u ild in g  but ^ r e a d  through th e s t e e l  and en g in eer in g  in d u str ie s  to  
coal-m in ing on one hand and to  the f in is h in g  trad es on th e  o ther. ^  In  
I 932- I 933 some 63 per cen t o f th e  S c o t t is h  sh ip b u ild in g  workforce was 
id le .  In  co n trast th e  post-w ar y ea rs  had r e la t iv e ly  f u l l  employment,
1 . Campbell, p .6 l .
s 
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in d eed  th ere were sh ortages o f many grades o f lab ou rers, e s p e c ia l ly  
w eld ers .^
There were no g rea t o cea n -lin ers  b u i l t  on th e  Clyde in  the years
im m ediately fo llo w in g  the Second World War such as th e Queen Mary t
If in is h e d  in  1934 and th e  Queen E liza b e th  ordered in  1936. T his type t
o f  p assen ger-sh ip  orders in  the m id-1930 ' s  helped p u ll  th e  Clyde out
2o f  the d ep ression  i t  had su ffered  in  the e a r ly  part o f th a t decade.
But th e  S c o tt is h  sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  was now dominated by tanker
orders. Follow ing the war 55 per cent o f  the tonnage in  Scotland  on
the b er th  or f i t t in g - o u t  was tanker tonnage and o f  the fo r e ig n  orders
th e p rop ortion  was n ea r ly  70 per cen t. Many S c o tt is h  yards had never
b u i l t  or were not d esign ed  or equipped to  b u ild  tan k ers, although the
m ajority  began to  do so  fo llo w in g  the war fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e. T his
boom disadvantaged the b u ild e r s  o f  sm all c r a f t ,  co a ster , c o l l i e r s ,  and
s p e c ia l is e d  r iv e r  and estu a ry  v e s s e ls .  A lso  tankers provided  l e s s  work
fo r  the f in is h in g  tra d es , which were so important to  th e  passenger  
3v e s s e ls .
The passenger sh ip s  which were b u i l t  fo llo w in g  the war, most o f  
which were ordered by A u s tr a lia  and South A fr ic a , were both  la r g e r  and 
fa s t e r  than th e average pre-w ar models. T his was an a tte n p t by sh ip ­
owners to  o f f s e t  in creased  operating  and b u ild in g s  c o s t s  b y  m aintain ing
1. James McG-oldrick, I n d u s tr ia l R e la tio n s  and the D iv is io n  o f  Labour
in  th e  B r it is h  S h ip b u ild in g  Industry : 194531956 F orm ality  vs
In fo r m a lity , (unpublished  paper. School o f  A pplied S o c ia l S tu d ies. 
H il l  C o llege  o f Higher Education, October I 98I ) ,  p . 2.
2. S laven , The Development o f  the West o f  Scotland , p .188.
3. C harles Connel, P r e s id e n t, Clyde S h ip b u ild ers A sso c ia tio n , 
'D ec lin in g  Sh ipbuild ing Order-Books', G. H.T.R., 1950, p . 19-
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th e same frequency o f  s e r v ic e  and volume o f  t r a f f i c  w ith  a sm aller
number o f sh ip s . O cean-going passenger-cargo and cargo sh ip s  showed
the same ten d en cies . The b a s ic  d esign  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  dim ensions
and speed a lte r e d  in  every sh ip  typ e.^  Cargo l in e r s  o f  450 f e e t  and
upwards were b u i l t  and alm ost a l l  cargo sh ip s  were two knots fa s t e r
than th e ir  pre-war cou n terp arts. Tramps (cargo  b o a ts  w ith  no f ix e d
ro u tes) had a speed o f  12 knots in stea d  o f  the previous 10 knots, and
2cargo l in e r s  g en era lly  o f  15 knots or more. Higher p r o p e llin g  power 
was ach ieved  by th e sw itch  to  the motor v e s s e l  over o th er fonns, t h i s  
was a id ed  by  th e a b i l i t y  to  apply th e  d ie s e l  in  i t s  new supercharged  
form to  la r g e  v e s s e ls  p r e v io u s ly  the p reserve o f the tu rb in e.  ^ Other 
changes in  sh ip  stru ctu re  included  a r i s e  in  accommodation standards 
fo r  both  p assengers and crew s,^
P r a c t ic a l sh ip  d esign  was guided by th e Government and C la s s i f i ­
ca tio n  S o c ie ty  r u le s  and r e g u la tio n s , th e r u lin g s  o f  the B r i t is h  
c la s s i f i c a t io n  s o c ie t i e s  became both  more s t r i c t  and more b in d in g  
fo llo w in g  the war. The Convention adopted by th e  1949 In te r n a tio n a l
5Conference on S a fe ty  o f  L ife  a t Sea came in to  op era tion  in  1951. I t s  
requirem ents, e s p e c ia l ly  th ose concerning p reca u tio n s aga in st f i r e  and 
damaged co n d itio n s , changed th e  d esign  o f most passenger and merchant 
sh ip s .
1. A. S i lv e r le a f ,  'Ship D esign, Ship S tructure Trends ; Cumulative 
E ffe c t  o f  Sm all Changes’ , G. H .T .R ., 1949, p.,33.
2. Ib id .
3. S laven, S h ip b u ild in g  Seminar, p . 28.
4 . S i lv e r le a f ,  p . 33.
5. Ib id .
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W elding made very  slow  p rogress in  S c o t t is h  yards u n t i l  the  
mid-1950 ' 8, b e fo re  then i t  was on ly  r e a d ily  accepted  in  yards accus­
tomed to  naval work because the Adm iralty a c t iv e ly  encouraged w eld ing. 
Lloyds, th e  main B r it is h  c la s s i f i c a t io n  agency, d id  not accept weld­
ing  and e s ta b lis h e d  c le a r  r u le s  fo r  q u a lity  co n tro l and s p e c ia l  m etal 
usage u n t i l  1955. O utside B r ita in  fo r e ig n  sh ip b u ild ers were much more 
resp on sive  to  new w elding procedures. In  1949 25 per cent o f  th e  world  
sh ip b u ild in g  ou tfu t was e l e c t r i c a l ly  welded, but the U nited  S ta te s  
con trib u ted  7 8 .8  per cen t and Sweden 17 .6  per cen t o f  th e  t o t a l .  ^
. Undoubtedly the fa c t  th a t Scotland  recovered  so w e ll from th e  war 
and went in to  th e  post-w ar y ea rs  w ith  f u l l  order books was in  some 
p art r e sp o n sib le  fo r  S co tlan d ’ s la c k  o f  enthusiasm  fo r  new market
1 . S laven, S h ipbuild ing  Seminar, p . 27, Arc w eld ing  was developed  as  
e a r ly  as 1885, in  which w elds su c c e s s fu lly  used  bare m etal e l e c ­
tro d es. T h is  procedure developed slow ly  as th e  bare m etal e le c ­
trodes proved b r i t t l e .  Major advances in  co a tin g  the e le c tr o d e s  
were made in  th e  1940’s and t h i s  procedure o f coated  e le c tr o d e  
w elding was dominant u n t i l  mig w elding (GMAW) was developed in  
th e la t e r  post-w ar years, in  t h is  procedure an arc was struck  
between a consumable w ire and the work. E le c t r ic  w elding became 
dominant fo llo w in g  th e Second World War and soon comprised many 
various forms in clu d in g  submerged arc and e le c tr o  s la g  w eld ing, 
and t i g  w elding (g a s tu n gsten  arc w elding, GTAW). O xy-acetylene  
w elding, which predominated b e fo re  the war, remained u se fu l  
e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e c u ttin g  and production  o f s t e e l .  See The Oxy- 
A cetylene Handbook A Manual on Oxy-Acetylene Welding and C utting  
Procedures. (New York, Union Carbide C orporation, 1976), p p ,2 , 3 
and 4 . The o x y -a cety len e  c u tt in g  procedure, as opposed to  th e  
cu ttin g  o f  s t e e l  by hand w ith  hammer and s e t  or c h is e l ,  had i t s e l f  
on ly  grad u a lly  become w idespread between the w ars, ’B asic  Raw 
M a ter ia ls ’ , B r i t is h  Scrap A sso c ia tio n  J u b ile e  I ssu e  1969. p . 18,
See a ls o , McGoldrick, pp. 5 -9 , on the in crea se  o f  u se o f  w eld ing, 
th e  change in  th e  d iv is io n  o f  labour caused by  th e growth in  
number o f  w eld ers, and th e p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  w elders in  th e  
sec tio n a lism  o f  the s t e e l  working trades through demarcation  
is s u e s  -  even though th ey  a l l  belonged to  th e  same union, the  
B oilerm akers.
.........................................................................................................  ■ ■ .......  • " • ■■ ‘- ^ 41
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tren d s, te c h n ic a l change and o rg a n isa tio n a l development. Mig w elding
■I(GMAW) was developed during th ese  years and ev en tu a lly  e l e c t r ic  w eld- 
ing was accepted  by S c o t t is h  sh ip b u ild ers as favourable to  r iv e t t in g .  
P r é fa b r ic a tio n  was a r e la te d  development to  w elding. P r é fa b r ic a tio n  
assembly shops were b ein g  in s t a l le d  in  th e e a r ly  1950' s , but th e  d is -  3
ru p tion  o f  b u ild in g  th ese  shops to  the sh ipyards in  an era o f  f u l l  
order books c le a r ly  served  to  slow down change. S laven concludes th a t  
p ro sp er ity  was thus a mixed b le s s in g  fo r  the post-w ar S c o t t is h  sh ip -  
b u ild in g  in d u stry .^  S u b sta n tia l investm ent could  have been  afforded .
spread and co n stru ctiv e  in n ovation .
Although th ere  were co n tra c ts  in  abundance fo r  S c o tt is h  sh ip ­
b u ild e r s  on the Clyde, i t s  even tu a l d e c lin e  in  th e y ea r ly  p rop ortion  
o f  the world market could be tra ce d  to  some ex ten t to  the s c a r c i ty  o f  
s t e e l  and o th er  raw m a ter ia ls . In q u ir ie s  by 1949 fo r  the passenger  
l in e r ,  the cargo l in e r ,  and th e tramp had disappeared  and, in  v iew  o f  
shipow ners’ a s se r t io n , were not expected to  f lo w  aga in  u n t i l  f ix e d  
p r ic e s  could  be quoted and the d ate  o f  d e liv e r y  guaranteed. Ship­
b u ild e r s  were anxious to  accommodate the shipowners, but cou ld  n ot g e t
f ix e d  p r ic e s  them selves fo r  s t e e l ,  e l e c t r ic a l  equipment, machinery and
2oth er  item s which they had to  buy o u tsid e . T h is caused a d ispropor­
t io n a te  c o s t  r i s e  in  the p r ic e s  o f  the sh ip s them selves, ten d in g  to  
make them more p r o h ib it iv e .
1 . S laven, Sh ipbuild ing  Seminar, p .29.
2 . ’L iner R econversion Programme P ast Peak : R is in g  Trend o f S h ip -  
R epairing C o sts ', G.H.T.R. , 1949, P .79 .
pa id  fo r  out o f earnings w ith  r e so r t  to  th e stock  exchange, b u t the
■3s e c u r ity  o f  f u l l  order books and the p ressure o f work in h ib ite d  w ide- I
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Even though th e  sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  i t s e l f  was not nation ­
a l i s e d  during th ese  y ea rs , i t  experienced  high c o s t s  which r e su lte d  
from the n a t io n a lis a t io n  o f other in d u s tr ie s . S h ip b u ild ers had some 
degree o f  con tro l in  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  yard planning, la y -o u t , hand­
l in g  o f  m a ter ia ls , m echanisation, pre-assem bly and o th er  .fa c to rs  
w ith in  the shipyards but the c o s ts  o f co a l, e l e c t r i c i t y ,  gas, and 
tran sp ort rose  under n a t io n a lis a t io n  and in creased  the c o s ts  o f  s t e e l ,  
th e  numerous m a te r ia ls  and components o f  sh ip s and thus sh ip b u ild in g  
i t s e l f .  D e liv ery  d a tes  were lengthened  not on ly  because o f  sh ortages
o f  raw m a ter ia ls  and components but a ls o  because o f  th e  lon ger w a itin g
1p er io d  fo r  new machinery to  be b oth  manufactured and then  d e liv ered .
The most p e r s is te n t  com plaint was th e l im it in g  o f  output because o f  th e  
r a tio n in g  o f s t e e l .  T h is was an a cu te  problem in  term s o f  both  amount 
and r e g u la r ity  u n t i l  1953 and to  some ex ten t as la t e  as 1958. The 
Government gave p r io r i t y  to  o th er in d u str ie s  which i t  f e l t  had g rea ter  
export p o te n t ia l,  such a s  autom obiles and a ir c r a f t  component su p p lie s ,  
and in  p a r tic u la r  e l e c t r ic a l  goods.
The rep a ir in g  o f  sh ip s  was an in te g r a l part o f  th e  sh ip b u ild in g
in d u stiy . T his a sp ect was a lso  plagued b y  r is in g  c o s t s .  T his i s
important to  note as during th ese  y ears  approxim ately 3, 500,000 tons
gross o f  sh ipping was im m obilised and t ie d  up in  th e B r i t is h  sh ip -
2b u ild in g  r iv e r s  to  aw ait reco n d itio n in g , overhaul or r e p a ir . The 
shipbreaking in d u stry  was another fa c e t  o f t h i s  is s u e , f o r  during the 
la t e  1940*8 th ere  was a h igh  demand fo r  scrap so th a t th e s t e e l  p la n ts  
could  produce a record  number o f  in got s t e e l .  Scotland  was a t th is  .
1 . Ib id .
2 . G .H .T.R ., 1949, p .79 .
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p o in t r e sp o n sib le  fo r  more than tw o -th ird s o f  the output o f  the
U nited  Kingdom, and more than h a lf  o f W estern Europe a s  a w hole.
'VDuring th e se  years the shipyards o f  France, Belgium, H olland and |
Scandanavia were f in is h in g  rec o n stru c tio n  and were beg in n in g  to  la y  
claim s to  t h e ir  r ig h ts  in  th e  sh ip  co n stru ctio n  f i e l d ,  as an essen ­
t i a l  p art o f the re -e sta b lish m en t o f th e ir  r e sp e c tiv e  econom ies.
( iv )  In d u s tr ia l R e la tio n s
The d isap p o in tin g  performance o f  the S c o tt is h  sh ip b u ild in g  
in d u s t iy  in  the post-w ar years has always been a s so c ia te d  in  th e popu­
la r  mind w ith  bad labour r e la t io n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  w ith  en d less  ’demarca­
t io n '  d isp u tes  -  i t  sc a r c e ly  appeared e f f ic ie n t  to  b u ild  a sh ip  by  u se  
o f  tw enty-three d if f e r e n t  trad es. McGoldrick d en ies  th a t problems o f  
dem arcation were a lon e  s u f f ic ie n t  t o  exp la in  the undeniab ly  se r io u s  
problem s o f bad in d u s tr ia l  r e la t io n s  in  the post-w ar p eriod  as a w hole. 
Indeed, s tr ik e s  were unusual b e fo r e  1949, and not o f great s ig n if ic a n c e  
to  1951.^  Another popular m isconception  was th a t the d iv is io n  o f  
labour w ith in  th e sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  remained unchanged throughout 
th e  e n t ir e  f i r s t  h a lf  o f  th is  cen tu ry . McGoldrick n o tes  that major 
te c h n ic a l in n ovation s d id  take p la c e  during th ese  y ea rs  and that th ey  
r e in fo r c e d  o ld er  problems such as  stra igh tforw ard  wage d isp u tes, 
ap p ren ticesh ip  d isp u te s  and sh ortages o f  cer ta in  ty p es  o f s k i l le d
workers (w elders in  genera l but a ls o  p la te r s  and sh ip w righ ts), a s  w e ll
2as c re a tin g  new problems such as manning le v e ls  and d ilu t io n s .
1 . McGoldrick, pp. 10, I 3 and I 9 .
2 . I b id . ,  pp. 13 and 15-18. See a ls o ,  C harles Woolf son. S o lid a r ity  J
and S ectio n a lism  : C lass and c r a f t  id e n t i t i e s  among shipyard
workers on the Upper Clyde. (Paper presented  a t  the Sh ipbuild ing  
H istory  Seminar, U n iv ers ity  o f Gothehberg, 27-29 November I 98I ) .  |
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1 , McGoldrick, p p .10-11 ,
I
In  1936 the sh ip b u ild in g  unions became for  the f i r s t  tim e part 
o f  a gen era l fed era tio n  which included  a l l  the major trad e  organisa­
t io n s , T his fed era tio n  -  a long w ith  th e  important n a tio n a l r o le  the  
trade u n ion s p layed during th e Second World War -  crea ted  the condi­
t io n s  under which, a f t e r  1945, major is s u e s  could be n e g o tia te d  a t a 4
n a tio n a l l e v e l  between the employers and th e  workforce as a whole. 
N ev erth e less , t h i s  d id  not rep lace  -  or weaken -  th e  tr a d it io n a l bar­
ga in in g  procedures.
Although th ere  were form al procedures fo r  n e g o tia t io n s  between  
the C onfederation  o f  S h ip b u ild in g  and E ngineering Unions (CSEU) and 
the S h ipbuild ing Employers F ed eration  (SEF)(a procedure which took  
s p e c if ic  i s s u e s  in vo lv in g  any g iv en  union from yard conference to  
lo c a l  and th en  to  n a tio n a l conference l e v e l ) ,  th e  CSEU d id  not in clu d e  
the two b ig g e s t  unions -  the Boilerm akers S o c ie ty  and the E ngineering  
Union, McGoldrick argues then  th a t th e p o s it io n  w ith  regard to  bar­
ga in ing  had to  b e an inform al one, even though both  unions would -  
when i t  su ite d  th e ir  in t e r e s t s  -  operate through the d isp u te s  procedure. 
Hence, t h is  ’ in form ality*  in  th e bargain ing stru ctu re  was one o f  the  
major in d u s tr ia l  r e la t io n s  problem s,^
Throughout the la t e  1940 's and ea r ly  1950 's  th e CSEU made 
n a tio n a l claim s fo r  in creased  tim e r a te s , improved h o lid ays and work­
in g  co n d itio n s and a sh orter  working week w ithout lo s s  o f  pay -  th ese  
were a l l  r e je c te d  on th e  grounds th a t th e  industry  could  not a ffo rd  
them. N ev erth e less , a rep ort by the SEE in  Februaiy 1954 by the  
Economist showed th a t th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  th e major sh ip b u ild in g  firm s |
‘A 'i- à â .
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1. I b id . ,  p p .3-4 .
2. I b id .,  p .15.
was h ea lth y  -  many companies were ab le  to  record  gross p r o f i t s  o f  |Jover one m il l io n  pounds betw een 1948 and 1954. John Browns o f  3
Clydebank had a sp ectacu lar  record  o f £ 2 .9  m il l io n  gross in  1949; 4
£ 3 .3  m illio n  in  1950; £1 .9 7  m il l io n  in  1951; £ 1 .6  m illio n  in  1952;
and £ 2 .2  m il l io n  in  1953. Hence, the r e fu s a l o f th e  CSETJ's cla im s
on th e  b a s is  th a t  th e in d u stry  cou ld  not a ffo rd  them a t  th a t p o in t in
tim e was not v a lid . The fu tu re o f  the sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  fo r
B r ita in  was n o t, however, secu re, as in d ica te d  by the lack  o f  demand
fo r  passenger sh ip s; hence, th e  SEF would have covered them selves
b e t te r  by r e je c t in g  the CSETJ’ s cla im s on the grounds that th e  le v e l
o f  fu tu re  demand was u n certa in  -  even though order books were f u l l  a t
1the moment -  and no con cession s could  be made a t th a t p o in t.
One much p u b lic is e d  problem w ith in  the sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry  was 
th a t o f  manning l e v e l s  and d i lu t io n  brought on by new technology.
Although w elders, to  u se  the b e s t  example, had no ch o ice  but to  accep t  
th e new machinery th a t rep laced  10 man squads in  the e a r ly  1950's ,  
th ey  demanded th a t 2 q u a lif ie d  w eld ers should man each machine. The 
employers somewhat j u s t i f ia b ly  countered th a t t h i s  was in e f f i c ie n t  a s  
th e  job could be done by a s e m i-s k ille d  op erative; th ey  ev en tu a lly  
m od ified  th is  p o s it io n  to  one w elder and one ap p ren tice  or labourer.
But t h i s  proposal was r e je c te d  by w elders in  both  th e lo c a l  and 
n a tio n a l conferences and th is  is s u e  was never s e t t l e d  on a uniform  
b a s is ,^
The o th er p r in c ip a l manning is s u e  was th a t o f d i lu t io n  -  the ques­
t io n  o f  whether p la te r s  or burners should man the new flam e cu ttin g  and «
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burning machines. A lthough th ese  d isp u te s  ra re ly  went to  s tr ik e s  
th ey  r e g u la r ly  went through procedures to  n a tio n a l con feren ces.
E ventual settlem en t provided  fo r  jo in t  manning o f  the machines by  
p la te r s  and burners. T h is problem was a c tu a lly  a t i t s  w orst during 
the in ter-w a r  yea rs . Although i t  remained very c o n tr o v e r s ia l through­
out th e post-w ar era, by th is  p o in t, even though d i lu t io n  agreements 
e x is te d  on paper, th ere  was very l i t t l e  d i lu t e e  labour used  in  
p r a c t ic e ,^
%B eginning in  1949 th ere  was a m ultitude o f  sm all, lo c a l  wage 
d isp u tes  in v o lv in g  almost a l l  o f  the variou s sh ip b u ild in g  trad es; th e  
co n d itio n s  v a r ied  from yard to  yard and d i s t r i c t  to  d i s t r i c t  bu t the  
main wages is s u e  was g e n e r a lly  r e la te d  to  a c tu a l earn ings. The on ly  
major in c id e n t o f  th ese  y ea rs  occurred in  1951 when the B oilerm akers  
Union (w hich enbraced a l l  th e  stee l-w ork in g  tra d es o f  th e  sh ip b u ild in g  
industry) in  th e  lov/er Clyde subm itted cla im s fo r  improved wages to
4'Ke.w-> ^the Clyde Sh ipbuild ing A sso c ia t io n  (CSA) and backed ^ w ith  th r e a ts  o f  %
in d u s tr ia l a c t io n . A lthough th e  CSA would not d ea l w ith  such 'uncon­
s t i t u t io n a l '  claim s ( i . e .  c la im s backed up w ith  b la ta n t  s t r ik e  a c t io n ) ,  
th e ir  p o s it io n  was undermined by the f a c t  th a t many firm s d e a lt  
d ir e c t ly  w ith  the B oilerm akers in d iv id u a lly . Thus the rem aining firm s
f e l t  o b lig e d  to  make co n cess io n s  they d id  not f e e l  were j u s t i f i e d  on 
2s t r i c t  m erits . N ev erth e less , th e immediate post-w ar years were v ir tu -  3
a l l y  fr e e  o f  s t r ik e s  and in d u s tr ia l  d isp u tes were s e t t le d  -  a t l e a s t  
u n t i l  the m id -1950's -  by  n e g o t ia t io n s  e ith e r  a t  form al or inform al 
l e v e l s .
1 , I b id . ,  p p .15- 16 ,
2 . I b id , ,  p . 14.
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( v )  Administration o f  the Industry
There were va r io u s n a tio n a l sh ip b u ild in g  o rg a n isa tio n s  operating  
during th e  post-w ar y e a r s . The S h ipbuild ing  Conference served as the  
in d u stry  spokesman in  th e  post-w ar y ea rs . I t  had been formed in  1928, 
o r ig in a l ly  to  deal w ith  a l l  commercial q u estion s o f a gen era l nature 
which were o f  in te r e s t  to  b u ild e r s  and rep a irers  o f a l l  typ es o f  sh ip s , 
w ith  a p a r tic u la r  in t e r e s t  in  the p r ic e s  o f  merchant sh ip s , Menfcership 
on ly  in clud ed  27 firm s in  1928 but by th e  post-w ar y ea rs  i t  v ir tu a l ly  
covered a l l  B r it is h  sh ip b u ild ers . The N ation a l S h ip b u ild ers S e c u r it ie s  
Ltd, ( 1930- 1958) was e s ta b lish e d  by the Sh ipbuild ing Conference to  
handle th e  is su e  o f  redundant b erth s by provid ing a means to  purchase 
and s t e r i l i s e  redundant cap a c ity . The N ation a l S h ip b u ild in g  S e c u r ity  
Ltd. operated  as a p u b lic  lim ite d  company from 1930-1939 when i t  was 
converted  to  p r iv a te  l im ite d  sta tu s  owned by th e in d u stry . The aim o f  
b oth  th e se  b od ies was to  reduce ca p a c ity  to  a l e v e l  approaching the  
a n tic ip a te d  amount o f  demand in  the medium to  long-term , to  reduce cu t­
th roat com petition  betw een the v a r io u s sh ip b u ild ers  and to  e s ta b lis h  
p r ic e s  a t  a p r o f ita b le  l e v e l .  The S h ip b u ild in g  Corporation was crea ted  
in  1942 to  provide fo r  th e  ad m in istra tion  and management o f  th e yards  
purchased and reopened fo r  war-time work. The C orporation ceased to  
trade in  June o f 1947 b u t was re ta in e d  as a l i v e  company owned by th e  
S h ip b u ild ers  Conference, Other n a tio n a l sh ip b u ild ers a s so c ia t io n s  were 
th e R ep airers C entral Committee, whose fu n ctio n s  were s im ila r  to th ose  
o f th e Sh ipbuilders Conference but con fin ed  to  the commercial in t e r e s t s  
o f  sh ip  rep a irers , and th e W arshipbuilders Committee ( 1925) ,  which was 
to  d ea l w ith  q uestions a r is in g  frcm th e  Adm iralty or w ith  w arships in
%
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g en era l.^
F ollow in g  the Second World War th e  l i a i s o n  fu n c tio n s  o f  the  
S h ip b u ild in g  Conference were g r e a tly  expanded. Links were made w ith  
other trade a s so c ia t io n s , p a r t ic u la r ly  th ose rep resen tin g  the d ir e c t  
su p p lie r s  to  the sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry , e .g .  the Iron  and S te e l  
F ed eration  and th e Timber Trades F ed eration . Contact was a lso  main­
ta in ed  w ith  the B r i t is h  Engineers* A sso c ia tio n , the E le c t r ic a l  and 
A llie d  M anufacturers A sso c ia t io n  and th e General C ouncil o f  B r i t is h  
Shipping which rep resen ted  both  the Chamber o f Shipping and the 
L iverpool Steamship Owner A sso c ia tio n . Links were a ls o  qu ick ly  re ­
e s ta b lish e d  w ith  the West European S h ip b u ild ers, in  what was a t f i r s t  
d esign ated  as the West European S h ip b u ild ers Inform al C ontract, and 
la t e r  as a menber o f  th e  A sso c ia tio n  o f  West European S h ip b u ild ers,^
The Conference m aintained, in  i t s  ca p a c ity  as the in d u stry  spokes­
man, very  c lo s e  con tact w ith  th e Government departments and a g en c ie s . 
During the in ter-w ar years con tact w ith the Government was m ainly  
through the a u sp ices  o f the M ercantile  Marine Department o f th e  Board 
o f  Trade. F ollow ing the co n c lu sio n  o f  the war the Adm iralty rep laced  
th e M ercan tile  Marine Department as the sponsoring department fo r  the
sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry . C ontact was m aintained as  w e ll  w ith  th e M in istry
5o f  T ra n ^ o r t, Board o f  Trade, Customs and E x c ise  and o th ers .
1. S laven, p . 23 and Anthony S laven, * Sh ip b uild in g  Industry  
O rganizations and P o l i c i e s  1920-1977', p p .305 and 306, in  
Sh ip b u ild in g  Seminar.
2 . I b id . ,  p .292 .
3. Ib id .
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1 . Slaven, in  Sh ip b uild in g  Seminar, pp. 291-292.
2 . I b id . ,  p p .291, 292 and 293.
3. I b id . ,  p .301 .
In  1946 the Government appointed th e Sh ipbuild ing Advisory  
Committee to  be the main l ia i s o n  w ith  the in d u stry  and to  ad v ise  th e  
Government on m atters concerning sh ip b u ild in g . But t h i s  Committee, 
although  i t  t e c h n ic a l ly  fu n ction ed  u n t i l  19&7 , n ever had any r e a l  sup- 
p ort from the in d u stry  because i t  d id  not l ik e  to  share membership 
w ith  r e p r e se n ta tiv e s  o f the shipowners, trade un ion s and o th ers.
The Sh ip b uild ers C onference thus came to  be regarded both  by  
industry  and the Government as the a u th o r ita t iv e  source on sh ip bu ild ­
in g . S laven  suggested  th a t the Conference could  most ap p ro p ria te ly  
have been d escrib ed  as a ’p ressure group, a c tin g  to  r e in fo r c e  th e |
in d u stry  case  fo r  the need fo r  government a c t io n  in  p a r t ic u la r  d ir e c -  
1t io n s* . The industry  was not slow  to  e x p lo it  i t s  lin k a g es  to  Govern­
ment and provided a reg u la r  flow  o f s e le c te d  data to  em phasise the  
co n tr ib u tio n  made by th e  in d u stry  to  the n a tio n a l economy. I
The p o l i c i e s  o f  the S h ip b u ild ers  Conference are o fte n  c i t e d  as 
detrim ental to  th e development o f  the sh ip b u ild in g  in d u stry . Yet 
Slaven  d is t in g u ish e d  between th e  concept o f  the Sh ipbuild ing Conference 
as an a d m in istra tiv e  u n it  and as an industry  p o lic y  machine. In  the  
former ca p a c ity  i t  d e a lt  e f f i c i e n t l y  on many l e v e l s ,  but as an execu­
t iv e  p o lic y  body i t  could not make or implement p o l ic ie s  con trary  or 
even independent o f  i t s  members v iew s. D e f ic ie n c ie s  in  p o lic y  or lack
o f  a coherent p o l ic y  a lto g e th e r  sim ply r e f le c t e d  th e in d iv id u a l s e l f
3in t e r e s t  o f th e  member companies. W ithin the Sh ip b uild ers Conference
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th ere was a la ck  o f  w i l l  to  implement any change u n t i l  no p o s s ib le  *
a lte r n a t iv e  remained, th e  case  o f  n a t io n a lisa t io n  o f th e  industry , |
which was fought fo r  so lo n g  (u n t i l  1977) ,  was the prime example o f  
t h is  a t t i tu d e .
This was an era o f f u l l  order hooks and a tim e remarkably fr e e  
o f  the major in d u s tr ia l  u n rest th a t has so o fte n  marked t h is  in d u stry . 
N ev erth e less , i t  i s  dangerous to  look  at th e se  y ears  out o f  t h e ir  
w ider con text : B r i t is h  sh ip b u ild in g  was on the d e c lin e  in  term s o f  
w orld lea d ersh ip  even though production  f ig u r e s  were r is in g .  No one 
p red ic ted  th a t l e s s  than f i f t e e n  y ea rs  a f t e r  the con clusion  o f  the  
Second World War Japan would le a d  the world in  sh ip bu ild in g  output and 
B r ita in  would rank th ir d . W ith h in d sigh t i t  i s  easy  to  blame 
S co tla n d ’s f u l l  order books fo r  lu l l in g  S c o t t is h  sh ip b u ild ers in to  a 
f a l s e  sense o f  complacency during the post-w ar y ea rs .
I
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5. T e x t i le s
( i )  Post-War S c o tt is h  T e x t i le  Industry
In  the m id-n ineteenth  century th e  t e x t i l e  and a l l i e d  trad es pro­
vided  employment fo r  more people than a l l  th e  o th er manufacturing  
trades put togeth er . In  th e la t e  1940‘ s t h is  had been reversed  and 
t e x t i l e s  had been o u tstr ip p ed  by the m etal and engineering in d u str ie s , 
but t e x t i l e s  s t i l l  accounted fo r  o n e - f if th  o f  the t o ta l  employment in  
m anufacturing, both  in  S co tla n d  and Great B r ita in  a s  a w hole, and fo r  
about o n e -tw e lfth  o f the t o t a l  working pop u lation . The t e x t i l e  in d u stry  
was p a r t ic u la r ly  s ig n if ic a n t  as an enployer o f  women. Of a l l  the women 
employed in  post-w ar S co tlan d  more than one in  seven was working in  the  
t e x t i l e  tra d es , and out o f  the 250,000 women employed in  the fa c to ry  
trades in  Scotland  approxim ately 110,000 were t e x t i l e  w orkers. This  
was a la r g e r  proportion  than in  England, where the engineering  trad es  
o ffe r e d  g rea ter  employment op p o rtu n ities  to  women; t h i s  was p a r t ia l ly  
due to  d if f e r e n t  typ es o f  work a v a ila b le  in  England. In  1950 164,600  
persons were working in  th e  t e x t i l e  trad es in  Scotland, t h is  rep resen ted  
9 . ^  o f th e  corresponding B r it is h  t o t a l ,  not fa r  from th e  proportion  
(10 .3^ ) which S c o tt ish  employment in  a l l  in d u str ie s  and s e r v ic e s  bore  
to  the B r i t i s h  t o t a l ,  ^
The two t e x t i l e  trad es most stro n g ly  rep resen ted  in  S cotland  were 
the lin e n  and th e  ju te  tra d es , in  both o f which Scotland  had th e  major 
share o f  production  in  B r ita in  -  although fo r  the l in e n  in d u stry  t h is  
would not have been tru e i f  Northern Irelan d  was included . The la r g e s t
1 . L eser, p p .124-125.
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sec to r  in  S cotlan d  o f the h o siery  in d u stry  was h ig h ly  s p e c ia l is e d ,  
v iz ,  the production  o f  w oo llen  goods l ik e  p u llo v er s  and card igans, 
o f  which t h i s  sec to r  had an extrem ely h igh proportion  o f  th e  t o t a l  
B r it is h  production . Y et, on th e  other hand, the manufacture o f  such 
s ta p le  goods as socks, s to ck in g s , and underwear was alm ost e n t ir e ly  
concentrated  in  England. Many t e x t i l e  trad es were very p o o r ly  repre­
sented, e .g .  co tto n  weaving, th e  rayon and s i lk  trad es and d ress­
making. The s p e c ia l is a t io n  o f  the S c o tt is h  cotton  in d u stry  on sewing 
co tton  accounted fo r  th e  comparative d e f ic ie n c y  in  the weaving sec to r  
o f the in d u stry , which was very  sm all.^  The S c o tt ish  co tto n  in d u stry  
a ls o  produced fu rn ish in g  fa b r ic s ,  and in  the post-w ar y ea rs  many new­
comers to  t h i s  in d u stry  were added. V arious a n c il la r y  in d u str ie s  such 
as b lea ch in g , dyeing, f in is h in g  and p r in tin g  contributed  to  th e co tton
trade, and such d iv erse  commodities as needlework fa b r ic s , co tto n  can-
2v ases and f is h in g  n ets  were produced. The coming o f man-made f ib r e s  
created  job s in  many d if f e r e n t  c a p a c it ie s . A new B r i t is h  product, 
based on I . C. I . research  a t  Ardeer, made t e x t i l e  f ib r e s  out o f  the pro­
t e in  l e f t  in  th e  resid u e  a f t e r  th e  a rach is  o i l  was ex tra c te d  from ground­
n u ts. In  1951 production  began at a fa c to r y  in  Dumfries, b u i l t  to  supply  
10,000 to n s o f th is  ‘A rdil* a year. The f ib  r e g la s s  in d u stry  produced a 
wide range o f  f ib ro u s g la s s  products. The main B r i t is h  p la n t fo r  making 
g la s s  yarn and tap es was s itu a te d  in  Glasgow and employed sev era l hun­
dred p erson s. The production  o f  rayon in  S cotlan d  was on ly  represented
by one firm . North B r i t is h  Rayon a t Jedburgh, but i t  was n o ta b le  as the
3la r g e s t  employer o f labour in  the E astern  Borders, Hence, th e  f a c t
1 . I b id . ,  p .125;
2. Oakley, p p .20 and 21.
3 . I b id . ,  pp. 41 and 42.
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th a t the S c o t t is h  s i lk  and rayon in d u str ie s  were much sm aller than 
those o f  England and Wales was in d ic a tiv e  of the v ir tu a l absence o f  
the newer in d u s tr ie s  in  S cotlan d , N ev erth e less , the statem ent th a t  
Scotland  had s p e c ia l is e d  on stagn atin g  ra th er  than on expanding trad es  
was g en era lly  l e s s  tru e fo r  th e t e x t i l e  than the m etal tra d es , fo r  
in stan ce  th e carpet in d u stry  in  Scotland  had e x c e lle n t  expansion pros­
p ec ts  in  th e  post-w ar y ea rs .^
There was not the same tendency fo r  the t e x t i l e  trades as fo r  
m eta ls  and en g in eerin g  to  be concentrated  in  one p la c e  a s  th ere was 
g e n e r a lly  l i t t l e  in te r r e la t io n  betw een the v a r io u s trad es, th e  excep­
t io n  was the t e x t i l e  f in is h in g  tra d es  which tended to  be lo c a te d  near t
th e  main co tton  and ju te  m anufacturing areas. There were various  
c en tre s  fo r  th e d if f e r e n t  t e x t i l e  trad es : P a is le y  fo r  co tton , Hawick 
fo r  wool and h o s ie r y , K irkcaldy and Dunfermline f o r  l in e n , Dundee fo r  
ju te , th e  Newmilns area in  Ayr fo r  the sm all la c e  trade, Glasgow and 
Kilmarnock fo r  ca rp ets , e tc .  Some o f th ese  in d u s tr ie s  l ik e  ju te  and 
la c e  were alm ost e n t ir e ly  con cen trated  in  one s in g le  d i s t r ic t ,  b u t  
o th ers  were more w id ely  spread over th e  country. For example, th e  
w oollen  trade was found not on ly  in  the Borders, but a ls o  in  A llo a ,
Aberdeen, Lewis and other areas; s im ila r ly  the l in e n  in d u stry  was
lo c a te d  not on ly  in  F ife  but a ls o  in  Dundee, Aberdeen, Greenock and 
2elsew here. The c lo th in g  trad es were g en era lly  sm all and w id ely  d is ­
p ersed  throughout Scotland, although the t a i lo r in g  trade to  a la r g e  
ex ten t was concentrated  in  Glasgow. The remainder o f t h i s  s e c t io n  con­
c e n tra te s  on the ju te  trade, both  because of th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  f in d in g
1. L eser, p .125. See a lso  Oakley, p p .1-40.
2 . Oakley, p p .l ,  2 and 4 .
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( i i )  Ju te
Although the d ep ression  o f th e  1920*s and 1930*s had g r e a t ly  
reduced i t s  inportance r e la t iv e  to  th e  pre-w ar era, th e  Dundee ju te  
industry in  the post-w ar y ea rs  was q u ite  complex. Consuming in d u str ie s  
used  ju te  products in  vary ing  forms, p r in c ip a l ly  yarn, c lo th  and hags 
but th ese  were required  in  an in f in i t e  v a r ie ty  o f  counts and q u a l i t ie s  
o f  yarn, o f  w idths and makes o f  c lo th s , and o f  s iz e s  and typ es o f  
bags.^  The ju te  in d u stry  d erived  i t s  markets la r g e ly  from w ith in  the  
U nited  Kingdom but the export market, both  d ir e c t  and in d ir e c t ,  was a 
m atter o f  prime importance.
The Second World War had a p recu lia r  e f f e c t  on the trade. Although  
t h i s  in d u stry  was s t r a t e g ic a l ly  important i t  was n o t a t f i r s t  covered  
under the E s s e n t ia l  Work Order, w ith  the r e s u lt  th a t thousands o f  opera­
t iv e s  were c a l le d  up in to  the s e r v ic e s .  A lso , on the manufacturing  
s id e , two con cen tra tion s took p la c e  in  Dundee in  1942 because o f th e  
demand fo r  fa c to r y  space fo r  w ar-tim e purposes. These developm ents 
brought the number o f workers down to  15, 577 and th e  conversion  o f  more 
ju te  fa c to r ie s  to  o th er war work fu r th er  d ep le ted  th e labour fo r c e  t i l l
1 , Oakley, p .8 . See T. Woodhouse and P. K ilgour, The Ju te  In d u stry  
Prom Seed to  F in ish ed  C loth . (London, S ir  I sa a c  Pitman and Sons, 
L td ., 1921) ; Survey o f U nited Kingdom Ju te  Industry. (1952 rep r in t  
in  b ook let form, endorsed by James S tuart, S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  fo r  
Scotland , o f  a s e r ie s  o f a r t i c l e s  in  the 1952 The Times Weekly 
Review) . p. 3; W illiam  M, Walker, J u te o p o lis  Dundee and i t s  t e x t i l e  
workers 1885-1923. (Edinburgh, S c o tt ish  Academic P ress , 1979), 
p p .529- 530,
ilcomprehensive data on th e w oollen  industry  fo r  th e se  years and Ia
because o f  the g rea t s e c to r a l importance o f ju te  in  the Dundee area ,
1
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and 1949 was crea ted  by a measure o f  unemployment in  the in d u stry  through  
a shortage o f raw ju te  su p p lie s  from P ak istan  a s  w e ll  as the d r i f t  o f  
workers to  the in d u s tr ia l  e s ta t e .
1 . Survey o f U nited  Kingdom J u te  Industry, p .24.
2 . Ib id .
3 . I b id .,  p .4 .
ÿ
Îi t  reached rock bottom  in  1945 a t 10 ,773 , or l e s s  than 5C  ^ o f  the S
1939 f ig u r e ,^  T h is shrinkage in  th e  labour force  had a ser io u s  e f f e c t  
on the in d u stry  when the war ended and there was an immediate demand 
fo r  a l l  kinds o f  ju te  goods. I t  took  sev era l v i t a l  years fo r  the con­
cen tra ted  fa c to r ie s  to  be reconverted  to  th e ir  o r ig in a l u se  and i t  was
21948 b efo re  a l l  o f  them were back to  reasonable production  le v e l s .
A fte r  the war a com plete r ev e rsa l o f  pre-war labour co n d itio n s  
ru led  in  t h i s  in d u stry . Along w ith  the déconcentration  o f fa c to r y  
space th ere  was a scramble fo r  a l l  a v a ila b le  labour, e s p e c ia l ly  w ith  so 
many former ju te  workers no lon ger l iv in g  in  th e  c i t y .  Recruitm ent was 
very  d i f f i c u l t  as p r a c t ic a l ly  a l l  the works in  the c i t y  were under-
s ta f fe d . The fo llo w in g  f ig u re s show the slow  progress o f  recm itm en t
in to  th e  ju te  in d u stry  in  th e immedia.te post-w ar y ea rs . ^
.1
1945 10,773
1946 13,224
1947 13, 907
1948 13,320 1
1949 12,510
1950 13,158 1
1951 13,911 ê
The s l ig h t  drop in  the f ig u r e s fo r  the labour fo rce  in  the y ears 1948 1
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The problem o f  recru itm ent fo llo w in g  th e war was com plicated  by  
the fa c t  th a t Dundee was c l a s s i f i e d  as a Development Area and under 
the D is tr ib u t io n  of In d u str ie s  Act (1945), the Board o f Trade estab ­
lish e d  an in d u s tr ia l e s ta te  on the o u tsk ir ts  o f  the c i t y  and encouraged  
new b u sin e ss  to  s e t t l e  th ere . Prom 1945-1951 th ese  new in d u s tr ie s  
absorbed 5 ,000  workers, many o f  whom were fem ale op era tiv es  on whose 
se r v ic e s  the ju te  in d u stry  had p rev io u sly  depended fo r  the major source 
o f i t s  labour fo rce . The le a d e r s  o f  the ju te  trade o s te n s ib ly  welcomed 
new in d u stry  as i t  would h elp  the c i t y ’ s economy and in d ir e c t ly  the ju te  
trade but th ey  argued th at in s u f f ic ie n t  regard was paid  by th e  Government 
to  Dundee’ s e s ta b lish e d  in d u s tr ie s ,  namely ju te . A fter  continued  repre­
sen ta tio n  i t  was decided not to  s e t t l e  any a d d itio n a l firm s in  the  
Dundee area. Although th e  Board o f  Trade ( th e  c o n tr o llin g  agency o f  
the S c o tt is h  In d u str ia l E s ta te s ,  L td ,) recogn ised  th a t th e  le a d e r s  o f  
the ju te  in d u stry  were showing u ndisgu ised  s e l f - in t e r e s t  in  not wanting 
any com petition  from new in d u s tr ie s  that would tempt t h e ir  workers away 
w ith  prom ises o f  h igher wages and b e t te r  working co n d itio n s -  i t  a lso  
argued o b je c t iv e ly  th a t Dundee was becoming sa tu ra ted  by to o  many firm s  
chasing to o  few workers. Thus i t  was fo r  t h i s  reason, and not to  per­
petuate the d e c lin in g  ju te  trad e, th a t the Board o f Trade decided  not
2to  s e t t l e  any more firm s in  t h is  area.
I t  was ju s t  as the ju te  in d u stry  was beginn ing to  recover th a t  
another blow f e l l .  The p a r t it io n  o f  India  in  1947 created  a shortage  
o f  ju te  and ju te  c lo th . This in  turn caused working hours to  be shor­
tened  fo r  Dundee ju te  workers and in  some ca ses  redundancies. T w o-thirds S
I
1. Ib id .
2, See pp .292-294 on th e  S c o tt is h  I n d u s tr ia l E s ta te s  Ltd.
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1 , I b id . ,  pp .4 -5 . See a lso  pp. 32-33 on th e  In flu en ce  o f P a r t it io n ,  
A lso  o f  in te r e s t  i s  N aruli P eera, The P r ice  In com oetitiveness. o f  
In d ia ’s Ju te  Manufacture E xports, (U n iv ers ity  o f  S a lford , Depart­
ment o f  Economics, S a lfo rd  Papers in  Econom ics), pp. 1 -2 , Accord­
ing to  Peera the post-w ar in te r n a tio n a l market fo r  ju te  manufac­
tu res was q u asi-m on op o listic  : in  1950 In d ia  su pp lied  alm ost 
n in e -te n th 8 o f  the t o t a l  w orld exports o f  ju te  export, bu t one 
decade la t e r  E ast P ak istan  had captured a s ig n if ic a n t  share o f  
the market.
o f  a l l  the ravf producing areas were in  E ast P ak istan , which had on ly  
one inadequate p o r t, C hittagong, on ly  to le r a b le  ra ilw a y  serv ic e  and |
no ju te  m il ls  or f a c to r ie s .  In d ia  had vast ju te  works and e x c e lle n t  
p o rt f a c i l i t i e s  in  C alcutta , but was l e f t  w ith  on ly  on e-th ird  o f  th e  
r ic h  ju te  growing area o f B engal. This incongruous s itu a t io n  was fu r ­
th er  com plicated by a d i l u t e  between the two co u n tr ies  over the ques­
t io n  o f the d eva lu a tion  o f  the rupee which was not s e t t le d  u n t i l  1951 .
As a r e s u lt  o f  th e se  d isp u tes  con sid érab le  d i f f i c u l t y  was experienced  
in  th e  supply o f  raw ju te  and C a lcu tta  c lo th  cau sin g  a packaging c r i s i s  
in  the U nited Kingdom and a la r g e  amount o f in s e c u r ity  in  the w orld  
ju te  trade. The sign in g  o f  th e Indo-P akistan  trad e pact was to  help  
In d ia  endeavour to  grow more ju te  and P ak istan  to  both  beg in  to  b u ild  
more ju te  m il ls  and f a c to r ie s  and a ls o  to  improve the p ort a t  
C hittagong and p ort f a c i l i t i e s  at Chaîna,
The ju te  in d u stry  was su bject to  government re g u la tio n s  through 
the op eration  of the J u te  Control O ff ic e  in  Dundee. The Control was 
e s ta b lish e d  in  September o f 1939 a t th e  outbreak o f  th e  war. I t  y/as 
o r ig in a l ly  r e sp o n sib le  to  th e Raw M a ter ia ls  Department o f  Supply, l a t e r  
to  the Raw M ateria ls  Department o f  the Board o f Trade and then to  th e  
M in istry  o f  M a ter ia ls . In  1941 to  meet the demands o f  th e  se r v ic e  
departments the C ontrol became the s o le  importer o f ju te  although i t  
d e a lt  through th e  normal trade supply channels fo r  both  raw ju te  and
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ju te  goods. In  1945 war c e r t i f ic a t e s ,  which had b een  requ ired  by
the Government each tim e the in d u stry  needed new su p p lie s  o f  ju te ,
were ab o lish ed  and consumers were a b le  to  d ea l d ir e c t  w ith  the trade
as in  th e pre-war y ea rs . Yet the J u te  Control was re ta in ed , i t s  main
fu n c tio n  in  the post-w ar years was p r ic e  con tro l which was achieved by
%th e s e t t in g  o f  maximum s e l l in g  p r ic e s  fo r  yarn and c lo th ,
- The J u te  Trade F edera l Council v/as formed in  May o f  1947, i t s  
membership comprised th e  variou s s e c t io n a l in t e r e s t s  o f  th e  ju te  
in d u stry . U n til the outbreak o f  the Second World War the ju te  trade  
had been h ig h ly  s e c t io n a l is e d  between im porters, sp in ners, manufactur­
ers , merchants, e tc . During the war much o f  the r e t ic e n c e  and secrecy  -n 
was broken down and th e  b e n e f i t s  o f some form o f  m acro-planning began 
to  be appreciated  by a l l  s e c t io n s  o f th e in d u stry , the J u te  Trade 
F ederal C ouncil b ein g  th e  r e s u lt .  The C ouncil included  r e p r e se n ta tiv e s  
from the A sso c ia tio n  o f  J u te  Spinners and M anufacturers, the United  
Kingdom J u te  Goods A sso c ia tio n , the J u te  Sack and Bag M anufacturers’
1. Survey o f  U nited  Kingdom J u te  Industry, p p .29 , 30 and 31»
2. I b id . , p . 6 .
A sso c ia tio n , Lim ited, th e  Dundee Ju te  and Linen Goods Merchants A sso c i-
2at ion , and the London J u te  A sso c ia tio n . T his should have been a not­
ab le event in  the h is to r y  o f  the in d u stry , because fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e 
the ju te  in d u stry  cou ld  speak w ith  both  a u th o r ity  and a u n ite d  v o ice , 
but the C ouncil never ach ieved  much, o f s ig n if ic a n c e .
A ser io u s  programme o f  m odernisation, which had been in terru p ted  
by the Second World War, was implemented by the ju te  trade fo llo w in g  the 
war. From 1945-1951 about £ 4  m il l io n  was spent on re-equipm ents w ith - %
out any Government a s s is ta n c e  o f  any kind. The m odernisation in clud ed
 ^ . ¥
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in s t a l la t io n  o f new m achineiy, w idespread e l e c t r i f i c a t io n ,  respacing
o f  p la n t to  provide more e f f i c i e n t  la y -o u ts , and improved w elfare
f a c i l i t i e s .  New tech n o logy  was introduced  e s p e c ia l ly  in  the weaving
s id e  o f the in d u stry . These in clud ed  the c ir c u la r  loom, which came
from France, and th e  autom atic cop -load in g  attachm ents fo r  the ordinary
f l a t  loom, brought from Germany. The c ir c u la r  loom was considered
rev o lu tio n a ry  fo r  th e se  looms g r e a t ly  increased  output, a s one worker
cou ld  operate fou r machines which ran a t 300 p ick s  a minute as compared
w ith  the 70 -150 p ick s  o f the f l a t  loom which by i t s e l f  took one worker 
1to  run. T his modern machinery not on ly  in creased  output in  the ju te  
in d u stry  but a ls o  e f fe c te d  savings in  labour and oth er c o s ts .
A lthough the U nited  S ta te s  imported raw ju te  to  sp in  in to  carpet 
yarn, i t  had no c lo th  m anufacturing in d u stry  o f i t s  own. N ev erth e less , 
i t  e x e r c ise d  a con sid erab le  in flu en ce  on the world ju te  markets because  
i t  imported one-quarter o f th e  w orld’ s output o f a l l  ju te  goods.
Twenty-three per cent o f  a l l  o f  In d ia ’ s ju te  exports went to  America 
between 1949 and 1952. The world-wide hunt fo r  d o lla r s  a f t e r  the war 
was a major fa c to r  in  th e world ju te  trad e, a l lo c a t io n s  o f ju te  goods 
by In d ia  were given w ith  much g rea ter  l i b e r a l i t y  to  hard currency ra th er  
than s o f t  currency c o u n tr ie s . Thus th e  w orld ’s on ly  a lte r n a t iv e  sources 
o f  supply were B r ita in  and the C ontinent. But th ere  was p resen t such 
s c a r c ity  in  B r ita in  th a t to  some ex ten t B r ita in  i t s e l f  was forced  to  
buy from the C ontinent, The European co u n tr ies  made la r g e  p r o f it s  -  
French production  reached record  le v e ls ,  Belgium, I t a ly ,  C zechoslovakia, 
A u str ia , Spain and Germany a l l  shared in  the p r o f i t s .  B r ita in  was th e
1. I b id . , p p .6 and 16-22 ,
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hardest h it  in  t h is  regard  fo r  not on ly  was i t  having to  pay the 4
Indian  le v y  and buy to  such ex ten t from the C ontinent, but a lso  i t s  
post-w ar m odernisation programme had to  be paid' fo r  by  an industry  
s t r i c t l y  co n tro lled  by th e  Government w ith  regards to  p r ic e  and 
p r o fits ,.^
1. I b id . ,  p . 34. See a ls o ,  S tuart McDowall, Paul Draper and Tony ll
McGuinness, P r o te c t io n , T echnologica l Change and Trade 
Adjustment : The Case o f Ju te in  B r ita in , (S t , Andrews U n iv ersity , 
Department o f Economics, R eprint S e r ie s  N o.14, rep r in ted  from 
GDI Review 1 -  1976).
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Chapter S ix
New Industry and R egional P o l ic y
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1 . New Towns
( i )  O rigin  o f New Towns Idea
Sidney Webb was quoted as saying th a t the normal la p se  o f  tim e 
from the f i r s t  prom ulgation o f  an important reform u n t i l  the tim e o f  
i t s  general acceptance was e ig h teen  years.  ^ But, to  c i t e  th e  example 
o f  the B r i t is h  New Towns, i t  was fo r ty -e ig h t  years from the f i r s t
p u b lica tio n  in  I 898 o f  S ir  Ebenezer Howard’ s book Tomorrow ; A P eacefu l
2 3Path to  R eal Reform u n t i l  the passage o f the New Towns Act ( 1946) .
Howard’ s book was a b len d  o f 'benevolent id ea lism  and b a s ic  common 
s e n s e b u t  whereas h is  suggested  p h y s ic a l town la y -o u t was o u t-o f-  
date by 1903 when th e  Garden C ity  A sso c ia tio n  b u i l t  i t s  f i r s t  tovm, 
Letchworth ( in  H ertford sh ire , 35 m iles  north o f  London), the underly ing  
p r in c ip le s  in  Howard’ s book remained th e impetus o f  th e  Garden C ity  
Movement during the f i r s t  two decades o f  t h is  century. Garden C it ie s  
were o f f i c i a l l y  d e fin ed  by th e Garden C it ie s  and Town P lanning A sso c i­
a t io n  as fo llo w s:
A Garden C ity  i s  a Town designed fo r  h ea lth y  
l i v in g  and industry; o f  a s iz e  th a t makes pos­
s ib le  a f u l l  measure o f s o c ia l  l i f e  but not
1. F rederic  J .  Osborn and Arnold W hittick , New Towns T heir O r ig in s ,
Achievements and P rogress. (London, Leonard H i l l ,  1977), p. 38.
2. R evised  and r e - is s u e d  in  1902 as Garden C it ie s  o f  Tomorrovf. The
l a t e s t  e d it io n , w ith  in tro d u ctio n s  by F. J ,  Osborn and Lewis 
Mumford, was p u b lish ed  in  I 965.
3 . See, New Towns Act (194-6) R eports o f the East K ilb r id e  and 
G lenrothes Development C orporations fo r  the p er io d  ending 31st  
March, 1950. (Edinburgh, H.M. S. 0. , 14th December, 1950), and Nevf
Towis Act ( 1946) R eports o f th e  Cumbernauld, E ast K ilb r id e  and
G lenrothes Development C orporations fo r  the p eriod  ending 31st  
March. 1957~. (Edinburgh, H. &L S. 0 . ,  31st J u ly , 1957).
4 . Osbom and W h ittick , p .4 .
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la rg er ; surrounded by a ru ra l b e lt ;  the whole |
o f  the land  b e in g  in  p u b lic  ownership or h eld  
in  tr u s t  fo r  the coimminity, I
Much o f the su ccess o f  th e  Garden C ity  Movement, in  terms o f th e  good 
fortune o f  th e two Garden C it ie s  -  Letchworth and Welwyn ( I 919) ,  was 
due to  the heavy streak  o f  p r a c t ic a l i t y  in  Howard’s scheme, which 
en v ision ed  a town f u l l y  adapted to  the modern in d u s tr ia l system  and 
the way o f  l i f e  i t  both  req u ired  and made p o s s ib le .  On t h i s  c r u c ia l  
p o in t Howard r a d ic a lly  d if f e r e d  from e a r l ie r  u top ian  p lan n ers, who had 
d ev ised  c lo se d -c o im in it ie s  both in  terms o f trade and a g r ic u ltu r e  and 
a l l  forms o f  s o c ia l  in te r -a c t io n .
Follow ing th e foundation  o f  the f i r s t  Garden C ity  o f Letchworth,
th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  Garden C ity  Movement were in e x tr ic a b ly  t i e d  up
2w ith  th a t o f  th e  town planning movement. Hence, p red ic ta b ly , the f i r s t  
B r it is h  town p lanning l e g i s la t io n  was passed in  1909. F ollow ing th e  
F ir s t  World War th e d rive to  b u ild  a d d itio n a l Garden C it ie s  was checked  
by two fa c to r s  : the development o f  the suburbs and the s tren g th  and 
p o p u la r ity  o f  the in ter-w ar housing d r iv e . In  S cotlan d  t h is  was very  
stro n g ly  f e l t  in  and around the Edinburgh area, ^
Although p u b lic  op in ion  was not in  favour o f  planned c i t i e s  during  
the in ter-w ar p er io d , two in f lu e n t ia l  conm ittees s tr o n g ly  endorsed th e  
Garden C ity  p r in c ip le s  during th e se  yea rs . The Chamberlain Committee
1. Ib id . See a ls o , Mark Swenarton, Homes F i t  f o r  Heroes The P o l i t i c s  
and A rch itectu re  o f E arly S ta te  Housing in  B r ita in , (London,
Heineman E ducational Books, I 98I )  .
2. See, G. E. Cherry, The E vo lu tion  o f  B r it is h  Tovm. Planning, (London, 
Leonard H i l l ,  1974), on the overlapping in t e r e s t s  o f th e Garden 
C ity  A sso c ia tio n  and the town planning movement.
3 . See, Douglas N iven, The Development o f  Housing in  Scotland .
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recommended the r e s t r i c t io n  o f  fa c to r y  industry  in  London along w ith  
th e  movement o f  a su b sta n tia l amount o f  the London in d u s tr ia l popula­
t io n  to  Garden C it ie s .  Chamberlain in  1938, when he was Prime M in ister , 
was instrum ental in  s e t t in g  up th e Barlow Commission, The Marley 
Commission (1935) aga in  r e ite r a te d  the Government’ s encouragement o f  
New Towns. But i t  was the p u b lic a t io n  o f the Barlow Report in  1940  
which was the turn ing p o in t in  Government concern w ith  urban develop­
ment, This i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  n ote  because the m a jority  report o f  the  
Barlow Commission d id  not openly endorse planned Government co n tro l o f  
th e  lo c a tio n  o f in d u stry , although the Chairman h im se lf  was to  become 
a member o f the Garden C ity  A sso c ia t io n .^  Thus, in  e f f e c t ,  Barlow  
r e tr o s p e c t iv e ly  endorsed the m in o r ity  report o f the Commission, which -  
among o th er  th in g s  -  advocated New Towns.
In  1943 C hu rch ill mandated th e crea tio n  o f  th e  M in istry  o f  Town 
and Country P lann ing , During th e  1940-1945 y ea rs  there was much con­
tro v ersy  regarding the c r e a tio n  o f  New Towns, as they were then  bein g  
c a l le d  -  as opposed to  Garden C it ie s ,  But, oddly enough, the is s u e  o f  
New Towns d id  not f ig u r e  prom inently  in  e ith e r  o f  the P arty  programmes 
in  th e 1945 e le c t io n .
( i i )  New Towns a f te r  the War
The New Towns (R eith ) Committee was appointed in  October 1945 by  
the new Labour Government. The passage o f the New Towns Act ( 1946) ,  
along w ith  th e  Town and Country P lanning Act o f  1947 crea ted  a * system  
o f  c o n tro l and a machinery fo r  p o s it iv e  town co n stru ctio n  th at was
1, Osborn and W hittick , pp, 38-39»
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com p letely  r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' T h e  New Towns Act ( 1 9 ^ )  fo llo w ed  the
recommendations o f the R e ith  Committee very  c lo s e ly . Each New Town
2was to  he constructed  by an ad hoc Development C orporation, which in  
England and Wales was to  be financed  by the M in istry  o f  Town and 
Country P lanning ( t h i s  law, in  fa c t ,  changed the named to  the M in istry  
o f  Housing and L ocal Government), and in  Scotland  by th e  S ecretary  o f  
S ta te  fo r  Scotland , Based on M in istry  approval each ad hoc development 
committee was enç)owered to  'acqu ire s i t e s  s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  complete 
towns, to  undertake a l l  th e  n ecessary  k inds o f development, in clu d in g  
th e p ro v is io n  o f  houses and fa c to r ie s ,  commercial b u ild in g s  and p u b lic  
s e r v ic e s ,  to  appoint and employ f u l l - t im e  o f f ic e r s  and con stru ction  
w orkers' .   ^ Although th e  Development Corporations had powers beyond 
th a t o f  a normal lan d lord , i t  was not to  rep lace lo c a l  au th o r ity  
government. The s i t e  o f  each town was to  be made a sep arate county 
d i s t r i c t  w ith  c o u n c il lo r s  e le c te d  in  the normal way. T herefore, the  
New Towns were not to  be s o le ly  r e s id e n t ia l  or dorm itory areas fo r  th e  
nearby conurbation. They were, in  f a c t ,  to  be s e lf -c o n ta in e d  towns -  
q u ite  d is t in c t  from suburbs.
( i i i )  Aims o f  New Towns
D esp ite  th e foreg o in g , the primary aim o f  th e E n glish  New Towns 
was housing : to  provide an a lte r n a t iv e  to  the slums fo r  many in n er -  
c i t y  r e s id e n ts . In  Scotland  i t  was d if fe r e n t ,  th e  major aim o f  b oth
1, I b id . ,  p ,5 6 .
2 , See, Lloyd Rodwin, The B r i t i s h  New Towns. (Cambridge, M assachusetts, 
1956) ,  on th e  Development Corporations and th e  M in istry  o f  Housing 
and Local Government,
3 , Osborn and W hittick , p ,5 6 .
276
E ast K ilb rid e and G lenrothes was job s. Houses were not to be a l l o ­
ca ted  in  e ith e r  o f  th ese  New Towns u n le ss  a worker a lready p o sse sse d  
a job in  th at town. ^ The d if fe r e n c e  in  emphasis was to  cause some 
problems w h ile  the S c o tt ish  New Towns were b ein g  created .
The p lanners o f  th e  New Towns a ls o  had many secondary g o a ls  in  
mind when form ulating New Town p o lic y  (o th er  than job s and h ou sing). 
They endeavoured to  maximise the s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y  o f  th e  community by  
the p ro v is io n  o f v a r io u s o p p o rtu n itie s  to  in crease  the workers p er-  
c a p ita  income. The New Towns were to  a t tr a c t  low income workers by  
th e  p ro v is io n  o f  a good environment, both  s o c ia l  and p h y s ic a l. Con­
t in u a l improvement o f  the f in a n c ia l  standing o f each New Town and i t s  
surrounding area was to  be achieved  v ia  th e s tim u la tio n  o f  economic
growth in  the depressed  and/or depopulated area surrounding the New 
2Town, The New Town d esign ers  hoped th a t the planned communities 
would a ls o  serve as c a ta ly s t s  o f  agrarian  growth in  th e se ttlem en ts  
e n c ir c lin g  them, and would, in  a d d itio n , fu n ctio n  as r e g io n a l growth^, 
c e n tr e s , which would a s s i s t  in  the estab lishm ent o f  some so rt o f  
eq u ilib r iu m  between an in d u s tr ia lis e d  New Tov/n and i t s  agrarian sur­
roundings, T herefore, i t  was hoped th a t  the New Towns would become
1, McGuinness In terv iew , See a ls o , H, R, Smith, The D isp ersa l o f  
P op u la tion  from Congested Urban C entres in  Scotland*, P u b lic  
A dm inistration . 34 (1956), pp, 129-130.
2. E ast K ilb r id e , Cumbernauld, and Irv in g  counted as New Towns con­
s tru c ted  in  D epressed Areas. On th e  o ther hand, G lenrothes was
a new community b u i l t  in  a r e la t iv e ly  sp a rse ly  populated  reg ion  -  
F if e ,  hence the need fo r  housing fo r  miners moving to  work in  th e  
expanding F i f e  c o a l f i e ld s .  L iv in g sto n  was b u i l t  in  I 966 to  pro­
v id e  fo r  o v e r s p il l  from the Edinburgh conurbation.
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incorporated  in to  th e l i f e  o f  the surrounding area and, in  tim e, 
become cen tres  o f  r e g io n a l in flu en ce , ^
N otw ithstanding th e o r ig in a l in te n t io n  o f  the Government to  con­
s tr u c t  20 New Towns in  th e  immediate post-w ar years, on ly  14 were 
s ta r te d  in  th e  years 1947-1950, 10 in  England and W ales and 2 in  
Scotland  -  E ast K ilb r id e  and G lenrothes. No more B r it is h  New Towns 
were b u i l t  u n t i l  1955, Cumbernauld in  S cotlan d  near
GlasgoWy\ Then i t  was not u n t i l  19&1 th a t the next ’g e n e r a tio n ’ o f 8 
B r it is h  New Towns were b u i l t  in clud ing  2 in  S cotland  : L iv in g sto n  
( 1962, in  West Lothian near Edinburgh) and Irv in e  ( I 966, near Glasgow).  ^
Almost a l l  New Towns were b u i l t  p ost-1951 , so w ith in  t h i s  p er iod  i t  
would be premature to  expect them to  prove them selves as a su ccess or 
oth erw ise . N everth eless, th e  1945-1951 p er io d  i s  in te r e s t in g  because  
one New Town in  Scotland  was put w e ll underway (E ast K ilb r id e) and 
another brought to  a s ta g e  o f advanced planning' (G len ro th es).
1 . Gideon Golany, New Tov/ns P lanning ; P r in c ip le s  and P r a c t ic e , (New 
York, A W iley In te r sc ie n c e  P u b lica tio n , 1976), p. 124. See a lso , 
Ray Thomas, A y c li f f e  to  Cumbernauld a study o f seven new tcwns in  
th e ir  reg io n s, (London, George B erridge, December I 969, Vol.XXXV, 
Broadsheet 516), p . 924. In  I 963 the Development Corporation o f  
E ast K ilb r id e  in v ite d  the Grants Committee to  se t  up a new u n i­
v e r s i t y  in  th e ir  town. Although th ere was con sid erab le  d is ­
appointment when the u n iv e r s ity  went to  S t ir l in g ,  a  Wmce 
away, t h i s  in c id en t showed how much p rogress had been made in  
B ast K ilb r id e  s in ce  i t s  i n i t i a l  co n stru ctio n  in  the la t e  1940’s . 
In  May I 9 6 3  E ast K ilb r id e  became a small burgh and by I 9 6 7 , by
an Act o f  P arliam ent, had been r a ise d  to  la r g e  burgh s ta tu s .
Another such in c id e n t, a lb e i t  a happier one than the u n iv e r s ity  
prospect in  E ast K ilb rid e , occurred in  1974 when the F ife  
R egional C ouncil lo c a te d  i t s  r e g io n a l headquarters a t  G lenrothes, 
au tom atica lly  enhancing the s ta tu s  o f  the town. Osborn and 
W hittick , p ,4 1 2 .
2. Osborn and W h ittick , p ,1 5 .
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( iv  ) The Post-War Scottish  New Towns
The S c o t t is h  New Towns o f E ast K ilb r id e  and G lenrothes d if fe r e d  
from th e ir  E n g lish  c o in te r p a r ts , in  th a t t h e ir  ’green b e l t s ’ were 
owned by t h e ir  r e sp e c t iv e  development corp orations. This dem onstrated  
the d iffe r e n c e  between th e  amount o f  land g e n e r a lly  a v a ila b le  in  
England and Scotland , e s p e c ia l ly  in  regard to  th e Greater London and 
Glasgow r eg io n s . T his a ls o  a f fe c te d  the a d m in istra tion  o f  the New 
Towns ; in  South-East England th ere was c lo s e  co-op eration  betw een  
the London County Council and th e Development Corporations o f the  
nearby New Towns, w h ile  in  S cotlan d  the New Towns were f u l ly  indepen­
dent communities.
(a ) E ast K ilb r id e
E ast K ilb rid e  was s p e c i f i c a l ly  proposed in  Abercrom bie's 
1946 Clyde V a lle y  P lan, and o f f i c i a l l y  d esig n a ted  as a New Town on 
the 6 May 1947» The p op u la tion  o f the town a t  d es ig n a tio n  was 2 ,400 ,^  
The p ro jected  s iz e  o f  the town was to  be 100, CXDÛ, but by 1975 the
2planned s iz e  was lowered to  95 ,000  and the a c tu a l s iz e  was 70 ,000 .
In  Glasgow, as opposed to  London, there was a c t iv e  o p p o sitio n  to  the  
’decanting' o f  iraich o f  t h e ir  population , ra th er  than the co n stru ctio n  
o f  new housing on undeveloped land  w ith in  th e  Glasgow b ou nd aries.^  But
1, The New Towns o f  B r ita in . (London, C entral O ff ic e  o f Inform ation  
Pamphlet 44, H.M.S.O., I 96I ) ,  p. 18.
2, Harvie, No Gods and P rec io u s Few Heroes, p . 67 .
3 , See PP.I78- I 8O on t h is  debate w ith in  the Glasgow C orporation which 
raged u n t i l  a t  le a s t  1952 when A, J ,  Jury became C ity  A r c h ite c t  of  
Glasgow and o f f i c i a l l y  gave the C ity ’s approval (a s  opposed to  
th a t o f  th e S c o tt is h  O ff ic e , or reg io n a l approval in  the form o f  
the Abercrombie P la n ), to  th e concept o f  d e c e n tr a lisa t io n  -  and 
thus New Towns -  as both  in e v ita b le  and d e s ir a b le  fo r  Glasgow.
He a ls o  endorsed f u l l  co -op era tio n  w ith  a l l  o v e r s p il l  agreements 
w ith  nearby c i t i e s .
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by 1954 the Glasgow Corporation had changed th e ir  a t t itu d e  c o n p le te ly  
and were demanding a second New Town (Cumbernauld), which they  were 
g iv en  in  1955.
A lthough the primary o b je c t iv e  o f  housing a l lo c a t io n  p o lic y  in  
East K ilb r id e  was to  p rovid e housing fo r  th o se  w ith  job s in  the town, 
rath er than to  r e l ie v e  a gen era l housing c r i s i s  in  th e reg ion , the  
Development Corporation observed th a t as E ast K ilb rid e  was so c lo s e  
to  Glasgow i t  would n a tu r a lly  be G laswegians who were o ffe r e d  jobs 
th ere. T h is l in e  o f  reason ing  was a l i t t l e  f a c i l e  from th e  Glasgow 
C oip oration ’ s po in t o f view , because the young and th e  s o c ia l ly  mobile 
who were o ffe r e d  jobs in  th e New Towns were very o fte n  not th e  ones in  
the most desperate need o f  housing in  Glasgow. The Development 
C orporation’ s answer was th a t they  were mandated to  crea te  s e l f -  
s u f f i c ie n t  new communities, not to  house a l l  the ' ch a r ity  ca ses ' from 
the nearby slums.
O cca sio n a lly , however, a s itu a t io n  arose  whereby the Development 
Corporation o f  E ast K ilb rid e  had houses a v a ila b le  beyond the w a itin g  
l i s t  o f  th ose w ith  jobs in  th e town, next p r io r it y  then bein g  g iven  
to  fa m il ie s  approved as o v e r s p i l l  by Glasgow. E ast K ilb r id e  actu a lljr  
announced housing vacan cies on te le v is io n ;  in  the words o f one member 
o f  i t s  Development Corporation: "There i s  a f la s h  on the t e le v i s io n
and the l i s t  has to  be c lo se d  b e fo re  i t  i s  opened*’.^
Industry in  E ast K ilb rid e  was d isp ro p o r tio n a te ly  heavy in  en g in ­
eer in g  in  comparison to  G lenrothes and even ( la t e r )  Cumbernauld.
1, Thomas, p . 913.
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N ev erth e less , the in d u s tr ia l  stru ctu re o f  E ast K ilb rid e  was much 
more even ly  based on d iv e r se  in d u str ie s  and there was never any fe a r  
o f E ast K ilb r id e  c o lla p s in g  due to  c lo su re  or cutbacks in  one industry , 
a s was to  be the case in  G lenrothes in  the m id-1950*s.^
(b) G lenrothes
As was the case in  E ast K ilb rid e , th e  s e le c t io n  o f
G lenrothes as a s i t e  fo r  a New Town was the outgrowth o f a r e g io n a l
p lan  : S ir  Prank Mears’ R egional P lan fo r  C entral and South-East
S co tlan d . At the con c lu sio n  o f the Second World War th e  N ational Coal
Board announced p la n s  to  tr e b le  th e  output o f the E ast F i f e  c o a l f ie ld s ,
which would employ an a d d itio n a l 6 ,500  m iners. At th e time i t  was f e l t
th a t th ese  workers should not be housed in  p u rely  m ining se ttlem en ts
2but in  a more balanced and d iv e r s i f ie d  community. Hence, the New 
Town o f  G lenrothes was d esign ated  on th e 30 June 1948,  ^ on a s i t e  ju s t
1 . T h is s e c t io n  has o f  n e c e s s ity  been w eighted more h e a v ily  on
housing than on th e  economic s id e . S t a t i s t i c s  on houses b u i l t ,
job s and in d u s tr ie s  lo c a te d  in  th e  New Towns b e fo r e  1951 are
incom plete and o fte n  con trad ictory . N either th e  Annual Reports 
o f  the Development Corporations o f  E ast K ilb r id e  or G lenrothes 
g iv e  d e ta ile d  a n a ly s is  o f th ese  typ es of q u estion s ( fo r  example 
one i s  g iven  the number o f  houses completed and under construc­
t io n  each year but never the t o t a l  number, a ls o  th ere  are no 
f ig u r e s  on in d u s tr ie s , much l e s s  an employment breakdo^vn per 
in d u stry  in  the New Town). See, New Towns Act (1946) Reports 
o f  the East K ilb r id e  and G lenrothes Development Corporations 
fo r  the period  ending 31st March, 1950. (Edinburgh, H. M. 3. 0 . ,  
1950) • Nor do th e  H,ïvL S. O. p u b lic a tio n s  on New Towns shed any 
l i g h t  on the pre-1951 years, and th ere  are no good or even 
adequate secondary sources on the S c o tt is h  New Towns fo r  th ese  
y ea rs . A rch iva l research  i s  req u ired  to  com pile th ese  typ es o f  s t a t i s t i c s ,
2 . A. G, Champion, K. Clegg and R. L, D avies, F a cts  About The New 
Towns A Socio-Econom ic D ig est. (N ew castle, J .  and P . B e a lls  L td .,  
1977) ,  P . 2 « .
3. The New Towns o f B r ita in , p. 18.
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north  o f the c o a l f i e ld s  which was w ith in  easy commuting d istan ce  o f
the p i t s ,^  There were 1 ,150  in h a b ita n ts  on d es ig n a tio n  date and an
i n i t i a l  ta rg e t go a l o f  30,000 was s e t .  Through a s e r ie s  of r e v is io n s
th e ta r g e t goal was r a ise d  to  70 , 000, although in  1975 there were s t i l l
2on ly  32,000 permanent r e s id e n ts . The g r e a te s t  m igration  to  E ast 
K ilb rid e  (a s  w ith  the E n g lish  New Towns) came from w ith in  a 10-15  
m ile ra d iu s . At G lenrothes, however, most o f  the incoming mining 
fa m ilie s  came from d is ta n c e s  o f a t le a s t  40 m ile s , because th e main 
purpose o f th e town was to  house workers needed in  the expanding F ife  
c o a l f ie ld ,  and such labour was simply not a v a ila b le  lo c a l ly .
The F ife  mines were expected  to  make up fo r  th e d ec lin e  o f  c o a l  
production  in  Lanarkshire, and G lenrothes became th e  most dram atic 
example o f the tendency among a l l  the New Tom s to  base the l iv e l ih o o d  
o f  th e  c i t y  on a s in g le  in d u stry  or sm all number o f  in d u s tr ie s .^  In  
the 1950*3 i t  alm ost co lla p sed  due both to  i t s  lack  o f  d iv e r s i f ie d  
industry  and i t s  is o la te d  p o s it io n  even w ith in  F i f e  which low ered th e  
p rosp ects  o f  a t tr a c t in g  new in d u stry . I t  was g e n e r a lly  f e l t  a t  the  
tim e th a t the opening o f the R othes C o llie r y  in  1955, a year e a r l ie r  
than planned, secured  the fu tu re  even i f  i t  s im ultaneously  cemented 
th e unbalanced stru ctu re  o f i t s  in d u s tr ia l economy. T his assessm ent 
was proved wrong. The in d u s tr ia l  imbalance was to  remain, but the  
alm ost t o ta l  f a i lu r e  o f R othes C o llie r y  fo r  g e o lo g ic a l  reasons ensured  
th a t th e fu tu re  was not to  be w eighted towards c o a l. U ltim a te ly , some
1. Champion, C legg and D avies, p . 243.
2. Ib id , and New Towns o f  B r it ia n . p. 18 and H arvie, No. Gods and 
P rec io u s  Few Heroes, p .67 .
3 . Thomas, p p .932-933.
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sa lv a tio n  was provided by e le c tr o n ic s ,  but i t  remained a on e-in d u stry  
town.^
In  a d d itio n , G lenrothes proved to  be one o f  the worst examples
among the New Towns o f  s o c ia l  i s o la t io n .  The m iners and th e ir
fa m il ie s  were not on ly  cut o f f  from the r e s t  o f  s o c ie ty , in  terms o f
p h y sica l d is ta n ce  (a s  were th e  r e s t  of the New Towns), but th ey  had
the added d isadvantage o f seldom mixing w ith  o th er  workers or t h e ir  
2fa m il ie s .  Thus, in  e f f e c t  G lenrothes tended to  become, in  i t s  e a r ly
days, the ‘p u re ly  mining settlem ent*  i t s  p lanners had sought to  avoid ,
and never p rop erly  achieved the 'more balanced and d iv e r s i f ie d  
3community* o f  the New Town id e a l .
( V ) ~ C onclusion
The c r it ic is m s  o f  th e  New Tovms were many. Inherent in  a l l  
a llo c a t io n  schemes was an im p lic it  d iscr im in a tio n  a g a in st a l l  age 
groups o f  workers except th e young, who were h ig h ly  sought a f te r  by  
New Town in d u str ie s . C onversely, th is  was viewed as the New Towns* 
co n tr ib u tio n  to  the housing shortage : h e lp in g  young cou p les. Never­
th e le s s ,  th ere was p resen t a marked ex c lu s io n  o f groups th a t were not 
s o c ia l ly  m obile -  the o ld , the handicapped and th e  poor.
1 . I b id . , p p .825-826. In  I 962 the R othes C o llie r y  was c lo se d  and 
the primary fu n ctio n  o f  th e  town -  to  house miners -  no longer  
e x is te d . S u b s id ia r ie s  o f  various American firm s, many o f  them 
e le c tr o n ic s  concerns, f i r s t  arrived  in  G lenrothes in  1957. But 
th e fu tu re  o f the e le c tr o n ic s  firm s were fa r  from secu re.
2. Golany, p. 124.
3 . Champion, Clegg and D avies, p . 243.
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The a t tr a c t io n  o f  New Towns to  would-he m igrants from the  
in n e r -c ity  was c e r ta in ly  adequate housing as imch as jobs. The New 
Towns o ffered  a separate house or f l a t  to  each fa m ily  u n it .  S in g le ­
house d w e llin g s  w ith  gardens were the most sought a f te r  and, hence, 
a r c h ite c ts  were forced  to d esig n  a lte r n a t iv e  c i t y  la y -o u ts  to  counter­
a ct th e  tedium o f  row upon row o f  id e n t ic a l  houses. But women, 
e s p e c ia l ly ,  who were a t f i r s t  overjoyed  to  have th e ir  own home and 
garden o fte n  found them selves 'trapped* in  the New Towns, T h is  was 
due to  sev era l fa c to r s  : most o f the jobs a v a ila b le  in  the New Town 
were fo r  men; u su a lly  th ere  was on ly  one car per fam ily , which l e f t  
th e  woman at home w ith no means o f  tra n sp o rta tio n  and nowhere w ith in  
walking d is ta n c e  to  go, s in c e  the New Tovms were is o la te d  from th e  
c i t i e s  by a 'green  b e l t ' o f  land; as a very  h igh  proportion  o f  r e s i ­
dents in  the New Towns were young, a great many women were req u ired  to  
s ta y  home w ith  t h e ir  young ch ild ren , even i f  a s u ita b le  job was a v a il­
ab le  fo r  them -  one o f  the E n g lish  New Tovms v/as, in  fa c t ,  nicknamed 
'Pram C ity ' .
The le v e l  o f  New Tovm re n ts  was p r o h ib it iv e  to  very  low income 
p eo p les  who d es ired  to  r e lo c a te . There was no graduated rent based  on 
aggregate fam ily  income in  the New Towns u n t i l  1966.^  H iring the p o s t ­
war years the r e n ts  in  th e New Tovms were much h igh er  than in  th e  
lo c a l  au th o r ity  area . In  the next tw enty years, because o f r i s in g  
b u ild in g  c o s ts  and in t e r e s t  r a te s , the c o s t  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between th e  
two narrowed. But during the immediate post-w ar y ea rs  t h is  type o f  
in d ir e c t  d iscr im in a tio n  aga in st th e  poor was con sid ered  to  be
1 . Thomas, p .841.
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in e v ita b le  u n le s s  Government su b s id ie s  were r a ise d  or housing stand­
ards low ered. These a lt e r n a t iv e s  appeared counter-productive to  the  
Development Corporations fo r  they  were not mandated to co n stru ct  
Government su b sid ised  housing fo r  the im poverished and/or unemployed, 
per s e . R ather, the accep ted  view  o f the Nevr Towns was th a t o f a 
f u l ly  modern tovm designed  fo r  workers as an a lte r n a t iv e  l i f e s t y l e  from 
th at o f  the in n e r -c ity .  Debate on t h is  p o in t raged between th e lo c a l  
a u th ority  co u n c ils , who f e l t  the New Towns should take a g rea te r  share 
in  housing low-income p eo p les , and the Development C orporations 
throughout the post-w ar y ea rs .
In  East K ilb r id e  and G lenrothes, a s opposed to  the f i r s t  E n g lish  
and Welsh Nevf Tovms, th ere  e x is t e d  a r e n ta l problem unique to  S cotlan d . 
Under S c o tt is h  law  the r a te s  were le v ie d  on the owner not the occu p ier  
(th e r e  were very  few  ow ner-occupiers in  the f i r s t  New Towns), and th e  
f ix e d  r a te s  were a high prop ortion  o f the ren t charged. Thus, as an 
example, fo r  a ren t in c lu s iv e  o f  r a te s , o f  30s, Od. a week the D evelop­
ment Corporation rec e iv ed  on ly  12s. Od., th e o th er  18s, Od, went to  
th e  lo c a l  County C ouncil. Hence, th e  ra te  o f r e n ts  was e x c e p tio n a lly  
low in  Scotland  : the Development Corporation fea red  to  s e t  them any 
h igh er as th ey  would not a t tr a c t  s u f f ic ie n t  low-income ten a n ts. A lso , 
n otab ly , because th e  Development Corporation would not have r e c e iv e d  
a s ig n if ic a n t  p o r tio n  o f  the in c r e a se , they sim ply s e t  ren ts  a t  a lower 
l e v e l .  The Development C orporations o f both  E ast K ilb rid e  and 
G lenrothes both  s e t  th e ir  ren t l e v e l s  fa r  below  the le v e l  needed to
balance th e ir  books. By the end o f  the 1950’ s t h i s  imbalance was very  
1s tr ik in g .
1 . I b id .,  p .825.
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In  E ast K ilb rid e  in  1957 th e average exchequer 
subsidy was £%  per d w ellin g , and the d e f ic ie n c y  
a ttr ib u ta b le  to  housing amounted to  another £38 
per d w ellin g ; th ese  f ig u r e s  compared w ith  an 
average ren t, e x c lu s iv e  o f  ra te s , o f  £13 per  
d w ellin g  (th a t  went to  th e  Development Corpora­
t io n )  .
‘ 9
1. Ib id * , p .826.
1
Hence, there was never any chance o f  the S c o tt ish  New Towns a ch iev in g  
economic s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y .  M assive debts, such as the one m entioned  
above began to  accumulate during th e  post-w ar y e a r s .
I t  would not be out o f  order to  look  b r ie f ly  at th e  post-1951  
developm ents o f the B r i t i s h  New Towns. The dramatic slowdown in  the  
c o n stru c tio n  o f a d d it io n a l New Tovms p ost-1951  r e f le c t e d  the change in  
Government a tt itu d e  towards the co n tro l o f  in d u s tr ia l lo c a tio n . The 
Labour Government had adopted a strong p o lic y  o f  s te e r in g  in d u stry  to  
the Development Areas by means o f I .D .C . and other f in a n c ia l  in c e n t iv e s  
but on ly  two B r i t is h  New Towns were s u f f i c ie n t ly  developed  a t t h i s  
p o in t to  b e n e f it  from t h is  s ta te  encouragement -  E ast K ilb r id e  and 
Newton Ay c l  i f f  e in  County Durham. Under the C onservative Government ^
o f  the 1950 's  there was a r e la x a tio n  in  Government co n tro ls  on indus­
t r i a l  lo c a t io n . T his changed again in  the la t e  1950’ s a llow ing  th e  
co n stru ctio n  o f advance fa c to r ie s  by New Towns again and th e a llo c a t io n  
o f  Government f in a n c ia l  in c e n t iv e s  to  in d u str ie s  which would r e lo c a te  
north . A r e f le c t io n  o f  th e  favour in  which New Towns were held  by 
su c c e ss iv e  Governments can be seen  c le a r ly  in  the co n stru ctio n  d ates  
o f  a d d it io n a l New Towns; fo r  example, the c r e a tio n  o f L iv in gston  and 
Irv in g  r e f le c te d  th e la t e  1950’ s upswing in  the Government a t t itu d e  
towards the e f f ic a c y  o f  New Towns.
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1. I b id . ,  p . 941.
2 . See a ls o , J a cq u elin e  T yrw hitt, 'Changes in  new town p o l ic ie s  in  
B r ita in  1946-1971', E k is t ic s . 36 (J u ly  1973), 1 4 -16 .
IThe qu estion  remains : were the post-w ar y ea rs  important in  th e  
im plem entation o f the New To;vn scheme? Most o f  the New Town p o lic y  
had been drawn up during th e 1940-1945 years. Almost a l l  o f  th e  New 
Towns were b u i l t  post-1951  or a t  l e a s t  became econom ically  v ia b le  '•I
a f t e r  that d ate . N ev erth e less , a t the very l e a s t  th ese  years were 
s ig n if ic a n t ,  marking one o f  the f i r s t  attem pts to  implement planned Îco n tro l o f  th e  in d u s tr ia l  p op u la tion . Beyond t h is ,  housing a llo c a t io n
p o lic y  -  fo r  example -  began to  cohere during th e se  years. Hence, the ïf
immediate post-w ar years were s ig n if ic a n t  in  th e estab lishm ent o f  
precedent. A lso , many o f the r e la t iv e ly  'minor' problems o f th e  p o s t­
war years, such as la ck  o f  jobs fo r  women in  the New Towns and th e  
s tr u c tu r a l imbalance o f G lenrothes, became major problems in  the n ex t  
tw enty years. ^
The accepted argument fo r  th e e x is te n c e  o f  New Towns during th ese  
years  was th a t i t  e s ta b lis h e d  p ock ets o f  p ro sp er ity  and almost f u l l  
employment in  o therw ise depressed a rea s.^  But unemployment was gener­
a l l y  a t  minimal l e v e l s  during th ese  y ears and by 1951 i t  was beginn ing  
to  be c o r r e c t ly  q uestioned  whether the r ig h t  procedure -was to  crea te
p e r fe c t  'new tovm s', in s te a d  o f d ea lin g  more d ir e c t ly  w ith  the prob-
2lems which made the reg io n  in  which they  were lo c a te d  'd ep ressed '.
I
I
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1. See Gavin McCrone, R egional P o l ic y  in  B r ita in . (London, George 
A llen  and Unwin, 1969).
2. See Report o f  Commissioner fo r  S p ec ia l Areas in  Scotland  1936-1937. 
p p .19-20 on th e  cre a tio n  o f  th e  S c o tt ish  I n d u s tr ia l E s ta te s , Ltd,
3 . See H, A. H i l l  and D. P . K errigan, e d s ,, Town and Country P lanning  
Act 1947. (London, Butterw orth and Co., 1947), p . i i i  on the  
in te r r e la t io n  o f  the p rev ious Town and Country P lanning A cts s in c e  
1932, w r itten  by e d ito r s . See a ls o  Brand, p . 247; Cole, Post-W ar 
Condition o f B r ita in , p. 368; and P o lla rd , p .403.
4:I
2. F actory  B u ild in g  g
( i )  D is tr ib u t io n  o f  In du stry
There was a lread y , in  th e post-w ar years, a t r a d it io n  in  S co tlan d  
o f  Government in te r v e n tio n  in  r e g io n a l a f fa ir s  to  determ ine th e  lo c a ­
t io n  and encouragement o f  new in d u stry .  ^ In  1934 th e  S p ecia l Areas Act 
had appointed two S p ec ia l Areas Commissioners, one fo r  Scotland  and 
one fo r  England and W ales. The Commissioners formed trad ing e s ta te
companies w ith th e  concomitant aims o f  granting f in a n c ia l  a s s is ta n c e
2to  e x is t in g  p r iv a te  companies and th e  b u ild in g  o f  new fa c to r ie s .  These 
powers were widened in  1945 by  th e  D is tr ib u tio n  o f  Industry A ct. In  
1947 th e  Town and Country P lanning A ct  ^ added a fu r th e r , and perhaps 
th e  most e f f e c t iv e ,  co n tro l which made necessary  th e p o ssess io n  o f  an 
In d u s tr ia l Development C e r t if ic a te  ( I . D. C. ) from the Board o f Trade 
even b efo re  a firm  cou ld  apply f o r  planning p e m is s io n  fo r  any new 
in d u s tr ia l b u ild in g  or any ex ten sio n  o f more than 5 ,000  square f e e t .
T h is system r e in fo r c e d  the a u th o r ity  o f  the n a tio n a l Government in  
regard  to  lo c a l  in d u s tr ia l  developm ent. The Board o f Trade made u se  o f  
th e  I.D .C . system to  d iscourage a d d itio n a l expansion in  the compara­
t i v e l y  booming so u th -ea st o f  England and the M idlands and to  d iv e r t  ne^ v
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in d u stry , e s p e c ia l ly  fo r e ig n  firm s, in to  the Development Areas such
1a s the C entral I n d u s tr ia l B e lt  o f  Scotland.
The Government th u s sought to  a f f e c t  the d is tr ib u t io n  o f industry
by variou s means. Development Area p o lic y  was implemented through th e
powers conferred  on th e  Board o f Trade by the D is tr ib u t io n  of Industry
A cts, 1945 and 1950, and on the b a s is  o f the Report o f th e  S e le c t
Committee on E stim ates e n t i t le d  ‘A dm in istration  o f th e  Development
Areas ‘ . The source o f  Government p lanning con tro l was the Town and
Country Planning A cts o f  1947, which conferred  power on the Board o f
Trade and planning a u th o r it ie s .  B u ild in g  lic e n s in g  was au thorised  by
the povfers conferred  on the M in istry  o f  Y/orks by Orders made under
D efence R egu lations and then was extended by the S u p p lies  and S erv ices
Act ( 1951) .  Other economic and s o c ia l  p o l ic ie s  arose in  consequence o f
enactments and programmes o f  the Government r e la t in g  to  f in a n c ia l  or
2t a r i f f  p o lic y  su b s id ie s , tran sp ort, housing, e tc .
The d ir e c t io n  o f  firm s in to  the Development Area was a m ixture of 
coercion  and d ir e c t io n  mixed w ith  a dash o f in c e n t iv e  and p ersu asion , 
which was hoped to  appease in d u s t r ia l i s t s  deprived  to  some ex ten t o f  
ab so lu te  ch o ic e  in  s i t e  s e le c t io n .  This elem ent o f reg io n a l p o l ic y  -  
s i t e  s e le c t io n  o f  new f a c t o r ie s  -  was adm in istered  by the Board o f  Trade 
in  the form o f  I .D .C ’ s . A fte r  1948 the p o sse s s io n  o f an I .D .C ., which 
were granted very  in freq u en tly  by  th e Board o f  Trade, was req u ired  fo r  
any new fa c to r y  b u ild in g  over a cer ta in  maximum square fo o ta g e  ou tsid e
1 , Thomas, p .815.
2. S c o t t is h  Council (Development and In d u stry ), Report o f th e  Committee 
on L ocal Development in  Scotland . (Edinburgh, 1952), p .45; subse­
quently  LDI5 .
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th e  Development Area, a f t e r  which lo c a l  p lanning perm ission  s t i l l  had 
to  be ob tained . On th e o th er hand, i f  a company wanted to  s e t t l e  in  
the Development Area th ey  were au tom atica lly  accepted  and i t  was sim ply  
a m atter o f  agreeing on one o f the s i t e s  w ith in  th e Development Area 
proposed by th e Board o f  Trade. In  ad d itio n , th e  Government sweetened  
th e ir  proposal by  o ffe r in g  va r io u s forms o f  a s s is ta n c e  to  companies 
moving w ith in  th e Development Area, th ese  in clu d ed  : cash gran ts fo r  
investm ent, favourable ta x  allow ances, tr a in in g  a llow an ces, removal 
expenses and fa c to r ie s  co n stru cted  by the Government and le a se d  on 
advantageous term s.^ Hence, a firm  cou ld  s e t t l e  ou tsid e  o f  th e  
Development Area but th e Government made i t  d i f f i c u l t  by req u ir in g  an
I .D .C ., lo c a l  planning perm ission  and w ith h old in g  the v ariou s forms o f  
a ss is ta n c e  g iv en  to  firm s w ith in  th e Development Area -  thus Government 
p o lic y  was a m ixture o f  the s t ic k  and ca rro t.
As McCallum p o in ts  out Government con tro l o f  lo c a tio n  o f  in d u str y  -
through the I.D .C . system, r a tio n in g  o f b u ild in g  m a ter ia ls , e t c .  -  was
a t  i t s  s tro n g est from 1945-1947 b e fo re  the balance-of-paym ents c r i s i s .
As a r e s u lt ,  during th ese  years the Development A reas throughout Great
B r ita in  gained t h e ir  g r e a te s t  share -  over 50 p er cent o f  the square
foo tage  -  o f  new n a tio n a l in d u s tr ia l  development. A fter  1948 c o n tr o ls
2were loosened , th e  b u ild in g  o f  advance fa c to r ie s  in  th e  Development 
Area stopped, and B r it is h  R egion al P o lic y  expenditure was cu t, from
1 , Bannock, B axter and R ees, pp. 21-22.
2 . Advance f a c to r ie s  were f a c t o r ie s  b u i l t  in  advance o f demand and 
which were im m ediately a v a ila b le  fo r  a p rosp ective , ten en t, th ey  
could be b u i l t  not on ly  by th e  Government but a lso  by lo c a l  
a u th o r it ie s  and New Town Development C orporations. Johnston, 
Buxton and Mair, p p .304-505.
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about £ 1 2 .1  m il l io n  per annum 1947-1948 to  1948-1949, dov/n to  about 
£ 6 ,5  m illio n  p er annum 1949-1950 to  1950-1951. The stock  o f w ar-tim e 
fa c to r ie s  in  th e Development Area had by t h is  tim e been taken over by  
p r iv a te  e n terp r ise  and in te r r e g io n a l supply d i f f e r e n t ia l s  were no lo n ­
ger as im portant. By t h is  p o in t in d u s t r ia l i s t s  were no lon ger w i l l in g  
to  ignore lo c a t io n  in  th e ir  h a ste  to  begin  production , as had been  the  
case  im m ediately fo llo w in g  the war. Hence, the Development A reas' 
share o f  approved in d u s tr ia l expansion f e l l  d ram atica lly  in  th e  1948- 
1951 period , down to  about 20 p er cent o f th e  n a tio n a l t o t a l .  In  
ab so lu te  terms, th e  average annual square fo o ta g e  in  the Development 
Area dropped over 45 per cen t, 1948-1951, whereas in  th e  r e s t  o f  Great 
B r ita in  i t  more than doubled. N ev erth e less , t h i s  f ig u r e  was, in  fa c t ,  
approxim ately the Development A reas' share o f  th e  n a tio n a l labour  
fo r c e .^
Table 1 -  New In d u s tr ia l B u ild in g  Approved 1945-1951 (annual average  
during p eriod )
Development Area R est o f  Great B r ita in
P er io d
1945-1947
1948-1951
Square
f e e t
15 , 734,000  
8, 602,000
Percentage  
o f  t o t a l
51.3
1 9 .4
Square
f e e t
14. 949.000
35. 819.000
Percentage  
o f  t o t a l
4 8 .7
80.6
Source; A. J ,  Odber, E. A lle n  and P. J .  Bowden (1957) Development
Area P o l ic y  in  th e  North E ast o f England. N ew castle : North 
E ast In d u str ia l and Development A sso c ia tio n , in  Maclennan 
and Parr, p . 8.
1, McCallum, in  IVIaclennan and Parr, pp. 8- 9 .
-g
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The primary o b je c t iv e  o f  Development Area p o l ic y  in  Scotland was %
1, See I ,  and E ., 1947, pp. 10-14 on a c t io n s  to  promote b e t te r  d i s t r i ­b u tio n  o f  industry .
2, L .D .I .S .,  p p .30- 31.
3, Ib id . See a lso , I .  and E . , 1950, p . l 6 .
to  r e s to r e  the h ea lth  o f the la r g e  cen tres  o f  in d u stry ,^  I t  was h e ld  
th a t not u n t i l  t h i s  f i r s t  o b je c t iv e  was achieved cou ld  the economies 
o f  the r e s t  o f th e  co u n tiy  be secured . Even a t t h is  tim e i t  was recog ­
n ise d  th a t the disappearance o f  la r g e  sc a le  unemployment fo llo w in g  th e  
Second World War was not due e n t ir e ly ,  or even p r in c ip a l ly ,  to  th é  new 
Development Area p o lic y .  The r e a l change was in  th e  r e v e r sa l o f  th e
2fo r tu n es  o f the s ta p le  in d u str ie s  which had begun in  th e la t e  1930* s , I
The in flo w  o f  new in d u stry  in to  the Development Area a f te r  the war 4-
Iwas to  some ex ten t a ttr ib u ta b le  to  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  a ttach ed  to  develop­
ment in  o th er  p a rts  o f  th e  country. Many o f  th ese  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were 
the d ir e c t  r e s u lt  o f  Government r e s t r ic t io n s ,  which were a p p lied  w ith  %
g r e a te s t  s e v e r ity  to  fa c to r y  b u ild in g  o u ts id e  the Development Area. The 
Government v/as p a r t ic u la r ly  su c c e ss fu l in  persuading firm s coming from 
ou tsid e  S cotlan d  to  go to  the Development Area, s in ce  such firm s r a r e ly  
had strong lo c a tio n a l p re fer en ces .^  Although unemployment was a t an 
a ll - t im e  low during th ese  y ea rs , th e Development Areas (by  nature o f  
th e ir  p rev iou s h is to r y ) continued  to  have the h ig h est l e v e l s  o f  unem­
ployment . Thus, the p resen ce o f  a la rg e  supply o f unemployed -  and a lso  
underemployed workers -  in  the Development Areas was a very r e a l drawing 
card to  incoming firm s. A clim ate  o f  op in ion  grew up more favourable to  
th e Development Area than th e  r e s t  o f  the countiy , and to  the eventual 
su ccess o f  a firm  lo c a t in g  th ere . N ev erth e less , i t  would not b e  correct
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to  c r e d it  the in flo w  o f new in d u stry  in to  the S c o tt is h  Development 
Area t o t a l l y  to  Government reg io n a l p o lic y .  Shortages o f  labour  
( e s p e c ia l ly  s k i l le d  la b o u r), housing and fa c to ry  space d isp osed  firm s  
to  move to  the Development Areas w ithout prompting, and a t  the same 
tim e led . the Government to  s te e r  new firm s in  th a t d ir e c t io n  i f  the  
opportunity  arose.^
But not a l l  lo c a t io n  o f in d u stry  occurred d ir e c t ly  as a r e s u lt  o f  
Government p lann ing. As we have seen  th e S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  h im self  
was capable o f  d ir e c t  a c t io n  to  brin g  fo r e ig n  in d u stry  to  S co tlan d  on 
h is  own i n i t i a t i v e .  T his was when S ecretary  o f  S ta te  McNiel f le w  down 
to  Sussex on h is  own ch artered  p lane to  g e t an op tion  to  s e l l  from the  
owner o f  a p lo t  o f land th a t Tom Watson, magnate o f I .B . M. , had s e le c ­
te d  a t  random as the type o f  lo c a t io n  where he would be w i l l in g  to  open
one o f h is  f a c to r ie s .  McNiel gained  the o p tio n  from the owner and
2I . B.M. moved to  Greenock. There i s  another s to iy ,  t h i s  one perhaps 
apocryphal, which may serve as a fa rth er  example o f a post-w ar industry  
en tering  S cotlan d  w ithout Government p lanning : an American firm  estab­
l is h e d  in  a town in  the n o r th -e a s t  of S cotlan d  claim ed th a t i t  f lo a te d  
in  on th e  t id e  o f  the p r o v o s t 's  w hisky.^
In d u s tr ia l expansion  in  the S c o tt is h  Development Areas was admin­
is t e r e d  by th e S c o t t is h  I n d u s tr ia l E sta te s , Ltd. ( S . I .E , ) .  The S c o t t is h  
In d u s tr ia l E s ta te s  were se t  up as Commissioners fo r  the S p ec ia l A reas in  
S cotland  in  1936, in  accordance w ith  the w ishes exp ressed  by the
1 . T, L. Johnston, N. K. Buxton and D. Mair. S tru ctu re  and Growth o f  
S c o tt is h  Economy. (Buxton, C o llin s ,  1971), p . 305.
2 . See p p .85-86.
3. Johnston, Buxton and Mair, p . 305.
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S ecre tary  o f S ta te  fo r  Scotland  a t  the inaugural m eeting o f the
’aS c o t t is h  Economic Committee o f the S c o tt is h  O ff ic e , The estab lish m en t
1. Report o f the Commissioners fo r  the S p ecia l Areas in  Scotland fo r  
th e p eriod  7 J u ly  1936 to  31 August 1937, (Edinburgh, H.M. 8. 0 . ,
1937) ,  p p .18-20 .
2. Alan G ilp in , D ic tio n a ry  o f  Economic Terms. (London, B utterw orths,
1966) ,  p p .105- 106 .
3 . Report o f the Commissioners fo r  the S p ec ia l Areas in  Scotland, 
p p .19- 20.
o f  th e  In d u str ia l E s ta te s  v/as hoped to  a ttr a c t  some o f  th e l ig h t e r  
in d u s tr ie s  which during th e in ter-w ar years went m ainly to  the South 
and Midlands o f England m th er  than Scotland . The most important fa c -  
to r  in  th is  tren d  in  favour o f  the South (a s  dem onstrated by the suc­
c e s s  o f  the E n g lish  In d u str ia l E s ta te s  o f Slough and Welwyn Garden 
C ity ) , was the p r o v is io n  o f  s u ita b le  fa c to r ie s  a t  the E n g lish  In d u s tr ia l  
E sta te s  which were a v a ila b le  on le a s e  -  t h is  ob v ia ted  fo r  incoming 
firm s the d i f f i c u l t i e s  and heavy i n i t i a l  expenditure involved  in  f a c -  4
to ry  con stru ction  or purchase. L igh t in d u str ie s  were to  a great ex ten t  
ca rr ied  on by sm all firm s who chose to  u se  th e ir  monies as working 
c a p ita l ,  rath er than in  th e  purchase or ren tin g  o f la r g e  u n su ita b le  
b u ild in g s  which would req u ire exp en sive  ad ap tation s. These l ig h t  
in d u s tr ie s  p referred  to  le a s e  s i t e s  a lready equipped w ith  l ig h t ,  h ea t­
ing  and power, where roads and ra ilw a y  s id in g s  were la id  cut and 
sewerage and dra in age.^  The la c k  o f  such 'advance f a c to r ie s '  ( f a c t o ­
r i e s  b u i l t  in  advance o f demand) in  Scotland  v/as acknowledged to  be a 
d eterren t to  th e a t tr a c t io n  o f  new in d u stry . Hence, the S c o tt ish  
In d u s tr ia l E s ta te s , Ltd, was formed, the purpose o f  which was to  b e
th e  con stru ction  o f  f a c to r ie s  fo r  ren t or sa le  in  advance or to  meet
2th e  known requirem ents o f  a p a r t ic u la r  firm . The Company -  The 
S c o tt is h  In d u s tr ia l E s ta te s , Ltd. -  was lim ite d  by guarantee and d id  
n o t have share c a p ita l ,^
€
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At the con clu sion  o f  the Second World War the o v e r a l l  con tro l 
o f  the S .I .E , was tr a n sfe r r e d  from the Commissioner fo r  the S p ec ia l 
Areas o f  Scotland  (a s  had been o r ig in a l ly  mandated by th e Secretary  
o f  S ta te  fo r  Scotland , and hence th e  S c o t t is h  O ffice )  to  the Board o f  
Trade. At the end o f the war there a lready e x is te d  one m il lio n  square 
f e e t  o f  developed fa c to r y  space in  the pre-war I n d u s tr ia l E s ta te s  a t  
H illin g to n  (Clasgov/) and C arfin , C hapelhall and L arkhall (L anarkshire), 
p rovid ing  employment fo r  over 7 ,000  p eo p le . Follow ing th e  war exten­
s io n s were made on a l l  th ese  e s ta te s ,  and the cre a tio n  o f  many new 
ones was in s t ig a te d . These second gen eration  e s ta te s  included  B lantyre  
and Newhouse in  Lanarkshire, S tra th lev en  in  IXinbartonshire, P ort 
Glasgow and Cappielow (Greenock) in  Renfrew shire, Kilmarnock and 
K ilw inning in  A yrshire, Carntyre and Q ueenslie in  the Glasgovr d i s t r i c t  
and the new e s ta te  in  Dundee. Yfork began in  the la t e  1 9 4 0 's on new 
e s ta te s  a t  Coatbridge in  Lanarkshire and a t Dalmuir, Drumchapel, and 
Thornliebank in  Glasgow.^ In  terms o f  employment, during the post-w ar  
years th e  la r g er  part o f  th e  new fa c to r y  con stru ctio n  in  the S c o tt ish  
Development Area v/as undertaken d ir e c t ly  by the S .I .E . on b eh a lf o f  
th e  Government, making i t  th e  la r g e s t  in d u s tr ia l d eveloper in  S cotlan d .
The in tro d u ctio n  o f  new firm s -  v/hether dom estic or fo r e ig n , new or  
r e lo c a te d  -  was a c t iv e ly  encouraged by the S .I .E . 4
( i i )  Post-Yfar F actory B u ild in g
At the con clu sion  o f the war th e in d u s tr ia l d is tr ib u t io n  o f  the  
manufacturing in d u s tr ie s  in  S co tlan d  was as fo llo w s .
1 . I .  and E ., 1946, p p .11-12.
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Table 2 -  D is tr ib u t io n  o f  M anufacturing In d u str ie s  In the Main 
In d u s tr ia l Areas and in  the R est o f  Scotland
Area
No, o f  in su red  
persons* in  
m anufacturing  
in d u str ie s  
J u ly  1948
0 0 0 's
Glasgow ( in o l .  
Lanarkshire, Ren­
frew sh ire  and W, 
Dunbarton
Edinburgh and 
L othians
Kilmarnock and 
N. A yrshire
Dundee
F alk irk  and S t ir l in g  
Aberdeen
Major In d u str ia l  
Areas
North and N orth-East 
( e x c l ,  Aberdeen)
E ast ( e x c l .  Dundee)
F if e
Borders
South-West
West and Is la n d s
R est o f S co tlan d
SCOTLAND
425
81
45
44
kh
28
667
21
17
33
16
10
8
105
772
P roportion
o f
t o t a l  fo r  
Scotland
fo
55.1
1 0 .5
5 .8
5 .7
5 .7
3 .6
8 6 .4
2.7
2 .2
4 .3  
2.1
1 .3  
1.0
13.6  
100 .0
* Insured under N ation a l Insurance A ct, 1946
P roportion  o f  
workers engaged 
in  manufacturing  
in d u stry  to  a l l  
workers in  the 
area  
%
46
28
41
52
44
31
42
19
26
26
37
17
14
23
38
Source: L. D. I , S. , p . I t  should  be noted th a t the d iv is io n  u sed  in
t h is  ta b le , 'Major I n d u s tr ia l A reas', i s  not the same as the  
Development Areas; fo r  example Aberdeen was not in  a D evelop­
ment Area and to  have claim ed i t  as a.m ajor In d u str ia l Area 
was p o s s ib ly  hopeful b u t c e r ta in ly  in a ccu ra te . (T his same type  
o f  d iv is io n  i s  in  T ables 3, 4, 6 and 7») N ev erth eless , th ese  
ta b le s  -  compiled by th e S c o tt ish  C ouncil (Development and 
Industry) -  are ex trem ely  u s e fu l and show th e approximate r a t io  
o f Development Area : non-Development Area.
'1'"i
•AÎ4
i
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No. o f  new e n te r p r ise s  
s ta r t in g  production  in
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Main In d u str ia l Areas 66 124 98 113 59
R est o f  Scotland 25 21 16 20 12
SCOTLAND 91 ' 145 114 133 71
./4
Source: L,D. I .  S . , p , 24.
The d e c lin e  in  th e  1950 f ig u r e  continued  in  1951 and 1952. There were 
in  f a c t  two spurts in  S c o tt is h  post-w ar fa c to ry  development : one 
im m ediately fo llo w in g  the war, th e  o th er in  th e l a t e  1940 ' s which was 
presumably lin lced  b o th  w ith  the p rosp ect o f continued demand -  e s p e c ia l ly  
from overseas -  fo r  S c o tt is h  goods, and the e f f e c t s  o f  the Government's
1 . L .D .I .S .,  p . 23.
F iv e  hundred and f i f t y - f o u r  a d d itio n a l new f a c t o r ie s  were b u i l t  /
between the y ea rs  1946 and 1950. F actory b u ild in g  fo llo w in g  th e  war 
experienced  a boom; t h is  had been a ffe c te d  by v a r io u s  fa c to r s  such A
as the m unitions programmes during th e war, then b y  war-time arrea rs, 
and a lso  to  some ex ten t by s tr u c tu r a l change in  th e  post-w ar economy 
which occasioned  th e need to  expand exports and hence manufacturing 
in d u stry .^  N ev erth e less , such rap id  growth in  th e  number of new fa c -  |
t o r ie s  was not expected  to  continue a t  t h is  h igh r a te  p ast the immed­
ia t e  post-w ar y ea rs  in to  the 1950*s -  nor d id  i t  occur.
Table 3 -  Separate New M anufacturing E n terp rises S ta r tin g  Production  
in  the years 1946 to  1950 4
I297 ,^s
•i %
Development Area p o lic y .  ^
Almost h a lf  o f  th e 554 fa c to r ie s  e s ta b lish e d  between 1946 and
1950 v/ere s ta r te d  in  e x is t in g  prem ises and adapted or converted  by
th e ir  owners. T his fa c t  was e s p e c ia l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  in  Scotland;
ou tsid e  Glasgow and the co u n tie s  o f  Lanark, Renfrew and Dunbarton,
in  which 133 o f  the 203 new en te r p r ise s  -  n ea r ly  tw o -th ird s -  were
in  e x is t in g  fa c to r ie s .  In  th e  areas o f S cotlan d  o u tsid e  th e main |
2in d u str ia l c en tres , th e number was 74 out o f  94 -  alm ost f o u r - f i f t h s .
1 . I b id . , p , 24.
2. Ib id .
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The ad ap tation  o f  e x is t in g  prem ises, o f te n  d isu sed  b u ild in g s ,  
rather than th e co n stru ctio n  o f  new fa c to r ie s ,  v/as much more p reva len t  
in  Scotland  than th e  r e s t  o f  Great B r ita in  -  th ere  v/ere 500 such under­
tak in gs in  S co tlan d  in  the 1940*s. This type o f  in d u s tr ia l adaptation  
was named 'c o lo n isa t io n * . One rath er co lo u r fu l example o f post-w ar  
c o lo n isa t io n  was a firm  making pyjamas in  an abandoned saw m ill near 
Kilmarnock. The most organ ised  c o lo n isa t io n  was accom plished by the  
Border vraollen m anufacturers who s p e c ia l is e d  in  the ' out-working * 
schemes fo r  town h a lls ,  d isu sed  ju te  m il ls  and oth er-p rem ises, not on ly  
in  the Borders but a ls o  a s  fa r  away as Arbroath, B o'ness and Bathgate. 
There was even one Border firm  which made u s e .o f  a ctnrch h a l l  during  
th e week, removing the machinery on Saturday in  time fo r  th e  h a l l  to  
be ready fo r  i t s  o r ig in a l u se  on Sunday. ^
Most o f th e  in d u s tr ia l growth ou tsid e th e  Development Areas was
in  e a st  c en tra l Scotland , T his was a lso  the case o f  the m ajority  o f
a l l  new fa c to ry  space completed by 1951, the b u lk  o f  which was in
2S t ir l in g s h ir e ,  Clackmannanshire and Edinburgh, The separate new fa c ­
t o r ie s  b u i l t  w ith  p r iv a te  c a p ita l  were g en era lly  much sm aller concerns 
than th e  average. In  th e  Glasgow area a T rea su ry -a ss is ted  e n te r p r ise  
was expected to  provide 186 job s, w h ile  the average pri-vately  b u i l t
fa c to r y  had an expected  maximum labour force o f  110, and o u tsid e  th e
3area averages v/ere m ch  low er. The fo llo w in g  ta b le s  show the s tr ik in g  
d iffe r e n c e  in  th e  amount o f  T reasury-aided  and p r iv a te  b u ild in g  fo llo w ­
ing  the war.
1. 'A New I n d u s tr ia l R evolu tion  in  S cotlan d ', Board o f Trade Journal 
160 (6 January 1 9 5 l) , 2.
2. I .  and E .,  1951, p .13.
3. L .D .I .S ., p . 24.
Table 5 -  New Factory  B u ild in g  in  Scotland. T reasu ry -A ssisted  and 
P r iv a te . 1947-1952
" A
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5(a) S c o t t is h  Development Area
Treasury-As s is t e d P r iv a te
Number
approved
New
fa c to r ie s E xten sion s
New
f a c to r ie s E xten sion s
1947 125 45 15 20 45
1948 84 25 6 11 ' 42
1949 122 50 14 15 63
1950 99 19 12 11 57
1951 71 6 4 12 49
1952 49 5 4 2 40
T otal 550 128 55 71 296
%
1
Î
I
1
'1
5(b) O utside S c o tt is h  Development Area
Number approved New fa c to r ie s E xtension
1947 66 36 50
1948 49 16 55
1949 56 15 45
1950 51 16 35
1951 60 17 45
1952 57 10 27
T o ta l 519 108 211
Source; S .E .C .S ., 1949, p .5 ;  1950, p .5; 1951, p . 5; 1952, p . 8.
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'Im m ig ran t' f irm s  v/ere overw helm ingly a t t r a c t e d  to  th e  Glasgow 
a re a , presum ably  due to  th e  Developm ent Area f a c i l i t i e s ,  w h ile  th e r e
Iwas a  much w id e r d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f a c t o r i e s  c o n s tru c te d  by  S c o t t i s h  con­
c e rn s ,  A lso , a much h ig h e r  p ro p o r t io n  (o n e -q u a r te r )  o f  e n t i r e l y  new If a c t o r i e s  w ere s t a r t e d  o u ts id e  th e  Development A reas , a s  compared to  A3b ran ch  f a c t o r i e s ,  w hether S c o t t i s h  o r  n o n -S c o tt is h . T h is  con sp icu o u s A
r e lu c ta n c e  o f  b o th  im m igrant and  l a r g e r  S c o t t i s h  f irm s  to  s e t t l e  in  ^
non-Developm ent A reas was due i n  g r e a t  m easure to  Development A rea 
p o l ic y .
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According to  the Board of Trade Journal the 'su c c e ss  s to ry ' o f  
th e 1940' s  was the a ttr a c t io n  o f  a la rg e  number o f  North American firm s  
to  Scotland  -  th e  m ajority  o f the new industry  en ter in g  Scotland  fo llo w ­
in g  the war was from America or Canada. Scotland  a c tu a lly  a tr a c te d  four  
out o f every f i v e  North American firm s en terin g  Great B r ita in  fo llo w in g  
th e  war and by 1951 10,000 S co ts were employed in  th ese  firm s. These 
were by no means th e  f i r s t  North American firm s in  Scotland  ; two o f  
S c o tla n d 's  o ld e s t  firm s were o f  American o r ig in  -  th ese  were S in g e r 's  
a t  Clydebank and Babcock and W ilcox a t Renfrew. Amohg the incoming 
N orth American firm s a t t h is  tim e were N ational Cash R e g is ter  Co. Ltd. 
and U.K. Timex L td ., both  a t Dundee; Burroughs Adding Machine L td . and 
W estclox L td ., b o th  a t Leven; and Remington Rand Ltd. a t H illin g to n .  
These new North American firm s con tr ib u ted  s u b s ta n t ia lly  to the develop­
ment of new tech n o logy  in  S cotlan d  and a lso  were resp o n sib le  f o r  th e  
in tro d u ctio n  o f improved tech n iq u es o f  management.
But not a l l  o f  th e  firm s en tering  Scotland  fo llo w in g  the war were 
North American in  o r ig in . For example. The M, V/iseman and Company Ltd. 
o f  London took over a farm b u ttery  in  Mauchline in  I 946 and did so w e ll  
th a t in  1950 they  le a se d  a new fa c to r y  on the Vale o f Leven In d u s tr ia l  
E sta te  near Loch Lomond, The M offat Hand Loom Y/’eaving C o., from 
Manchester adapted and occupied a former slaughterhouse in  a sm all 
D um friesshire town -  another case o f  c o lo n isa t io n . Perhaps th e  most 
p ictu resq u e example was th e adaptation  by a Norwegian o f  a b u ild in g  
ere c ted  many years ago by  Lord Leverhulme on the I s la n d  o f H arris, 
which became the n u cleu s o f  a Hebridean whaling in d u stry . ^
1. Board of Trade Journal, p .2.
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The new post-w ar f a c t o r ie s  provided over 30,000 new job s to  the  
S c o tt is h  economy.^ N ev er th e le ss , th is  was a much lower f ig u r e  than  
was hoped fo r .  In  1945 i t  had been estim ated  th a t by June o f  1951 
7 .1  per cen t o f the in sured  p opulation  in  S cotlan d  would be employed 
in  jobs cre a ted  by new, approved post-w ar en te r p r ise s  and fa c to r y  
ex ten sio n s . This f ig u r e  in c lu d ed  both  th e workers in vo lved  in  the  
co n stru ctio n  o f  the new fa c to r y  space and a ls o  those peop le who would 
be enployed in  th ese  firm s once completed. But i t  can be seen from
ta b le  7 th a t the a ctu a l f ig u r e  on 30 June o f  th a t year was o n ly  4 .5
 ^ 2 per cen t.
1. S .E .C .S ., 1951, p .5 .
2. L, D. I . S . , p .26. See a ls o , ta b le  4, p .16 'Changes in  the In d u str ia l 
P op u la tion  o f  Scotland  1938-1948'.
-T
56
01
II
0î
1
rH
9
A
NO
>N dA
T j P0 (d-P bO(d Ü rH0 •R cd
8 3 5•H Om 0 <0 , n•rH
■P•H 0
g 0
3to >A oA PO A
-P & yd •H
K 1O p
H o
A PH
tJIICQ A  00 H cd -4  •H H  ON
I
. g
I
I-p  cq (d _4 H  ON%
CQ§iPh
CTnrH
Ia
CM
NO
S
NO
O
%COON
lA  H  CM _4  O
CM O  LA LA H  (H
_ 4  c o  LA H  lA  00 rH CM CTN A - LANO lA  H  LA
VO*' OcT NO** UN r-T
CM NO O  - 4  NO • • • • •tA  NN rHI—I
00 00 CM - 4o  canû CMCM NO -4 o  MO
ON 4  ccT cnT
CM
LA
sI—l
NO00
CM
00
!aH I
CQ(dIICQI
3
LA CM ON hA lA  H  
d  H  d  CM UN 4
ON NO 00 Q  H  rH PA ^  H  O  00 r >  CM ON rH O  LA - 4
O
1
tiI
I
1i
1.
rH rH CM
H  r -  ON 00 A - 
CM H  CM MO rH
00 NO CM NO r- 4-- 4  ON rH A  ON ON 4 "  LA O  CM CM NO
r-T C\T r-T A
ï
%
I
I
PH
H
0
g
•H CQ
bH> 0 nO m <H b cd *fH OM m
I
&
co
t î•3 â
0 tJ3!d 01G d) CO ^
305
r -
H
NO
A
CM
A
N
ON
A
d
S 'NO
rH
rH-P8CO
%
■ë0
«
Â
CO
H
d
4
306
Not o n ly  was th e  t o t a l  p e rc e n ta g e  o f w orkers  employed i n  some c a p a c ity
in  new p o s t-w a r  i n d u s t r i a l  e n te r p r is e s  much low er th a n  was hoped, b u t
a ls o  th e  b a la n c e  was even more in  fa v o u r  o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  c e n tr e s
th a n  can  b e  drawn from  th e  above f ig u r e s  on i n d u s t r i a l  p o p u la tio n .
Indeed , .Glasgow and Dundee, th e  a re a s  whose in c lu s t r ia l  p o p u la tio n s
d e c l in e d  th e  most betw een  1938 and 1948, w ere th e  same a re a s  in  which
th e  g r e a t e s t  amount o f f a c to r y  b u i ld in g  was u n d ertak en  fo llo w in g  th e
w ar. New in d u s t r i a l  b u i ld in g  was c o n c e n tra te d  i n  th e  C e n tra l  I n d u s t r i a l
B e l t  (D um fries was a n o ta b le  e x c e p tio n ) , w h ile  a t  th é  same tim e in  F i f e
and th e  E a s t  o f  S c o tla n d  new fa c to ry  b u i ld in g  was n o t in  p ro p o r tio n  to
1th e  grow th  o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  p o p u la tio n .
There was a  c lo s e  agreem ent betw een  th e  e x i s t in g  p a t t e r n  o f  
employment and th e  p a t t e r n  o f  la b o u r  req u ire m en ts  f o r  new p r o je c t s .
I n  e f f e c t  t h i s  m eant t h a t  th e  new f a c t o r i e s  were d i s t r i b u t e d  by  in d u s tr y  
g roup in  much th e  same p ro p o r t io n  a s  th e  o ld .
1 . Ib id .
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Table 8 -  I n d u s tr ia l D is tr ib u t io n  by Industry Group o f  New 
Developments. 1957-1931
P roportion  o f  P rop ortion  o f  expected
In du stry  group
E ngineering and Sh ipbuild ing  
T e x t i le s  and C lothing  
M etals
Pood, Drink and Tobacco
B rick s, Cement, G lass, 
Chem icals, Rubber and M isc. 
M anufactures
V eh ic le s
Paper and P r in tin g  
M anufacturers o f YTood and Cork 
E le c tr ic a l  Goods
manufacturing 
workers in  
groups a t  
J u ly  1948 
%
25.2  
20.3
12.4-
12.0
9 .9
7 .6
6.6
3 .9
2.1
peak labour fo r c e  
in  a l l  new in d u s tr ia l  
developments approved 
1937-1931 %
22.9
17 .9
1 2 .7
6.2
9 .7
14-. 6
2.8
3 .7  
9 .5
The most s tr ik in g  d if fe r e n c e s  were in  e l e c t r ic a l  goods and th e v e h ic le  
trade ( t h i s  in clu d ed  garages, e t c ,  and a lso  a ero -e n g in e s), which  
accounted f o r  a much more s ig n if ic a n t  proportion  o f new b u ild in g . Sev­
e r a l o f  the l i g h t  in d u str ie s  such as "food, drink and tobacco, and the 
paper and p r in t in g  groups were p a r t ic u la r ly  h e ld  back by r e s t r ic t io n s  
and shortages o f m a ter ia ls .^
By the e a r ly  1950*s th ere was r e b e llio n  a g a in s t  Government in f lu ­
ence o f  s i t e  s e le c t io n .  I n d u s t r ia l i s t s  began to  a s s e r t  th at many firm s  
cou ld  not be a r b it r a r i ly  a ssign ed  to  f i l l  the most 'needy* Development
1 , I b id . ,  p .27.
J
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Area. Many firm s had to  h e  lo c a te d  in  r e la t io n  to  fa c to r s  such as : wi
demand, a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  labour -  e s p e c ia l ly  lo c a l  s k i l l s ,  m a ter ia ls
and gen era l co n d itio n s , c lea n  a ir  and w ater, and cheap e l e c t r ic a l
su p p lies; th u s, th ese  firm s •ch ose’ th e ir  own s i t e s ,  so to  speak.
And, indeed, th ese  elem ents were not always p le n t i f u l  or even a v a ila b le
w ith in  a Development Area. Hence, by 1951 many businessm en f e l t  th a t
they had reaped a l l  the advantages they  cou ld  from a d iscr im in atory
reg io n a l p o l ic y  and i t  was now r e s t r ic t in g  th e ir  in d u s tr ia l growth. ^
A lso in  1951 i t  was adm itted th at no a d d itio n a l new fa c to r ie s  could  be
e s ta b lish e d  in  the Development Areas w ithout a ttr a c t in g  labour from
e x is t in g  in d u stry . T herefore, th e  new Government a t t itu d e  was not to
turn new in d u stry  away from the Development Areas com pletely , but
2in stea d  to  be imich more s e le c t iv e  and, consequently, to  b eg in  to  
d iv er t a more s ig n if ic a n t  amount o f new in d u stry  to  non-Development 
Areas.
1. I b id . ,  p . 38.
2. S .E .C .S ., 1951, p . 5.
il
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1, Slaven , The development of the w est of Scotland  ; 1750-1960.
p p .220-222.
Post-w ar economic r ec o n stru c tio n  in  Scotland  was determined both  
by th e  a c tio n s  o f  th e  Government in  London and by th ose  o f in d iv id u a l 
businessm en -  but i t  was the Government that got blamed fo r  any ;|
f a i lu r e s .  Much o f  th e Government ' s a c t io n  in  S co tlan d  was e f fe c te d  
through the S c o tt is h  O ffic e , b a lan cin g  the demands o f  n a tio n a l and 
r e g io n a l p o lic y . The 1945 D is tr ib u t io n  o f  Industry A ct, the Town and 
Country P lanning A ct (1947 ), and th e la t e r  D is tr ib u tio n  o f  Industry  
Act ( 1950) a l l  served to  r e in fo r c e  th e power o f th e  Board o f  Trade in  
the im plem entation o f r eg io n a l p o lic y , e s p e c ia l ly  by means o f  fa c to r y  
b u ild in g  in  the Development Area.^ Thus th e e f f e c t iv e  body fo r  
reg io n a l p o l ic y  was in  London : the S c o tt is h  O ffic e  e x e r c ise d  qu ite  
con sid erab le  in flu en ce , bu t no more.
The f i r s t  problem th a t fa ced  the Government a f t e r  th e  war was to  
b rin g  about an e f f e c t iv e  sw itch  from war-time to  peace-tim e production .
That was f a i r l y  q u ick ly  and sm oothly achieved . Two o f th e o ther major 
problems th a t ob sessed  th e  p ost-w ar Government in  r e la t io n  to  th e  
S c o tt is h  economy were employment and housing. R egional p o lic y  during  
th ese  years d ea lt  s o le ly  w ith  the e ra d ica tio n  o f unemployment in  the  
Development Area, thus in  e f f e c t  ign orin g  many other needy areas o f  
S cotlan d . A move to  counteract t h is  was made when the Development o f  
In du stry  Act (l9 5 0 ) con sid erab ly  expanded the amount o f  land included  
in  the S c o tt is h  Development Area to  in c lu d e p a rts  o f  the Highlands -  
even though unemployment remained the s o l i t a r y  preoccupation  o f  reg io n a l 
p o lic y  in to  the 1950' s .  Although unemployment l e v e l s  were a t an a l l - t im e  
low  throughout the immediate post-w ar y ears  o f  ' f u l l  employment*, i t
'■11
't.
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rem a ined a  so u rce  o f  concern  t h a t  th e  S c o t t i s h  unemployment l e v e l  
was c o n s i s te n t ly  h ig h e r  th a n  th a t  o f  G rea t B r i t a i n  as  a w hole.
T here i s  th u s  no ev idence t h a t  r e g io n a l  p o l ic y  had any su c c e ss  
even on i t s  own te rm s. I f  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  unemployment betw een 
th e  Development A rea and th e  r e s t  o f  B r i t a in  d id  n o t d isa p p e a r , o r 
m a te r ia l ly  d im in ish , th en  th e  p o l i c y  f a i l e d .  The g e n e ra l o v e r a l l  lovr 
r a t e  o f  unemployment (v/hich lo o k s  so en v iab le  now) m ust b e  a t t r i b u t e d  
to  o th e r  f a c to r s  th a n  re g io n a l  p o l ic y .  And th e  f u r t h e r  q i e s t  io n  m is t  
a l s o  be  r a i s e d  -  was th e  Government r i g h t  to  w orry  abou t unemployment 
p e r  se r a th e r  th a n  w o riy in g  abou t and p lan n in g  more e f f e c t iv e ly  f o r  
b a s ic  changes i n  th e  S c o t t i s h  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c tu re ?  The need to  resume 
p e a c e -tim e  p ro d u c tio n  f o r  i t s  own sake , and to  a v o id  th e  t r a g e d ie s  o f  
in te r - w a r  unemployment f o r  i t s  own sake, ten d ed  to  push  on to  th e  back  
b u rn e r  th e  no l e s s  p re s s in g  lo n g - te rm  aim o f m odern is ing  th e  e n t i r e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f th e  econony.
A rguably , th e re  w ere two th in g s  wrong w ith  th e  G overnm ent’ s 
h ousing  p o l ic y  in  S c o tla n d  -  to o  many re s o u rc e s  w ere p u t in to  i t  too  
soon, and to o  much was t r i e d  f o r  th e  m ost d e p re sse d  a r e a s .  I f  th e  
money had  been  u sed  in s te a d  to  r e s t r u c t u r e  th e  economy a long  new l i n e s ,  
and i f  w hat h o u se b u ild in g  th a t  was a llo w ed  had been  c o n c e n tra te d  in  
a re a s  o f  d evelop ing  in s t e a d  o f d e c l in in g  in d u s try ,  th e n  th e  lo n g -te rm  
r e s u l t s  a l l  round c o u ld  have been  b e t t e r .  I t  would have been  p r e f e r a b le  
to  p u t up w ith  th e  o ld  ab u ses  and h o r ro r s  in  housing  f o r  a  few more 
y e a rs  i n  o rd e r  to  d ev o te  re s o u rc e s  and e f f o r t s  to  a  new economy b e t t e r  
a b le  to  a f f o r d  new h o u sin g  i n  an  a p p ro p r ia te  p la c e  and on an  a p p ro p r i­
a t e  s c a le .  A lthough, o f  co u rse , some o f  th e  housing  in  th e  d e c l in in g  
a re a  was so  bad  t h a t  i t  had  to  b e  re p la c e d  -  i f  on ly  te m p o ra r ily .
312
Housing sh ortages a ls o  d ir e c t ly  a f fe c te d  the expansion o f th e  
economy; most d ram atica lly  i t  hampered the growth o f  new or r e lo c a te d  
industry , as th ere  was very  r a r e ly  s u f f ic ie n t  housing fo r  the incoming 
workers and procedures fo r  the a llo c a t io n  o f  cou n cil houses were 
u su a lly  w eighted  a g a in st newcomers.^ P rogress in  t h is  area was made 
by the S c o t t is h  S p ec ia l Housing A sso c ia tio n  which con stru cted  *non- 
t r a d it io n a l'  housing fo r  workers u n t i l  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  could  ad ju st 
to  th e  new en larged  demand fo r  housing. But i t  was too slow .
R egional p o l ic y  and housing p o lic y  were not, then, an u n q u a lif ie d  
su ccess , and t h is  f a c t  had ser io u s  rep ercu ssion s fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  
clim a te  in  which a b a s ic  re s tr u c tu r in g  o f  the S c o t t is h  economy cou ld  
have taken p la c e . There had been  a f e e l in g  o f expectancy as th e  war 
concluded : ' p eop le not on ly  d e s ir e d  l i f e  to  be d if fe r e n t  from war-tim e, 
b u t a lso  markedly b e t t e r  than t h e ir  pre-war e x is te n c e . The c lim a te  was 
r ip e  fo r  e f f e c t iv e  p lanning, as was most c le a r ly  demonstrated on the  
r e g io n a l l e v e l  by  th e  mandate g iven  to  lo c a l  a u th o r it ie s  to  produce 
r e g io n a l p lan s. Y et th e general p u b lic  soon t ir e d  o f the whole n o tio n  
o f  planning when th ere  were no immediate ta n g ib le  r e s u l t s .
Rather u n fa ir ly , ’p lanning' as a n o tio n  became confused  in  the 
p u b lic  mind w ith B r i t i s h  ' so c ia lism  in  a c t io n ’ : and a s  th e beleaguered  
Labour Government w re s tle d  w ith  sh ortages, ra tio n in g , n a t io n a lis a t io n  
programmes and balance o f payments c r i s e s ,  the v o te r s  began to  a s so c ir  
a te  p lanning w ith b u rea u cra tic  c o n tr o ls , in e f f ic ie n c y  and d elay . The 
C onservatives returned to  ’fr e e  the n a tio n  from s o c i a l i s t  red -ta p e’ .
1 . See, Joseph Sykes, ’Some R esu lts  o f  the D is tr ib u t io n  o f Industry  
P o l ic y ’ , The M anchester School o f  Economic and S o c ia l S tu d ies. 23 
(January 1955), 1 -21 .
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P a r tly  because b efore 1951 major reco n stru ctio n  had not been g iven  
s u f f i c ie n t  p r io r ity  (a s  opposed to  m erely ta ck lin g  unemployment and 
housing problem s), th e  very  id ea  o f planned reco n stru ctio n  su ffered  
a setback . P u b lic  b e l i e f  that the economy could  be r e b u il t  by  
Government planning dwindled in to  cyn icism .
Yet, during th ese  yea rs , th e  S cots were demanding more co n tro l  
over th e ir  own economy. The fe a r  th a t London d id  not understand (o r  
care about), the nature o f  S c o t t is h  economic problems^ con trib u ted  to  
th e r i s e  o f th e  Covenant Movement in  the la t e  1940’ s . This f e e l in g  of  
estrangement had e a r l ie r  been expressed  in  th e 1945 and 1947 c a l l s  by  
th e S c o tt is h  Labour P arty  fo r  an enquiry in to  th e  Government’ s t r e a t ­
ment o f S c o t t is h  m atters. These .demands were e s s e n t ia l ly  fobbed o f f  by  
th e  appointment o f  a Royal Commission designed  to  j u s t i f y ,  the s ta tu s  
quo. But i f  th ey  had not been, the id ea  o f  p lanning might have been  
g iven  a new le a s e  o f  l i f e  e a r l ie r ,  fo r  some so r t o f  S c o tt is h  assem bly  
or e le c te d  ad v isory  committee would in e v ita b ly  have given  i t s e l f  the  
job o f having to  d ev ise  an economic p o lic y  s p e c i f i c a l ly  ta i lo r e d  to  
S cotlan d ’ s needs.
Along what l i n e s  could such a major reco n stru ctio n  have proceeded?  
The popular exp lan ation  fo r  the long-term  f a l l  in  S co tla n d ’s economic 
power was th a t i t  over-concen trated  on ’ d ec lin in g  ’ in d u str ie s  such as  
sh ip b u ild in g , L eser shed some in te r e s t in g  l ig h t  on t h i s  su b ject in  
1948 . He p o in ted  out th a t S cotland  d if fe r e d  imch l e s s  from th e  r e s t  cf  
Great B r ita in  in  i t s  in d u s tr ia l d is tr ib u t io n  than many o f  the reg io n s  
o f  England and W ales, fo r  example the M idlands, th e  North o f England,
1. Palmer, p . 333.
314
and W ales. But as S cotlan d  em phasised the very  h e a v ie s t  and very  
l i g h t e s t  in d u str ie s  (such  as t e x t i l e s )  on balance i t  was in  substance  
w eighted  much more towards heavy in d u stry . A lthough th ere was a f a i r  
amount o f  in d u s tr ia l  d iv e r s ity  in  Scotland  i t  was on e ith e r  end o f  the  
spectrum. Thus L eser a sse ssed  c o r r e c t ly  th a t to  f a c i l i t a t e  ' f u l l  
employment' in  the long-term  what was needed was more 'medium heavy* 
and 'medium l i g h t '  in d u s tr ie s ,^  such as  p la s t ic s ,  chem icals and 
e le c tr o n ic s  (which came to  G lenrothes in  the la t e  1950*s and requ ired  
en gin eerin g  tech n o lo g y ), a l l  o f which were l ig h t  in d u s tr ie s . E a r l ie r  
and more p o s it iv e  a c t io n  to  encourage re s tru ctu r in g  along th ese  l i n e s  
im m ediately a f te r  th e  war could, perhaps, have p a id  b e t te r  d iv id en d s  
in  the long run than the p o l i c i e s  a c tu a lly  pursued.
1 . C. E. V. L eser , 'In d u s tr ia l S p e c ia liz a t io n  in  Scotland  and in  
R egions o f England and W ales' ,  Y orkshire B u lle t in  o f  Economic 
and S o c ia l R esearch. 1 (December 1948), 30.
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